MASS MOVEMENT, MILITANT RELIGION, AND DEMOCRACY:
THE SOKAGAKKAI IN JAPANESE POLITICS

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By

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PREFACE

In the course of researching and preparing this study the author became indebted to a great number of persons both in the United States and Japan. Professors Nobutaka Ike, Kurt Steiner, Sidney Verba, and Gabriel Almond, and Thomas C. Smith of Stanford University read various preparatory papers and offered cogent criticism at many points in the completed essay, while Assistant Professor Miyake Ichiro of Kyoto University was of great assistance in analyzing and evaluating the survey data so generously made available by the research team, headed by Sidney Verba, conducting the Cross-National Study of Political and Social Change. In addition, Professors Harry K. Nishio of the University of Toronto and John K.-C. Oh of Marquette University provided, in numerous conversations, insights into the workings of the Sokagakkai.

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A final note on the language used in this essay. Japanese word order (surname first) has been used throughout for Japanese names, and macrons have not been added over long vowels--for those who know Japanese they are largely unnecessary and for those who do not they are entirely so.

-- J.W.W.

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Since the American occupation, in 1945, began its breathtaking attempt at constitutional engineering, the fortunes of democratic politics in Japan have been a focus of attention for many scholars and statesmen. That the new political framework could be assimilated without strain, or that it would be completely free of dangers was not expected; Japan had no tradition of democratic politics, however defined, despite an unsuccessful experiment with parliamentary institutions before the war. Today, however, Japan stands as an example of relatively stable parliamentary democracy in a context of high economic development, the only such in Asia. But neither democratization nor development has been without strain; social, psychological, and political discontinuities have meant insecurity, bewilderment, and frustration for large numbers of people. And though today stabilization is the trend in polity, economy, and society, there remain elements of social and economic instability, and opponents of the democratic political process on both left and right.

In the 1950's there emerged what many observers took to be a new manifestation of the undemocratic threat: the

Sokagakkai,[*] a militant religious movement composed of lay believers of a traditionally nationalistic Buddhist sect, Nichiren Shoshu.[**] In its religious aspects the Sokagakkai was described as fanatical, millenarian, and intolerant; when its political interest became publicized it was accused as fascist, chauvinist, and totalitarian.

One of the novel aspects of the Sokagakkai, from the point of view of Japanese religious and political history, is the nature of its membership: both outsiders and Gakkai leaders described the organization as a "mass movement" and as the Society drew ever greater numbers from the lower strata of Japanese society it seemed indeed to approximate the common images of "mass movement."

In many ways the Sokagakkai is an entirely new phenomenon in Japanese history: its size, its theology, its peculiar combination of religion and politics, and its membership as a particular social element render it an intrinsically interesting subject for study. In addition, the political implications of the Society for its Japanese context are important: an organization with a claimed membership of over 10 million, the third strongest party in the nation in terms of total legislative assembly seats held, deserves attention as a potentially critical political actor.

Two works in the literature on democracy, its sources and problems, are of particular relevance in studying the Sokagakkai: William Kornhauser's The Politics of Mass Society and Seymour Martin Lipset's Political Man.[1*] Kornhauser presents a model of the mass movement, describing the major political implications thereof, notably a marked dysfunctionalism[2] for stable democratic political systems. Lipset, approaching the subject sociologically, indicates that the lower classes, that is, those social strata most often pointed out as the primary constituents of the Sokagakkai's membership, tend toward undemocratic beliefs and behavior.[3]

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[*] Translatable as "Value-Creation Academic Society."

[**] Translatable as "Orthodox Nichiren Sect," and named for its founder, Nichiren, a bellicose thirteenth-century Japanese monk.

The choice of Kornhauser is based upon impressionistic criteria; there are various types of threats to democratic systems, but the Sokagakkai seems most amenable to analysis along the lines of this mass movement model. Lipset is but one of many who treat the sociological aspects of political systems; his study, however, is especially relevant as a conceptual treatment of the political implications of lower-class life.

A. Concepts: Masses and Mass Movements

The concept of the "mass society" has been defined by Daniel Bell as follows:

> The revolutions in transport and communication have brought men into closer contact with each other and bound them in new ways; the division of labor has made them more interdependent. . . . Despite this greater interdependence, however, individuals have grown more estranged from one another. The old primary group ties of family and local community have been shattered; ancient parochial faiths are

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[*] Numbered references appear sequentially at the end of each chapter.

> questioned; few unifying values have taken their place. Most important, the critical standards of an educated elite no longer shape opinion or taste. As a result, morals and mores are in constant flux. . . . At the same time greater mobility, spatial and social, intensifies concern over status. Instead of a fixed or known status symbolized by dress or title, each person assumes a multiplicity of roles and constantly has to prove himself in a succession of new situations. Because of all this, the individual loses a coherent sense of self. His anxieties increase. There ensues a search for new faiths. The stage is thus set for the charismatic leader, the secular messiah, who, by bestowing on each person the semblance of necessary grace, and of fullness of personality, supplies a substitute for the older unifying belief that the mass society has destroyed.[4]

A large number of writers have dealt with the problems of the so-called "mass society," differing greatly as regards their opinions of its causes, its particular characteristics, and its consequences.[5] As Bell indicates, the concept of mass society and of the "mass man" who inhabits it are essentially developmental ideas. The "techno-industrial revolution;" processes of rationalization in economy, society, and polity; urbanization; the numbing barrage of information from a modern communications system; the obsolescence of numerous skills and the consequent superfluity of those who rely upon them; the increasing complexity of structures and processes in every area of life: all these factors, and more, contribute to the reduction of the individual to an atom, thrown together with his fellows in a mass as producer and consumer, yet remote from them as a human being.[6] As Bell also points out, it is not only the appearance of the new which is responsible for the appearance of mass society, it is in addition the engulfing of the old by the new; the disintegration of premodern social bonds and values, the increasing fruitlessness of traditional manners of behavior all lead to feelings of isolation, of a lack of psychological moorings, of futility.

Most of the proponents of the idea of mass society have approached the problem in a total fashion: is a given society a mass society, or is it not? Daniel Bell attacks the whole "slippery" concept, the unrealistic conceptualization of social atomization in contrast to the "complex, richly striated social relations of the real world," and the ideologically biased semantics which read undemocratic tendencies into the idea of mass society, which Bell prefers to think of as a society where mass (in the sense of universal) participation and equality and inclusion in all areas of human activity are the norm.[7]

While agreeing with Bell on the unlikelihood that any fully mass--in the sense of atomized and alienated--society has ever existed, I believe that at any point in time, in any social system, some elements may be characterized as "masses." The definitions of mass and related concepts used here are those offered in The Politics of Mass Society, where Kornhauser defines "mass man" as man unattached to any broad social groupings (such as class society, or nation) either objectively (that is, he has few interpersonal relationships) or subjectively (that is, he feels no sense of belonging to or identification with such groupings).[8] Moreover, mass man is alienated[9] from the social and political systems of which he is objectively a member: alienated from himself, he is alienated also from his fellow men as human beings and from the particular social, economic, and political structures within which he exists.

Aggregating those members of any society who may be characterized as "mass men," Kornhauser visualizes "the masses:" "large numbers of people who are not integrated into any broad social groupings, including classes."[10] Where the masses constitute the predominant social element in a society, one may speak of a "mass society." Kornhauser does not suggest any threshold beyond which a society as a whole becomes "mass," but he states that any "social system in which elites are readily accessible to influence by non-elites and non-elites are readily available for mobilization by elites" may be termed a mass society.[11] Mass society is one of four societal types categorized by Kornhauser in the following manner:[12]

		AVAILABILITY OF NON-ELITES (degree to which non-elites lack ties to independent groups):	
		Low	High
ACCESSIBILITY OF ELITES (degree to which non-elites participate in the selection of elites):	Low	Communal society	Totalitarian society
	High	Pluralist society	Mass society

To accentuate the importance of social attachment in the definition of human and societal types, Kornhauser's typology may also be rendered as follows:[13]

INTERMEDIATE (SECONDARY) RELATIONSHIPS ARE:	Strong	Weak
Inclusive	Communal society	Totalitarian society
Non-inclusive	Pluralist society	Mass society

Mass man is available because he has few attachments to secondary groups which serve as a screen between himself and the elites; similarly elites in mass society are accessible to non-elites because there are no strong intermediate groups which can mediate and structure the influence which non-elites exert over the selection and behavior of the elites.

The modal behavioral pattern of mass men, according to Kornhauser, is "mass behavior," which has the following characteristics: the focus of attention is *remote* from personal experience and everyday life; this attention leads to *direct*, activist response (i.e., behavior unmediated by social relations). Such activity is *unstable*: periods of intense activity are interspersed with long periods of apathy.[14] Where mass behavior is politically relevant one may speak of "mass politics:" "large numbers of people engaging in political activity outside of the procedures and rules instituted by a society to govern political action."[15] This definition indicates the alienation of the actors involved and the "direct-action" nature of their response; insofar as such behavior is anomic and unorganized the definition implies the unattached position of the actors. If such mass behavior, political or otherwise, shows continuity as a pattern of purposes and effort organized around a program, then one may speak of a "mass movement," or, if the leaders of the movement have totalitarian inclinations,* of a "totalitarian movement."[16]

As is apparent from the manner in which he expands his model from mass man to mass society, from individual mass behavior to mass movement, Kornhauser considers mass man, in his various psychological, social, and behavioral aspects, as a microcosm of mass movement and mass society. One might speak of a "mass system" as any social entity the compenent units of which are characterized by unattachment to and alienation from the system *in toto* and the structure of which is characterized by a paucity of buffer subsystems between the basic components of the system and its political subsystem, those buffer subsystems which do exist being weak and non-inclusive *vis-à-vis* their respective components. In this paper, however, in order that the level and unit of analysis be at all times clear, the terms mass man, mass movement, and mass society will be used.

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*E.g., if the leaders treat the attributes of totalitarian society (see p. 7) as objectives to be realized within the movement itself as a microcosm of totalitarian society.

A final note: Kornhauser's four societal types are best considered as ideal types, as Daniel Bell advises.[17] However, it is assumed for the present that individuals fitting the model of mass man do exist and that movements closely approximating Kornhauser's mass movements do also, and that they have the behavioral characteristics he imputes to them.

B. Mass Man and Democracy

The syndrome of social, psychological, and behavioral attributes which, according to Kornhauser, typifies mass men and movements is, by his definition, subversive of democratic political systems.[18] The behavioral tendencies of such people and movements directly contravene the constitutional order; their alienation and isolation render them available for mobilization to such behavior. In Japan several factors indicate that mass movements might arise: devastating military defeat followed by extremely fast-paced economic development; concomitant widespread disintegration of older, more stable social structures as urbanization increases; normative vacuum following the discrediting of the prewar ethical system; and wholesale implantation of novel political structures and processes, the roots of which are still of questionable strength.[19] This last factor appears important to Kornhauser's evaluation of a polity's vulnerability to mass potitical behavior: where democratic institutions have been superimposed upon a non-democratic tradition the influence of prevalent political cultural norms (which might otherwise inhibit "availability" among the people) may in fact increase the inclinations of the alienated to act against the new democratic order.[20]

1. Mass Man: Unattached

The causes of detachment from social groups are multiple. The physical dissolution of social entities, the fruitlessness of membership in groups which have lost all ability to satisfy the needs sought therein, and the appearance of new needs or the magnification of old ones due to environmental changes are all contributory factors.[21] Whatever the causes, this unattachment or isolation breeds normlessness, anxiety, and a susceptibility to mobilization by movements promising alleviation. Erich Fromm described this susceptibility as a desire to "escape from freedom:"

> Modern man, freed from the bonds of preindividualistic society, which simultaneously gave him security and limited him, has not yet gained freedom in the positive sense of the realization of his individual self; that is, the expression of his intellectual, emotional, and sensuous potentialities. Freedom, though it has brought him independence and rationality, has made him isolated and, thereby, anxious and powerless. This isolation is unbearable and the alternatives he is confronted with are either to escape from the burden of this freedom into new dependencies and submission, or to advance to the full realization of positive freedom which is based upon the uniqueness and individuality of man.[22]

The response to isolation may, as Fromm notes, follow a self-fulfilling course; at the other extreme it may result in utter submission to a totalitarian movement. The latter possibility has been historically realized in at least the Nazi case; Kornhauser asserts that, in time of crisis, a greater proportion of those people with few close social ties of the sort instilled by social relationships will resort to mass or totalitarian behavior than will those with extensive social relationships.[23]*

This concentration upon social unattachment as one important aspect of mass man signifies, as is probably apparent, an acceptance on the part of the author of the pluralist sociological interpretation of democracy. The primary assertion of this approach is that a wide network of secondary social relationships and associations, overlapping in memberships and interests, none of which make total demands upon the loyalty of their members, provides the firmest social foundation for democratic political systems. These relationships are visualized differently by various scholars: Emil Lederer focussed upon "groups" and social classes; Karl Mannheim spoke of "publics;" William Kornhauser uses the terms "proximate interests" and "secondary groups;" David Riesman talks of groups and "cells;" Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba of "voluntary associations," Harry Eckstein of secondary associations, and Robert Dahl, Talcott Parsons, and Seymour Lipset of "crosscutting affiliations;"[24] but all of these writers agree that a system of strong, but neither totally inclusive (as regards their members) nor exclusive (as regards each other), secondary groups between the individual and the state is a valuable social resource of any democratic system.

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*The concept of unattachment used here is close to Durkheim's idea of "anomie" as a state of normlessness. In the absence of a strong set of thoroughly internal norms lack of social connections means fewer group sources of norms; in any case, the proportion of a person's normative system which is not at least indirectly group-derived is probably near zero. In addition, subjective unattachment is anomie in that no identification with any social groups as normative systems is felt. Parsons would go farther: objective unattachment, a lack of "integration with stable institutional patterns," is anomie. See Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Glencoe, 1957, p. 135; Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, Glencoe, 1958, p. 125.

The extended meanings of anomie offered by Merton, Srole, Riesman, and DeGrazia closely approximate the idea of "alienation" used in this paper. They go considerably beyond Durkheim's original usage of the word anomie to denote an a-normative condition. See Merton, op. cit., pp. 164-65. David Riesman, The Lonely Crowd, New Haven, 1961, pp. 243-44. Sebastian DeGrazia, The Political Community, Chicago, 1948, pp. 71-72.

The effects of a network of such relationships are several: membership in secondary groups, it has been suggested, correlates with an individual's perceptions of his own ability to influence the political system and with his commitment to the system or to abstract democratic values.[25] Second, intermediate groups, if autonomous, serve to insulate the people from the direct impact of the state, and vice versa. One of the main features of mass societies and movements, it will be remembered, is the lack of secondary groups which aid the independence of both elites and non-elites, while restraining each in its efforts to influence the other.[26] Third, intermediate groups, insofar as they pursue political activity, serve to personalize a political system which, in modern society, seems increasingly distant from the common man.[27]

The pluralist interpretation of democracy's social basis has especial significance in the case of Japan. To those who emphasize the alacrity with which the Japanese have taken to democracy since World War II, it may be pointed out that Japan has never developed an ideal of cross-cutting group affiliation, In the words of sociologist Nakane Chie, Japan is not a plural but a "unilateral" society, where individuals are members of either (a) one secondary group, or of (b) several with largely identical memberships and interests, or of (c) several among which one is the predominant focus of loyalty.[28] Neither the development of voluntary groups on the Western model nor the attenuation of traditional patterns of inclusivity and exclusivity of group membership has progressed to the point where one could describe Japanese democracy as having a pluralistic social base.[29] Insofar as this base is lacking it is this writer's opinion that Japanese democracy as yet has its unstable aspects.

Another such aspect may be the Sokagakkai, impressionistically described as a conglomeration of lower social elements, such strata--the working class and the low in status--as Lipset and Kornhauser assert tend to be least closely attached to society.[30] The members of any organization have, _ipso facto_, social relationships; in the case of Gakkai members it is suggested that they will have few, if any, relationships which are not consequent upon their membership in the Society. Their implied lack of education increases the probability that they will be unattached: social attachments appear also to vary inversely with education.[31]

2. Mass Man: Alienated

Alienation is considered here in three aspects: alienation from self, from society *qua* mankind, and from concrete political and social systems. Self-alienation is described by Erich Fromm as:

> a mode of experience in which the person experiences himself as an alien. He has become . . . estranged from himself. He does not experience himself as the center of his world, as the creator of his own acts--but his acts and their consequences have become his masters, whom he obeys, or whom he may even worship. The alienated person is out of touch with himself as he is out of touch with any other person."[32]

Self-alienation is manifested as a sense of futility and impotence, a non-acceptance of oneself and a low opinion of one's own value, abilities, and potentialities. Marx, Fromm, Mannheim, and Erich Kahler deal with the influences which contribute to self-alienation: the contemporary obsession with quantification and scientism and the "specialization, functionalization, standardization, anonymization" effected by modern techniques or organization, communication, and marketing render all men equal and equally interchangeable; the uniqueness of the individual, his value as an individual, and then his own evaluation of himself as an individual wither away.[33]

Alienation is presented by these writers as a psychological type modal to certain types of societies, notably capitalist, modern, or mass society, depending upon the writer. As used here self-alienation is a narrower concept, a term descriptive of those individuals in any society who feel a high degree of futility, impotence, and non-acceptance of self. As a result of their low estimation of themselves and their own reasoning powers their critical faculties tend to be weak; simplistic, irrational belief systems can be foisted upon them, especially if such beliefs include some method by which the believer is able to overcome, revolutionize, or else at least escape his present worthless self.

Human alienation, the term used here for alienation from one's fellow men both individually and collectively, is again often seen as a concomitant of modern society. Old relationship patterns, groups, and values are rendered useless by the process of modernization and the new relational patterns--emotionally neutral, functionally specific, and bureaucratically impersonal--not only cannot satisfy basic human needs but even alienate those caught up in them from one another. The attitudinal and behavioral manifestations of human alienation are most feasibly studied as attributes of interpersonal relationships. A diffuse distrust of people in general and antipathy or jealousy toward certain social groups, and an inability to cooperate with other people, are characteristics of the human alienate.[34] The other side of the coin of distrust is intense partisanship.[35] When basically alienated people are members of some group they tend to draw very sharp lines between their fellow members and outsiders, be they of another village, political party, religion, social class, or ethnic group.[36]

Systemic alienation, or alienation from particular social and political structures, has two aspects as examined in this paper. First is disaffection from one's concrete social, economic, and political context. This can take the form of dissatisfaction with one's own ability to influence the system ("input alienation"), with the performance of the system as a provider of values ("output alienation") or with the system as a whole ("diffuse system alienation").[37] Second is alienation from the more abstract "rules of the game;" in the case of this paper, from Lipset's "democratic formula."[38]

As they are less firmly attached to society, so also are the lower social strata more prone to alienation. Feelings of futility and impotence, predilections for simplistic and irrational belief systems, are most common among the lower classes, as are more specifically undemocratic aspects of personality such as those focused upon by the authors of The Authoritarian Personality.[39] On an interpersonal level, trust in one's human environment is, it is suggested, positively correlated with socioeconomic position; politically, "subjective competence"--the individual's own perceived ability to influence the political system--shows similar variance.[40] One cross-national study indicated that lower social elements in several countries had less commitment to democratic institutions, processes, and values than did their fellow nationals as a whole.[41]

Many factors combine to produce such tendencies in the lower classes. Low education, marginal status, mobility and instability in job and life pattern, and frustration in efforts to better one's position; all conduce to disaffection with self, neighbors, and system. Education in particular has been shown to have important implications; the less educated appear to have a greater tendency toward "rigid and intolerant" political views, narrow ranges of opinion, and extreme and simplistic thought patterns.[42] They are, in addition, less trusting of other people, less confident vis-à-vis their social environment, and less inclined to talk freely about politics with a wide range of people.[43] Finally, one study suggests that alienation from the political system also varies inversely with education: both input and output satisfaction, and subjective competence as well, are apparently influenced by education.[44]

The heuristic relevance of these attidudinal tendencies to the present study is plain when one remembers the ostensible social composition of the Sokagakkai. In addition, certain studies regarding the political relevance of religious involvement also lead toward tacit assumptions about the significance of the Gakkai for a democratic polity. Lipset has pointed out the predisposition toward "rigid and intolerant" thought patterns among the lower classes; such patterns have both religious and political manifestations. Erich Fromm sees the religious manifestation of alienation in idolatry; that idolatrous orientations may be transferred to political leaders or symbols is no surprise.[45] Gerhard Lenski and T. W. Adorno have indicated the possible causal relationship between certain types and degrees of religious affiliation and prejudices, parochialism, and undemocratic tendencies.[46]

Conversely, a tie between religious groups and undemocratic political movements has on occasion been clear. In America in particular,

> Not only is the entire right-wing movement infused at the mass level with the fundamentalist style of mind, but the place in its ranks of fundamentalist preachers, ex-preachers, and sons of preachers is so prominent as to underline the mutual congeniality of thought.[47]

Finally, a tendency among certain social strata toward certain types of religious belief potentially disruptive of political order may be inferred from studies showing the millenarian proclivities of the lower middle and lower classes in both medieval and modern Europe.[48] Whether such proclivities exist cross-culturally, is not known; in the Sokagakkai one may suspect that there exists a worthwhile subject of study in regard to this question.

3. Mass Man in Action

Kornhauser has provided us with a definition of mass behavior: unstable, focussed on remote objects, and direct.

When politically oriented such behavior is destructive of democratic systems: the remoteness of focus allows such action to be mobilized toward utopian goals, and direct action, unmediated by formally sanctioned channels of political behavior or by intervening social relationships, denies the democratic political process itself. The instability of the mass' behavior is also dangerous; apathy hides widespread hostility and alienation and action directly violates society's norms and the rules and processes governing political activities.[49]

This direct, unmediated action is typical of mass man due to both his unattachment to society and to his alienation from it: his lack of social relationships which to a degree moderate his actions and his negative attitude toward the dominant norms of his social context. In Erich Fromm's words:

> Modern man is starved for life. But since, being an automaton, he cannot experience life in the sense of spontaneous activity he takes as surrogate any kind of excitement or thrill: . . . the danger that threatens our culture from its human basis /is/ the readiness to accept any ideology and any leader, if only he promises excitement and offers a political structure and symbols which allegedly give meaning and order to an individual's life.[50]

To Glenn Tinder it is the boredom and anxiety deriving from alienation which create receptivity to destructive or violent impulses.[51] Pitirim Sorokin saw calamity--war, revolution, pestilence, or famine--as the catalytic agent conducive to antisocial behavior.[52] One might here add high-speed modernization, with all its accompanying social stresses, as a fifth form of calamity from the point of view of the majority of those who undergo it.

As in the cases of unattachment and alienation, one can also find correlations between low socioeconomic positions, low education, and tendencies toward both apathy on the one hand and deviant political behavior on the other.[53] Empirical examples of deviant political movements also indicate the connection: the nineteenth-century "urban mobs" examined by E. J. Hobsbawm were composed of "little people," "the unclassifiable urban poor."[54] Similar social elements more recently formed the nuclei of a series of movements which explicitly apotheosized direct action: European fascism.[55]

In the sphere of religious behavior the lower classes have similar deviant inclinations: Lipset notes a correlation between the lower social strata and intolerant, millennial religious movements. In addition, he asserts that the religious proclivities of the lower classes "are linked to the same underlying characteristics, attitudes, and predispositions which find another outlet in allegiance to extremist political movements."[56] Norman Cohn finds similar social elements at the center of medieval European chiliastic movements, and the political activities of these movements were deviant in the extreme.[57] Such activities, if pursued in a democratic system by large numbers of the populace, could have lethal effects for the system. And it is precisely the social elements which support such movements which are today seen as the chief components of the Sokagakkai. To generalize from the social composition of European political and religious movements to the political behavior of a Japanese Buddhist sect is dangerous; however, the heuristic hint justifies further investigation.

C. Mass Movement

Individuals with the attributes of mass man described above probably exist in every society. In most societies, however, they may neither constitute the modal personality type nor be in any way organized. Simply because they are not dominant, though, does not mean they do not exist in considerable numbers. Daniel Bell denies the reality of the mass society specter by pointing out that the United States, the most highly developed nation of all, is not subject to large-scale social disorder and pervasive anomie.[58] However, the periodic reappearance during American history of certain types of movements such as the Know-Nothings, the Ku Klux Klan, the Minutemen, and a whole spectrum of splinter religious sects, suggest that there are potentialities in this nation, as in any other, for mass behavior.

The key elements are the number of mass men in a society (and the possibility of communication between them) and an organizing catalyst which throws them together. Emil Lederer avers that the unorganized masses tend to action and lack only a catalytic event or leader.[59] Erich Fromm states that the "escape from freedom" usually takes one of two forms: submission to a leader, or compulsive conformity to some set of norms.[60] Both forms imply the presence of some reference group and in either case the mass man has found a mooring. If this mooring is purposeful and sustained mass behavior organized around a program, there exists what Kornhauser calls a mass movement.[61]

The internal structure of mass movements is analogous to that of the mass society described above. Non-elites have a high degree of influence over the selection of elites,[62] and the intermediate groups in mass movements are non-inclusive and weak. These groups can be traditionally, culturally weak; or they can be weakened by crescive changes in their environment; or they can be intentionally kept weak or weakened by the elite, as in the case of totalitarian movements.[63]

The belief systems of mass movements show certain parallels with the psychological patterns of mass men, such movements being essentially macrocosmic mass men. They are ideologically unattached to society, and ideologically alienated from self, humanity, and society and polity. Their belief systems are characterized stylistically by simplism, unrealism, and irrationality, and substantively by assertions of the impotence and futility of the individual. In regard to humanity, doctrinal distrust of outsiders is central.

Finally, the beliefs of mass movements show an alienation from both the socio-economic and political systems within which they exist and from the more abstract attitudinal "formula" necessary to the existence of stable and effective democracy. This last form of alienation is but one aspect of the syndrome of mass attributes, but it is a most important one, especially in its political implications. As minorities, mass movements may be expected to value minority rights; but, in combination with the other characteristics of mass movements, this defense of one facet of democracy rings rather hollow.

D. Man Versus Movement

The Sokagakkai, a social phenomenon often characterized as a mass movement or a millenarian sect, has organized several millions of the Japanese population, drawing upon those social elements which according to arguments presented above are most likely to support undemocratic movements in general and mass movements in particular. As has been seen, the Gakkai may be examined by focusing either on its membership, to determine how closely they approximate the model of mass man, or on the Society as an organization, to determine from official doctrines and activities how closely it approximates the model of mass movement. Kornhauser implies that one will mirror the other, with no contradiction between the attributes of each. In his concentration upon deducing political character from social composition and internal structure, Kornhauser neglects the possibility of contradiction and conflict between the official/formal precepts and activities of the organization and the unofficial/informal attitudes and behavior of the rank-and-file. In this paper it is assumed that there may exist within an organization precisely such contradictions and conflicts and that the degree and form of resolution of these problems will have crucial significance for the relationship of the organization *in toto* to its environment.

It is thus possible to envision an organization composed largely or even predominantly of mass men which possesses neither the structural attributes nor the formal doctrinal features of a mass movement; the reverse is equally imaginable. These possibilities render it necessary that one examine both the formal and informal aspects of any supposed mass movement, and the interactions of the two, in order to discern all the implications of the movement in question for its social and political context. And it is only when one can see the movement in question as a totality of the psychological and doctrinal, programmatic and behavioral attributes of both the leaders and rank-and file and of the official and unofficial structures and processes, that one is able to understand both the internal workings and problems of the movement and the relations of the movement with its environment.

E. Overview

As the foregoing has hopefully implied, the intent of this study is not simply to examine the Sokagakkai and its implications for its Japanese context. As the examples cited indicate, the Gakkai has partial parallels with many movements--religious, political, social--which have appeared at different points in time and space. In order to illuminate more clearly the Gakkai itself and to test against a variety of data some of the existing propositions concerning the rise, internal workings, and external effects of mass movements as they will be applied to the Sokagakkai, it is incumbent upon the student to turn to a higher level of generality. By examining the Sokagakkai on various levels of abstraction one can compare its development and present state with those of such diverse social phenomena as the chiliastic religious movements of medieval Europe and the religious revivals of medieval Japan;[64] the "totalitarian-democracy" and "political messianism" and urban "mobs" of nineteenth-century Europe;[65] the "revitalization movements" and new religions of the developing areas,[66] the "value-oriented movements," splinter religious groups, and deviant political phenomena--Poujadism, McCarthyism, and the like--of the twentieth century;[67] and the great totalitarian movements of the right and left, both Eastern and Western.[68]

The focus of this study, then, is four-fold. First, after presenting a full description of the development and present state of the Sokagakkai, the psychological, attitudinal, and behavioral attributes of the membership of the Society will be compared with the attributes of Kornhauser's mass man. Second, the other set of independent variables will be examined: do the officially espoused beliefs, practices, and structures of the Gakkai approximate those of the mass movement as envisioned by Kornhauser? Third, the form of interaction of these two elements, as an intervening variable, will be analyzed. Fourth, out of this analytic process come conclusions regarding the dependent variables of the study: the nature of the relationships between the Sokagakkai as a totality and (a) mass movements in the abstract and (b) its Japanese environment. Is the Sokagakkai a mass movement, with all the behavioral implications thereof? And what is its significance for the Japanese political, religious, and social systems?

The dual level of abstraction used in the conclusion of the study is necessitated by the possibility that the Sokagakkai, while not approximating a mass movement or even any other historical politico-religious movement, may yet have destructive consequences for the formally democratic Japanese political system. As mentioned earlier, the dangers to democratic regimes do not issue from mass movements alone; the mass movement model was chosen for this study due to its initially perceived parallels with the Sokagakkai. A movement such as the Gakkai may have undemocratic aspects completely unrelated to its points of congruence with this model.

A related question concerns intramodel consistency. Kornhauser's model provides no mensurative aids for the student; nor does it stipulate which of the many attributes of mass men and mass movements are most important in determining whether a person or organization is "mass." First, as regards measurement, one has no threshold for any single attribute: just how, e.g., alienated one must be to be a mass man is unclear. Moreover, one does not know just how many of the attributes of mass men or movements must be present in the entity studied before one may infer "massness." Second, one is given little help by the model in facing the possibility that an organization which is indubitably mass in structure may be an unequivocal supporter of democratic values, institutions, and processes in both ideal and actual behavior. Is unattachment, alienation, or behavior most important to the definition of mass man and mass movement?

A major subjective element enters in the treatment of these problems. All the data obtained will be presented as they pertain to each attribute of mass man and mass movement; these characteristics will initially be considered as a syndrome, the majority of the features of which must be present before a conclusion of "massness" may be drawn. Furthermore, the characteristics of man and movement will be compared to those of the population as a whole and of other movements in an effort to determine relative proximity to the mass models. The data presented may lead different observers to different conclusions. Ultimately the judgment of the Sokagakkai as mass or not, undemocratic or not, must rest on the interpretation by each observer of the available data. By presenting as broad a spectrum of data as possible the writer hopes to provide an empirical basis from which others, using different models and approaches, may draw different conclusions.

In any case of subjective determination such as the above the personal values of the judge play a role. The data here presented were collected through a process as wide-ranging and unbiased as possible, and value-laden influences are restricted as far as possible to the concluding portions of the study. The values of the writer which may be relevant to this study are primarily those deriving from an upbringing in a Western, Judeo-Christian culture. In addition, the authorities of the Sokagakkai, and members on every level, were extremely helpful to the author in all phases of this study and were congenian at all times; therefore, if there are value influences upon the interpretation of the data they are in the direction of excessive sympathy toward the Society.

F. A Note on Data and Methodology

The data on Sokagakkai used in this study were collected primarily during two visits of one year each to Japan in 1962-63 and 1967. They consist of secondary and primary materials--books, periodicals, and newspapers--a large number of opinion surveys (for a list see the Introduction to Part IV, note 7, below); interviews with members of the Sokagakkai on various levels of the organization; and statistics from various types of elections during the period 1955-1968. The most important sources of information regarding each part of this study are cited in the relevant part; at this point a brief description of the uses made of the various types of data is in order.

Secondary sources were used in all phases of the study, both in creating and applying comparatively an analytic framework and in gathering information on the history, organization, membership, and official ideology of the Sokagakkai. As mentioned above, the English-language theoretical works of greatest utility are those by Kornhauser and Lipset; the Prothro and Grigg article is of equal importance in the operational elaboration of one aspect of the model. English material on the Gakkai may be found in the works by Clark Offner and Henry van Straelen, Harry Thomsen, Jerrold Schecter, H. Neill MacFarland, David Hesselgrave, Robert Ramseyer, Noah Brannen, and James Dator, and in the author's previous writings; those by Hesselgrave and Dator are the only primarily empirical studies. Japanese-language material on the Gakkai can be found in books by Saki Akio and Oguchi Iichi, Kasahara Kazuo, Takase Hiroi, Togawa Isamu, Murakami Shigeyoshi, Ishida Ikuo, Nakaba Tadakuni, and Tsurumi Shunsuke *et al*. A Marxist bias is visible in certain of these authors, especially Saki and Oguchi and Murakami; nevertheless, both facts and interpretations contained in these works were of great help. Of note for their specialized relevance are Takase's biography of Ikeda Daisaku and Nakaba's biographical chapter 4 on top leaders of the Society.

Primary sources abound, since the Sokagakkai's multilingual publishing activities are vast. Of the multiplicity of sources available those of greatest importance to this study are the daily Gakkai newspaper Seikyo Shimbun, the daily Komei Shimbun (the official newspaper of the Komeito or Clean Government Party, the Gakkai's political arm), and the monthly theoretical journal Dai Byaku Renge (Great White Lotus). A number of doctrinal and operational "classics," such as the Shakubuku Kyoten (Propagation Handbook), Nichiren Shoshu-Sokagakkai, and Kodaira Yoshihei's Sokagakkai provided the foundation for the descriptive sections of this study. Finally, the writings of Sokagakkai President Ikeda Daisaku are an invaluable source of information regarding the official positions of the Gakkai on practically every issue it considers worthy of note. The most complete presentation of Ikeda's religious and political thought to date has appeared in his Rissho Ankoku Ron Kogi (Lectures on the "Treatise on the Pacification of the Nation Through the Establishment of Righteousness") of Nichiren.* Much of the same material is presented in a lighter form in Ikeda's fictionalized biography of his predecessor, President Toda Josei, Ningen Kakumei (Human Revolution), and parts thereof are reiterated in his Seiji to Shukyo (Politics and Religion) and Kagaku to Shukyo (Science and Religion). Volume I of Ikeda Kaicho Zenshu (Complete Works of President Ikeda) containing the last two essays, has already appeared. The Gakkai's ideals concerning leadership in faith and action are contained in Ikeda's Shido Memo (Guidance Memo) and Shido Shu (Collected Quotations on Guidance).

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*The Gakkai prefers "True Religion" to "Righteousness" as the translation of "sho."

All of the above works, with the exception of Rissho Ankoku Ron Kogi, are now available in English translation; in addition, a number of original English-language primary sources are available. Of these, the present study utilizes the Seikyo News and its successor, the World Tribune (now a thrice-weekly newspaper); a pamphlet series entitled This is the Sokagakkai; and the comprehensive, official English work The Nichiren Shoshu Sokagakkai. These primary sources provided much of the data upon which the following analysis of the official ideals of the Sokagakkai is based; in addition, the large number of testimonial stories and letters to the editor carried in Gakkai newspapers give a vivid picture of the individual needs and interests fulfilled through membership in the organization.

Primary sources of principally political relevance are the Komei Shimbun, Ikeda's Seiji to Shukyo, and a host of press releases from the Komeito, supplemented at election time by formal policy pamphlets. For an exhaustive presentation of these policies and the ideas behind them the Komeito has published the 4-volume Fukushi Keizai e no Michi (The Road to Welfare Economy) and the two-volume Taishu Fukushi wo Mezashite (Toward Mass Welfare).

Elucidation of the ideals presented in Gakkai media was offered by a number of top-echelon representatives of the Sokagakkai interviewed by the author. President Ikeda agreed to a lengthy interview and General Executives Hojo Hiroshi and Akiya Einosuke gave repeated assistance, as did Komeito members of parliament Tada Shogo and Kuroyanagi Akira and others of the Gakkai headquarters staff. How these ideals were interpreted on lower levels of the organization was discerned through visits to local "cell" discussion meetings (zadankai) and conversations there with both leaders and rank-and-file members. In the case of top leaders, the interviews provided very little new information; these men have thoroughly internalized official ideology and in most cases a thorough prior reading of Gakkai media makes one aware, with a high degree of accuracy, of the responses which certain questions will elicit. For this reason the high-level interviews were used primarily for explication of fine points of policy and doctrine and for the acquisition of impressions concerning these leaders. Interviews on lower levels, on the contrary, provided candid personal interpretations of Gakkai goals, tactics, and characteristics which, as will become apparent, often conflict with official positions.

Approximately two dozen opinion surveys of varying magnitude and focus were utilized in the preparation of this study, primarily for the purpose of determining the attitudes of the Gakkai rank-and-file (a list appears in note 7 to the Introduction to Part IV below). Although in most cases these surveys were performed by agencies--journalistic, academic, governmental, and professional polling groups--of high integrity and compentence, a multiplicity of problems accompanying their use necessitates great caution in their interpretation. First, due to financial considerations the only original survey run for this study was an F-Scale test administered to a small number of Gakkai members. In all other cases it was necessary to work with samples and questions composed by others, often for other purposes than those of interest to the author. Thus it was necessary to select from these surveys those questions which seemed most amenable to interpretation through the theoretical framework here utilized. The validity of this interpretation is for the reader to judge.

Second, in every case the sample size ("N") of Gakkai members involved was far too small to enable the drawing of firm conclusions from the data. The proportion of Sokagakkai members contained in national surveys rarely exceeded 4%, that is, perhaps 100 persons in a survey with a total sample of 2500. Local samples of Gakkai members are commonly in the range of n = 25-75. To attempt even to form hypotheses about modal attributes of the membership of an organization of several million persons on the basis of an n of 100 is precarious; to draw conclusions therefrom is folly. This necessitated the practices--which it is hoped will not impress the reader as methodological overkill--of (a) utilizing several indicators (independent variables) of "massness" (the dependent variable), rather than depending wholly on a single indicator of dubious validity; and (b) of citing wherever possible a number of surveys with independently constructed samples the responses to which seem to indicate parallel attitudinal configurations.[69] Where contradictions between surveys appear these too must be cited.

Third, and partially offsetting the previous problems, is the nature of the samples of Gakkai members obtained. In many cases (noted below) the sample is in fact one of Komeito supporters discerned through responses to questions on political affiliation, not religious inclination. Assuming that politicized Sokagakkai members, e.g., Komeito supporters,[*] are relatively highly committed to the Gakkai and therefore more active and ideologically orthodox than the average membership, this group is treated as a hard case as regards its responses to questions concerning doctrinal orthodoxy and organizational commitment and activism. Fourth, the nature of the total samples also adds to the validity of generalization from the survey data collected. In every case where a subsample of Gakkai members of Komeito supporters was drawn from a larger sample, the distribution of responses of the total sample includes the responses of the Gakkai subsample, thus deceptively diminishing the actual difference between the total sample exclusive of Gakkai members and the Gakkai members themselves.

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[*] Almost all vocal Komeito supporters are Sokagakkai members; in two recent and representative surveys the proportions of Komeito supporters claiming Gakkai membership were 87.5% and 100%. See Sidney Verba: Cross-National Study; Okabe Keizo in Asahi Janaru, June 23, 1968, p. 49.

Unfortunately, such comparisons are not in every case possible because, fifth, many of the surveys directly concerned with the Sokagakkai or Komeito used no control groups. This did not hinder intramembership comparisons between, e.g., activists and non-activists, but it did render extremely difficult any comparison of Gakkai members with other Japanese. Where analysis was secondary, that is, where Gakkai subsamples were drawn from larger samples, this problem was avoided; such cases were sufficiently numerous to enable contrast of the Gakkai membership with the general Japanese population.

With these conditions in mind survey data were gathered and interpreted. The surveys which proved most helpful were those by Suzuki Hiroshi, James Dator, and Sidney Verba and his associates; the Japanese newspapers _Mainichi_ and _Yomiuri_ provided helpful material; the Japanese National Character studies by the Institute of Statistical Mathematics (see bibliographical entries by Hayashi Chikio, Suzuki Tatsuzo, Suetsuna Joichi, and _Tokei Suri Kenkyu-jo_) are illuninating as regards general cultural trends; and the Japanese government annual survey on popular attitudes concerning the Constitution (see in bibliography _Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanbo Koho-shitsu_), with an _n_ of 349, provided the most reliable data on the political attitudes of Komeito supporters available anywhere.

Finally, the election statistics of greatest utility in this study (presented in appendices 5, 8, and 9 below) were those from the House of Councillors elections of the last thirteen years, showing the disciplined growth of Sokagakkai electoral power. In addition, the increase of intraparliamentary political strength in terms of legislative assembly seats held by Sokagakkai representatives on all levels of government may be seen in appendices 10-16.

NOTES: CHAPTER 1

1. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, Glencoe, 1959, ch. 5: Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man, Garden City, 1963, passim.

2. Lipset, *op. cit.*, p. 27, defines democracy as "a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office. . . . This definition . . . implies a number of specific conditions: (1) a "political formula" or body of beliefs specifying which institutions . . . are legitimate (accepted as proper by all); (2) one set of political leaders in office; and (3) one or more sets of recognized leaders attempting to gain office."

   The "political formula" of democratic politics is defined as by James Prothro and C. W. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy," in The Journal of Politics, vol. 22, spring 1960, pp. 276ff.: acceptance of democracy in the abstract and acceptance of the principles of majority rule and minority rights.

   Functionalist terms are used here as by Marion Levy in The Structure of Society, Princeton, 1952:
   structure: "a pattern, i.e., an observable uniformity, of action or operation." (p. 57)
   function: "a condition, or state of affairs, resultant from the operation . . . of a structure through time." (p. 56)
   eufunction: "a condition, or state of affairs, that (1) results from the operation . . . of a structure of a given unit through time, and that (2) increases or maintains adaptation or adjustment of the unit to the unit's setting, thus making for the persistence of the unit. . . ." (p. 77)
   dysfunction: "a condition, or state of affairs, that (1) results from the operation . . . of a structure of

a given unit through time, and that (2) lessens the adaptation or adjustment of the unit to the unit's setting, thus making for a lack of persistence (i.e., a change in or dissolution) of the unit. . . ." (p.77)

3. Lipset, op. cit., ch. 4.

4. Daniel Bell "The Theory of Mass Society, a Critique," in Commentary, vol. 22, July 1956, p. 75.

5. Tokyo Daigaku Shakaigakka and Tokyo Joshi Daigaku Shakaigakka, Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1963, p. 29.

6. Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction, New York, 1940, pp. 60-61; Walter Gerson "Alienation in Mass Society," in Sociology and Social Research, vol. 49 no. 2, January 1965, pp. 145-49; Glen Tinder, The Crisis of Political Imagination, New York, 1964, pp. 7ff.: David Apter, Ideology and Discontent, Glencoe, 1964, pp. 33ff.

7. Bell, op. cit., p. 76.

8. Kornhauser, op. cit., p. 14.

9. Ibid., pp. 59-61, 107ff, 237.

10. Ibid., p. 14; for a similar definition see Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon, New York, 1952, pp. 281ff.

11. Kornhauser, op. cit., p. 39.

12. Ibid., p. 40.

13. Ibid., p. 84.

14. Ibid., pp. 43-48; see also Selznick, op. cit., pp. 292-97.

15. Kornhauser, op. cit., p. 227.

16. Ibid., pp. 43-48.

17. Bell, op. cit., p. 76.

18. Kornhauser, op. cit., p. 227.

19. Nobutaka Ike, "An Experiment in Political Forecasting: Japan, 1965-75," unpub. paper, Stanford, 1966, pp. 22-27.

20. Kornhauser, op. cit., p. 134.

21. Pitirim Sorokin, *Man and Society in Calamity*, New York, 1942, passim; Erich Fromm, *Escape From Freedom*, New York, 1961, p. 19; Kornhauser, *op. cit*., p. 125; Emile Durkheim, *Suicide*, Glencoe, 1951, pp. 211ff.

22. Fromm, *op. cit*., p. viii.

23. Kornhauser, *op. cit*., p. 64.

24. Emil Lederer, *State of the Masses*, New York, 1940, pp. 10, 140-50; David Riesman *et al*., *The Lonely Crowd*, New Haven, 1961, pp. xl-xli; Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Boston, 1965, ch. 10; Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy*, Princeton, 1966, pp. 281-83; Lipset, *op. cit*., p. 77; Mannheim, *op. cit*., pp. 96ff.: Kornhauser, *op. cit*., ch. 3.

25. Almond and Verba, *op. cit*., pp. 264-65; Kornhauser, *op. cit*., pp. 67-72.

26. Kornhauser, *op. cit*., ch. 3, pp. 230-31.

27. Durkheim, *op. cit*., p. 380.

28. Nakane Chie, "Nihonteki Shakai Kozo no Hakken," in *Chuo Koron*, vol. 78 no. 5, May 1963, p. 48ff. Miss Nakane's presentation is rather extreme. Cross-national data collected by Sidney Verba *et al*. indicate that a higher proportion of Japanese than Americans are members of some secondary group; the fact that in Japan neighborhood associations, the PTA, and labor unions are often more compulsory than voluntary in large part explains this situation but the fact of widespread memberships must be borne in mind when reading Nakane's material.

29. Frank Langdon, *Politics in Japan*, Boston, 1967, pp. 72-90, 198, 281-83. Nobutaka Ike, *op. cit*., p. 10-12. Suzuki Eitaro, *Toshi Shakaigaku Genri*, Tokyo, 1957, p. 218.

30. Lipset, *op. cit*., pp. 114-16; Kornhauser, *op. cit*., pp. 212ff.

31. Philip Converse in After, *op. cit*., p. 213; Almond and Verba, *op. cit*., pp. 315-16; Herbert McClosky "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," in *American Political Science Review*, June 1964, p. 379.

32. John Schaar, *Escape From Authority: The Perspectives of Erich Fromm*, New York, 1961, p. 173.

33. Erich Kahler, *The Tower and the Abyss*, New York, 1957, chs. 2, 3; Fromm, *op. cit*., pp. 125ff.; Mannheim, *op. cit*., p. 59.

34. Almond and Verba, op. cit., p. 153, ch. 8.

35. *Ibid*., pp. 113ff; Gabriel Almond, *The Appeals of Communism*, Princeton, 1965, p. 63.

36. Laurence Wylie, *Village in the Vaucluse*, New York, 1964, and Edward Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society*, Glencoe, 1958: both passim.

37. Robert Lane, *Political Ideology*, Glencoe, 1962, p. 162; Almond and Verba, *op. cit*., pp. 18-22.

38. Lane, *op. cit*., p. 98; Lipset, *op. cit*., p. 27.

39. Lipset, *op. cit*., ch. 4; Converse in Apter, *op. cit*., pp. 228-30; McClosky, *op. cit*., p. 378; Mannheim, *op. cit*., p. 63; T. W. Adorno *et al*. *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York, 1950, passim; Muramatsu Tsuneo, *Nihonjin*, Nagoya, 1962, pp. 101-139.

40. Almond and Verba, *op. cit*., pp. 161-62, 211ff.

41. Lipset, *op. cit*., pp. 95-96.

42. *Ibid*., ch. 4; Almond and Verba, *op. cit*., p. 315-16.

43. Almond and Verba, *op. cit*., pp. 211ff., 315-16.

44. *Ibid*., pp. 63ff., 161-62, 168.

45. Schaar, *op. cit*., pp. 194-95.

46. Adorno, *op. cit*., p. 220; Gerhard Lenski, cited in James White, "The Sokagakkai in Japanese Politics," unpub. paper, Stanford, 1966, p. 25.

47. Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American* Politics, New York, 1966, p. 73.

48. Lipset, *op. cit*., pp. 97-100.

49. Kornhauser, *op. cit*., pp. 43ff.

50. Fromm, *op. cit*., pp. 255-56.

51. Tinder, op. cit., pp. 104-09.

52. Sorokin, *op. cit*., pp. 28, 35, 45, 50, 57, 65.

53. Lipset, op. cit., pp. 87-89, ch. 4; Almond and Verba, *op. cit*., p. 315-16.

54. E. J. Hobsbawm, *Primitive Rebels*, New York, 1965, ch. 7.

55. Lipset, *op. cit*., pp. 150-51.

56. Ibid., pp. 99-100.

57. Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, Fairlawn, 1967, passim.

58. Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology*, Glencoe, 1960, ch. 1.

59. Lederer, *op. cit*., pp. 38-39.

60. Fromm, *op. cit*., p. 134.

61. Kornhauser, *op. cit*., p. 47.

62. *Ibid*., pp. 52-54, 59.

63. *Ibid*., p. 84.

64. Cohn, *op. cit*.; Kasahara Kazuo, *Tenkanki no Shukyo*, Tokyo, 1966, and *Kakumei no Shukyo: Ikko Ikki to Sokagakkai*, Tokyo, 1964; *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, supplement 2, 1962.

65. J. L. Talmon, *The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy*, London, 1955, and *Political Messianism: The Romantic Phase*, London, 1960; Hobsbawm, *op. cit*.

66. Anthony F. C. Wallace, "Revitalization Movements," in *American Anthropologist*, vol. 58, April 1956, p. 264; Vittorio Lanternari, *The Religions of the Oppressed*, New York, 1963.

67. Neil Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior*, New York, 1963; Charles Braden, *Spirits in Rebellion*, Dallas, 1963, and *These Also Believe*, New York, 1949; Liston Pope, *Millhands and Preachers*, New Haven, 1965; Stanley Hoffman, *Le Mouvement Poujade*, Paris, 1956; Hofstadter, *op. cit*.

On Japanese new religions see Clark Offner and Henry van Straelen, *Modern Japanese Religions*, Tokyo, 1963; H. Neill McFarland, *Rush Hour of the Gods*, New York, 1967; Harry Thomsen, *The New Religions of Japan*, Tokyo, 1963; Takagi Hiroo, *Nihon no Shinko Shukyo*, Tokyo, 1961; *Contemporary Religions in Japan*, all issues.

68. Almond, *op. cit.*; Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism*, New York, 1966; Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*, New York, 1955; Hadley Cantril, *The Politics of Despair*, New York, 1958; Hans Gerth in Robert Merton, *Reader in Bureaucracy*, Glencoe, 1952; David Lerner, *The Nazi Elite*, Stanford, 1951; Harold Lasswell and David Lerner, *World Revolutionary Elites*, Cambridge, 1965; Alan Bullock, *Hitler, A Study in Tyranny*, New York, 1964; Charles Loomis and Allan Beegle "The Spread of German Nazism in Rural Areas," in *American Sociological Review*, vol. 11 no. 6, December 1946, p. 724; Adolf Hitler, *Mein Kampf*, New York, 1939; Barrington Moore, *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Boston, 1966.

69. This is a standard method of compensating for measurement error. See Hubert Blalock, *Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research*, Chapel Hill, 1964, p. 158.

BOOK ONE

PART I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE SOKAGAKKAI

CHAPTER 2

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL STRAIN

The Sokagakkai is but one manifestation of a broad social, psychological, and religious current known collectively as the "New Religions (shinko shukyo)" of Japan.[1] Very difficult to define or delimit (some of the "religions" are hardly new, and some are only generously termed religions), the new religions comprise over 1000 incorporated religious juridical persons claiming over 15 million believers, or some 15 percent of the total population.[2]

These new groups have been characterized as "crisis religions," having arisen largely in reaction to over one hundred years of endemic social crisis, a penalty paid by Japan in her drive to attain modernity, Asian hegemony, and finally reconstruction.[3] Social crisis, however, while perhaps the major element in the appearance of the new sects, is in fact but one of many contributory factors. The factors involved in the appearance of a new religious movement are of six types:

1. "Structural conduciveness" of a given social system to certain kinds of, e.g., religious behavior.

2. "Structural strains": "ambiguities, deprivations, conflicts, and discrepancies" in the social structure.
3. The "growth and spread of a generalized belief" which identifies the origin of strain and prescribes appropriate responses.
4. "Precipitating factors," for instance, some "dramatic event."
5. The "mobilization of the participants believers for action."
6. The "operation of social controls," that is, forces which prevent, deflect, interrupt, inhibit the foregoing elements; these forces may be either institutional or non-institutional.[4]

The key concept in this model is that of "value added."[5] Each step of the process outlined above adds "value" to the end-product (in this case, a particular religious sect) in the sense of contributing to the total number of prerequisite conditions realized. Each step increasingly determines the nature of the final end-product, and each increasingly narrows the possible alternate forms of the end-product. Finally, for a sect to develop, a certain pattern must be present; each element must be "added" at the proper point or the end-product will be different. The same elements, added in different sequences, produce different end-products. However, each element can be present long before it is "added" to the process by a fortuitous constellation of other elements, or long before other prerequisite elements even exist.[6]

One can expect no high correlation between certain forms of any component element and the resultant movement; each movement is determined by a combination of structure-strain-belief-precipitation-mobilization-control, and all the elements have crucial influences on the end-product sects.[7] In addition, not one of the new religions has followed a neat, paradigmatic "value-added" process, because the component elements "continuously combine and recombine" through time.[8] Thus this process is only analytically divisible into its steps; any one of the new sects is a "value-added" process in constant flux, with feedback to each component from its interaction with (a) all the others, with (b) each momentary state of the end-product, and with (c) the environment, with a similar interaction characterizing the relationship between the end-product sect and its environment.

The various "value-added" processes which have given rise to the new religions of Japan have differed with each point in time, both among and within particular sects. Yet, as regards conducive structures, strains, and precipitating factors, many parallels are discernable. Similarities exist also in the beliefs and mobilizational techniques of the sects. In examining the appearance and development of the Sokagakkai both the common (why another new religion?) and the unique (why this particular new religion?) aspects of the Gakkai will be treated.

A. Structural Conduciveness

There are four aspects of social structure which conduce to the appearance of religious movements such as the Sokagakkai:

1. Differentiation of a society's value system from the other components of action; i.e., non-differentiation of norms and values. Religious movements tend to appear only when religion is a dominant interest; where a society's world view is couched in primarily religious terms, protest is defined in religious terms.
2. Availability of alternative means to express grievances and to reconstruct the social system.
3. Social and political environment, especially those institutions and attitudes relevant to tolerance or intolerance of such movements.
4. Communications facilities available to such movements.[9]

1. Differentiation of the Value System

The position asserted here is that the particular degree of differentiation of the value system from other components of action in Japanese society helps explain both the religious and political aspects of the Sokagakkai.

Religious values in the broadest sense have been traditionally strong in Japan, and are so still; they have also been long related to the political value system. On an official level religious principles have been invoked and inculcated by Japanese rulers for centuries, culminating in the formation of State Shinto, the religious foundation of the Japanese political system from the Meiji period until Japan's defeat in 1945. Religious institutions have been intimately connected with political; during over two hundred years of Tokugawa rule Buddhist temples were in certain ways branches of the governmental apparatus.

On a popular level, religious recourse has long been one of very few alternatives open to the Japanese people in time of stress. The historical denial of political participation and political articulation to the people retarded the secularization of the popular outlook on the world; thus, when the people "have sought aid and security in the resources closest to them, their most accessible resource has been their religious tradition."[10] On this unofficial level one can see historical examples of politically-relevant religious movements: the great popular Buddhist sects which spread throughout Japan in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries (and their most clearly political phases, the Ikko Uprisings and the political activities of Nichiren and his followers), the Shimabara Rebellion, and the politico-religious frictions of the modern period, from repression of the newly-arisen Tenrikyo sect in the early Meiji era to the acrimony which has accompanied the entry of the Sokagakkai into postwar politics.[11]

Below the level of religious movements one can also discern the historical role of religion in the basic patterns of social life. Shintoism provided in its divine pantheon a niche for almost every manifestation of nature; nearly all shrines, moreover, have had both religious and political significance. And the shrines, and their resident deities with their appropriate rituals, played an important role in the community in premodern Japan.

All these factors culminated, as mentioned, in the State Shinto system of presurrender Japan. The Shinto mythology was utilized to mobilize the people for the great task of modernization, to unify them behind a divinely ordained political system centered upon the God-Emperor; it was utilized subsequently to mobilize the people for the realization of Japan's divine mission in East Asia. Thus as modernization progressed in many spheres of society, atavism was the trend in the ethical and religious value system: differentiation, secularization, and rationalization were blocked, and generations of school children were taught to believe in living gods and in the centrality of religion in social and political life.

But while Shinto was retained as the core of the official value system, Japan was modernizing. By 1945 Japan already had fifty-five years' experience with parliamentary political institutions, the knowledge of which was imparted through the educational system. Thus opportunities and abilities for political participation were developing, too; and the possibility that popular unrest would flow through secular channels increased constantly.

The term which perhaps best describes the present state of religious orientations among the Japanese is "irreligious religiosity." A minority of the populace, it is indicated by numerous opinion surveys, professes belief in any religion. For the population as a whole about one third admit belief; among certain subgroups, notably students, the figure is nearer to one tenth.[12] For those who do believe, family inertia often seems to be the main motivating force; of those who professed belief in one survey, thirty percent gave as a reason "family custom," while another thirty percent didn't know why they believed.[13] On a more impressionistic level, the Japanese have been described for centuries as apathetic toward all forms of religious observance, except for perfunctory obeisances at shrines and temples visited in the course of sightseeing trips and memorial services for departed ancestors. More recently, R. P. Dore, in his City Life in Japan, also reported a "general lack of contact with Buddhist teachings" in the community he studied: of one hundred adults, only nine (of whom two were Christians) had head a sermon within the previous year.[14]

But Dore also noted the religious side of this irreligiosity. The same people who ignored religious teachings regularly worshipped their ancestors and participated in celebrations at shrines and temples.[15] In addition, Dore perceived "a generalized attitude of religious humility --a sense of the individual's dependence on and insignificance in the face of what may be described as Nature, the Universe, or the whole abstract world of the noumenal."[16] Empirical data again corroborates his position: in several polls, up to two thirds of those questioned responded that they thought religion was important to life or important in the education of children--even the exceptionally irreligious students.[17] And the plain fact of the burgeoning of religious groups after World War II, when new sects sprang up "like bamboo shoots after the rain," attests to a religious questing on the part of large numbers of the Japanese.

That Japanese religious orientations have retained their political relevance is plain, even aside from the example of the Sokagakkai. The intimate ties between daily life and religion persist: the new religions place great emphasis upon this world, with fruitful personal life and earthly, collective paradise their goals. Kamishima Jiro goes so far as to call this view of the unity of gods and men "the fundamental concept which latently prescribes the life of the masses."[18] And politics, as a phase of life more open to the common people now than ever before, has its still unsecularized aspects. Although the secular political channels for the articulation of demands are far more open and numerous than previously, the large numbers of people who still seek economic, social, and physical benefit from divine sources indicate that traditional orientations are still strong.

The Sokagakkai may in fact epitomize the present state of development of Japanese culture, as evidenced in the level of differentiation of the value system. In a society where secular politics is highly developed, but where traditional religious values remain strong, the Sokagakkai is unquestionably the largest and most powerful of all the new religions, and the Gakkai's unique blend of politics and religion may be the key to its success.

2. Availability of Alternate Channels of Articulation

The structures through which those who join the new religions might otherwise articulate their discontent and demands upon the social system are of three types: narrowly social, political, and religious. (Since the Sokagakkai, and most of the postwar new sects in addition, have arisen in the cities, only those structures available to the urban dweller will be treated.)

Such observers as R. P. Dore and Suzuki Eitaro see in the cities the development of stable social relationships of the type through which individuals realize a sense of belonging and security and through which they become attached indirectly to the larger society.[19] Family, community, school, place of work, and interests form the bases for such relationships; Suzuki claims that up to ninety-nine percent of the urban population is covered by such primary and secondary relationships, which impart stability and order to their lives.[20]

But despite the purported discovery of little gemeinschaften all over the cities by Suzuki and others, the fact remains that the Sokagakkai alone has perhaps four hundred thousand member-families in Tokyo; several other new religions are centered there, too, indicating that such groups, if they are in fact as widespread as supposed, are still not fulfilling the social and spiritual needs of a sizable part of the population. Dore recognizes that "the

Japanese are not great joiners," although limited face-to-face groups are pervasive.[21] Voluntary associations in particular were relatively few in the neighborhood Dore studied, and were usually coincidental with some other (e.g., community-centered) organization.[22] In addition, physical mobility has disintegrative effects upon both primary and secondary relationships and the social strata upon which the Sokagakkai and other new religions draw are among the most mobile.

As Dore and sociologist Nakane Chie point out, the Japanese do not tend to join multiple, mutually separate voluntary associations.[23] In addition, the lower social classes are more likely to have a degree of physical mobility which makes the establishment of such relationships difficult. This mobility also robs people of the opportunity to find fulfillment through job-related organizations. In Japan many voluntary groups are composed of co-workers; the lower classes, however, are more often employed in small enterprises which have no program of outside activities, or they do not remain long enough at any one job to establish stable relationships. Wives are similarly penalized; lacking even their husbands' opportunities for social intercourse they are very much at loose ends, and the female majorities in many of the new religions (including the Sokagakkai) demonstrate the lack of alternative structures.

A final potential alternative social structure through which urbanites might find satisfying relationships is the labor union. Unfortunately, unions benefit only those in unionized enterprises, and the great majority of small enterprises in Japan (which type of enterprise, i.e., under one hundred employees, accounts for approximately half of the work force and comprises over half of the total number of business enterprises)[24] are not unionized. In addition, the unions themselves are of questionable viability as sources of social-relational satisfaction: organizational materialism and politicization often supercede members' interests, and venal factionalism and impersonal bureaucratism have plagued the unions throughout the postwar period.[25] Today there are an estimated 640,000 Sokagakkai members in Japanese labor unions (approximately 8 percent of the 7,940,000 total union membership), a state which does not speak well for the unions as an alternative.[26]

The absence of alternative political structures through which a large stratum of the population might otherwise articulate its demands is often cited as the major element in the rise of the Sokagakkai. The Society is pictured as a voice for the voiceless, a representative of the urban lower classes which have until now been largely excluded from the political process. Whether it is or not is still an open question; however, the area of political articulation is one in which established parties and the governmental authorities could take considerable initiative if they so chose. Thus, as in the case of the unions, the mere existence of the Sokagakkai in its present size indicates a lack of alternatives. Though the other, less overtly political, new religions do not necessarily signify such a lack, the Gakkai (which has achieved its most striking growth after it entered politics) does, its constituency being precisely those social elements which have no organization, nor any direct representation in any of the other major political parties.

This lack of satisfactory political alternatives is also cited to explain the unexpectedly strong showing of the minor parties in the general election of January 1967, at the expense of both the ruling Liberal Democrats and the dominant opposition party, the Socialists. Survey data suggests the accuracy of this interpretation: a study by Watanuki Joji of Tokyo University published in January 1967 indicated a falling away from the Socialists by younger voters, whose views on a number of policy issues remained congruent with Socialist Party policies[27] but who had ceased to regard the party as an attractive structure.

The new religions as a collective phenomenon indicate the lack of alternative channels for the articulation and fulfillment of religious sentiment as perceived by many Japanese. The same is true in other societies; splinter religious groups in America "originate mainly among the religiously neglected poor, who find the conventional religion of their day unsuited to their social and psychological needs."[28] In Japan the traditional faiths are just that--the repositories of traditions, of abstruse philosophy and sterile theology far removed from the daily life of the common people.

Shinto, as a unifying spiritual system, has not recovered from the blow dealt it by military defeat and subsequent discredit; the established Buddhist sects have never regained the vitality they demonstrated in the fourteenth century. Christianity, though it made a genuine impact upon its introduction in the sixteenth century, could not overcome a foreign stigma and an initially elitist appeal when it was readmitted in the Meiji era. An imported theological system disseminated by foreigners, it attracted a number of intellectuals but never reached the masses.[29] In fact, if one seeks living religion in contemporary Japan there are very few places to look outside of the new religions.

The lack of religious alternatives contributes to the growth of all the new religions (though there may be elements in the Gakkai's belief system which enable it in particular to profit from this lack); therefore it is probable that the key to the peculiar success of the Sokagakkai lies elsewhere. But whether the functions performed by the Gakkai are social, political, or religious, it is clear that a lack of structural alternatives in Japanese society is a major factor in the Society's growth. A point which was made repeatedly in a series of case studies of

Sokagakkai members was this felt need for some kind of psychological armor with which to gird oneself against the world.[30] In some cases subjects explicitly recognized that the functions fulfilled for them through Gakkai membership could possibly be fulfilled by other social structures; however, they themselves had found that only the Gakkai did in fact satisfy their needs.

3. The Social and Political Environment

The new religions as a group are quite harmonious with their cultural context. In general they are part of the Japanese religious tradition: tolerant, eclectic, attentive to everyday life, and vague as regards the dividing line between the natural and supernatural.[31] They are singularly amenable to the materialistic trends of postwar Japanese society: economic gain is a commonly promised fruit of faith. Health is another; the hypochondriacal tendencies of the Japanese find a welcome outlet in the faith cures which are a prominent part of the activities of many of the new sects. This is not to say that the appeal of the new faiths is universal. Certain of the characteristics of both the sects and of their believers are disdained by more educated persons, and their attraction is in fact limited to certain less sophisticated social elements. But, nevertheless, it is clear that they do not constitute any marked break with the Japanese religious tradition.

The Sokagakkai, however, is another matter. Intolerant, exclusive, it contravenes major features of its environment. It does, however, have the secular relevance (termed materialism by its detractors) of the other new religions. It has another feature of great importance, too: a strong group orientation.

The Japanese almost instinctively show a predilection for group-oriented life. The components of social behavior have traditionally been groups, not individuals, and the individual's identity is as a member of a group, subordinate and significant in relation to a limited and specific social nexus.[32] This group orientation pervades even religious life: the "Japanese though that to propagate Buddhism was to profit their particular human nexus."[33] Groups, in turn, have tended to be very diffuse and inclusive as regards their members, influencing members in practically all phases of their behavior.

This group or _gemeinschaft_ orientation on the part of the Japanese has been referred to as an "octopus-pot mentality (_tako-tsubo konjo_)," conveying the impression of a desire to crawl into a safe, cozy refuge (composed, in this case, of close, satisfying social relationships).[34] This psychological feature of the Japanese has weakened with modernization, but it is still strong and receives major emphasis among the new religions in general and the Sokagakkai in particular. The cellular organization common to many of the new sects offers a _tako-tsubo_ wherein the isolated urban dweller may find psychic haven, and millions of Japanese have apparently found the offering attractive. The basic unit of the Sokagakkai, the _kumi_ or group, is essentially of this _tako-tsubo_ type; whether the Gakkai's peculiar form of this structure is more effective than those of other sects will be seen when the Society's overall organization is examined below.

4. Communications Facilities

The communications system of contemporary Japan is highly conducive to the dissemination of ideas of all kinds. Universal literacy, an open political system, and a level of economic affluence which permits widespread diffusion of radios, televisions, and written communication of all types provide the basis; a comprehensive network of national and local newspapers, television and radio and cinematic media, and a huge publishing industry have arisen thereon. Many of the new religions have devoted great efforts to mass communications, and none more than the Sokagakkai. But the media communications of the Gakkai, as with those of the other new sects, serve more internal than external purposes. Gakkai publications are used in propagation, to be sure; data indicate, however, that converts are drawn primarily by personal communication.

It is in small groups that such communication is most often effected. Thus once again one sees the importance of the _tako-tsubo_ mentality of the Japanese in the development of the Sokagakkai. In fact, one may suggest that this mentality, in combination with a lack of alternative structures of need-satisfaction and communication--social, political, and religious--is the most important aspect of Japanese society conducing to the appearance and growth of the Gakkai.

B. Structural Strains

A social structure, even though conducive to the appearance of new forms of religion offering novel value systems through which the reconstitution of society is sought, need not witness the appearance of any such sects at all if the extant value system continues to suffice for the needs of society's members. When, however, "a way of living which has long been taken for granted is called in question, invalidated or simply rendered impracticable, a situation of peculiar strain in created."[35] Norman Cohn, in his examination of medieval European millennarian sects, saw in such strains the immediate preconditions for radical new forms of religious behavior. When

1. Social and economic horizons expand beyond the possibility of satisfaction; or
2. traditional social groups (especially kin groups) disintegrate until people find themselves without their accustomed emotional and material supports; or
3. rapid changes in relative status and economic position of different social classes occur; or
4. society as a whole loses its independence and is subjugated; or
5. traditional authority ceases to fulfill its supposedly proper functions; or

6. supreme authority is discredited or disintegrates altogether; or
7. contact with alien cultures shakes a previously unquestioned world view;

then the cohesion and stability of society decreases and the impact of additional calamitous events on social patterns is magnified.[36]

In the years since the mid-nineteenth century Japan has undergone all of these forms of social strain, and the appearance of novel religious phenomena has been a continuous occurrence. The most salient forms of strain differ at different times and any comprehensive study of the new religions should cover at least the last century.[37] Since the Sokagakkai in its present form is a postwar phenomenon, only this period will be treated here.

The strains in Japanese society which, during the postwar period, have been conducive to the appearance and flourishing of new religious groups stem from two temporally overlapping sources: military defeat and the subsequent process of recovery and high-speed modernization. The types of conducive strain will be grouped under three headings: those related to normative and value disorder, those related to the expectation-deprivation ratio in society, and those related to the inadequacy of techniques or knowledge in new situations.[38]

1. Normative and Value Chaos

The normative and value strains in postwar Japanese society result from three influences: specific new elements of Western normative and value systems, more general norms and values which may be thought of as concomitants of modernization in all its aspects, and the collapse of the officially sanctioned and assiduously inculcated presurrender value system.[39] The influx of foreign ideas began on a major scale in the mid-nineteenth century. Egalitarianism, liberalism, individualism, Marxism--all the major philosophical currents of the West became the common property of the Japanese, and are so today. But whereas foreign influences were often selectively transmitted before the war in order to minimize disruptive effects upon the established morality, the postwar political system formally incorporated liberal democratic values and a democratic normative structure which was in contradiction to traditional, indigenous social norms and values with their hierarchical, authoritarian roots. While Japan now appears to be a relatively stable democratic system, the contradiction is not yet solved; in many phases of life traditional values still determine behavior.

Overlapping with the strains caused by the introduction of Western norms and values are those strains, dealt with extensively in the literature of the social sciences, resulting from new normative and value patterns which accompany modernization wherever and under whatever auspices it occurs. Weber's idea of "rationalization" in all its ramifications and movement along the continua of Parsons' "pattern variables" convey the impression intended here of new forms of social relationships which in many cases contradict older regulative norms and values. As in the case of specific new foreign normative concepts, the crescive development of new principles of social relationship dates from long before World War II. Amid the ultra-modernization of many aspects of Japanese society, it continues today; and yet, "many features of the system of social relations prevailing in the Tokugawa village are still preserved in the city."[40] Universalistic criteria for recruitment and advancement, emotionally neutral and functionally specific relationships, and highly rationalized procedures do not sit well with the Japanese in many instances, but there ~~is~~ strong pressure in the direction of such criteria, relationships, and procedures exerted by the processes of social, economic, and political modernization. The contradiction is felt by many individuals within themselves; an illuminating study by Robert J. Lifton of the personality conflicts in Japanese youth points this out clearly.[41]

The most dramatic case of normative and value disorder came in 1945. The national polity suffered military defeat for the first time in its history; the supportive official value system was both abolished formally by the Occupation authorities and popularly discredited by its failure to lead to victory. Not only was the old normative and value system largely destroyed, the agencies of socialization which transmitted it received blows that severely impaired their functioning. The legal pre-eminence of the family over its members was ended and the educational system was decentralized, increasing the difficulty of implanting any new patterns of values and norms.

In the sense that not only norms, but values too, were missing, the early postwar period went even beyond Durkheim's meaning of "anomie." Few agencies existed which could offer viable alternatives to the now-defunct prewar orientations. The resurrected Communist Party was one; the new religions were another. Both provided ultimate values which gave life meaning and immediate norms by which to regulate social intercourse. Considering the level of development and secularization of Japanese culture it is possible that a religious solution to normative chaos is still most attractive to the Japanese; the adherents of the new religions are in fact far more numerous than those of the Japan Communist Party. The simple provision of a normative and value system, then, does not distinguish any one of the new religions, such as the Sokagakkai, from any other, although it is without doubt one of the most important elements in the rise of the sects as a group.

2. Expection and Deprivation

That deprivation is a major factor in the gravitation of converts to the Japanese new religions is undebatable. Almost all of the reasons given by believers for entry into the new sects can be subsumed under the headings of economic, physical, and psychological deprivation. Physical and psychological deprivation are always felt by the old and the ill, but in times of social stress such persons may be less well cared for; poverty is by definition economic deprivation, but when society in certain of its parts or as a whole is becoming more prosperous this deprivation becomes much harder to bear. The three forms of deprivation often overlap, and when in addition there is little hope of assistance from secular sources, there is room for belief systems which either redefine the whole value system and thus eliminate the feeling of deprivation or promise to fulfill expectations through nonsecular means, or both.

This is precisely what the new religions have done in Japan. The devastation inflicted by the Allies during the war meant severe deprivation for the entire nation; this deprivation was absolute, in that everyone was subject to it. It was less that some had more than others than that very few had much of anything. Some of the major psychological deprivations have been mentioned under the heading of normative chaos. In addition, economic losses were staggering, and food shortages and disruption of administrative processes meant greatly increased health problems.

Surrender accentuated the deprivation problem. Hundreds of thousands of demobilized soldiers returned to

Japan; more hundreds of thousands of evacuees poured back into the desolated cities. Inflation wiped out much of what savings had been preserved, and food and shelter and clothing shortages reached emergency magnitude in the winter of 1945-46. Remedial Occupation measures staved off crisis but economic uncertainty was a fact of life for countless families for several years. Some of the Occupation's remedies for the general situation even intensified the deprivations of many; implementation in 1949 of the Dodge Plan, designed to end inflation, resulted in the dismissal of 300,000 laborers and 260,000 government workers.[42]

Into this situation moved the new religions, promising "instant benefit in this life."[43] One of the primary controls upon the rise of such movements, the ability of the government to respond to strain by reducing the causative agents, was largely lacking. The new sects, however, knew no such secular limitations as did the government; anything and everything could come to those who would believe.

As the nation rebuilt, new forms of deprivation became salient. With the repudiation of the prewar ideology the official sanction of low levels of popular living standard, consumption, and economic expectation was removed, and overt acquisitive inclinations have become as marked in Japan as in any society on earth. At the same time, the high rate of economic growth attained by Japan in the mid-1950's spread prosperity throughout much of the nation.

Accordingly, relative deprivation has become the major contributory factor to the growth of the new religions. Some families never regained their prewar economic or social status; many more saw their fellows rising more quickly than they on the tide of prosperity. In addition, many of those who did escape economic deprivation have not been immune to other forms: there are suggestions that the psychological deprivation attributed to members of "mass society" has also appeared among the newly-affluent Japanese.[44]

The Sokagakkai, in fact, attained its giant size precisely during this period of economic boom. (See Appendix 1.) Thus the Gakkai is, in this respect, unlike the Nazi movement, with which it is sometimes compared, and more similar to the French Poujadists: relative deprivation of certain social elements, and not absolute deprivation of major portions of the society, is the context of Gakkai growth.[45] Those who predicted the decline of the new religions with the advent of national prosperity have been confounded by this fact, which also indicates that either the control mechanisms available to society for the removal of strains conducive to the growth of such movements are still incomplete, or that certain forms of deprivation are beyond their reach, or both.

3. Old Knowledge in New Situations

Before the Meiji Era very few Japanese ever faced a "new" situation, in the sense of a situation wherein the techniques and knowledge acquired from one's family, schooling (if any), and peers did not suffice to enable one to cope. One of the most momentous consequences of modernization was the institutionalization of the uncertain future, the condition in which increasing numbers of Japanese became involved in life patterns which their previous socialization had not prepared them to expect, much less to adjust to smoothly.

This institutionalization was limited before 1945 by the retention of a traditionalistic value system which dictated proper modes of behavior supposedly valid in all situations. However, even among the peasantry, the least developed class, the old knowledge was gradually invalidated; even the officially approved habits of diligence and frugality did not suffice in the face of depressions which began elsewhere and came upon the farmers as disembodied, inexplicable disasters.

In 1945 the official value system, the explicatory framework for all situations, was swept away. The legal centrality of the family, the model for social groups on all levels of collective behavior, was ended. Thus the uncertainty created by new situations was greater than before, and was increased even further as the growing trend toward urbanization created an ever greater frequency of new situations.

This urbanization took place on all levels of society, in three forms. First, there was physical urbanization, the move to the city. This became a veritable rush during the 1950's (see Fig. 1), resulting in unprecedented numbers of new, inexperienced urbanites anxious for moorings and criteria of behavior. Second, there was objective urbanization, the adoption everywhere of overt urban life styles and appurtenances. Greatly expanded systems of communications--especially the mass media--and transportation facilitated this spread of the material aspects of urban life. Third, and inescapably, there was subjective urbanization (read "modernization"). New patterns of thought and social organization spread to the country along with the television sets and automobiles; new forms of social interaction necessitated new knowledge, and vice versa.

Figure 1

	Urban (shibu) population percent of the total	Non-urban (gunbu) population percent of the total
1930	21.1	75.9
1935	32.9	67.1
1940	37.9	62.1
1947	33.1	66.9
1950	37.5	62.5
1955	56.3	43.7
1960	63.5	36.5

(Source: Ikado Fujio in Toyo Bunka Kenkyu-jo Kiyo, March 1964, p. 125)

The role of the new religions in these new situations is clear. Ever since the Tenrikyo sect provided a solution for Meiji peasants caught up by economic forces beyond their comprehension, the sects have explained away, sublimated, or otherwise tranquilized the anxieties of many Japanese in new and unaccustomed social contexts. It was in the resolution of the normative and value problems involved in these new situations that the new religions played their greatest role; nevertheless, by providing new knowledge and techniques also, the sects eased the passage of their members into new social structures. The theological interpretations of reality offered are occasionally bizarre, and the techniques for adjusting to reality--dances, offerings, devotions, or simply self-fulfilling daily life--are sometimes equally so, but that they do enable many believers to cope with new situations, and that as such they have an attraction for others, is undebatable.

4. Conducive Strain: Conclusion

The key strains which conduced to the rise of the new religions in the postwar period derived from defeat and subsequent high-speed reconstruction and further development. These strains have benefited all of the new faiths; therefore it is probable that the peculiar elements to which the Sokagakkai alone owes its spectacular success are to be found elsewhere.

The social strains which did contribute singularly to the growth of the Gakkai are the psychological consequences of defeat (normative chaos, psychological deprivation, and the invalidation of old knowledge in new situations) rather than the economic, and the relative deprivation which became salient as Japan moved into the ranks of the world's most affluent nations. Though the Gakkai certainly did draw upon the economically disadvantaged and the ill in the early postwar period (as it still does) its greatest success, coming after poverty and health ceased to be major problems, indicate that the more lasting psychological consequences of defeat may be more significant. Similarly, the failure of the Gakkai to emerge as a major religious movement until after absolute, general deprivation had been considerably decreased suggests that the deprivations, of all types, in reaction to which people join the Society are deprivations felt in relation to other social elements seen as better off.

NOTES: CHAPTER 2

1. English-language surveys: Neill McFarland, Rush Hour of the Gods, New York, 1967; Clark Offner and Henry van Straelen, Modern Japanese Religions, Tokyo, 1963; Harry Thomsen, The New Religions of Japan, Tokyo, 1963. Japanese-language survey: Takagi Hiroo, Nihon no Shinko Shukyo, Tokyo, 1961.

2. Mombusho, Shukyo Nenkan, Tokyo, 1965 ed., pp. 131-57.

3. Neill McFarland, "Japan's New Religions," in Contemporary Religions in Japan, vol. 1 no. 4, December 1960, p. 57.

4. Neil Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior*, New York, 1963, pp. 15-20.

5. *Ibid*., pp. 13-14.

6. *Loc. cit*.

7. After *ibid*., p. 345.

8. *Ibid*., p. 310.

9. *Ibid*., pp. 319-38.

10. McFarland, *Rush Hour*, pp. 11-12.

11. Kasahara Kazuo, *Kakumei no Shukyo: Ikko Ikki to Soka-gakkai*, Tokyo, 1964, passim.

12. Nihonjin no Kominsei data, e.g.; "Seinen no Shukyoshin," in *Toki*, June 1966, pp. 270-72.

13. Oguchi Iichi, *Shin Shinrigaku Koza 4: Shukyo to Shinko no Shinrigaku*, Tokyo, 1956, p. 206.

14. R. P. Dore, *City Life in Japan*, Berkeley, 1958, pp. 344-45.

15. *Loc. cit*.

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17. Ikado Fujio, "Kyodan Soshiki Ron Josetsu," in *Toyo Bunka Kenkyu-jo Kiyo*, vol. 34, March 1964, p. 131; *Toki*, *op. cit*., pp. 270-72.

18. Kamishima Jiro, *Kindai Nihon no Seishin Kozo*, Tokyo, 1961, p. 42.

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20. Suzuki in *Toshi Mondai*, *loc. cit*.

21. Dore, *op. cit*., p. 246.

22. *Loc. cit*.

23. Loc. cit.; Nakane Chie, "Nihonteki Shakai Kozo no Hatten," in *Chuo Koron*, vol. 78 no. 5, May 1963, pp. 48ff.

24. Eugene Staley and Richard Morse, *Modern Small Industry for Developing Countries*, New York, 1965, pp. 17-20.

25. Takagi, *op. cit*., pp. 97-98.

26. *Japan Times*, December 4, 1967; Asahi Shimbunsha, *Asahi Nenkan*, Tokyo, 1967, ed., p. 467.

27. Shinohara Hajime, "Komeito e no Gimon," in *Ekonomisuto*, February 14, 1967, pp. 34-36.

28. Elmer Clark, *The Small Sects in America*, New York, 1949, p. 16.

29. Takagi, *op. cit*., p. 15; Murakami Shigeyoshi, "Gendai Seinen to Sokagakkai," in *Shukyo Koron*, September 1962, p. 43.

30. Naikaku Kanbo Naikaku Chosa-shitsu, *Shinko Shukyo ni kansuru Shakai-shinrigakuteki Kenkyu*, Tokyo 1965 (?), pp. 83ff.

31. Offner and van Straelen, *op. cit*., pp. 266-70; Hajime Nakamura, *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*, Honolulu, 1964, p. 400; Tatsuzo Suzuki, "A Study of the Japanese National Character, Part III," in *Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics*, supplement 4, 1966, pp. 19-20; Fujimaki Hajime, "Sokagakkai wa doko made Nobiru ka?" in *Shukyo Koron*, May 1963, p. 40; Dore, *op. cit*., p. 66.

32. Nakamura, *op. cit*., p. 409.

33. *Ibid*., pp. 510-11.

34. For a discussion of this concept, see Maruyama Masao, *Nihon no Shiso*, Tokyo, 1963, part III.

35. Norman Cohn, *The Pursuit of the Millennium*, Fairlawn, 1957, pp. 310-11.

36. *Ibid*., p. 313.

37. Examples of such periodization may be found in Saki Akio and Oguchi Iichi, *Sokagakkai*, Tokyo, 1960, pp. 34-38; McFarland, *Rush Hour*, pp. 54ff.

38. Smelser, *op. cit*., pp. 338-47.

39. Dore, *op. cit*., p. 188.

40. *Ibid*., p. 378.

41. Robert Lifton, "Youth and History," in *Asian Cultural Studies: 3: Studies on Modernization of Japan by Western Scholars*, Tokyo, 1962, passim.

42. Takagi, *op. cit*., p. 89.

43. Kasahara Kazuo, *Tenkanki no Shukyo*, Tokyo, 1966, pp. 28-32.

44. Tokyo Daigaku Shakaigakka and Tokyo Joshi Daigaku Shakaigakka, *Sokagakkai*, Tokyo, 1963, pp. 39ff.

45. Emil Lederer, *State of the Masses*, New York, 1940, p. 65; Togawa Isamu, *Zenshin-suru Komeito*, Tokyo, 1966, pp. 157ff.; Stanley Hoffman, *Le Mouvement Poujade*, Paris, 1956, pp. 11-22.

CHAPTER 3

SOKAGAKKAI BELIEFS

The belief systems which form the doctrinal basis of the various new religions, including the Sokagakkai, are more or less organized sets of ideas which redefine the world and the proper ends and manners of social and religious behavior.[1] They vary in scope; they prescribe certain forms of action designed to alleviate one or more forms of strain or deprivation, and their aims vary from those which seek only personal salvation for a small elect to those, like the Gakkai, which aspire to convert the entire human race and reconstitute all of the world's social structures and values in their own image. The new sects almost uniformly rely on extraordinary supernatural agents in their plans for redefinition and reconstitution.*

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*Religion, as used in this paper, is the service and adoration of a supreme being or beings or supernatural force or forces as expressed by the believers in a given supreme being or beings or supernatural force or forces in forms of worship, in obedience to divine commands (especially as found in accepted sacred writings or as declared by recognized teachers), and in the pursuit of a way of life regarded as incumbent on true believers. (See Webster's New International Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition.) By this definition, some of the Japanese new "religions" which perhaps more closely approximate ethical systems are of doubtful religiosity are included in the grouping of "new religions" only due to popular usage. Thus the "almost."

The beliefs of the new religions are strain-oriented, as as the strains which gave rise to the sects are largely the same for all, the faiths show considerable similarities in their doctrines.[2] They are very worldly and practical in their orientations: they stress benefit in this life, set forth concrete (often bluntly materialistic) goals, and in most cases emphasize social relevance and conscience. In the achievement of their goal-values the sects rely heavily upon miracles and divine benefits of all kinds, again indicating the disillusionment with secular means which has estranged their believers from social or political channels of self-improvement.

Material deprivations and economic strains are not the only targets of the new sects' efforts, however. They provide moral and normative guidelines for social behavior, usually given added authority by being presented as divine revelation and often transmitted by religious leaders who are themselves divine beings or the representatives of divine agents or forces. Thus the new religions dictate both the ends (goals, values) and means (norms) of human behavior. The common feature of simplicity in doctrines is adapted to the low level of sophistication of most believers and suggests the urgency of the needs for which converts seek satisfaction. The cultural influences working upon all the sects in common are visible in the tolerance, syncretism, inclusivity, and eclecticism of their doctrines, and in ancestor worship, a nearly universal element.

The Sokagakkai shares many, but not all, of these common features of the majority of the new religions. It is eminently practical and worldly in its orientation, both on the level of individual belief and in its larger social concerns and claimed universal relevance. Divine benefits are the core of the Gakkai's appeal; genze riyaku (benefit in this world) and kudoku (divine reward) are two themes which recur incessantly in Gakkai literature and in the testimonials of members. However, the more spectacular forms of miracles are eschewed by the Society; incremental rather than sudden and massive changes are the rule, and through its political activities the Gakkai accords a major role to secular procedures, especially in the achievement of larger, societal goals.

The Sokagakkai offers its converts a comprehensive set of social injunctions, norms, and principles. Though denying that it dictates any system of commandments beyond specified devotional practices, the Society does in fact provide criteria in more or less concrete form for proper forms of behavior in one's place of work, in school and family, in Gakkai contexts, and in society at large. Some of the values and norms provided by the Gakkai's belief system are of divine origin. The writings of Nichiren (revered by the Gakkai as the True and Universal Buddha) constitute the basic scriptures. However, these writings, dating from the thirteenth century, must be given contemporary relevance; therefore extensive interpretations have been made by Sokagakkai leaders and, though these additions are justified by reference to scripture, they do not have any divine quality themselves.

Nor do the leaders who transmit the teachings claim any divine qualities. Charisma of any kind is denied; the Gakkai is an organization of lay believers and the successive presidents of the Society have described themselves as fellow worshippers and teachers.

Simplicity of doctrine, in the sense that the average member must actually understand only a minimal number of ideas, is a characteristic of the Sokagakkai. However, the complete theological system of Nichiren Shoshu, the Gakkai's parent sect, is of extreme complexity and scope, and the Gakkai's intense emphasis upon study suggests that the Gakkai members probably know more of the teachings of their church than do those of most of the other new religions. Another point of divergence of the Sokagakkai from the other new sects concerns cultural congruity of the Society's beliefs. Although the present doctrinal complex of the Society is an amalgam of influences from Nichiren and his successors, and from each of the Gakkai's presidents, the Society emphatically denies any suggestion of syncretism and is intolerant and exclusive of the beliefs of other faiths, including ancestor worship. This cultural dissonance is one of the factors which makes the Gakkai *sui generis* not only among the new religions, but as a part of Japan's entire religious history. That this history has included an undercurrent of militance is indicated by the existence of a large number of Nichiren-derivative sects for the last seven centuries; it may be that the Sokagakkai is the only contemporary religious group which taps this stream. Nevertheless, the dominant religious attitude of the Japanese is tolerant, and there are signs that the Sokagakkai itself is cognizant of the limits to which it can grow as a church militant.

A. Sokagakkai Doctrines

The present teachings of the Sokagakkai are a still-dynamic blend of several elements. The basic source is the writings of Nichiren (1222-1282) as handed down through the Nichiren Sho Sect and rendered into their present state by Nikkan (1665-1726), a later high priest of the sect. These teachings were taken by Makiguchi Tsunesaburo, founder and first president of the Soka Kyoiku Gakkai (predecessor of the Sokagakkai) and grafted onto his own "Theory of Value" to form the core of Gakkai ideology. This amalgam was reinterpreted by the second president, Toda Josei, and further reinterpreted by the third and present president, Ikeda Daisaku.

To speak of the teachings of the Sokagakkai, itself nominally only a lay organization of the faithful of the Sho Sect, may sound strange; however, the extent to which Sokagakkai leaders have redefined the original Nichiren Shoshu precepts justifies this terminology. In fact, it is more meaningful now simply to subsume the Sho Sect under the title Sokagakkai. The Gakkai is incorporated as an independent religious juridical person. Although, according to the Rules of the Sokagakkai,

> This juridical person, with the Ichien-budai Soyo no Gohonzon, established by St. Nichiren on the twelfth day of the tenth month of the second year of Koan, as its object of worship, has as its objectives the carrying out of propagation of the object of worship and of ceremonies and functions based upon the teachings of Nichiren Shoshu, and the conduct of affairs for the sake of the realization of the great ideal of Obutsu-Myogo, and conducts those publishing enterprises and educational and cultural, etc., activities necessary thereto,[4]

and thus appears to be a proselyting arm of the Sho Sect, the actual condition is that, in the words of one critic,

> the Gakkai has intruded into Nichiren Shoshu and the Head Temple has completely lost its autonomy, having become the Religious Affairs Section of the Gakkai.[5]

Thus when discussing theology no distinction will be made here between the present belief systems of the Sokagakkai and Nichiren Shoshu. These beliefs are not presented in this paper in the order that the Gakkai organizes them. In fact, as presented by the Gakkai they often have little apparent organization at all, a situation which the author has tried to remedy. There is a risk in that the order of presentation is artificial and that neither the leaders nor the rank-and-file of the Gakkai necessarily see their beliefs in this order, or even that they see all of the elements here presented at all. Nevertheless, the following is a brief summary of the important points of

Gakkai doctrine as implied by emphasis in official publications. A final note: philosophical and theological criticism is outside the scope of this paper. Concerning doctrinal criticism, only those facets of belief with significance for politics or the further development of the Sokagakkai will be treated in any detail.

There are four main points in the theology developed by Nichiren.[6] The first is his acceptance of the Lotus Sutra as the highest and only valid scripture in this, the Latter Day of the Law (Mappo), when the true teachings of the Buddha have fallen into general decay. Second, and flowing from his choice of scripture, is his postulation of a universal, omnipotent, omnipresent, and eternal Buddha. Third, this Buddha is imminent in every aspect of reality. All beings possess the Buddha-nature and are thus equally able to attain salvation. Fourth, as the means by which salvation is to be achieved, Nichiren set forth the Three Great Secret Laws (San Dai Hiho). The first is the gohonzon, or object of worship, a mandala or symbolic representation of the universal, eternal Buddha inscribed by Nichiren himself. The second is the daimoku, or formula, the words "Namu Myoho Renge Kyo (Adoration be to the Sutra of the Lotus of the Wondrous Law)," which, if recited, bring divine blessings upon the believer. Third is the kaidan, or high sanctuary. When all Japan has been converted to Nichiren's religion a sanctuary symbolizing this achievement and the resultant salvation of the country will be established, where the ruler(s) of the nation will come to worship.

Nichiren introduced four novel elements into Japanese religious life. The first was intolerance. He asserted unequivocally that his was the one and only true and efficacious religion for his day and that all other faiths would lead only to damnation: "Nembutsu is Hell; the Zen are devils; Shingon is national ruin; Ritsu are traitors." Moreover, all misfortune--social, political, economic, and natural--was the result of heretical religion, and universal acceptance of his beliefs and the elimination of all others was the only way to avoid calamity.

Second, Nichiren advocated a very aggressive form of propagation called shakubuku (literally, "to break and flatten"), a high-pressure approach which he considered the only effective method of breaking through the depravity of people of the Mappo period. Third, Nichiren was unprecedentedly political in his orientations. The calamities accruing to heretical beliefs were not only personal but societal as well, and the high sanctuary he envisioned was to be a national, not merely sectarian, shrine. Thus it was imperative that the nation's rulers adopt his precepts as their philosophy of government, and to this end he presented numerous petitions to the governing authorities of his day in his customarily intolerant and aggressive way (which led to repeated stiff official repression, to exile twice, and to a suspended death sentence once).

Fourth, Nichiren was a singularly national figure. He predicted that his Buddhism would spread from Japan to cover the world and that the Japanese had thus a propagative mission to fulfill. He was not a nationalist of any modern type; any special qualities possessed by Japan derived only from the fact of his own birth there. However, the peculiarly political and ethnocentric elements of his thought have provided a theological basis for numerous later Japanese nationalists.[7]

The Sho Sect split off from the Nichiren Sect shortly after Nichiren's death and, claiming to be the really orthodox succession, moved from the original Head Temple, taking what they now claim to be the only genuine gohonzon with them. The Sho Sect retained the basic ideas of Nichiren, but in the eighteenth century the then high priest, Nikkan, systematized the doctrine and added the Nichiren Honbutsu Setsu, the idea that Nichiren himself was an incarnation of the eternal Buddha, a claim never made by Nichiren for himself. Nikkan postulated a mystic unity of Nichiren the man, his mandala, the daimoku, and the universal Buddha of the Lotus Sutra. It is this conception of Nichiren which has become officially enshrined in the teachings of the Sokagakkai.

The central idea in the Sokagakkai ideology is that of "life." The entire universe is a single flow of life, eternal and eternally in flux. Any given being, at a given moment, is but the present manifestation of a continual current of life which has also past and future manifestations (ichinen-sanzen) in accord with Buddhist principles of transmigration, death being but an "expedient" by which new forms of existence are attained. Successive forms of life are determined through the workings of karma, but a breakout from the wheel of karma is possible due to the universality of life (Nichiren's Buddha-nature) and the presence within each form of existence of a spark of the highest, most perfect form: Buddhahood (jukkai-gogu). Thus man, as a being, is fundamentally neither bad nor good but simply potentiality; karmaic influences work upon him but, due to his possession of all possible manifestations of existence within himself, do not determine his future unalterably.

In this flow of existence, subject to these influences and possessed of these potentialities, what is the proper aim of man? According to the Sokagakkai it is happiness. This goal is assumed to be natural, universal, and self-evident; due to the universality of the Buddha-nature, it is equally attainable by all. This idea was introduced by President Makiguchi; happiness is the ultimate goal of human life as postulated in his "Theory of Value," and has been retained, albeit with a more religious tone, by the Gakkai. With the end of human life established, the question arises of the means to this end. Here the Gakkai introduces the concept of value: human life is itself a process of creation and maximization of certain values and the attainment of happiness thereby.

Makiguchi elaborated the idea of value, specifying three types of value and their opposites, or anti-values. These pairs are beauty and ugliness, gain and loss, and good and evil, in increasing order of importance. However, gain (riyaku, the divine benefit--goriyaku--of Gakkai theology) is in fact the most prized value: while gain per se is an individually-achieved value, good is simply collective gain. Thus gain, in its collective aspect, takes precedence over all other goals of human endeavor.

The connection between Makiguchi's value theory and Nichiren Shoshu theology developed in answer to the question of just how these values were to be created, and their opposites avoided. Value is to be created through the practice of the True Religion. Individual devotion brings divine benefits in the form of beauty and gain; collective faith creates good. To the objection that other religions may be valuable and that Nichiren Shoshu may not be the only valid faith by which man might find happiness, the Sokagakkai employs a number of doctrinal "proofs" designed to show beyond doubt that Nichiren's Buddhism embodies both the highest philosophical verities and the most efficacious means of obtaining concrete divine benefits in this life.

Not only does Sokagakkai claim sole efficacy, it also retains the traditional Nichirenite doctrinal intolerance of other religions. Economic distress, ill health, domestic discord, juvenile delinquency, corrupt politics, earthquakes, and train wrecks have been attributed ultimately to the pernicious effects of heresy. In recent years the Gakkai has markedly ameliorated its attacks upon other faiths and has made the attribution of evil to heresy a much more abstract process. But false religions remain the final culprit, and only universal practice of Nichiren Shoshu can wipe evil and misery from the earth.

The precepts and practices which constitute the exclusive path to value and happiness include acceptance of the *Nichiren Honbutsu Setsu* and the trinity of the Great Secret Laws. To put these principles into action the believer must perform a prescribed worship service (*gongyo*) before a copy of the *gohonzon* enshrined in his home in the morning and evening. In addition, he must recite the *daimoku* as often as possible. By these professions of faith the believer will bring upon himself benefit, both tangible and intangible. Wives will cease their nagging, business will improve, light misfortunes will be visited upon one instead of heavy, and the sum of one's happiness will increase as bad karma is turned to good and good karma is magnified.

The ultimate stage of the value-creation process is enlightenment (*jobutsu*). From the traditional Buddhist conception of enlightenment as a breaking away from the wheel of karma into a state of non-being the Sokagakkai has moved to an interpretation of *jobutsu* as a state of absolute happiness to be achieved in this life and enjoyed in endless future lives. The achievement of jobutsu in this life the Gakkai refers to as human revolution (ningen kakumei), the realization of personal bliss through religious faith.

Personal happiness, however, even though absolute on a microcosmic level, is yet incomplete. The ultimate goal of the Sokagakkai is not a selfish happiness enjoyed in solitude by the faithful, unmindful of the miseries of the rest of the world. No man's happiness is complete until every man's is; mankind is unified in the great flow of universal life, in the all-encompassing scope of the Buddha-nature, and every man complements and supplements every other.

Thus human revolution must be extended into universal revolution. Every Sokagakkai member bears the responsibility of propagating the faith and the enormity of this task justifies the aggressive methods (a spiritual inheritance from Nichiren) with which it is undertaken. The goal is Kosen-rufu, conversion of the entire world, and its attainment will usher in the millennium. Simultaneously political activity must be undertaken. In the Nichirenite tradition of remonstration with the authorities, the Gakkai pursues the goal of winning the government over to the True Religion by participating in the political system, sending its own representatives into government where they can work for the good (i.e., the collective benefit) of the whole people, and exerting themselves toward the acceptance of the principles of Nichiren Shoshu as the proper foundation of political behavior.

This acceptance is the goal of Obutsu-myogo, or "fusion of Buddhism and politics." Actually, it is the fusion of Buddhist beliefs with every phase of secular behavior, the veritable reconstitution of society on a comprehensive base of religious values and norms. Historically, the state of Obutsu-myogo will be the "Third Civilization (Dai San Bummei)," following as it will upon the successive rise and decline of the idealist civilization based upon Christianity and the materialist civilization based upon Marxism. The political system of Obutsu-myogo will be one of "Buddhist Democracy (Buppo Minshushugi)," where politicians motivated by the compassion which springs from the realization of the essential unity of mankind will act to maximize freedom and equality and "the greatest happiness of the greatest number."

Economically, the Third Civilization will be characterized by a system variously termed "Neo-Socialism (Shin Shakaishugi)," "Humanitarian Socialism (Ningensei Shakaishugi)," or "Mass Welfare Economy (Taishu Fukushi Keizai)." The titles indicate the emphasis upon social benefit and compassion, as in the political system. The Gakkai claims that such an economic system will be able to combine the freedom of the capitalist system and the equality of the socialist system.

Internationally, the world after the completion of Kosen-rufu will be united on the principle of "One-Worldism (Chikyu Minzokushugi)" or "Global Nationalism (Gurobaru Nashonarizumu)." Here, too, the central idea is the essential brotherhood of man in Buddha and the compassion for one's fellow man which springs from the realization of this fact. In a Global Nationalist world each nation would retain its independence, but a vastly heightened sense of community would induce acceptance of regulation of sovereignty imposed by some form of international federation. In such a world armaments would of course become unnecessary.

It is highly unlikely that many of the members of the Sokagakkai have internalized the beliefs of the organization in any fashion resembling the above exposition. The most salient articles of faith to the great majority are without doubt the life-goal of personal happiness and the divine benefits which contribute to this state. The practical and this-worldly aspects of faith appeal immediately to those in need of economic, physical, or mental assistance; that there is no "rigid or unusually lofty moral code" to adhere to, nor any stiff standards of asceticism or contemplation in worship, make the pursuit of practical value through faith much simpler.[8] Simple also is the Gakkai's comprehensive explanation of the universe and all the good and evil therein.[9]

But the appeal of the Gakkai's teachings is not only to those with narrow, personal goals. The Society's doctrines are in fact a series of dual appeals which offer something to almost everyone. This skillful broadening of appeal may well be the most significant aspect of the Gakkai's belief system as a contributory factor to the Society's expansion.

First is the combination of the spiritual ("the more you believe . . .") and the material (". . . the more you will receive"). This doctrinal division is paralleled organizationally by the structural bifurcation of the Gakkai and the Sho Sect: the believer may consider himself primarily a member of one or the other, and at least some do make the distinction.[10]

Second is the distinction between the relative and the absolute. The sphere of value is relativistic; the value of any thing or action is determined by the relationship between it and its perceiver, the extent to which the thing or action is relevant to the needs of the perceiver. Political behavior is included within this sphere; the merits of any political act are relative to the resultant benefit to the total environment in which it occurs. Providing ultimate standards of good and evil is the function of religion. While even heretics may, and should, be included in the beneficial political measures enacted for all society, on an absolute plane their beliefs are still the source of evil and, on this plane of religious and spiritual conviction, must be struggled with. That these two spheres must be kept distinct is emphasized by the Gakkai: the effort to eliminate false religions must be restricted to debate and education and must never degenerate into physical, social, or political pressure.[11]

Third is the blend of egocentrism and altruism. The Sokagakkai offers an opportunity to benefit not only oneself but also one's fellow man. In fact, such a blend is incumbent upon the true believer; one's own human revolution is insufficient and propagation is a duty. In the act of propagation, or _shakubuku_, both elements are combined. By performing _shakubuku_ one obtains divine blessings for himself and at the same time contributes to the universal goal of _Kosen-rufu_.

Fourth, the Gakkai offers both security and adventure. A comprehensive frame of reference is provided, but those who have achieved security are urged to move outward, to participate in the great adventure of world propagation.

Fifth, the Gakkai is simultaneously both rational and irrational. It accepts the advances and the beneficial influences of modern science and medicine, but also emphasizes their limitations. Science is incomplete at best, and catastrophic at worst, without a proper guiding philosophy behind it; in addition, there are social and natural phenomena which even science is at a loss to explain, but which the Gakkai claims to understand with the aid of its theology. Medicine, too, is efficacious, but there are diseases which defy modern medical science; since heresy is the ultimate cause of disease, such sicknesses must be attacked through faith.

Sixth, Sokagakkai beliefs are a blend of old and new. In Japan, where old and new are often in intimate juxtaposition, this feature may well be of great appeal. The roots of Nichiren Shoshu go back to the thirteenth century, giving believers a tie with their national tradition. At the same time, the Gakkai claims "scientific" validity for its precepts: the Theory of Value is empirically efficacious, as thousands of members have attested, and the modern terminology--Neo-Socialism, Third Civilization, etc.--conveys an impression of current and even *avant-garde* thought.

Last, and related to the previous point, is the Gakkai's merging of nationalism and internationalism. The Nichiren tradition is indigenous and Nichiren himself was the most nationally oriented of Japan's great religious leaders; and the Japanese are at all times a very nationally-conscious race. Feelings of national superiority or altruism are projected outward by the Gakkai's establishment of universal goals. The altruist feelings of those who begin from a national orientation, as well as those who transcend this orientation, can seek fulfillment in the Sokagakkai.

NOTES: CHAPTER 3

1. After Neil Smelser, *Theory of Collective Behavior*, New York, 1963, p. 8.
2. James White, *Militant Religion in Japan: The Soka Gakkai*, unpub. A.B. thesis, Princeton, 1964; pp. 19-26; Neill McFarland, *Rush Hour of the Gods*, New York, 1967,

pp. 71ff.; Niels Nielson, "Religion and Philosophy in Contemporary Japan," in The Rice Institute Pamphlet, vol. 43 no. 4, January 1957, pp. 7-9; Clark Offner and Henry van Straelen, Modern Japanese Religions, Tokyo, 1963, pp. 121ff.; 143-44; Harry Thomsen, The New Religions of Japan, Tokyo, 1963, p. 22; Watanabe Baiyu, "Modern Japanese Religions, Their Success Explained," in Monumenta Nipponica, vol. 13, April 7, 1957, pp. 159-61; Takagi Hiroo, Nihon no Shinko Shukyo, Tokyo, 1961, p. 7.

3. This section is adapted from the following Sokagakkai publications: Makiguchi Tsunesaburo, Kachiron, Tokyo, 1961; Sokagakkai Kyogaku-bu, Shakubuku Kyoten, Tokyo, 1961 and 1967; Ikeda Daisaku, Rissho Ankoku Ron Kogi, Tokyo, 1966; Tokyo Daigaku Hokekyo Kenkyu-kai, Nichiren Shoshu Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1962; Kodaira Yoshihei, Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1963; and the English The Soka Gakkai, Tokyo, 1960, and The Nichiren Shoshu Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1966. Secondary English sources are White, op. cit.; Robert Ramseyer, "The Soka Gakkai," Ann Arbor, 1965; Thomsen, op. cit.; McFarland, op. cit.; Noah Brannen in Comtemporary Religions in Japan, vol. 2 no. 1, March 1961, p. 55, vol. 2 no. 2, June 1961, p. 13, vol. 3 no. 3, September 1962, p. 247, vol. 5 no. 2, June 1964, p. 143, vol. 5 no. 3, September 1964, p. 232.

4. "Shukyo Hojin 'Sokagakkai' Kisoku," Tokyo, 1966.

5. Nitta Rinzo, Sokagakkai, Komeito no Shinso, Tokyo, 1965, p. 66.

6. For a complete study of Nichiren and his teachings, see Gaston Renondeau, La Doctrine de Nichiren, Paris, 1953, and Le Bouddhisme Japonais, Paris, 1965; Masaharu Anesaki, Nichiren the Buddhist Prophet, Cambridge, 1916; Charles Eliot, Japanese Buddhism, New York, 1959. White, op. cit.; and Ramseyer, op. cit.; contain rather briefer treatments.

7. Delmer Brown, Nationalism in Japan, Berkeley, 1955; Ivan Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan, New York, 1960.

8. James Dator, "The Soka Gakkai: A Socio-Political Interpretation," in Contemporary Religions in Japan, vol. 6 no. 6, September 1965, pp. 219ff.

9. Loc. cit.

10. Loc. cit.; Yamaguchi Akira, Issenman-nin no Kokoro wo Tsukanda Himitsu: Sokagakkai no Shinri Senryaku, Tokyo, 1967, pp. 41ff.

11. Interview with Akiya Einosuke, General Executive, Sokagakkai.

CHAPTER 4

PRECIPITATION AND MOBILIZATION

A. Precipitation

> When the existing structure of a society is undermined or devalued, the members of that society become less able to face calamity. This process is a cumulative one; and if after it has gone at all far some major catastrophe strikes the lower and more exposed strata of the population, the way to revolutionary chiliasm may lie wide open.[1]

What is under consideration here is the process by which the conducive structures and strains of a society become linked to generalized belief systems such as that of the Sokagakkai so as to produce new social movements. Norman Cohn, above, mentions "catastrophe" as the key precipitating factor; such catastrophes would be the sudden creation or intensification of structural conduciveness or strain, such as a sudden collective deprivation (economic, social, or political) or a general systemic political failure.[2] Another type of precipitative factor could be the appearance of a charismatic or otherwise extraordinarily able leader.

In the case of the medieval European chiliastic movements investigated by Cohn, the catalytic factors tended to be events: plagues, civil disorders, and natural disasters in a context of disintegrating normative and value systems and traditional organizations and institutions had greatly magnified effects as they set off "an outburst of paranoia, a sudden, collective and fanatical pursuit of the Millennium."[3]

In a more recent example, the rise of Nazism exhibits all the elements precipitative of social movements.[4] Economic deprivation, national shame and outrage, and a political system which never won popular acceptance nor proved effective on certain crucial issues, became fuel for the flames set by a charismatic leader of truly epic proportions.

In the rise of the new religions in postwar Japan, the key precipitative elements are to be found in the changes in the Japanese psychological climate and political structure occasioned by defeat and Occupation. The formal elimination of and popular disillusionment with the official value system which provided for the inculcation of a single religious truth in the entire people; and the abolition of the institutional restrictions on all unofficial forms of religion created an environment wherein the conducive structural factors and social strains were freed from control and all types of religious behavior became permissable. Lacking these two changes, it is highly dubious that, even with military defeat, many of the new sects (and especially the Sokagakkai) would ever have appeared.

Concerning the evaporation of the official value system, it was the simultaneity of institutional relaxation and popular discrediting which accounted for the proliferation of new sects. The cessation of compulsory religious socialization precisely at the time when the content of this socialization process had most blatantly shown its impotence created a singularly unstructured situation wherein new values and socialization agencies enjoyed unprecedented opportunities. Whereas under the prewar constitution religious freedom was permitted only insofar as it did not interfere with one's obligations as a subject of the Emperor, the 1947 Constitution unconditionally guarantees freedom of religion to all. The effect of this change was to render impossible almost all control over the propagation of any ideology which could claim religious status, and this status was very broadly defined.[5]

Apart from these two general changes, which contributed to the rise of all of the new religions, there was a specific precipitating factor which led directly to the emergence of the Sokagakkai as the most prominent of the new sects. This was the Shakubuku Dai-Koshin, or Great Propagation Drive, launched in July 1951. From a membership of about three thousand persons in April 1951, the Gakkai grew to 5728 families by the end of the year, 22,324 families by the end of 1952, and 70,000 families in late 1953.[6]

The organization of the Sokagakkai and its proselyting style were largely responsible for the success of this drive. Well equipped with doctrinal arguments, the members aggressively presented their teachings to social elements which were unsure of themselves, their beliefs, and their future, and were at least relatively aware of calamity or crisis and a sense of lack of reliable support, material or spiritual. The entire drive, in its organizational and stylistic aspects, as well as in the choice of target social strata and suitable doctrinal emphases, was in large part determined by President Toda, whose role was crucial. Toda defined the situation with the help of both scripture and shrewd social observation and brought to bear his considerable organizational abilities in creating a militant, vigorous, proselyting church.[7]

B. Mobilization

Although the Sokagakkai was established in 1930, it is inaccurate to speak of "mobilization" in any real sense until the initiation of the Shakubuku Dai-Koshin in 1951. Makiguchi Tsunesaburo and his protege Toda Josei had joined Nichiren Shoshu in 1928, but during the prewar years the influence of religion upon the Soka Kyoiku Gakkai (or Value-Creation Education Study Society, as the organization was first named) was minor.[8]

The prewar Gakkai never exceeded a membership of a few thousand and was, as its name indicates, concerned primarily with questions of education and the creation of a pedigogical system based upon Makiguchi's Theory of Value. Nevertheless, the religious element deepened after the formal founding of the Society in 1937 with Makiguchi as first president and Toda as general director. In the late 1930's and early 1940's, as the government became more restrictive of religious behavior, inherently exclusive groups such as Nichiren Shoshu came under pressure. Amalgamation and conformity were the orders of the day, and the Gakkai's obstinacy brought on police surveillance and harassment. In 1943 a governmental order that Shinto paper offerings (kamifuda) be accepted and worshipped by all members was refused and in July the 22 top leaders of the Gakkai were imprisoned and the Society dissolved.

In November 1944 Makiguchi Tsunesaburo died in prison; Toda Josei was released shortly before surrender. The years 1945-50 were a rebuilding period.[9] Toda reassembled as many of the prewar membership as he could, renamed the organization the Sokagakkai (to signify the new universality of its relevance) and began small-scale propagation. At the same time he started to lay the infrastructure for later expansion: the nurturance of selected leaders, provision of the membership in general with a strong ideological weaponry, development of a strong organizational structure, and systematization of the proselyting technique.

In May 1951 Toda was inaugurated as second president of the Gakkai, and his Great Propagation Drive was launched in July, spearheaded by the Youth Division, a 1946 Toda creation. The years 1951-1958 were a period of rapid growth as the shakubuku campaign proved a success; the religious coloration of the Gakkai intensified and the Theory of Value was reduced to secondary status. In 1955 the Society made its political debut as fifty-three members, running as independents, were elected to local assemblies throughout the nation.

In successive elections the Gakkai extended its foothold; simultaneously, vigorous propagation increased its potential electoral base. By the time of Toda's death in April 1958, the Society had grown to almost 900,000 families and held fifty-six legislative seats, including three in the 250-seat Upper House of the National Diet, or parliament (see Appendices 1, 2).

With the death of Toda, the organizer and guiding spirit of the Sokagakkai, many observers expected the decline of the Society. But even during the interregnum of 1958-1960 the membership grew, and by May 1960, when Ikeda took office as third president, the Gakkai claimed almost 1.5 million member-families and boasted 281 legislative assembly seats, of which nine were in the Upper House.

Ikeda's tenure has been termed the "period of the religious political party."[10] While the teachings of Nichiren have been accorded unquestioned predominance within the Gakkai's belief system, political activities have expanded manyfold. Creation of a specialized and nominally autonomous political arm in 1961 was followed by the formation of a full-fledged political party, the Komeito (Clean Government Party), in November 1964, in whose name the Gakkai entered its first Lower House election, from which it emerged as the fourth largest force in that House. At present the Gakkai maintains its dual political and religious structural character, having achieved the status of third strongest political force in Japan (almost two thousand legislative assembly seats) and largest of the new religions (6.5 million families).

* * * * * * *

This sketchy history of the Sokagakkai may be periodized and analyzed in many ways. The purpose here is to analyze it as a process of mobilization of a social collectivity to value-oriented activity.[11] As mentioned above, only the years after 1951, when the Gakkai became a mass organization in any sense of the term, will be covered. The process of mobilization has the following aspects:

1. Leadership: what is the role of leadership in the mobilization process, especially charismatic leadership, a common element in movements oriented toward reconstitution or revitalization of entire societal value systems.
2. Real (i.e., original) and derived (i.e., brought in by different social elements later attracted to the movement) aspects of the movement.

3. Success or failure of specific tactics and strategic or tactical change brought about by trial or error.
4. The process of institutionalization and routinization.
5. Problems and instability developing during the institutionalization process: the appearance of new types of leaders; increasing social heterogeneity of the organization; strategic and tactical changes; and the problem of adaptation to the environment.

1. Leadership

Strong leadership roles are a common feature of social movements in general and the Japanese new religions in particular. In mass movements "it is the leader who makes the crowd last over a longer /than temporary7 period" and makes possible the organization of the masses.[12] Quite often such men are marginal intellectuals: frustrated aspirants to roles of prestige, achievement, and self-realization in education, the arts, or the professions who do not possess sufficient talent or connections to enable them to succeed. Hitler was such a man; so was Makiguchi Tsunesaburo.

The role of a central leadership figure is traditionally important in Japanese Buddhism.

> It might not be going too far to say that it is generally true of Japanese Buddhism that the general conception of the tie uniting the members of a given sect is less the fact that they share certain doctrinal views in common as that they share the characteristic of being all the followers of a certain sect founder.[13]

True to this tradition, the new religions almost without exception are built around an outstanding leader--often divine--who lives his principles, represents his religion's ideals, and shows in his behavior an example of living religion.[14]

The Sokagakkai is no exception. Makiguchi Tsunesaburo (1871-1944) was a frustrated academic who wrote one well-received book but who could not penetrate the highly centralized and bureaucratized Japanese educational world of his day with his novel pedagogical notions.[15] He moved through a succession of jobs in textbook publishing and elementary school administration, always deeply critical of the prevalent educational approaches of the day. To him, education should be pragmatic and creative of value, not stiff, formal, and archaic in its ethos.

Makiguchi's academic nature strongly influenced the Soka Kyoiku Gakkai. He was a scholar and pedagogue, not an organizer or orator--his protege Toda Josei often handled the lecturing chores.[16] Makiguchi was largely unconcerned with organizational expansion; had he lived longer the Gakkai might well yet be a small discussion circle.

Toda Josei was quite another type of man.[17] Like Makiguchi an immigrant to Tokyo from the northern island of Hokkaido, Toda had an abortive pedagogical career (during which he met and was so impressed by Makiguchi as to become his virtual disciple), but he gave up in 1923 to try his hand successively at insurance solicitation, running a school, writing, printing, and publishing. Prosperity eluded him and in 1924 his child died, followed in 1926 by his wife. He tried Christianity without success, and entered Nichiren Shoshu in 1928 along with his mentor.

In the Soka Kyoiku Gakkai Toda was concerned with organization and finance; he was little learned in the articles of faith until his imprisonment, during which time he pored over the scriptures, developed his sense of resolution and mission, and reportedly recited the daimoku two million times.[18] Upon his release from prison Toda set to work to resurrect the Gakkai, and as it developed he was perhaps the ideal man for the task.

In contrast to Makiguchi the scholar, methodical, steady, persuasive, puritanical in personal habits, meditative, and speculative, Toda was a hard-sell pitchman for his faith: frank, vigorous, often rude, talkative, fond of tobacco and alcohol in quantity, impulsive, and activist.[19] His great preference for the spoken over the written word was a strong point in the development of his propagational style, and he could beat down, win over, and inspire his adversaries much in the tradition of his predecessor Nichiren. He was also an organizational innovator; the interlocking horizontal and vertical dual structure of the Gakkai, an organizational tactic to which to Society today owes much of its cohesion, was established during his tenure.

The incumbent president of the Sokagakkai, Ikeda Daisaku (born 1928), was, like Toda, a fortuitous choice at a given stage of Gakkai history. Meeting Toda and being won over to conversion as a sickly youth of 19 whose family had suffered intensely from the war, his rise in the organization was swift.[20] He was a charter member of the executive staff of the Youth Division, established in 1951, and in 1954 became chief of staff (Sanboshitsu-cho), thus becoming in substance the operational head of the shakubuku program. This indication that he was being groomed for the succession was strengthened when he became concurrently General Executive (Somu) in 1958, just after Toda's death.

Until 1960 Ikeda ran the Gakkai in a triumvirate with General Director (Rijicho) Koizumi Takashi and Ishida Tsugio, editor of the Seikyo Shimbun (Holy Teaching News), the official Sokagakkai newspaper. Upon his election to the presidency in 1960 Ikeda became sole head of the Society.

Although an extremely able organizer, as was Toda, Ikeda is also an "organization man." Smooth and urbane, persuasive rather than vituperative, he has been described quite accurately by one Western journalist as "remarkably unassuming," "forceful," "Calmly authoritative and . . . extremely self-possessed," a man of "abiding patience and consideration."[21] More subtle and flexible, less open and ideological in style than Toda, he is very much the image of the leader of an organization which has arrived and feels secure and confident.

And the Sokagakkai has arrived. Ikeda inherited an organization of almost one million families, a viable religious and political concern. His tasks have been to keep the Society intact (no small job, in faction-ridden Japan); prevent lethargy and preserve proselyting vigor; enable further expansion by making the Gakkai more versatile in function and appeal and more harmonious with its social context; and to consolidate past and present gains by strengthening the internal agencies of indoctrination. Thus talents more administrative than evangelical are required, and Ikeda has them in abundance, as the continued growth and stability of the Gakkai shows.

At the same time, Ikeda is definitely an activist. Impatient, decisive, and intolerant of quibbling and hesitation, he is always in a hurry to put decision and thought into action. A man of strong habits, tastes, and preferences, he has perhaps impressed his own personality upon the Gakkai more than did either of his predecessors. In this process, the element of charisma has appeared for the first time in the Gakkai's history.

Makiguchi was completely devoid of charisma. Toda may have possessed the quality to a degree, but it was not a major factor in his leadership. To the Youth Division in particular he was the great master, the transmitter of the teachings, the commander and guide; he was not deified or idolized.[22]

Ikeda, on the contrary, is without doubt idolized and most probably deified by some of the Sokagakkai membership. The awe and respect in the voices of believers when they speak of him is impressive; the rapture with which they listen to one describe a conversation with him is intimidating; the sight of him at large gatherings moves many to tears. His interpretations of scripture and writings on guidance are considered on a par with the works of Nichiren himself as the repository of truth.[23]

2. Real and Derived Aspects

The original, ultimate goals of the postwar Sokagakkai were personal jobutsu and universal Kosen-rufu. Jobutsu is within the reach of all members and the divine benefits which are both contributory to and evidence of enlightenment have remained one of the most important points of doctrine around which converts can be mobilized.

Kosen-rufu, on the contrary, has remained beyond reach; with time it has become a very vague goal, and partial, short-term, and intermediate goals have been devised to fill in the foreseeable future.

In a speech in 1955 President Toda predicted Kosen-rufu by 1980; in 1963 President Ikeda pushed the date back to 1985.[24] By 1965 Ikeda declined to name a target date:

> the accomplishment of Kosen-Rufu will depend entirely upon the will of the High Priest. In other words, it is known only to the True Buddha or Gohonzon and it is unknown to us ordinary people.[25]

And in early 1966 Ikeda acknowledged that attainment could be "fifty years, a hundred years, two hundred years from now," although he subsequently set 1990 as a target.[26]

The 1990 target was made possible through the device of Shae no San'oku, one of the additional concepts derived from scripture to make Kosen-rufu a more plausible goal. According to this idea (first publicized in the early 1960's), when one-third of the population of an area has accepted Buddhism, one-third is sympathetic but unconverted, and one-third is ignorant of the faith, Kosen-rufu of that area may be considered complete. On this principle the Gakkai set up numerous partial Kosen-rufu goals: of the Japanese student population, of Tokyo, of Japan.

More concrete short-term goals have also been provided to keep spirit from lagging. In 1966 Ikeda set forth a set of seven seven-year periods covering the years up to 1979, each with its own set of goals.[27] At the beginning of each year a new series of annual goals is set; those for 1967 were

1. entry into the Lower House of the Diet,
2. initiation of construction of the Grand Main Hall (Shohondo) at the Head Temple,
3. emphasis of shakubuku,
4. a broadened cultural program, and
5. completion of the buildings for Soka Junior High School and Soka High School, the new Gakkai education project.[28]

In addition, monthly propagation goals and hortative slogans are presented.

As quoted above, the Sokagakkai includes political goals in its action program. These are the most important category of derived aspects of the Gakkai. The objective of Obutsu-myogo itself, as operationalized through the

Gakkai's entry into politics, is a derived goal. In light of the features of the Japanese context which have proved conducive to the growth of the Gakkai, one might suggest that the development of this political aspect is one of the most important factors in the Society's success.

The political aspect of the Sokagakkai, too, has its ultimate and short-range objectives. Obutsu-myogo is of course the final aim; as an intermediate step the Komeito has allowed the possibility of a coalition government. Before that stage is reached, the party restricts itself to targets of seat increases in each successive election, vigorous campaigns, and realization of its policies in legislation.

The concrete and immediate goals of kudoku and electoral success--the one real, the other derived--may well be the formal aspects of the Sokagakkai most responsible for the mobilization of several million believers to date. In addition there is one informal (and real, in that it dates from the Gakkai's earliest postwar beginnings) aspect, which is probably of equal importance: the feeling of belonging. Insofar as the Sokagakkai constitutes a frame of reference, a social nexus, and a system of values and norms for the socially distressed, the quality of the Society as a psychological and interpersonal tako-tsubo and the simple fact of membership are very likely to be at least as important factors in mobilization as are any of the principles or objectives formally adopted by the organization.

3. Specific Tactics and Strategies

Since its inception the Sokagakkai has enacted changes in both its strategies and tactics, in response to changes in presidential personality, organizational size, and social context. Many of the constant features of Gakkai tactics are shared with the other new religions.[29] One factor is structure: the new sects tend to have simple and highly centralized organizations. The complexity of the Sokagakkai's structure is evidence of a more advanced stage of differentiation and is a difference of degree, not of kind. Another factor is cost: the new faiths put very little financial burden upon their members. A third factor is activity and energy: the new sects are as a rule proselyting groups, eager to demonstrate their virtues to the world. This demonstrative proclivity is directed both inward and outward. Religious gatherings feature testimonial stories of blessings enjoyed; mass assemblies present a strong impression of unity, enthusiasm, and power to believer and non-believer alike.

Supplementing this extensive communication factor is an intensive communication factor: there is a high degree of vertical leader-follower instruction, guidance, and counselling and horizontal small-group interaction. The believer's superiors are exemplars of faith with whom to identify; his cellular worship group is a reference group and gemeinschaft from within which he can cope with the outside world.

A fifth factor is construction projects. Many of the new religions have extensive real estate holdings and elaborate headquarters complexes. The Sokagakkai has contributed great sums to the Head Temple of Nichiren Shoshu at the foot of Mt. Fuji, the Taisekiji, where now huge ferro-concrete edifices for worship and the accommodation of pilgrims tower over the original centuries-old temples, archways, and pagoda. In Tokyo, the Sokagakkai's administrative headquarters dominate the skyline of the Shinanomachi area; new multi-story buildings in ultramodern style house the Gakkai, the Seikyo Publishing Company, the Komeito, and the Soka Cultural Hall (Soka Bunka Kaikan). The impression (doubtlessly intended) conveyed by all this architecture is one of great affluence and financial power, of a very au courant philosophy with the solid and devoted backing of its adherents.

A final factor is the tactics of propagation. The new religions are highly rational in their technique of tailoring their beliefs and approaches to the social structures and strains which are potentially fruitful, and in aiming their efforts at the most deprived, but yet expectant, social strata. Concrete and immediate benefit and group membership are offered by nearly all of the new religions. The Gakkai, in addition, offers channels to the political system, where increasing numbers of Japanese see the possibility of benefit. Moreover, it ties the new member into the Japanese religious tradition and the currents of national pride by means of its connection with Nichiren.

Unlike the other new sects, too, the Sokagakkai makes explicit tactical appeal to the anomic elements in Japanese society.[30] The Gakkai accepts the notion of the atomized, alienated mass society and claims that its philosophy alone makes restoration of man to himself possible, through the organizing and coordinating agency of the Gakkai itself.

The strategic and tactical changes which have been made can be summarized by dividing the Gakkai's history into the Makiguchi, or exclusivist-academic, period; the Toda, or mobilizational-religious, period; and the Ikeda, or moderate-political, period. During the Makiguchi period the Gakkai's strategy--if there was one--was simply the dissemination of its pedagogical ideas; its tactics were those of a small study group interested in neither organizational growth nor efficiency. What proselyting was done was carried on largely through preaching; the tactical style was relatively passive.[31]

Under Toda the Gakkai's strategy became one of achievement of religious goals through giant-scale social mobilization. While the elements of tactics were consistently those listed above, the tactical style became belligerent, activist, and ideological. In the years 1945-1951 Toda (a) armed the lukewarm Makiguchi-period followers with his own brand of activist theory, replacing

Theory of Value (Kachiron) with a new Propagation Handbook (Shakubuku Kyoten), (first edition November 1951) as the principle guide to action; (b) built a new shock troop of proselyters in the Youth Division; and (c) redefined the relationship between the Gakkai and Nichiren Shoshu, arrogating to the Society substantive operational supremacy.[32]

During the years of his presidency Toda increasingly strengthened the religious aspects of the Sokagakkai. He drew extensively on the writings of Nichiren to justify both general strategy and specific tactics and relegated the teachings of Makiguchi to a tertiary role behind his own instructions and interpretations. These were embodied in numerous speeches, in the Shakubuku Kyoten, and in two hortatory works aimed at the Youth Division, Injunctions to Youth (Seinen Kun) and Injunctions to Patriots (Kokushi Kun), in the last of which he urged the youth to become "the pillar, the eyes, the great vessel of Japan," as Nichiren had claimed to be.[33]

Two examples of the activism typical of Toda's strategy are the Otaru Debate and the Tanro Controversy. In March 1955 the Sokagakkai challenged the original Nichiren Sect, Nichiren Shu, to a theological debate in the Hokkaido city of Otaru. The Nichiren Sect sent priests as its representatives, but at the hall they were met by a packed house (mainly Gakkai supporters) and a battery of skilled debaters brought from the Sokagakkai Study Department in Tokyo. The priests resorted to involved, philosophical arguments, the very language of which is difficult for the average Japanese to understand. The Gakkai side accused Nichiren Shu of worshipping snakes and foxes and being a gang of money-hunters.

The hall was soon in an uproar; the Nichiren Shu priests, recognizing the futility of further talk, withdrew. The Sokagakkai deemed this a signal victory for the faith and has since enshrined the incident in its chronology of achievements.[34]

The Sokagakkai came into conflict with Tanro, the Japanese coal miners' union, in the mid-1950's.[35] From 3800 families in Yubari, a Hokkaido coal city, local Gakkai membership climbed to 15,000 in 1956 and 25,000 in 1957. By 1957 there were Gakkai groups in all 75 Tanro locals and proselyting was proceeding apace. The Gakkai approach was to stress the efficacy of faith over union membership in the achievement of higher wages and better working conditions; the Society also emphasized a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship between labor and management which was anathema to the Marxist union leaders.

At first nonplussed by the Gakkai offensive and sharply restricted in their responses by the laws guaranteeing religious freedom, the union mounted a program of counter-education which, along with informal on-the-job pressure, eventually proved successful in halting the Gakkai drive. Nevertheless, today Hokkaido is one of the Sokagakkai's secondary power centers and the Tanro incident has also become a widely-cited precedent in the Gakkai's self-proclaimed record of resistance against religious repression.

Although a process of "thaw (yuki-doke)" began in the late 1950's, the moderate-Sokagakkai image is associated primarily with the tenure of President Ikeda. The aggressive shakubuku practices of the more zealous members of Toda's Youth Division sometimes constituted intimidation or invasion of privacy and occasionally led to violence. The belligerence with which priests of other faiths were set upon and badgered created an extremely negative impression in the public mind which exists today. At the same time the Sokagakkai had begun to pursue political goals; in order to maximize its electoral strength a broadening of appeal was necessary and moderation thus became a more advisable tactic than continued militance and combativeness. Finally, the environment was changing. The tensions and widespread dislocations of the Occupation and early post-Occupation years were giving way to a new situation of increasing social stability, economic affluence, and expanding popular perspectives.

In this new context the tactics and strategies of Ikeda Daisaku have proved admirably successful. Against the negative popular image, Ikeda preached relaxation, social acceptance, and moderation:

> The Sokagakkai was once able to rush forward at a speed of 100 miles per hour, on a wide-open field. However, almost everyone knows about the Sokagakkai

> now. Thus, today conditions are changed, as if [we were] driving a car in the city of Tokyo.
>
> To drive at 100 miles per hour in a place as crowded as Tokyo would cause terrible accidents. Therefore, I think a method of shakubuku based on a realization of the present environs, wherein everyone is coming to be quite conscious of Nichiren Shoshu and the Sokagakkai, would be best for the attainment of [our] goals.[36]

A general abatement of the previous climate of permanent mobilization was part of the moderation program. The adoption of the Shae no San'oku concept and an increased program of non-religious cultural activities characterized this strategy. The spirit of shakubuku has become more one of "Do your utmost!" than "Attack!," and the goals of propagation drives have been revised downward since the early 1960's.

In fact, the tactical atmosphere of the Gakkai is now one of "three steps forward, one step back."[37] One to three months of shakubuku activity are followed by a month of study, leadership, guidance, and counselling to consolidate the gains. Ikeda's speeches turn upon such themes as these, plus mention of short-term goals proposed and attained, and the necessity of long-term belief of a calm and rhythmic, not unstable and fiery, nature before any spectacular benefits may be expected.[38]

As the outlook of the Japanese people changed during the late 1950's, so did the strategies of the Sokagakkai. With personal security achieved people could afford to look beyond narrow individual interests; as the nation attained political and economic stability it began, a few years later, to move tentatively into a role in the international community.

President Ikeda's doctrinal emphases have mirrored and in some cases run ahead of these trends. Instead of Toda's stress on individual gain, national development, and racial salvation, Ikeda dwells upon altruistic self-exertion and societal benefit, a spirit of community with all the world, and the ultimate happiness of all mankind.[39] Ikeda's peripatetic habits reinforce the internationalist impression: he has visited North America and Europe several times since his inauguration.

The internal workings of the Sokagakkai are not sufficiently open to the non-member observer to permit judgment of the relative degree to which the strategic and tactical consistencies and changes described above are the outcome of personality, role, organizational context, or environmental influences. That the President has throughout Gakkai history clearly appeared to be a nearly absolute ruler and that the outward aspect of the Society has mirrored in turn the behavioral and stylistic traits of the three presidents constitutes, in this opinion, a prima facie case for the primacy of the presidential personality. The president seems to define his role and the strength of personality of at least the last two presidents suggests that the congruence of president and environmental situation was more the result of fortuitous circumstance than of environmental determination of either the choice of president or presidential behavior.

4. Routinization

Just as one is led to expect from a reading of the literature on social, and more particularly religious, movements the Sokagakkai has undergone a process of routinization during the years since initial mobilization in 1951.[40] This process has been structural and behavioral. Structurally the Gakkai has undergone an extensive process of differentiation and functional specialization. (See Appendices 4, 5, 6.) Roles have become very well developed; the holding of multiple positions by most of the top leaders means that personal specialization is limited, but any impression of the Gakkai as an unstructured, fluid social conglomerate is totally inaccurate. One excellent example of the degree to which internal processes have stabilized is the succession of Ikeda Daisaku to the presidency of the Gakkai.

With Toda's death in 1958 the disintegration of the Gakkai was widely predicted.[41] However, the uninterrupted growth and expansion of political power which continued during the 1958-1960 interregnum indicate that the leadership gap was structural and not functional. According to one Sokagakkai leader, Akiya Einosuke, all of those at the top of the Society had known for some years that Toda favored young Ikeda as his successor and that a consensus had already been achieved by the time of Toda's death. As proof of this he points out that Ikeda was appointed General Executive only months after Toda's death.

The fact remains that the interregnum lasted two years; perhaps a "consensus" was being forcibly created during that time. In addition, although the Rules of the Sokagakkai stipulate procedures for selection of presidents, Mr. Akiya reminds one that these rules are codified for the benefit of the public authorities in order to obtain permission to incorporate as a juridical person, and should not necessarily be regarded as an exact model of the Gakkai's internal workings.[42] However, succession problems can be among the very knottiest for social movements, and the fact that this particular one was solved with neither significant discontinuity in organizational behavior nor any visible internal division whatsoever is strong suggestion that the Sokagakkai has established a stable modus operandi.

The behavioral (external) routinization of the Sokagakkai is demonstrated by the relative "demobilization" of the Society under President Ikeda and the development of a stable pattern of activities. The relaxation of intensity was to some extent dictated by the Gakkai's new environment; it is not, however, a wholly beneficial development in the eyes of the leadership. That many members are becoming slovenly (read "relaxed") in their faith is shown by repeated exhortations in the Seikyo Shimbun to "return to the spirit of the early days" and to avoid at all costs complacency and inertia in one's organizational role.

The development of a patterned sequence of short-term goals also betokens routinization. The repetitious schedule of shakubuku, study, and guidance with predictable intervals of political activity constitutes a degree of institutionalization which was not yet present during Toda's presidency.

In direct contradiction to the overall process of routinization which seems to characterize the Sokagakkai today is the possible trend toward idolatry of the president. The "routinization of charisma" which Weber foresaw in, e.g., religious movements appears to be working in reverse in the Gakkai. This tendency is visible on the lowest level of the Society in the remarks of the faithful and, although explicitly inveighed against by Ikeda, it is probably enhanced by the increasing prominence given to the teachings of Ikeda in the total Gakkai ideology. This reverse process of charismatization is one of the elements of fluidity and flux which as yet bar description of the Sokagakkai as a "church" or "denomination."[43] The Gakkai is no longer an amorphous mass nor an unstable group with only intermittent structures; it has a highly developed organizational framework, very sophisticated operational strategies, and stabilized patterns of action. But it is still somewhere near the middle of any continuum leading from "sect" to "church."

5. Routinization and Instability

In a social context so given to factional intragroup behavior and a religious context so characterized by division and fragmentation, the lasting cohesion and apparent lack of instability of any kind which have accompanied the growth of the Sokagakkai are incredible. Leaders have changed, the membership has become increasingly heterogenous, tactics and strategies have evolved, and a tentative process of harmonization with the environment has begun, all without significant disruptive influences for the organization. Therefore discussion of problems of instability associated with the routinization and growth of the Sokagakkai may be deferred until future developments are considered; at this point only a few past and present matters will be cited.

The change in leadership from Makiguchi to Toda was facilitated by the fact that (a) Toda was the recognized protege of Makiguchi and (b) that the prewar leadership had evaporated with arrest and repression in 1943, Toda being one of only three leaders who did not recant while in prison.* During the early postwar years Toda gathered the old believers, among them Harashima Koji (former General Director of the Sokagakkai and head of the Komeito, now deceased), Izumi Satoru (now a Member of Parliament and Gakkai General Director), Koizumi Takashi (former General Executive, now inconspicuous), Tsuji Takehisa (M.P. and General Executive), Kashiwabara Yasu (M.P. and General Executive; the only woman in the top echelon of the Gakkai), Shiraki Giichiro (M.P. and General Executive), and Morita Kazuya (General Executive).[44]

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*Nineteen leaders recanted and were released, Makiguchi died, and Toda and Yajima Shuhei--now a Shoshu priest--remained steadfast until released in 1945.

At the same time, Toda was creating the Youth Division as a source of future leaders. Among the early products of this recruitment channel were Ikeda Daisaku, Hojo Hiroshi (now M.P. and General Executive; probably the number two man in the Gakkai), Ryu Toshimitsu (Tokyo Assembly member and General Executive), and Nakanishi Haruo (Alternate General Executive).

It is also alleged that during this period Toda was exerting pressure upon the Nichiren Shoshu hierarchy to accept the new role of the Sokagakkai vis-à-vis the sect. Apparently this new, upstart organization was not accepted by all of the priesthood, and a number of priests were "purged" and driven from the Taisekiji.[45]

By the late 1950's two groups were distinguishable in the elite of the Sokagakkai, the older Makiguchi converts and the younger Toda followers. According to Takase Hiroi, an experienced observer of the Gakkai, the Makiguchi "faction" spearheaded the early political drive, especially by providing candidates for the Upper House of the Diet. Meanwhile, Toda's "group" was taking over the key leadership positions in the Gakkai itself. By this interpretation, a compromise was reached between the two groups in 1960 when Ikeda became president but Harashima Koji, a "Makiguchi man," was chosen as General Director immediately below him.[46] The later appointment of Izumi Satoru, another prewar convert, to the post of General Director after the death of Harashima supports the Takase position.

However, one suspects that these two "factions" may be more analytical (or even fanciful) than concrete entities. Every member of the Gakkai may be categorized according to the period of his conversion. But factions, in the sense of relatively stable intraorganizational groups espousing differing policies or serving different interests even where such espousal or service may be destructive of the common good, have never been apparent in any documentable shape. This remains the case even now, with the existence of a third analytically separate group, the Ikeda followers.

According to Takase, Ikeda began to build his own band while he was Chief of Staff of the Youth Division.[47] Supposedly this group of subordinates was, even during Toda's incumbency, more obedient to Ikeda than to the president. One could see, if he were so inclined, the ascendance of ex-Youth Division personnel from the Ikeda group in the Komeito, especially in the Lower House Komeito contingent. Party Central Committee Chairman Takeiri Yoshikatsu clearly represents such a "faction." However, as in the case of the Makiguchi-Toda "division," a substantive split on any issue of religion or politics has yet to be shown.

The strategic and tactical changes most likely to produce schism in the Sokagakkai have been those involving first, the successive supercession of Makiguchi, Toda, and Nichiren Shoshu by Toda, Ikeda, and the Sokagakkai respectively; and second, the politicization of the Gakkai.

The eclipse of Makiguchi and his Theory of Value have been recounted at some length above. Toda never occupied as doctrinally central a spot in the Gakkai as did Makiguchi; therefore it may be misleading to speak of his "eclipse." However, the stylistic characteristics of the Toda period, summed up in the bluntly intolerant *Shakubuku Kyoten*, have been replaced by the easy, confident advice of Ikeda's *Guidance Memo* (*Shido Memo*): rhythm, consistency and constancy, sociability, and moderation.[48]

The eclipse of Nichiren Shoshu by the Sokagakkai is part of the politicization process of the Gakkai. Organizationally the supercession began in the 1950's; by 1962 one observer remarked upon his impression that while the Gakkai was certainly thriving, the Shoshu temples seemed overlooked.[49] With Ikeda's ascendance this development has become clearer. The intolerant spirit of Toda was also that of Nichiren; its categorical denial by the Gakkai ("We're not anti-Christian, we're just un-Christian") thus runs counter to the spiritual core of Nichiren Shoshu. A recent article by Ikeda in the doctrinal journal *Dai Byaku Renge*

(Great White Lotus) leaves little question that the Gakkai has assumed the core position for itself. While mentioning the Sho Sect once (as part of the full name of the Gakkai, Nichiren Shoshu-Sokagakkai), Ikeda declared that

> It is clear, in light of the Sacred Teachings /of Nichiren/, that, apart from the Sokagakkai, neither the true exaltation of Buddhism, nor the tranquillity of the nation, nor a peaceful world is possible.[50]

Such changes in emphasis as these could well have led to schism between leaders and followers or within either the elite or the rank-and-file. There definitely are leaders who are more oriented either to religion or to politics; in addition, there are members who can be identified temporally with each president and therefore possibly with his ideas.

But, again, no division has been seen. Perhaps it is that the interests of the whole organization, or the strength of ideology, or the personalities of the last two presidents, have had the power to preclude schism. Perhaps the continuous success enjoyed by the Gakkai has justified doctrinal changes post facto. On the elite level all of these factors are influentail. Among the membership at large one suspects that presidential personality and success have been most crucial; in addition, there may be a considerable number of believers for whom the primary gratifications obtained through membership in the kumi, or Gakkai cellular group, are most important, and for whom ideology, organizational goals, and even charisma are minor factors.

Success is probably the major reason why problems have not arisen regarding adaptation to the environment. In any militant religious group the contradictions between adaptation and internal integration (or idealism and pragmatism, or purism and realism) must be faced; when such a group participates in a democratic political system where votes must be won outside the sect if electoral success is to be achieved repeatedly, the problem is more sharply drawn. With a very few exceptions, the Sokagakkai's political record has been spectacularly successful, but one may suspect that at some point the decision will have to be made, at least tacitly, on the limits to which faith may be compromised in order to win votes. Conflict could well arise at such a time. And if present tactics begin to fail, any existing oppositions to the current degree of politically-motivated adaptation will be exacerbated.

* * * * * * *

Throughout its mobilization period the Sokagakkai has been able to sustain a combination of growth and cohesion unparalleled in Japanese history. Of great importance has been the leadership tandem of Toda the builder and Ikeda the maintainer, a pair of organizational and inspirational wizards whose fortuitous succession may be the most important single factor in explaining the rise of the Sokagakkai above the rest of the new religions.

Various aspects of the Gakkai movement have also been significant, especially the original and formal idea of kudoku, the derived and formal goal of electoral success, and the original but informal phenomenon of primary gratification in the small face-to-face group. However, in the evolution of strategy and tactics the primacy of the president is again apparent. The Sokagakkai shares many tactical features with the other new religions; these are no doubt largely responsible for its success. But no other of the new sects has been so fortunate as the Gakkai in the congruence of leadership style, leadership policy, and social context.

In the routinization process, too, the incumbents of the presidency have been of crucial significance. Strong and inspiring personalities have been instrumental in forestalling the appearance of factional activity; although, as Weber points out, charisma depends on success and the presidents have doubtlessly been strong in part because they have been presiding over an organization with potent doctrinal and intrinsic psychological appeal. But the presidents have shaped the doctrine and structure which have proven so appealing and thus some of the credit in this area,, too, is theirs. This is not to say that the development of the Sokagakkai is the result solely of its leaders. This development is the result of a complex process of interaction between social structures, social strains, doctrine, precipitating factors, and the actual mobilization of the Gakkai. At all points in this process social controls were --or, equally significantly, were not--at work. The element of leadership was also at work at several points, especially at the stages of doctrine, precipitation, and mobilization. And although leadership was not everything, it may well have been the most significant factor in these three stages in explaining the relative ascendance of the Sokagakkai over its religious competitors.

C. Conclusion

Having looked at some length at the process by which the Sokagakkai appeared on the Japanese scene and grew to its present size, we may address ourselves once again to the questions posed at the beginning of this section: Why another new religion? And why this particular new religion?

The social system within which the new sects arose possessed four principal properties which constituted fertile soil for such value-oriented social movements. These were (a) a relatively low degree of differentiation of the various components of action, especially norms and values, such that religious orientations were still central to the culture; (b) the absence of adequate alternative structures through which basic religious and social needs could be satisfied, of which the most important social need was (c) the acute desire for a psychic tako-tsubo, or framework of stable and intimate social relationships established within a small-group context which was also (d) an extremely effective communication structure.

Two additional properties of the Japanese social structure which conduced to the growth of the Sokagakkai in particular were (a) the stage of secularization and differentiation which Japanese culture had reached, a level at which the populace had become politically conscious, thus creating a potential response to the Gakkai's political appeals; and (b) the simultaneous absence (as perceived by a sizable element of the populace) of structures of political articulation which were both open and responsive.

The social strains which contributed to the growth of all of the new religions during the period of Sokagakkai development derived primarily from defeat and the subsequent reconstruction/hyperdevelopment process. Of these, (a) normative chaos and (b) deprivations of various kinds, both absolute and relative, were of primary significance. The Gakkai battened on the large numbers of people suffering from all these strains, but the expansion of the Society after the period of initial postwar crisis, and the responses of Gakkai members to questioning on the subject, indicate that the Sokagakkai, more than the other new religions, may have responded successfully to the relative deprivation--especially psychological--which developed later and is the most significant form of deprivation extant in Japanese society today.

Doctrinally, all of the new religions responded to these structural characteristics and strains in certain common ways, the most important of which were (a) the provision of normative and value systems with purported validity in contemporary society, and (b) the promise of divine benefit, here and now, as the tangible fruit of faith. The Sokagakkai's kudoku-ron (theory of divine reward) and kofuku-ron (theory of happiness), and its stipulated rituals and (often tacit) behavioral guidance, are examples of this doctrinal response. In addition, the singularly national quality of the Gakkai's heritage and the consummate skill with which seemingly contradictory appeals are blended are largely responsible for the ascendance of the Society among the new sects.

Military defeat and Occupation, by leading to (a) popular disillusionment with and formal disestablishment of the official prewar value system and (b) abolition of all institutional controls upon religious expression, were the key factors in precipitating the "rush hour of the gods" in postwar Japan. The defiantly nonconformist Sokagakkai owes perhaps more to these factors than do the more pliable sects, but it is in the Shakubuku Dai-Koshin of 1951, masterminded by Toda Josei, that one finds the factor which precipitated the Sokagakkai's exclusive drive to prominence.

The role of leadership, which stands out in any examination of the Shakubuku Drive, has been of crucial importance to the Sokagakkai throughout its mobilization period. Great leaders, especially charismatic ones, have been central figures in the rise of most of the new sects; but in none are they so significant as in the Sokagakkai. Many of its tactical characteristics and real and derived aspects the Gakkai has shared with other sects; among these are the primacy of divine benefit, the provision of a social _tako-tsubo_, the focus upon certain socio-economic strata, and the patterns of intensive and extensive communication. However, changes in strategy and tactics, and the very process of routinization and the problems it entails, have brought schism and decline to many of the new religions, while the Gakkai flourishes. Why?

Apart from the common characteristics of the mobilizational process of the new religions in general, the peculiar features of the Sokagakkai's extraordinarily successful development with possible explanatory relevance are (a) the quality of leadership and, as derivatives of this feature, (b) politicization and (c) success. As previously mentioned, the political element of the Gakkai's appeal may be especially significant in a society at the developmental level of Japan, where traditional values and orientations are still strong despite the emergence and increasing penetration of more modern structures and behavior patterns.

The final point may appear redundant, but it is true that nothing succeeds like success. The Sokagakkai's success to date has been largely the result of able leadership, but the objective conditions of social structure and social strain have also made crucial contributions; the "value-added" process which has produced today's Sokagakkai is in constant flux and a change in any one of the contributory factors of the process could result in the disappearance or radical alteration of the movement, possibilities which will be considered at the conclusion of this study. Survival and demise are not solely determined by leadership or any other subjective property of the Gakkai. But the very fact of success has a feedback effect upon both the environment and the Gakkai which has to date been singularly "successful (that is, beneficial)" for the continued growth and stability of the Society.

NOTES: CHAPTER 4

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3. Cohn, op. cit., p. 30.

4. Emil Lederer, State of the Masses, New York, 1940, p. 65; Alan Bullock, Hitler, A Study in Tyranny, New York, 1964, passim.

5. See the Religious Juridical Persons Law as discussed by William Woodard, "Study on Religious Juridical Persons Law," in Contemporary Japan, vol. 25 nos. 3

and 4, September 1958 and March 1959; vol. 26 nos. 1 and 2, August and December 1959.

6. Nakaba Tadakuni, Nihon no Choryu: Sokagakkai Hatten no Ayumi, Tokyo, 1968, pp. 313-14.

7. Saki Akio and Oguchi Iichi, Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1960, p. 137.

8. For a more complete account of the early history of the Sokagakkai see Saki and Oguchi, op. cit.; Takase Hiroi, Dai San Bummei no Shukyo, Tokyo, 1962; James White, Militant Religion in Japan: The Soka Gakkai, unpub. A.B. thesis, Princeton, 1964; Robert Ramseyer, "The Soka Gakkai," Ann Arbor, 1965; Sokagakkai, The Nichiren Shoshu Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1966.

9. This period is described vividly, though subjectively, by Ikeda Daisaku in Ningen Kakumei, Tokyo, 1965

10. This period is covered in greater detail in Takase Hiroi's Komeito, Tokyo, 1964; Ningen Kakumei wo Mezasu Ikeda Daisaku, Tokyo, 1965; and Ningen Fukko: Sokagakkai ni Ikiru, Tokyo, 1964; Ishida Ikuo, Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1965; Murakami Shigeyoshi, Sokagakkai to Komeito, Tokyo, 1964. The available English sources--White, op. cit.; Ramseyer, op. cit.--are somewhat dated now.

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12. Lederer, op. cit., pp. 230ff.

13. R. P. Dore, City Life in Japan, Berkeley, 1958, p. 347.

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16. Nakaba Tadakuni, "Sokagakkai Gekido no Shichinen," in Zaikai, June 15, 1967, p. 120.

17. Saki and Oguchi, op. cit., pp. 152ff., Takagi Hiroo Nihon no Shinko Shukyo, Tokyo, 1961, p. 71.

18. Takagi, op. cit., pp. 72-73; Takase, Dai San Bummei, p. 148.

19. Tsurumi Shunsuke et al., Shakubuku, Tokyo, 1962, pp. 118ff.; Takase, Dai San Bummei, p. 151; Oguchi Iichi,

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20. For a biography of Ikeda, see Takase, Ikeda Daisaku. English sources are White, op. cit.; and Ramseyer, op. cit.

21. J. F. Flagler, "A Chanting in Japan," in The New Yorker, vol. 42 no. 40, November 26, 1966, p. 183.

22. Saki and Oguchi, op. cit., p. 150.

23. Takase, Ikeda Daisaku, p. 22.

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25. World Tribune, August 7, 1965.

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27. World Tribune, May 10, 1966.

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31. Ikeda, Seiji to Shukyo, pp. 123-24; Takase, Ikeda Daisaku, pp. 79ff.

32. Takase, Dai San Bummei, p. 150.

33. Murakami, op. cit., p. 39.

34. Saki and Oguchi, op. cit., pp. 143ff.

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37. Seikyo Shimbun, June 3, 1967.

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40. Ernst Troeltsch, *The Social Teaching of the Christian Churches*, New York, 1931; Liston Pope, *Millhands and Preachers*, New Haven, 1965; Bryan Wilson in *American Sociological Review*, vol. 24 no. 1, February 1959, p. 3; Benton Johnson in *American Sociological Review*, vol. 22 no. 1, February 1957, p. 88.

41. Takase, *Dai San Bummei*, pp. 121-22.

42. "Shukyo Hojin 'Sokagakkai' Kisoku," 1957, 1962, 1966; interview with Akiya Einosuke, General Executive, Sokagakkai.

43. Troeltsch, *op. cit*.; Pope, *op. cit*.; Wilson, *op. cit*.; Johnson, *op. cit*.

44. Takase, *Dai San Bummei*, p. 147; Murakami, *op. cit*., p. 108.

45. Murakami, *op. cit*., p. 112.

46. Takase, *Dai San Bummei*, p. 124.

47. Takase, *Ikeda Daisaku*, p. 207.

48. Ikeda Daisaku, *Shido Memo*, Tokyo, 1966, passim.

49. Takami Jun, "Sokagakkai ni Tou," in *Chuo Koron*, August 1962, p. 291.

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PART II. INTERNAL PROCESSES IN THE SOKAGAKKAI

CHAPTER 5

ADAPTATION TO THE ENVIRONMENT

The process by which the Sokagakkai adapts[1] to its environment by obtaining the resources necessary to sustain itself and by maintaining organizational relationships with its social and political context has two primary aspects. The first is the recruitment of members, the "resource" without which there would be no organization at all. Second is the procurement of funds. The Gakkai claims that its vehicle is faith, but no organization of the Society's magnitude, with the multifaceted program of activities supported by the Gakkai, can exist without a solid financial base.

A. Recruitment

The recruitment process through which the Sokagakkai perpetuates itself is a combination of three factors: the tactics of propagation; the congruence of these tactics and the teachings which they communicate with the condition and attitudes of the target of propagation; and the process of actual conversion to Nichiren Shoshu and entry into the Sokagakkai.

As made abundantly clear in the preceding section, the Sokagakkai is a proselyting organization. The proselyting ideal is central to the Gakkai's self-judgment as the only true religion: any faith which does not try to prosylete or criticize other religions or to reform the world (especially the world of this the Mappo era, characterized by glaring injustice, rampant evil, and general moral decay) with its teachings is by definition a dead religion.[2] Propagation is thus not simply a natural feature of any real religion but is the epitome of the proper relationship of religion and society in this age.

Not only is propagation essential, but the shakubuku form of proselyting in particular is required by the exigencies of the epoch. In these chaotic days heretical religious thought is rampant and befogs the minds of the people, necessitating a drastic tactical approach which can forcibly root out mistaken modes of thought.

1. Tactics

The propagation tactics of the Sokagakkai center upon shakubuku, especially as practiced in the zadankai, or discussion meeting, the gathering of the members of the lowest-level subunits of the Sokagakkai, the kumi (unit), the han (group), and the chiku (district). The recruitment process may be at present undergoing a major change: the longer the Sokagakkai exists, the greater will become the role of family socialization in the creation of new Gakkai members. However, the great bulk of new Sokagakkai members is still brought in through the propagation process, and it is this process which will be focused upon here.

The duty to proselyte is made quite clear to the membership. Shakubuku is not only "one's natural duty as a member of society," but "one's essential activity as a Gakkai member."[3] "The Sokagakkai is a proselyting organization and if you take away the term shakubuku there is nothing left;" propagation is thus "the marrow of the Gakkai spirit."[4]

Shakubuku is defined by the Gakkai as "the merciful deed of saving those who are troubled with various kinds of misfortunes arising from heretical religions."[5] What it is most often in its concrete practice is a technique of determining the dominant problem by which the prospective convert is troubled and presenting him with the ideas of happiness and divine benefit as they bear upon his particular problem. Although this tactic is by definition an "act of mercy" which emanates from the compassionate heart of the propagator, it has often in the past been rhetorically (and sometimes physically) a very violent matter. The Gakkai denies all violence but acknowledges that pressure may be necessary; shakubuku is

> forceful urging, as in the case where a child may be about to fall off a precipice or into a river. At that point one does not worry about niceties, but out of zeal to save the individual one puts all his force into his appeal and literally commands.[6]

But the spiritual motivation of shakubuku is always defined as compassion. This feeling, jihi, is akin to the Western notion of agape; it is neither eros (the Gakkai denounces the conflict and misery resulting from Christian passion) nor love (which the Gakkai sees as meaningful only in relation to hate) but "the absolute, highest manifestation of life," which springs from realization of the unity of all forms of life in the Buddha.[7]

Shakubuku has undergone a change during the last several years. Until the early 1960's the literal translation of shakubuku, "to break and flatten," was an accurate description of the process. On occasion Gakkai members (usually acting in groups) would surround a home and make noise until one family member would agree to join, or belabor a mark with intensive criticism and earnest exhortation for hours on end.[8] Sometimes threats of divine punishment were used: a child's illness or death might be explained as the parents' fault due to heretical beliefs; dire injuries and calamities might be predicted as the fruit of resistance to the True Religion.[9] In such instances the "fear of punishment /instilled/ in a mind weakened and made receptive by hours of pressure" could lead to collapse of one's critical faculties and intellectual defenses, and acquiescence in the demands of the proselyters.[10]

The reputation of the Gakkai as a fanatical, ultramilitant bank of religious zealots owes much to this earlier style of shakubuku. One of the primary efforts of President Ikeda has been to institute a milder form of propagation and thereby help to reform the Gakkai's image. Ikeda advocates *shakubuku*, but only within reason.[11] Unrestrained propagation is more likely to repel than attract and the proselyter as a model of faith is as important as his role as an active evangel. At a recent meeting of leaders Ikeda stressed *shakubuku* by example:

1. The member should first build a united, harmonious, and happy family circle worthy of admiration and respect by all;
   a. Familial discord and late hours are thus to be avoided, and
   b. Neighbors are to be treated with respect and consideration regardless of their religious beliefs.
2. The member should endeavor to make himself the most trusted and respected person at his place of work.
3. Specific *shakubuku* activity should be bright, enjoyable, and relaxed.[11]

In fact, *shakubuku* has lost its essentially aggressive character during the recent past and has in practice become very similar to Nichiren's other propagation technique, *shoju*. *Shoju* is best described as soft-sell *shakubuku*, according to the Gakkai it is to

> introduce the True Buddhism [to another] without denying the sect to which the other man belongs.[13]

It is much more explicatory and explanatory than *shakubuku*, and much less combative and imperative. It has received major emphasis only since early 1964, when it was presented as the proper propagation technique for use in foreign countries.[14] Since that time, however, the entire propagation program has tacitly taken on the attributes of *shoju*, both in Japan and abroad.

As the style of propagation has turned from *shakubuku* to *shoju*, so the primary recruitment agency has changed from confrontation in the streets or in the target person's home to *zadankai*. This trend began in the latter half of the 1950's and by 1960 the emphasis was clear.[15] The advantages of *zadankai* *shakubuku* are many. Attendance by non-members is a more voluntary act than virtual incarceration in one's own home; thus the whole situation is less intimidating. The visitor has the opportunity to see a congenial gathering of a few dozen kindred spirits who have established a trust and rapport which is enviable. With a gathering of this size, the probability is high that at least one of the members present will either be plagued by or will have already overcome through faith problems similar to any which may be bothering the visitor; such common problems aid in the creation of empathy and familiarity.

The *zadankai* enables collective attack where such a tactic may be considered necessary, but it also enables the Gakkai leadership to control the *shakubuku* campaign; all proselyting at *zadankai* takes place under the eyes of a leader, thus reducing the chance that over-zealous believers will depart from officially-sanctioned doctrinal or tactical methods. It is firmly asserted by the Sokagakkai--and the assertion appears largely justified--that whatever excesses were committed in the past were unsanctioned and uncondoned; the increased role of the zadankai can certainly be interpreted as an effort to avoid such damaging publicity in the future.

A final recruiting agency which has developed during the last few years is the Komeito. Ostensibly independent of the Sokagakkai, the Komeito assiduously cultivates a secular image. The party newspaper, the Komei Shimbun, seldom mentions either religious goals or principles, although all of the policies it presents issue directly from the Gakkai in that all of the Komeito leaders are also Gakkai members.

The Komeito tries very hard to attract votes from outside the Sokagakkai membership; its policies contain elements calculated to attract almost every, if not every, social group. The exact significance of the Komeito as a recruitment structure is difficult to assess. It is probable that very few converts are drawn solely by political appeals, although considerable numbers of non-Gakkai member voters do apparently succumb to secular Komeito appeals. However, political arguments are used by the Gakkai in its propagation activities, and it is also probable that they do contribute to the persuasiveness of the shakubuku effort.

The pace of the shakubuku program, like its style, has changed with time. In the early stages of the Shakubuku Dai Koshin mobilization was constant and the Gakkai increased geometrically (see Appendix 5). With time the rate of increase began to decline (see Appendix 1) and such growth became an unrealistic goal; by the mid-1960's the Society seems to have settled upon a *shakubuku* strategy of "one family per *han*" in its one- or two-month propagation drives.[16] This was the goal in the May, July, and August 1967 *shakubuku* campaigns, and the converts in these three periods totalled 174,197; 133,333; and 165,938 families, respectively.[17]

But despite the lasting success of propagation efforts, as shown by the above absolute figures, problems have arisen. Although the number of *han* increases with time, the rate of increase of the membership has declined almost every year since 1958 (see Appendix 1). In such a situation the pressure upon each *han* to convert one new family during each drive must become considerable. According to one backslider, a member under pressure to find converts offered a taxi driver three thousand yen (about eight dollars) to accompany him to a temple and nominally join.[18] Another member spoke to the author of the anxiety he felt when he discovered that he had approached every one of his relatives and acquaintances.

The importance of this member's statement is shown when the relationship of proselyters and converts is examined. Hardly anyone, it appears, is subjected to *shakubuku* by strangers. Sokagakkai members have indicated in a number of surveys[19] that they were won over primarily by (a) *friends* (28% of the responding Gakkai members in one survey, 48% in another, and 25% in a third); (b) *neighbors*

(22% in one survey, 35% in another, and 33% in a third; (c) relatives (32% in one survey, 16% in each of two others, 19% in a fourth, and 39% in a fifth); and (d) co-workers (25% in one poll, 22% in another, and 20% in a third). The popular image of Sokagakkai members scouring the streets accosting strangers is inaccurate; in the five surveys cited here the proportion of respondents who named strangers as their converters averaged 4 percent.

A tentative distinction on the basis of sex may be discerned in these data. Male Gakkai members tended to have been converted by relatives, friends, and co-workers; female members were more often brought in by relatives and neighbors.[20] This distinction intuitively seems accurate, given the stay-at-home life pattern of Japanese wives and the large amount of time spent away from home by working Japanese males.[21] The absence of geographical ties between many converts--especially males--and their converters (who become responsible for their spiritual fidelity and maturation) has potentially damaging influence upon organizational unity since it makes mentor-follower communication difficult. As we shall see later, the Gakkai has taken steps to compensate for this problem.

2. Entry Motives: Congruence of Tactics and Conditions

The winning over of a new convert to the teachings of the Sokagakkai requires that contact be made between the tactics which the proselyter brings to bear and the preexisting mental set of the target person. Judging from the responses of Gakkai members to the question "Why did you join?," contact is most often made when the Gakkai's doctrine of happiness (kofuku-ron) and divine benefit (kudokuron) intersect with the personal problems of the proselytee. Motives for entry into the Sokagakkai have been impressionistically grouped under three headings: byo or illness, hin or poverty, and so or conflict. Empirical data support this description of the forces which bring the Gakkai its new members, although they do not directly provide an explanation of whether the motive force is social (a search for sympathy or other human assistance) or religious (a quest for divine blessing). That social causes are at least important can, however, be inferred from such data as the following.

In five surveys of members of the Sokagakkai,[22] the proportion of respondents who gave illness as the major motive for entry varied from 13% to 28%; the mode was 19% and the mean was 20%. Considering the popular impression of "the Sokagakkai, fattening on the hopelessness of the poor."[23] economic reasons for entry play a surprisingly minor role: in the same five surveys such responses accounted for from 4% to 27% of the respondents, with a mode of 13% and a mean of 14%. Conflict, on the other hand, seemed to be a very important factor. This category was very loosely defined and included all types of interpersonal friction and miscellaneous problems of "human relations." The proportion of respondents who placed themselves in this category ranged from 11% to 61%, with a mode of 26% and a mean of 29%. This last factor suggests the importance of social causes in the growth of the Sokagakkai. Although it may be that converts expect their social relationships to be revolutionized through divine assistance, it is also quite possible that this particular motive is not connected with any doctrinal point at all but signifies rather the search for a satisfying social nexus which is ended by the act of conversion.

The total proportion of Gakkai members whose motives for entry fell under these three headings in the five surveys cited above ranged from 38% to 80%, with a mode of 67% and a mean of 63%. The balance of the respondents was divided among a large number of alternative motives, no one of which seemed to account for a significant proportion of the Gakkai membership.

More intensive data parallel the aggregates presented above. A study of testimonials (taikendan) in the Seikyo Shimbun which mentioned motives for entry showed that reasons related to health, family, and economics were in a ratio of 4:3:3.[24] A few examples of such testimonials illustrate the motivation which leads to entry:

> Miss Sato Yoshiko (22 years old) suffered from dermatitis; a red rash broke out all over her face and initial itching gave way to pain. With hospitalization she improved but, after her release, she still suffered from the rash and redness. Ashamed, she

> avoided her friends. Upon seeing her thus, one of her dormitory-mates spoke to her of the faith of Nichiren Shoshu. . . . By the time a week had passed, Miss Sato had enshrined [her] *gohonzon* and, sitting properly [before it], recited her prayers in a small voice. . . .[25]

* * *

> Until I entered the faith three years ago, my desk was full of stomach and liver remedies, which I treated like valuables. Medicine was everywhere; the drawers of my wife's mirror-stand were full. Even at dinner--which should be enjoyable--every day I gulped down medicine while listening to my wife hysterically complaining about the misery of life.
>
> Now, only three years since then, clippings from the *Seikyo Shimbun* have taken the place of the medicine in my desk and once again, after 25 years of marriage, it is as it was when we were newly wed, with ordinary cosmetics neatly arranged on my wife's mirror-stand. (Mr. Aoki Koji, 53 years old)[26]

* * *

> The P. Clothing Store of Miss Iga Kazue (34 years old) is extremely busy with the large number of orders for summer wear, and every day [she] is furiously at work. "We're so busy, so busy; it's like year-end all year long. It's gotten to the point where I have to turn customers away."--with happy cries of despair, Miss Iga works away at her sewing machine.
>
> For Miss Iga, too, who has been with her needles for 15 years, her earnest wish since the time she entered the faith has been fulfilled; since last July she has possessed her own, though small, shop.[27]

Differences in motivation appear to exist between different elements of the Gakkai membership. The reasons given by the younger believers focus more on social and spiritual needs, on altruistic and universal goals, and on specifically doctrinal orientations.[28] The dullness, decadence, or looseness of life and the search for a significant, meaningful mode of existence are often the attractive agents which draw youth to the Gakkai upon contact with its proselyters. A more specific element in the motivation is the extreme pressure of secondary school, especially the preparation for college entrance examinations, which is felt by Japanese children.[29] Illness is also a factor. President Ikeda, General Executive Akiya Einosuke, Student Division Chief Shinohara Makoto, and other top leaders offer physical disability as a major cause in their decision to accept the faith.[30]

Health problems are a more important factor, however, in drawing older people to the Gakkai, as are financial, family, and other concrete problems of everyday life. Older Gakkai members tend toward these "instrumental"[31] reasons for their conversion, as do women more than men.[32] Males may tend to be slightly more altruistic and, expectably, more concerned with job problems than women.

Such "external" forces as those described above, which push people toward the Gakkai, are not the sole element leading to conversion. The Gakkai's own ("internal") teachings, intersecting as they do with these external problems (nayami), provide a link between external cause and acceptance of faith. However, these two factors do not exhaust the range of causal elements which influence the decision to join. In a survey run by the Gakkai itself, 29% of the respondents asserted that they had been attracted "by the zeal of the proselyter."[33] Related to this group are the respondents in two other surveys--25% in one and 37% in the other--who averred that they entered because they "were talked to" or "were advised to."[34] Considering the role of the zadankai meeting in the offering of such talk and advice, it is also significant that some converts are attracted simply by the "atmosphere" of the zadankai.[35]

The establishment of secure social relationships which can bring an end to anxiety and interpersonal conflict has already been mentioned as a factor in conversions; the possibility that such relationships may be yearned for, sought, and achieved without reference to Gakkai beliefs has also been discussed. Finally, the confidence and new sense of orientation which could come with internalization of Sokagakkai teachings can similarly be independent of these beliefs. In response to a question about the possibility of having received benefit without the Gakkai, one member replied,

> No, I think that even if you don't join the Gakkai, if you have self-confidence you can get it. In everything, having confidence in oneself is most important of all.[36]

This self-confidence is no doubt created in some measure by absorption of Gakkai teachings; the member quoted above apparently could not himself find confidence outside of the Society. But his nonchalance regarding the absolute and exclusive efficacy of Gakkai tenets suggests that here, too, Gakkai membership may have intrinsic attraction.

3. Conversion and Entry

Whatever the combination of factors which induces a decision to join the Sokagakkai and however secular it may be, entry is a religious act. Conversion to Nichiren Shoshu and entry into the Sokagakkai have become a single act; the "gojukai" or act of receiving one's own copy of the gohonzon, which signifies acceptance of the faith, "automatically" makes one a member of the Gakkai.[37] The gohonzon costs the convert 250 yen (about 70 cents); he must also buy a set of prayer beads (juzu) for 400 yen (about $1.11).

At this point the major overt action has been taken; however, the process of inculcating the doctrine in the new believer is just beginning. Most converts are lukewarm--if that--in their faith. Uncertain, subjected to coaxing or responding to social obligations to a friend or relative, the average convert has only the foggiest notion of the whole Gakkai belief system, the most tenuous commitment to the teachings, and the weakest of expectations.[38] With such tepid new members the Sokagakkai must rely upon post-entry indoctrination to transform the new believer into the true believer. The key person in this indoctrination is the converter, the individual who brought the new member to the temple. He must be a continual mentor and source of help and guidance, and must be sure that the new believer attends meetings and participates in Gakkai activities.[39] There are a host of supplementary socializing agencies, but the converter is the critical link between them and the convert. That the Gakkai can keep as many of its initially uncommitted converts as it does indicates that this socialization process is effective.

B. Finance

The Sokagakkai does not publish any accounts of its financial activities, thus making possible numerous rumors (which the Society's opponents are only too happy to circulate) concerning its sources of funds. One recent estimate of the regular expenses of the Gakkai was $28 million, with income exceeding outgo.[40] The distribution of expenses, according to President Ikeda, is that 90% of income is donated to the Taisekiji and the construction of local Nichiren Shoshu Temples; the balance, plus the profits from Gakkai publishing activities, goes for the construction and maintenance of Sakagakkai headquarters buildings and local halls.[41] The income is derived from--in addition to publishing--contributions from the members of the Financial Department and special donation drives among the whole membership. There are no regular assessments levied upon the members aside from the obligation to buy certain publications.

The Financial Department (Zaimu-bu) is in a sense an elite group within the Gakkai. Membership is voluntary and selective; applicants must demonstrate firm belief and solid theological knowledge; their financial situation is investigated and they are interviewed by leaders before appointment by the Headquarters.[42] Upon appointment the member receives a distinctive gold Gakkai lapel badge, in contrast to the lead badge worn by the general membership.

Members of the Financial Department are obliged to contribute a minimum sum to the Gakkai annually. At present this sum is 8000 yen (about $22); since there are an estimated 2 million persons in the department, the annual income from this source is at least $40 million.[43]

Slightly less profitable (though more productive of income) is the Sokagakkai's publishing empire. The Gakkai pours forth a flood of written material, from Nichiren's works and exigeses thereof to children's picture magazines. The following chart shows only the Society's periodical literature as of 1966; in addition, the Seikyo Press, Ushio Publishing Company, and other Gakkai subsidiaries offer a reading list of over one hundred titles, including the collected lectures and writings of presidents Toda and Ikeda and a number of works by non-Sokagakkai members unrelated to the Gakkai.

	Circulation	Yen	Cents
Seikyo Shimbun (*Holy Teachings News*):	3,000,000/dy.	300	(80)/mo.
Seikyo Gurafu (*Holy Teachings Graphic*):	1,100,000/wk.	160	(40)/mo.
Dai Byaku Renge (*Great White Lotus*):	1,500,000/mo.	50	(15)
Todai (*Lighthouse*):	50,000/mo.	50	(15)
Kibo no Tomo (*Friends of Hope*):	350,000/mo.	130	(35)
Ushio (*The Tide*):	430,000/mo.	120	(33)
Shukan Genron (*Weekly Forum*):	500,000/wk.	160	(40)/mo.
Komei Shimbun (*Clean Government News*):	1,300,000/dy.	200	(55)/mo.*
Dai San Bummei (*Third Civilization*) and others:	200,000	150	(42)/mo.

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*Even if one excludes the Komei Shimbun, the Komeito party paper, the Gakkai's own income remains an estimated $45 million.

These figures were compiled for an anti-Sokagakkai book, Dato Sokagakkai (Down With the Sokagakkai; by Yui Hiromichi, Fujisawa City, Dai Byaku Ho Shorin, 1967; p. 17), and may be inflated to emphasize the financial magnitude of this supposedly religious organization. They do, however, reflect the partial statistics available from other scattered sources and may be accepted with a large grain of salt as a gross representation of the Gakkai's publishing enterprises. Taken thus, the figures indicate that the Sokagakkai's annual income from its periodicals is approximately 19,339,000,000 yen, or $54 million.

The publishing activities serve adaptive functions also by conserving resources. Gakkai leaders receive no pay whatsoever for their roles in that organization. On lower levels of the Society this means that leaders must hold full-time non-Gakkai jobs; many of the top-echelon leaders, including President Ikeda, hold salaried positions in the Seikyo Publishing Company and other commercial Gakkai subsidiaries.

The most spectacular source of Sokagakkai financial backing is neither the Financial Department nor the publishing business, but the membership. As mentioned, no regular levies are imposed upon the members; however, the dramatic and paradoxical examples of financial commitment typical of lower-class religious groups in other countries are reflected in the Gakkai.[44]

There are in fact certain costs which accrue to membership. Gohonzon, prayer beads, and badges must be bought upon entry and everyone is expected to subscribe to the Seikyo Shimbun. Periodical pilgrimages (tozan) to the Taisekiji are also expected and, although more of a privilege than an onerous duty, the costs are borne by the individual pilgrim. All additional travel expenses incurred in the course of one's Gakkai activities must also be paid out of one's own pocket. Participation in these activities brings divine blessings, so the expense is less begrudged by the members; these indirect levies upon the membership are also a blessing which permits the Society to avoid a great deal of expense.

The most striking example of membership giving is the donation drive, or go-kuyo. Such drives for contributions are staged for the benefit of special construction projects, but the financial response is such that the costs of the project involved are invariably surpassed, thus providing the Gakkai with additional working capital.

In 1961 the Gakkai held a four-day contribution drive to finance the construction of the Grand Reception Hall, or Dai Kyaku-den. The goal was one billion yen (about $2.8 million); the faithful donated almost 3.2 billion yen (about $8.9 million).[45] In 1965 another drive was held to benefit the projected Shohondo, or Main Hall of Worship. This time the goal was five billion yen (about $14 million). Again the duration of the campaign was four days; in this period the Gakkai claimed that over 8 million of the faithful participated, giving an average of 4500 yen ($12.50) apiece, for the astounding total of 35.5 billion yen--almost $100 million.[46]

C. Relations with the Environment

In addition to those branches of the Gakkai which facilitate the organization's adaptation to its environment by drawing in the resources, human and economic, which permit it to continue to exist, there are a number of agencies which are designed to have direct influence upon the relationship of the Sokagakkai to its social environment.

The Gakkai's publications, especially its periodicals, have a definite adaptive role, presenting the Society as an assemblage of happy, brotherly fellow citizens working for the salvation of their entire nation and of all mankind. The *Seikyo Shimbun*, which is used extensively in *shakubuku*, and the *Seikyo Graphic*, a slick and colorful magazine along the lines of *Life* or *Look*, have especial significance in this regard.

A special part of the publishing enterprise is the Ushio Publishing Company. This nominally independent firm publishes *Ushio*, a nonsectarian monthly of the *sogo zasshi* type which carries articles of general interest, including pieces by such non-Gakkai figures as Imperial Prince Mikasa and Edwin Reischauer. This nonpartisan magazine, whose tie with the Sokagakkai is common knowledge, has a circulation which compares it favorably with other magazines of its type.

The major proportion of the buyers are no doubt Sokagakkai members; nevertheless, Ushio presents an unbiased picture. Along the same lines the Ushio company puts out the Ushio Shinsho (Ushio New Books) series, which includes such titles as Mao Tse-Tung and Liu Shao-Chi, Gladstone, and The Japanese in Brazil.

The Ushio Publishing Company is but one of a number of Sokagakkai front organizations which help improve the Society's relations with Japanese society as a whole. These organizations, coordinated with the Sokagakkai's Culture Bureau (Bunka-kyoku), are open to non-Gakkai members "who approve of the Society's ideals" and promote activities of a largely or completely nonsectarian nature.[47] These front groups include:

Institute of Buddhist Philosophy (Buppo Tetsugaku Kenkyu-jo);
Institute of Occidental and Oriental Thought (Seiyo Toyo Shiso Kenkyu-jo);
Institute of Politics and Economics (Seiji Keizai Kenkyu-jo);
Institute of Oriental Science (Toyo Gakujutsu Kenkyu-jo);
Asian People's Association (Ajia Minzoku Kyokai);
Institute of Asian Culture (Ajia Bunka Kenkyu-jo);
Democratic Concert Association (Minshu Ongaku Kyokai or Min'on);
Democratic Drama Association (Minshu Engeki Kyokai or Min'en); and
Fuji Symphonic Orchestra (Fuji Suiso Gakudan). (see Appendix 3)

The most noteworthy of these groups are Min'on and

Min'en. Each provides both opportunities for participation in musical and dramatic activities and a slate of performances for audiences of all ages. Min'on supports a host of small local musical groups, claiming a membership of one million (of which an estimated 20% are non-Gakkai members) by mid-1967.[48] In the same year it also sponsored tours to Japan by the Novosibirsk Ballet and the Twentieth Century Ballet company from Belgium and, on a smaller scale, stages Sunday concerts in urban housing developments (danchi).

Other front organizations include the Komeito and the Gakkai's projected labor union. The Komeito is of sufficient importance that it will be treated separately later; the labor union is still in the early planning stages and will be considered when possible future developments are examined.

The final structure which plays an important adaptive role is the Sokagakkai Public Relations Bureau (Shogai-kyoku). Directly under the Board of Directors (Riji-kai), its formal duty is the betterment of relations between the Gakkai and its environment. The author has had very little contact with this organ; however, the Gakkai's Overseas Bureau has its own public relations division and, if the great volume of press releases, reprints of Gakkai publications and Gakkai-related articles, and general informational material which issues from this latter office is any indication, the Public Relations Bureau is active indeed. To what degree it succeeds in its assigned function will be seen later upon examination of the overall relationship of the Sokagakkai to its political, social, and religious context.

NOTES: CHAPTER 5

1. The reader will note that Part II is organized through the functional approach developed by Talcott Parsons; chapters 5 and 6 deal with the adaptive subsystem of the Sokagakkai, chapter 7 with its latency or pattern-maintenance subsystem, and chapter 8 with its goal-attainment and integrative subsystems. See Talcott Parsons, Structure and Process in Modern Societies, Glencoe, 1963. For a brief and lucid exposition see Karl Deutsch's chapter 8 in Philip Jacob and James Toscano, The Integration of Political Communities, New York, 1964.

2. Yanaihara Isaku, "Minshu Fuman no Sentoteki Nensho," in Asahi Janaru, August 5, 1962, p. 17.

3. Seikyo Shimbun, May 17, 1967.

4. Seikyo Shimbun, June 25, 1967.

5. Sokagakkai, The Soka Gakkai, Tokyo, 1960, p. 131.

6. Alfred Bloom, "Observations in the Study of Contemporary Nichiren Buddhism," in Contemporary Religions in Japan, vol. 6 no. 1, March, 1965, p. 65.

7. Ikeda Daisaku, Seiji to Shukyo, Tokyo, 1965, p. 238, and Rissho Ankoku Ron Kogi, Tokyo, 1966, pp. 220-21.

8. "Stamping in Nichiren's Footsteps," in The Economist, March 20, 1965, p. 1250.

9. Saki Akio and Oguchi Iichi, Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1960, pp. 203-04.

10. "Characteristics of the Upper House Election," in Japan Socialist Review, no. 18, July 15, 1962, p. 57.

11. Ikeda, Rissho Ankoku, p. 721.

12. Seikyo Shimbun, October 19, 1967.

13. Sokagakkai Overseas Bureau, What is Shakubuku?, no. 8 in "This is the Sokagakkai" series, Tokyo, 1965 (?), p. 3.

14. Seikyo News, April 28, 1964.

15. David Hesselgrave, A Propagation Profile of the Soka Gakkai, unpub. Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1965, p. 25.

16. Seikyo Shimbun, July 2, 1967.

17. Seikyo Shimbun, June 1, August 1, September 1, 1967.

18. Shin Shukyo Shimbun, all issues autumn 1967, "Kokuhaku" column.

19. Suzuki Hiroshi, "Toshi Kaso no Shukyo Shudan," in Shakaigaku Kenkyu, no. 24, 1964, p. 63; Seikyo Shimbun, August 23, 1967; Tokyo Daigaku Shakaigakka and Tokyo Joshi Daigaku Shakaigakka, Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1963, p. 72; data from Takahashi Naoko; Murakami Shigeyoshi, Sokagakkai to Komeito, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 27-28.

20. Seikyo Shimbun, August 23, 1967; Murakami, op. cit., pp. 27-28.

21. Ezra Vogel, Japan's New Middle Class, Berkeley, 1963.

22. Suzuki, op. cit., pp. 62-63; Tokyo Diagaku Shakaigakka et al., op. cit., pp. 111-12; Murakami, op. cit., pp. 13-14; Seikyo Shimbun, August 23, 1967.

23. Takase Hiroi, Dai San Bummei no Shukyo, Tokyo, 1962, p. 133.

24. Suzuki, op. cit., pp. 62-63.

25. Seikyo Shimbun, August 29, 1967.

26. Seikyo Shimbun, July 11, 1967.

27. Seikyo Shimbun, June 15, 1967.

28. Naikaku Kanbo Naikaku Chosa-shitsu, Shinko Shukyo ni kansuru Shakai-shinrigakuteki Kenkyu, Tokyo, 1965 (?), p. 8; Aochi Shin, "Todai Sokagakkai-in no Ishiki," in Gendai no Me, vol. 8 no. 4, April 1967, p. 112ff.; Koya Azumi, "Functions of Soka Gakkai Membership," unpub. paper, Columbia University, 1967, p. 12.

29. Takase Hiroi in Shukan Gendai, May 23, 1963, p. 26.

30. Takami Jun, "Sokagakkai ni Tou," in Chuo Koron, August 1962, p. 293.

31. Naikaku Kanbo, op. cit., p. 8; Azumi, op. cit., p. 12.

32. Azumi, *loc. cit.*; Murakami, *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14; *Seikyo Shimbun*, August 23, 1967.

33. Tokyo Daigaku Shakaigakka *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

34. Suzuki, *op. cit.*, pp. 62-63.

35. Takami, *op. cit.*, p. 294.

36. Naikaku Kanbo, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

37. Sokagakkai, *The Nichiren Shoshu Sokagakkai*, Tokyo, 1966, p. 39.

38. Tokyo Daigaku Shakaigakka *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

39. *Seikyo Shimbun*, June 9, 1967.

40. *The Economist*, op. cit., p. 1255.

41. *Seikyo News*, April 21, 1964.

42. Takase, *Dai San Bummei*, p. 110.

43. Murakami Shigeyoshi, "Komeito no Seiji Kodo," in *Sekai*, no. 233, May 1965, p. 162.

44. Liston Pope, *Millhands and Preachers*, New Haven, 1965, p. 137.

45. *Japan Times International Edition*, March 20, 1965.

46. *Japan Times International Edition*, October 2, 1965; *World Tribune*, June 4, 1966.

47. Sokagakkai, *The Nichiren Shoshu Sokagakkai*, p. 28; Sokagakkai Overseas Bureau, *Sokagakkai and Culture Movement*, no. 3 in "This is the Sokagakkai" series, Tokyo, undated, pp. 7-8. Compare with the camouflaged front groups utilized by communist parties: United States Congress, Senate Judiciary Committee, *The Communist Party of the United States of America*, Washington, 1955, p. 90; Philip Selznick, *The Organizational Weapon*, New York, 1952, pp. 114ff.

48. Yamaguchi Akira, *Issenman-nin no Kokoro wo Tsukanda Himitsu: Sokagakkai no Shinri Senryaku*, Tokyo, 1967, p. 142; Nakaba Tadakuni, "Sokagakkai Gekido no Shichinen," in *Zaikai*, June 1, 1967, p. 124.

CHAPTER 6

THE MEMBERSHIP OF THE SOKAGAKKAI

A. The Membership: Numbers

Although the rapid growth rate and present gigantic size of the Sokagakkai are admitted by all, there is very little agreement on the actual number of Gakkai members, or on whether the rate of change of the membership is positive or negative.

As Appendix 5 shows, the claimed size of the Gakkai was approximately 6.5 million families at the beginning of 1968. In computing the number of individual members, the Gakkai has varied between two and three as the accepted multiplier, signifying a possible range of from 13 million to 19 million members. The statistics on number of adherents provided by Nichiren Shoshu to the Ministry of Education for inclusion in the ministry's Religion Yearbook totaled about 15 million individuals as of December 31, 1964, generally corroborating the usual gross Gakkai estimates.[1]

As regards rate of change, according to the Gakkai's own published figures (Appendix 1) the Society has increased in size every year since 1951. However, the rate of increases of the last two years--13% and 6%--suggest that the Gakkai may be nearing its peak, although at its present size an increase of only a few percent is, in absolute numbers, quite large.

The break in growth appears from Appendix 1 to have come in 1965. This is due in large part to the fact that President Ikeda announced in early 1966 that, although total shakubuku figures had reached almost six million families, an estimated half million families had deserted the faith.[2] For this reason he declared that the membership of the Gakkai should more accurately be estimated at 5.5 million families. Even if one attempts to "prorate" the half-million decrease over the three previous years the drop in rate of increase in 1965 is apparent.

But regardless of the way one interprets the claimed membership figures of the Gakkai, great discrepancies are visible between these figures and the size of the Society as indicated by public opinion surveys and the vote obtained by the Komeito in various kinds of elections. For this reason, frequent accusations have been made to the effect that Gakkai inflates its membership figures.

Two nationwide surveys serve to indicate the degree of discrepancy. In 1963 the Gakkai was, by its own declaration, just below 3.5 million families. At a charitable 2 believers per family there should have been some 7 million individual Gakkai members, or 7% of the total population. However, only 3.5% of the respondents to a survey run that year declared membership in the Sokagakkai.[3] A more recent survey, run in late 1966, shows the same phenomenon: as opposed to six million claimed member-families, or at least 12 million members (about 12% of the population) only 4.1% of the sample stated that they were Gakkai members.[4]

The same discrepancy is visible if one examines the more numerous surveys which suggest Gakkai membership by means of questions concerning political party preference.* A series of eight nationwide surveys by a variety of agencies, covering the period September 1963-March 1967, indicates that although Komeito popular support is growing it has never surpassed about 5% of the electorate (see Appendix 6). Since the national electorate during these years had grown from approximately 58 million to approximately 62 million, while the Gakkai membership had ostensibly grown from about 3.5 million families to about 6.2 million, the members of the Sokagakkai should have increased (at a charitable 1.8 voters per family) from 6.3 million voters to 11.2 million, or from 11% of the electorate to 18%.[5]

A monthly survey run by a single agency, the Chuo Chosa Sha, hints at similar gaps between claim and reality (see Apppendix 7). From late 1964 until 1967 the Komeito registered consistent increases in popular support, but as of mid-1967 was still only approaching 4% of the samples, as opposed to the 18% it should have drawn had the Gakkai's membership claims (6.3 million families or perhaps 11.4 million voters) been accurate and all of the membership mobilized (at least vocally).

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*See above: Intro., p. 34.

The vote obtained by the Sokagakkai/Komeito offers a third index of the membership. Since this index is a measure of those Gakkai members who are electorally mobilized, supplemented by politically sympathetic non-Gakkai members, it is perhaps the most important index of the Gakkai's role in the parliamentary aspect of the political system. Since the national constituency of the Diet's Upper House provides the only opportunity for the Sokagakkai effectively to have candidates in every electoral district, voting figures from elections of candidates in the national constituency are the most accurate set of statistics upon which to calculate the Gakkai's relative national electoral strength.

As Appendix 8c shows, the Sokagakkai vote in the national constituency in the last four Upper House elections has been consistently larger than the implied membership as estimated from responses to surveys: 3.5%, 8.5%, 11.5%, 13.7%, and 15.5% in the five elections. Until 1965 the vote was also larger than the Gakkai's claimed membership--in families. However, a comparison of claimed membership at the time of election with vote shows that the vote has recently been less than even a charitable estimate of the number of voters per family would imply:

from 2.5 votes per claimed family in the 1956 election the turnout decreased to 2.1 per family in 1959, 1.5 in 1962, and .96 in 1965.[6] A slight reversal to 1 vote per family was shown in the 1968 election, but it appears that only if the Sokagakkai assumes but one believer in each family does the claimed number of families not exaggerate at least the number of voters which the Gakkai is able to mobilize.

One sees, then, four contradictory indices of the size of the Sokagakkai. First, one has the Gakkai's own figures: 6.5 million families, i.e., some 16 million persons, or 15% of the population. Second, one has the vocally mobilized Gakkai membership: approximately 4% of the population, or 4 million persons--the equivalent of about 1.6 million families by the usual Gakkai manner of calculation (2.5 members per family). Third, there is the vocally politicized Gakkai membership: approximately 4% of the electorate, or about 2.5 million persons. Generalizing to the entire population, this 4% is again very roughly 4 million persons or 1.6 million Gakkai families. Fourth, there is the politically mobilized "Gakkai membership:" 15.5% of the voters in the national constituency election for the Upper House in 1968, or 6.6 million persons out of the 43 million who voted. If one dared to extrapolate from this proportion to the population as a whole one would have nearly the 16 million individual Gakkai members which the Society claims for itself. However, there is data which indicates that Sokagakkai members and Komeito supporters tend to vote more often than other people;[7] moreover, the lack of any additional supportive data, in combination with an understanding of the manner in which the Gakkai reaches its total membership count, make such a generalization unjustifiable.

The official Gakkai method of reckoning membership is, in one sense, quite accurate. It is the total number of gohonzon distributed, at one per family.[8] Changes, such as births and intrafamilial conversions on the one hand and deaths and defections on the other, are ignored. The Gakkai's own measure, as noted, is 6.5 million families, or approximately 16 million persons. In light of other available data, this figure is taken to be a great exaggeration of reality.

The second index (and second largest measure), the votes won in the Upper House national constituency elections, may be taken as the upper limit of the consciously committed membership. If one considers that all 6.6 million of the votes garnered by the Komeito in the 1965 Upper House election represent mobilized, politicized Sokagakkai members, then, assuming that a certain proportion of the Gakkai membership is less active, one would conclude that the total membership is well above 6.6 million.

However, such is probably not the case. A certain number of non-Gakkai members vote for Komeito candidates.[9] The exact number is impossible to calculate; since such voters are likely not to be habitual Komeito supporters (very few non-Gakkai members admit such support), surveys--

which nearly always phrase their questions in terms of customary party support--do not enable estimation of their number. Moreover, such customarily uncommitted voters, not being members of the Gakkai, may well be reticent about their support of the Komeito. The fact of Komeito support without Gakkai membership suggests the existence of reservations or inhibitions concerning the Society itself.

The politicized and active membership of the Sokagakkai may in fact be above the 5 million level. In the estimation of Gakkai size one must rely heavily upon intuition, inference, and previous estimates by those conversant with the movement. From all three of these perspectives, opinion survey data seem the most accurate indicator of the membership of the Sokagakkai as those persons who have received the gohonzon in their families and still consider themselves to be believers.

Surveys aimed at measuring religious affiliation and political party support both suggest that the vocally committed membership approximates 4% of the population, or about 4 million persons. However, where both types of questions are included in the same survey, the number of Komeito supporters does not equal the number of professed Sokagakkai members.[10] This supports the assumption made above about political apathy among the membership, and seems intuitively proper, too, since Komeito supporters are the not only religiously but also--vocally, at least--politically mobilized Gakkai members. That the great majority of Gakkai members entered primarily for non-political reasons indicates that politicization is a later development in the believer's behavior and commitment.

A fifth index of Sokagakkai membership used by some observers is the circulation of the Seikyo Shimbun, which suggests, at one subscription per family, three million families, or perhaps as many as six million readers. A similar problem is encountered here as in the case of voting statistics: many Gakkai members do not subscribe, and many others buy multiple copies for use in shakubuku. For instance, the Gakkai noted that while only 85% of the families in one area in Tokyo subscribed to the paper, they took a number of subscriptions equal to 130% of the number of families.[11] One student of the Society estimates that a large number of Gakkai members take as many as five or ten subscriptions.[12]

Thus Seikyo Shimbun circulation is only a partially helpful index of Gakkai size; nevertheless, it serves to reinforce the impression of an interested membership of somewhere in the vicinity of three to five million persons. This is the closest approximation the author feels entitled to make. Even if one has to rely on such a gross estimate as this, it is apparent that the Gakkai, which should possess at least 13 million members, has effectively lost about two-thirds of those people converted. A defection rate of two-thirds raises some doubts as to the efficacy of the post-conversion socialization process which was evaluated so positively--albeit tentatively--above.

Although reality does not seem to reflect the Gakkai's claims, as far as being a political movement and more particularly a possible mass movement is concerned, the reality of several million believers is more significant than the weakness of the organization relative to its claims. It is even more significant in the case of any suspected mass movement to try to reach some estimation of the proportion of the membership which may be termed "active," and therefore most likely to take part in the direct political behavior which according to Kornhauser typifies such movements.

Activism can be measured in two ways: through office-holding and through participation in organizational activities. in the case of the Sokagakkai, surveys indicate that approximately half of those who vocalize membership can be considered active as regards the frequency with which they perform gongyo, attend meetings, and practice shakubuku.[13] If the membership is estimated at 3-5 million, this means 1.5 to 2.5 million participatory activists. Statistics on office-holding support this inference; in August 1967 the Seikyo Shimbun states that there were 1,680,000 holders of the rank of unit chief (kumi-cho) and above.[14] The other major structure with titled positions, the Study Department (Kyogaku-bu), numbered 1.5 million members as of June 30 of that year.[15] Since there is a great deal of personnel overlap between the administrative hierarchy and the Study Department, the office-holding activists also seem to number some 1.5 to 2.5 million persons.

One step farther, one may try to estimate the size of the activist "hard core" of the Sokagakkai. This element comprises those members who hold higher office or participate in every phase of the Gakkai's activity program and, if the indications of data from several surveys are correct, constitutes 10-20% of the self-declared membership (that is, 20-40% of the activists).[16] Drawing from previous estimates of participatory and office-holding activists this would amount to from 300,000 to 1 million persons. A statement by President Ikeda in June 1967 to the effect that there were at the time 100,000 unspecified "top leaders (*dai-kanbu*)" in the Gakkai suggests that the true figure is closer to the lower limit of the estimation: 500,000 is a *very* rough, but intuitively attractive, surmise.[17]

B. The Membership: Composition

Impressionistic descriptions of the social composition of the membership of the Sokagakkai evoke mental parallels between this giant politico-religious movement and other historical examples of social movements--religious, political, and especially mass movements. The Gakkai has been termed a "lower-class urban" phenomenon, its members uneducated, poor, and concentrated in low-status occupations.[18] They are mobile, the deprived, the voiceless; the little people who have suffered in defeat, struggled unsuccessfully amid reconstruction, and have not won a share of the new affluence.[19]

The role of such "little people" in the followings of mass movements has been touched upon in the introduction to this study. The only point to be made here is the reminder that the tendency for (a) lower-class and less-educated people to constitute the major proportion of mass movements and for (b) the characteristics of mass man--unattachment and alienation--to be more common among such demographic and socioeconomic elements has been indicated by generalizing from historical examples of mass movements and from broad studies of unorganized population groups. No evidence exists which justifies the assumption that because the membership of the Sokagakkai is, e.g., less well-off and less well-educated than the Japanese norm, it is *ipso facto* a mass movement. However, sociological data do have heuristic value; furthermore, comparison with the sociological bases of other social movements adds substance to the comparative framework within which the Gakkai will be analyzed.

For each of the socioeconomic factors dealt with below from five to ten nationwide surveys and, where mentioned, additional local surveys were used. The sociological composition of the Gakkai is still an open question; the data presented here would be best considered as indicative of modal qualities of the membership, not as definitive of exact proportions.

1. Sex

The majority of those Japanes who profess belief in some religion are women; the majority of the believers in both the traditional religions and the new sects are also women.[20] The Sokagakkai is no exception to this rule. Attendance at Gakkai meetings gives one a strong impression to this effect, and empirical data support the impression.

In nine nationwide surveys conducted between 1963 and 1967 the majority of professed Gakkai members or Komeito supporters were women, and in eight the proportion of males in the Sokagakkai sample was less than the proportion of males in the sample as a whole.[21] The mean proportions for the Gakkai membership in the nine surveys were 42% male and 58% female; the mean proportions for the nine national samples as a whole were 49% male and 51% female.

Among activists the frequency of males is greater than among the membership as a whole. (For this reason, in combination with the assumption that the Komeito supporters used as Gakkai members in the national surveys above are more activist, and therefore more likely to be males, one might suspect that the Gakkai membership as a whole is even more heavily female than is indicated by this data.) In three surveys of activists (two local and one national) the proportions of males and females were approximately equal.[22] This indicator reinforces the impression gained from an examination of the upper ranks of the Gakkai; only one of the top hundred leaders, General Executive Kashiwabara Yasu, is a woman. And both of these situations parallel the sex distribution in the German Nazi Party: most of the elite were men, while women constituted one of the most conspicuous supportive demographic elements.[23]

2. Age

One of the Sokagakkai's most common claims is that it is an organization of youth. As compared to the total Japanese population and to its urban sector, this is true; it is true also relative to the other Japanese religions, new and old.[24] Compared to the other political parties, however, the supporters of the Komeito tend to be the second oldest group of party supporters, after the followers of the conservative Liberal Democrats, as regards the proportion of professed supporters who are in their 20's and 30's.[25]

A 1963 nationwide survey offers a picture of relative age distribution of the Gakkai and the general population which is parallelled by ten other similar polls covering the years 1963-1967:[26]

	Percentage of sample in their:				
	20's,	30's,	40's,	50's,	over 60.
Sokagakkai members	24%	24%	27%	13%	8%
National sample	26%	26%	19%	15%	14%

The modal distribution of Sokagakkai believers in these surveys is a fairly even proportion of the membership in each of the age groups 20's, 30's, and 40's, with the 30-year-old and 40-year-old groups usually slightly the larger. Since the general population has successively fewer people in almost each age group, the Sokagakkai membership appears to be relatively concentrated in the 20-49 age group, more so in the 30-49 group, and most so in the 40-49 group.

As regards youthfulness in a stricter sense of the term, i.e., below 40 years of age, the Sokagakkai is no more youthful than the general population and certainly less so than the urban population. However, in the share of its membership which is below 50 years of age the Gakkai clearly exceeds the populace even in the cities where the population is younger than the national average. The significant age groups, however, are the 30's and 40's. In each of the ten surveys the proportion of Gakkai members in their 40's exceeds that group's share of the general population; the same is true of the combined 30's-40's age group in the Gakkai membership in nine of the ten surveys.

These two age groups took the full psychic brunt of war and defeat. Old enough to have received their education in whole or in part under the prewar system but not old enough to have moved out of the most intense period of one's socialization process before defeat, these age groups provided the bulk of the Japanese military, which was devastated and decimated in battle, and also the bulk of the young labor conscripts mobilized late in the war in a education-disrupting effort to boost production.

Those Japanese who were in their teens or early twenties during the war years 1937-1945 underwent the most severe psychological deprivation and dislocation--so much so that the Japanese have used the term "wandering thirties (_samayoeru sanju-nendai_)" to describe the disorientation of the generation. Credence is lent to the assertion that one of the important functions that the Gakkai performs for its members is psychological stabilization by the fact that the Gakkai draws disproportionately heavily upon this age group.

Despite the fact that the general age distribution of the Sokagakkai's membership is not spectacularly skewed toward youth, among Gakkai activists young people are much more in evidence. Two polls of Gakkai actives support this impression, the under-40 age group constituting 62% of one sample and 75% of the other.[27] However, even in these cases the Gakkai is not more numerous than the general population in the under-40 group in the urban areas covered in the surveys. Thus the Gakkai seems empirically to diverge from the NSDAP, which relied upon youth for a considerable part of its support,[28] and relies more upon the older "youth" who passed their younger years in the turbulence of war and defeat.

3. Education

The less educated social strata have provided fertile ground for the spread of extremist political and religious ideas at many points in space and time. They have also been more likely to constitute the bulk of the followings of mass movements and other types of undemocratic organizations wherever they have appeared.[29] As S. M. Lipset points out, the extremist movements most often buttressed by the broad social elements with relatively little education in relatively modernized societies have been those which he describes as "fascist."[30] The case of Japan also indicates that this is so: the "fascist" trends of the 1930's drew their broadest backing from the less educated sectors of society; the Japanese extreme left, by contrast, has traditionally been relatively strong among the more educated strata.[31] A study of ex-communists in the United States, England, France, and Italy shows a similar characteristic: a full 40% of the subjects of the study had received some higher education.[32]

The impression one receives from extended contact with the Sokagakkai is one of a relatively little educated membership. Members who have risen in the organization seem proud of having done so without benefit of much formal education. Sokagakkai publications are lavish in their use of furigana, a notational aid to pronunciation of characters which is inserted between the lines of Japanese text; one might infer from this a consciousness of the part of the Gakkai of the relatively low educational level of its audience. One observer has commented upon the writing ability of those people who vote for Sokagakkai candidates; ballots cast for such candidates tend to contain the worst handwriting, even to the extent of an inability to write kana, or simplified characters, correctly.[33]

Survey data imply clearly the accuracy of these impressions. In ten nationwide surveys taken during the years 1963-67, Sokagakkai members or Komeito supporters were above the national average as regards proportion with no more than a junior high school--that is, nine years'--education, regardless of what demographic or socioeconomic controls are applied.[34] In addition, Komeito supporters were less educated than the followers of any of the four major parties. Two of these surveys suffice to indicate the pattern:[35]

EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

	Extent of Education				
	Elementary (6 years or less)	Junior High School (7-9 years)	High School (10-12 yrs.)	College (13 yrs. or more)	NA, DK
National sample	21%	41%	29%	8%	1% = 100%
Sokagakkai members	19	55	18	4	3 = 100%

EDUCATION AND POLITICAL AFFILIATION

	Elementary (6 years or less)	Junior High School (7-9 years)	High School (10-12 yrs.)	College (13 yrs. or more)	NA, DK
National sample	56.4%		34.4%	8.7%	= 99.5%
Supporters of the:					
Liberal Democratic Party	60.5		31.1	8.4	= 100
Japan Socialist Party	47.1		41.3	11.6	= 100
Democratic Socialist Party	53.3		36.0	10.7	= 100
Japan Communist Party	55.6		25.9	18.5	= 100
Komei Party	65.5		34.5	--	= 100

In the ten surveys taken as a whole, the proportion of Sokagakkai/Komeito affiliates who had received nine years of schooling or less averaged 70%, with a range of 62% to 80%; the proportion for the national samples was 59%, with a range of 55% to 63%. Five additional local surveys,--three from Tokyo and one each from Fukuoka and the Kansai--reflect the same pattern.[36]

One claim of the Sokagakkai's which seems to conflict with these findings is its constant asseveration that university students are flocking to join the Society. According to the Seikyo Shimbun of August 7 and 25, 1967, the Sokagakkai (university) Student Division had achieved 200,000 members, out of a total of slightly over one million college students in the nation, or roughly 18%. However, a 1966 survey of six thousand university students in the Tokyo area turned up only 52 professed Gakkai members, or less than one per cent of the respondents.[37]

However few the well-educated may be in the Gakkai, however, they apparently have occupied a disproportionately large number of leadership roles. One critic estimates that 70% of the younger leaders are college graduates; of the 25-man Komeito contingent in the Lower House at present fifteen have thirteen years or more of schooling, as did eleven of the fourteen Komeito candidates for the Upper House election of July 1968.[38] Two slightly larger groups of activists in the Tokyo area illustrate a similar tendency; versus the overall membership average of 1-3% with college education, in these two samples those persons with thirteen or more years of schooling comprised 17% and 19% respectively.[39] Again, if one assumes that Komeito supporters are more likely to be activists than those people who articulate Sokagakkai membership alone, then the inclusion of Komeito supporters as typical Gakkai members in the general educational picture of the Gakkai may exaggerate the educational level of the membership as a whole.

4. Geographical Distribution

The Sokagakkai is a predominantly urban phenomenon. A gross examination of survey data shows that Gakkai-member respondents are relatively concentrated in the Kanto, the area of the country which contains the cities of Tokyo and Yokohama.[40] Areas of secondary concentration are the Kinki, where Kyoto, Osaka, and Kobe are located, and the Chubu with its central city of Nagoya. However, in these latter two areas the relative Sokagakkai concentration apparently reflects the overall urbanization of Japanese society.

That Gakkai members are in fact most numerous in the large cities of these and other areas is indicated by six nationwide surveys run during the years 1963 to 1967.[41] In these polls an average of 77% of the Gakkai/Komeito respondents resided in urban areas (shibu), with a range of 73% to 82%. The average for the national samples was 68%, with a range of ± 2%. An average of twenty-seven per cent of the Gakkai members lived in the seven largest cities alone; an average of only 19% of the national samples lived in these cities. Relative to the other political parties, the Komeito was usually the second most urbanized, after the Japan Communist Party. The following data, from a survey by the Mainichi Shimbun on May 1966, is typical:

	Supporters of the					
Place of Residence	Liberal Democratic Party	Socialist Party	Democratic Socialist Party	Communist Party	Komei Party	Nat'l Sample
Seven Large Cities	14%	22%	22%	35%	30%	19%
Other Cities	49	49	48	41	43	49
Rural Areas (gunbu)	37	29	30	24	27	32
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%

Statistics from the national constituency elections for the House of Councillors (the Upper House of the Diet) support the impression of urbanity; however, they suggest a decreasing concentration of absolute and relative Sokagakkai electoral strength in the urban areas along Japan's Pacific coast since 1959 (see Appendix 8).

As these statistics show, the absolute vote garnered by the Sokagakkai is greatest in the urban Pacific-coast prefectures and these prefectures have shown the greatest absolute growth in Gakkai electoral strength since 1956 (see Appendix 8a). A number of rural prefectures (Mie, Ehime, Shimane, Shiga, and Tokushima) have led the nation in percentage growth of absolute Sokagakkai vote, but in many cases the high percentage is of such a small absolute vote that absolutely the increase is of little importance either nationally or locally. Although the top ten prefectures, according to percentage of obsolute Komeito vote increase, included Ishikawa, Shimane, Mie, Ehime, Tottori, and Shiga prefectures between the 1962 and 1965 elections, the lowest ten prefectures as regards absolute Komeito vote in 1965 still included Ishikawa, Shiga, Shimane, and Tottori; the lowest ten as regards the Komeito's percentage of the total vote included Ishikawa, Shiga, and Shimane.

As regards the Sokagakkai's share of the total vote (see Appendix 8c), the appearance of local power centers (where the Komeito can draw over 15% of the vote) outside of the Pacific belt can be seen. The Gakkai is strong, relative to other parties, in urban Tokyo, Osaka, Okayama, Kanagawa, Chiba, and Saitama prefectures (over 15% of the vote in each), but equally strong in Kochi, Kagawa, Wakayama, Ibaraki, Ehime, Mie, and Tokushima. In addition, among the prefectures in which the Komeito's share (percentage) of the total vote has shown the greatest absolute increase since 1959 one finds such relatively non-urban prefectures as Gifu, Wakayama, Tottori, Mie, Ehime, Kagawa, Tokushima, Ibaraki, Yamaguchi, and Kochi.

Appendix 8b shows the Sokagakkai becoming more reliant over time upon the urban Pacific-belt prefectures, as seen in the distribution of the Komeito vote among the various prefectures (although 1968 may mark a reversal of this trend). The greatest intra-Gakkai power centers have increasingly become the urban prefectures (in 1968: Tokyo, Osaka, Kanagawa, Hyogo, Hokkaido, Aichi, Fukuoka, Saitama, Shizuoka, and Chiba in that order), and the Gakkai since 1959 came to rely ever more upon these prefectures, which produced 49.8% of the Komeito vote in 1959, 50.7% in 1962, and 52.6% in 1965, but 52.2% in 1968. Again, a few rural prefectures are among the relatively fastest-growing areas as regards intra-Gakkai power as measured by the change in the proportion of the total Komeito vote secured in each prefecture. Between 1965 and 1968 the fastest-growing intra-Gakkai "power centers" included such relatively non-urban prefectures as Ishikawa, Niigata, Miyagi, Saga, Toyama, Fukui, Yamanashi, Nagano, Tokushima, Kagawa, Ehime, Kochi, and Oita. However, again, it was often a case of high relative growth of a small absolute figure: the weakest areas in absolute share of total Komeito vote in 1968 still included Toyama, Fukui, Ishikawa, Saga, and Yamanashi.

The trends visible in these voting statistics indicate that the Sokagakkai is strongest in urban areas and that it has become increasingly concentrated in the cities. However, relative to the population as a whole, the Gakkai may be--and the Komeito's electoral support certainly is--becoming less urban. According to Appendix 8d, from 1956 to 1968 the proportion of the electorate concentrated in

12 prefectures of the Pacific belt area increased 16.6% (from 45.2% of the total electorate to c.52.7%); the proportion of the total vote which came from these prefectures increased 23.6% (from 40.7% of the total vote to 50.3%) during the same period. The proportion of the Komeito vote which came from these prefectures decreased 6.6% (from 59.3% of the Gakkai total to 55.4%) during these ten years. Since 1959 the proportion of the Gakkai vote from this area has increased 4.1 percent (from 53.2% to 55.4%); nevertheless, the proportion of the electorate in the area has also increased--by 13.6%--during this nine-year period. Whether this relative expansion into the countryside represents rural religious acceptance of the Sokagakkai or political acceptance of the Komeito is unclear; in either case it implies the Gakkai's ability to broaden its appeal beyond the cities, with implications for the future dealt with below.

Patterns of geopgraphical distribution of Sokagakkai members in localities also show particular configurations. In Tokyo, for example, both survey and electoral data show that the Gakkai is strongest in the shitamachi or downtown inner core wards of Adachi, Katsushika, Edogawa, Kita, Itabashi, Koto, Arakawa, and Sumida, with a secondary concentration in the southern industrial wards of Shinagawa and Ota.[42] These areas are characterized by industry--much of it non-unionized and very small-scale--great congestion, and relatively low standards of living.

However, recently a trend toward other sections of

Tokyo has begun to appear. The vote won by the Komeito in the Tokyo second election district (Shinagawa and Ota wards) in the January 1967 general election represented a slight decrease from the vote won there in the 1965 Upper House election.[43] In the sixth district (Sumida, Koto, and Arakawa wards) the increase was slight; in the *yamanote* or uptown fifth district (Toshima and Nerima wards) and the more suburban seventh (Santama) district, both residential areas, the Komeito enjoyed a great increase in vote. In addition, two recent surveys show an increase in Sokagakkai, Komeito strength in the seventh electoral district and in an area which includes the Yamanote wards of Nakano, Suginami, Toshima, and Nerima, in addition to the more downtown Itabashi and Kita wards.[44]

Living standards are relatively higher in the yamanote and Santama areas, suggesting that the Gakkai is diversifying its appeal. The latter area in particular is noteworthy; the seventeen cities and three counties of the Santama district are the focal points of the present trend toward giant apartment complexes (*danchi*) which house thousands of persons (primarily white-collar families) in impersonal concrete termite colonies. The ties of kin, locality, and voluntary association are relatively weak in the *danchi*; the atomized life style is a new phenomenon in Japanese society and often gives rise to acute loneliness, especially on the part of wives whose husbands commute to central Tokyo.[45] In the *danchi* spatially proximate *tako-*

tsubo for the residents are relatively rare; the Sokagakkai is in a position to remedy this lack, and polls and voting statistics suggest that it does.

The urban concentration of the membership of the Sokagakkai places it in sharp contrast with many other social movements with which it otherwise has several points in common. Several studies have concluded that Nazism drew its greatest strength from smaller cities and rural areas. Of the 1932 German election, S. M. Lipset state that "the larger the city, the smaller the Nazi vote."[46] A study by Charles Loomis and Allan Beegle of one area in Germany during the years 1918-1932 found that the NSDAP was strongest in portions of the area characterized by small and medium farms and also in those places where small-scale crafts and industries were the predominant form of industry.[47] The parallel between this form of industrial structure and that characteristic of the older shitamachi areas in Tokyo where the Sokagakkai is strong is noteworthy; however, the Nazis' power in the marginal, family-scale agricultural areas is unmatched by the Gakkai in contemporary Japan.[48]

Other social movements seem historically to center more upon the provinces than does the Gakkai. Hobsbawm's Sicilian Fasci, Italian Mafias, and Spanish agrarian anarchists--all nineteenth-century phenomena of social protest with millennial features resembling the Sokagakkai's--were primarily rural.[49] The French Poujadist movement, too, was strongest in the provincial cities and the countryside, especially in the relatively depressed areas.[50] In a more strictly religious vein, the American splinter sects dealt with in the works of Elmer Braden have shown their greatest strength in the less urban areas of this country.[51]

One might assume (as many have) that Gakkai members, though urban, are recent immigrants from the country and thus qualitatively similar to the adherents of the above movements. Data on migration are sketchy, however, and the social movement with which the Sokagakkai shows the greatest static geographical resemblance is communism; in many areas of urban Japan the Japan Communist Party and the Gakkai are in direct competition for votes and supporters. There are equally significant demographic differences among the two movements, however--such as educational level--and these factors will be included later in a more comprehensive comparison of the Gakkai membership and the communists.

5. Occupational Distribution

The Sokagakkai claims to be a microcosm of Japanese society and at many Gakkai gatherings this assertion seems substantiated. Bar girls and bank clerks, students and teachers, shop owners and day laborers, factory workers and housewives--all are in evidence. However, a slightly deeper look reveals that some occupational groups are heavily overrepresented in the Society.

On a national level, nine surveys indicate that (a) housewives and (b) laborers of all types are extraordinarily numerous in the Gakkai, while (a) official, managerial, professional, and technical personnel, (b) white collar workers, (c) students, and (d) persons engaged in agriculture, forestry, and fishing are relatively rare.[52] The following data, from a survey of 1965, is representative except for the high incidence of persons engaged in trade and services, an incidence not reflected in most of the other nationwide data compiled.[53]

	Occupation	National Sample	Gakkai Members	
Self-employed	1. Agriculture/forestry/ fishing	11.9%	5.4%	
	2. Trade/manufacturing/ service	9.	13.2	
	3. Professional	1.3	.6	
Employed	4. Managerial	1.7	---	
	5. Technical	3.2	1.1	
	6. White collar	10.	6.3	
	7. Labor	14.8	22.4	
Work in home	8. Agriculture/forestry/ fishing	9.5	4.9	
	9. Same as 2 and 3	3.5	2.9	
Unemployed	10. Student	1.1	---	
	11. Housewife	34.1	43.2	33.8
	12. Other			9.4
	Total	100.0%	100.0%	

The paucity of students and high-level personnel suggested by this data reinforces the impression gained from study of data on the educational level of the Gakkai membership. The data also indicate the probable relatively low socioeconomic position of a major portion of the Gakkai's members, that is, the probable inclusion of a major proportion of the membership in the relatively deprived sectors of Japanese society.

Examination of survey data dealing with occupational distribution of Gakkai members in certain urban localities reveals a pattern generally parallel to the national distribution, with certain differences. Again, housewives and laborers are overrepresented; in addition, so are persons (recent migrants from the country, unskilled and unfamiliar with the requirements of the modern, urban economic sector?) engaged in (a) medium- and small-scale and self-owned commercial and industrial enterprises, especially shops; and in (b) sales and services of all kinds.[54] The frequency of shopkeepers and shop workers and personnel from smaller businesses among the Gakkai membership parallelled the general distribution on the national level, but in the local surveys--from Tokyo, Fukuoka, and the Kansai--these enterprises on the periphery of the modern economy were overrepresented. Again, the professions, technology, and officialdom were underrepresented, as were white collar workers.

This survey data is corroborated by an analysis by James A. Dator of voting statistics from the Tokyo local constituency in the 1962 House of Councillors election. In this election Sokagakkai vote in the various wards of Tokyo was proportionately higher in those wards where

(a) over half of the population was engaged in secondary industry: manufacturing, construction, and transport;
(b) the proportion of white collar and government workers was low; and
(c) the proportion of factories, the proportion of land used for factories, and the proportion of factories with ten or less workers were high.[55]

The surveys are also corroborated by the geographical distribution of the Sokagakkai's membership in Tokyo. Statistics from 1959 indicate that the downtown, or shitamachi, areas where the Gakkai is strongest have a relatively high incidence of workers in transport, labor, and crafts; whereas the uptown, or yamanote, district shows a much higher frequency of persons employed in the professions, management, and white collar occupations.[56]

The geographical and occupational distributions of Gakkai members in Tokyo are also related in the matter of intracity shifts in strength. As the Gakkai is increasing its numbers in the suburban areas one may surmise that, although isolated _danchi_ housewives may provide the most fertile ground for expansion, the Society is also succeeding in attracting an increasing number of white collar workers who, though having gained entry into the economically advantaged sector of society, are nevertheless dissatisfied with some features of life. One very recent survey of Sokagakkai members does indicate that, for whatever reason, white collar workers may in fact be entering the Gakkai in greater numbers than before.[57] In this survey, the heads of family of 37% of the respondents were technologists or other types of white collar workers. The heads of 29.6% of the families were self-employed in trade or industry, and those of only 14.2% of the families were laborers.

Two additional characteristics of the occupational makeup of the Sakagakkai's general membership may be noted. Gakkai members, while being largely laborers, are more likely to be non-unionized laborers; second, Gakkai members are occupationally relatively mobile. The first point is relevant in connection with the possibility that unions could provide a satisfying social nexus for the worker which the Gakkai, by default, is allowed to provide. In a late 1964 study of organized labor in the Tokyo-Yokohama area, the largest geographical concentration of Gakkai members in the nation, Sokagakkai members comprised only 1.7% of the total sample.[58] According to a survey by the Prime Minister's Agency supporters of the Komeito were 50% more likely to be employed in non-unionized enterprises than were other employed individuals in a national sample.[59] And in a poll conducted by the Asahi Shimbun in April 1967 in connection with the Tokyo gubernatorial election a full 56% of the supporters of Abe Ken'ichi (the Komeito candidate) were employed in "Other Labor," a classification which included small and intermittent (and therefore most of the non-unionized) enterprises and day laborers.[60] In contrast, the other two candidates in the election drew 21% and 18% of their support, respectively, from this category.

The degree of occupational and physical mobility of the Gakkai's membership is still an open question from a methodologically rigorous point of view. Mobility is suggested, however, by two small local studies, lending credibility to the hypothetical influence of mobility upon anxiety, normative disorder, and receptivity to the teachings of such organizations as the Sokagakkai. A study of Gakkai members in Fukuoka City by Suzuki Hiroshi indicates considerable mobility, both occupational and physical:[61]

Occupational Position of Respondent: Occupation of Respondent's Family of Birth:	Salaried or Managerial	Employer, Owner of Enterprise	Owner without Employees	Work in Own Home	Public Employee	Employee in Private Enterprise	Part-time or Temporary Employee	Other	Total
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing	.75%	3.73%	8.21%	2.61%	1.49%	15.30%	5.97%	2.61%	40.67%
Self-employed in Trade or Industry	1.49	3.36	5.60	.37	1.87	11.19	2.24	1.12	27.24
Employee in Trade or Industry	----	1.12	1.12	.37	.37	4.10	.75	.37	8.21
Employee in Transportation	.37	----	1.87	.37	----	2.61	.37	.75	6.72[sic]
Professional	.37	----	.75	.37	.75	1.12	----	.37	4.48[sic]
Clerical	.37	1.12	1.49	.37	.37	1.87	----	.75	5.60[sic]
Managerial or Executive	----	.37	----	----	----	----	----	----	.37
Temporary, Day, or Unskilled Labor	----	----	.37	----	----	.75	.75	----	1.87
Other	----	.37	1.49	.37	----	1.49	----	.37	4.48
Indeterminate	----	----	----	----	.37	----	----	.37	.37[sic]
Total	3.36%	10.07%	20.89%	5.22% [sic]	5.22%	38.43%	10.07%	6.72%	c.100.00%

N.B. None of the above-indicated typographical errors exceeds 1%

One should note that agrarian origins, reported by 40.67% of the sample, suggest migration from the country to the city of Fukuoka. Suzuki shows that in fact 34.7% of his sample were countryborn; 81% were born outside of Fukuoka, and almost none were living at the time of the study in the place of their birth.[62] A similar pattern of physical movement is shown in a Tokyo study: of a sample of thirty-five Gakkai members twenty were migrants from outside Tokyo and fourteen were native Tokyoites, of whom only eight were living in the ward of their birth.[63]

A final, more specific note on the occupational patterns of Sokagakkai activists: according to a single small survey in the Tokyo area Gakkai activists, despite their relatively high educational level, were still inordinately frequently self-employed and engaged in small enterprises.[64] This condition was interpreted as a discrepancy between background and present situation which could well be productive of frustration and a sense of relative--and unjust deprivation.

The occupational distribution of the Sokagakkai membership has points in common with other social movements, especially those of the late nineteenth- and twentieth-century European Right. With communism the contrasts are greater: the Japan Communist Party draws more from students, organized workers, and the intelligentsia than does the Sokagakkai; a cross-national study of ex-communists also showed a conflictingly high frequency of skilled workmen, professionals, and students accompanied by a relative paucity of small entrepreneurs and unskilled workmen.[65] The elites of communist states and movements include "plebian" elements such as constitute the core of the Gakkai; however, they also include a much higher frequency of persons with professional and intellectual backgrounds[66]--the best that the Sokagakkai can boast in this area is overrepresentation of the primary and secondary teaching professions in its ranks, especially in its own elite.

More similar to the Society were the anti-Semitic groups of late nineteenth-century Germany and Austria.[67] The lower middle class--tradespeople, artisans, low-ranking officials, and medium- and small-scale entrepreneurs and their employees--was heavily represented in this movement which, like the Sokagakkai, had both its political and its religious aspects: one of its major figures, Karl Lueger, was mayor of Vienna; and its specific political content, where there was any, was often a variant of the Christian Socialism which had developed from Pope Leo's encyclicals.

The NSDAP, the culmination of the European anti-Semitic tradition, also drew from occupational groups among which the Gakkai is strong: workers and housewives.[68] Moreover, secondary school teachers were apparently especially attracted; they were the "best represented of all professional groups composing the Nazi party" and by 1940 97% of the teachers in Germany were members of the party or its affiliated groups.[69] One is reminded of the abortive pedagogical careers of Sokagakkai presidents Makiguchi and Toda.

In the Nazi elite, too, sociological resemblances exist with the Gakkai.[70] The "pauperized, resentful intellectuals" who were "perhaps the single most important element in the Fascist elite," are not present in great numbers in the Gakkai; however, they do have a disproportionately large role in the Gakkai elite. The "plebians," especially those from the old commercial and industrial middle class and the ranks of the unemployed, are amply represented in the Society. And there may be parallels between the "new middle class" white-collar Nazis who suffered from a sharp discrepancy between their social and economic statuses and the underpaid but highly educated young Japanese office worker caught in the bottom rung of a seniority-oriented system (the legitimacy of which is failing in the eyes of many) and possibly living in a *danchi*.

The prewar Japanese extreme right also relied heavily upon some of those social elements which now support the Gakkai. Maruyama Masao characterizes the major social supportive element of Japanese "fascism" as "pseudo-intellectuals:" teachers, low-level official functionaries, independent farmers and small landlords, artisans, and owners of small factories and shops; people with no great education, knowledge, or insight who were nevertheless self-styled interpreters and expositors of ideology.[71]

Finally, as its formal name indicates, the Union for the Defense of Merchants and Artisans (the Poujadist movement) was consciously and formally based in just those social strata where the Sokagakkai finds its greatest support.[72] This occupational similarity between the Poujadists and Nazis, who apparently found most of their support--in the early stages of their activity, at least--in the provinces, and the Sokagakkai, which is based in the major cities, suggests that although there may be high positive correlations between certain forms of political expression and geographical distribution, the more significant variables are social, economic, or--as here--occupational. The types of deprivation, the social discontinuities, and the values seen as being under attack in the provincial areas of Germany in the 1920's and 1930's and France in the 1950's might be similar to those strains as they developed in the cities of Japan in the 1950's (especially if those most subject to such strain are recent immigrants from rural areas), and if a causal relationship is sought between demographic variables and political expression, it is probably to be found in these social strains rather than in the physical fact of geographical location.

6. Income

The data on occupation suggest that the membership of the Sokagakkai is relatively concentrated in the lower-income sectors of Japanese society. This can be inferred from voting statistics: the Komeito vote in the Tokyo local constituency of the Upper House election of 1962 was proportionately larger in those wards where the proportion of the population which was on welfare was high.[73] Survey data provide more explicit information. Sokagakkai members are relatively low on the income scale, though not overwhelmingly so; while the absolute economic position of the membership is improving, there is no real sign that the Society is becoming more like a microcosm of Japanese society.

In a representative national survey of 1960 the average per-family income of Gakkai members was very roughly 30,000 yet (about $80) per month; the average income of a laborer's family at the time was 30% higher (38,900 yen or about $108 per month).[74] By 1965 the average income of Gakkai families, as indicated in a nationwide survey, had climbed to 39,000 yen (about $108) per month; however, the income of the average urban laborer's family in 1966 was almost 40% higher (56,515 yen or about $157).[75] Even if one assumes that the average was lower in 1965, it was probably still high enough that the increase in the average Gakkai family income in five years (about 30%) was matched by the increase in the national average.

Local surveys have produced similar data. Polls conducted in Fukuoka, Osaka, and Tokyo all show Gakkai members concentrated in the lower income brackets.[76] The argument has been advanced that Gakkai members tend to be younger than the population as a whole and that, in a society where seniority--and therefore age--is the major determinant of income, a collectivity of the young will inevitably appear as a economically depressed group.[77] This point is doubtless valid; however, the simultaneous concentration of Gakkai members in lower-class neigborhoods and lower-class occupations, and their relatively lower-class appearance, indicate that age does not explain away the discrepancy in income.

The more activist Gakkai members may have generally higher incomes than the membership as a whole. In one survey, a full 67.4% of a sample of Tokyo activists reported incomes of over 50,000 yen (about $140) per month; 20.2% reported making between 70,000 and 100,000 yen (between $195 and $280) per month, and 20.2% claimed incomes of over 100,000 yen monthly.[78] There are various interpretations for this apparent relative affluence. There is doubtless a reinforcing effect exerted on one's faith by increased income, that is, by divine benefit. However, another study found a positive correlation between activism and age; if activists are older then one would expect that, in a seniority-oriented society, they would have higher incomes.[79] Whichever may be the case, one might surmise that activists, being better off materially, may be less prone to frustration and anxiety despite the discrepancy suggested earlier between their educational level and occupational pattern. We shall see later, however, that this is not so; activists are, if anything, more alienated and frustrated than the membership as a whole.

The class composition of the Sokagakkai invites comparison with other social movements. Barrington Moore describes fascism, in both its Japanese and German variations, as a coalition of commercial-industrial elites and traditional rural ruling classes directed against the peasantry and working class, which developed into right-wing radicalism buttressed by the peasantry and petty bourgeoisie who were suffering from the dislocations and strains brought on by the advance of capitalism.[80] The peasantry in contemporary Japan, though not completely happy with its position, is kept in an artificially prosperous state by a program of governmental price supports; in addition, it is, due to the Occupation's land reform, relatively free of landlordism and tenantry, the source of considerable agrarian unrest in other societies. The petty bourgeoisie, however, constitutes the primary support of the Sokagakkai. It does not as yet draw heavily upon the middle class; neither did the NSDAP until German society was faced with depression and economic disaster: "Only when the storm engulfed them /the middle class/ did any port seem good," and until that time the lower middle class was the Nazis' principal socioeconomic pillar.[81]

The French Poujadist movement resembles both the Gakkai and the NSDAP economically. Drawing from the provincial petty bourgeoisie and peasantry, it is strongest, moreover, in those departments where per capita production is lowest relative to national per capita production and where per capita revenue is lowest relative to national per capita revenue.[82] Stanley Hoffman, in his study of the Poujadists, refers to the membership as being of the "classes moyennes;" but his middle classes and the lower middle classes from which the Gakkai takes its strenth are roughly similar.

Similar also are some of the economic strata in which the right wing is strongest in the United States. McCarthy counted the lower classes among his strongest supporters, and his support was socioeconomically of a higher level than that of his ideological predecessor, Father Coughlin.[83] A more recent phenomenon, the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade, has been shown to command support from more educated, affluent, and high-status social elements; however, the study from which these data issued was made at a meeting of the Crusaders. Thus the Crusaders in this study, being meeting-goers, are perhaps comparable with the activists of the Sokagakkai.[84]

As opposed to extremists of the left, members of the Sokagakkai appear to be relatively low in class. In Gabriel Almond's cross-national study of ex-communists almost 60% of the respondents reported that their parents' income had been middling or high.[85] Had the respondents been subject to negative social mobility, an element cited in several studies as a factor in the development of extremist attitudes? Apparently not: only 16% of the sample reported that their own socioeconomic status was below that of their parents; and 23% claimed to have risen in status.[86] In addition, only a minority--29%--reported that they were dissatisfied at the time of entry into the party with career prospects relative to aspirations.[87]

The data on class mobility among Gakkai members is similarly inconclusive, as the chart on page 190 above suggests. A large proportion of the families in the agriculture/forestry/fishing and self-employed commerce and manufacturing categories--totalling 68% of the sample--were certainly self-employed. In contrast, 54% of the sample reported themselves as employees, in public or private enterprises. Thus perhaps 38% of the sample experienced a transition from a self-employed to an employed condition. On the other hand, of the 31% of the sample who classified themselves as self-employed, one-third (10%) came from employed circumstances and thus had managed to establish an enterprise of their own. No generalizations are possible about the status consequences of the transition from independence to employment or vice versa although one may assume psychological strain to accompany both, especially where migration to the city is a concomitant factor; one may guess that the former is more often considered negative social mobility than is the latter, but nothing is known about the class within, e.g., the peasantry from which the Gakkai members came: moving to the city, even into employee status, may have been a welcome escape from rural poverty. And, at the same time, there was a smaller but perhaps equally significant factor of potential upward mobility.

7. Political Background

The voting behavior of Sokagakkai members prior to their conversion cannot be determined with any degree of certainty from the data available. First, the Gakkai may be drawing people who previously were politically inactive. Koya Azumi's study of activists, based on a small sample of Gakkai members in the Tokyo area, indicates that politicization may take place in the Society: whereas 35% of Azumi's sample reported that before entry they had voted occasionally or not at all, 98% reported having voted in the immediately previous House of Councillors election.[88] However, this study was made at Gakkai meetings; the subjects may well have felt constrained to show themselves in the most orthodox (i.e., active) light possible.

Second, if the Sokagakkai is attracting voters away from the other political parties, from which is it drawing its strength? Certain data suggest the right: in a nationwide survey of 1963, of those Sokagakkai members who did not support the Koseiren (predecessor of the Komeito), twice as many (22% of the sample) supported the conservative Liberal Democrats as supported the parties of the left (10%).[89] A local poll in Tokyo's Itabashi ward shows a similar pattern: about 60% of the Gakkai members reported previous conservative leanings, while 40% had been prior supporters of the socialist parties.[90] In the Azumi survey of activists, of those who had not voted for Komeito candidates before conversion, 57% had voted for parties of the right and 37% had voted for parties of the left.[91] In addition, when asked toward which parties, if any, a particular aversion was felt, 66% of the sample named leftist parties, while only 3% specified parties of the right.* In a final poll of voters in Tokyo, of those who supported Komeito candidate Abe Ken'ichi but were not regular Komeito supporters, three times as many (10% of all Abe's supporters) considered themselves supporters of the Liberal Democrats as of the leftist parties (3.4%).[92]

However, in a survey of the voting behavior of Komeito supporters in Lower House elections in the years before the Komeito began to put up candidates for the Lower House, roughly equal numbers of respondents reported voting for parties of the left and the right, and a local poll in Fukuoka indicated that 60% of the Komeito's support was coming from former leftists, while only 40% had been drawn from the right.[93] Because of the small samples used in all of these surveys no conclusion may be reached as to the former political coloration of Sokagakkai members. The evidence suggesting rightist roots is perhaps more persuasive, especially in light of the demographic and socioeconomic parallels between the membership of the Sokagakkai and the supporters of other social movements of the political right.

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*This anti-leftism varies with commitment and politicication according to data collected by Sidney Verba and his associates in 1966: Gakkai members who supported the Komeito strongly were more anti-left than those who simply supported the party, who were in turn more anti-left than Gakkai members who considered their faith "important," who were in turn more anti-leftist than the average Gakkai member.

There exist few hard data on the question of the political background of the supporters of historical mass or other social movements. Kornhauser and others have pointed out that in times of social crisis in several European nations both the Communists and extremist parties of the right increased their vote.[94] Thus the data which are available, most of which concern the NSDAP, may be applicable to the supporters of communist parties also. However, this is a possibility only; the demographic and socioeconomic differences between the followers of the left and right suggest that their political backgrounds will differ also.

One group which may be a common source of votes for both extremes is the apathetics. Hannah Arendt stresses the role of previous non-voters in the increased electoral power of the Nazis; S. M. Lipset argues that this group was not a major factor until the Nazis were already a dominant force in the political system.[95] In either case, Lipset would agree, and other studies by Philip Converse and by Charles Loomis and Allan Beegle indicate, that previous non-voters eventually did constitute an important element of support for the NSDAP.[96]

The Loomis and Beegle study suggests, in addition, that the Nazis profited from the shrinking appeal of the liberal parties of the middle, and from the radicalization of the other parties of the German right. Lipset concurs in the view that the "liberal bourgeois center parties" lost voters to the Nazis.[97] A comparable situation in Japan might be for the Gakkai to draw its voters from the Democratic Socialists, a moderate centrist socialist party, and from the right wing of the Liberal Democrats. There is no firm basis for supposing this to be the case; the Democratic Socialists, while losing ground to the Komeito in legislative assembly seats held, seem to be profiting from the same trends among the electorate which benefit the Sokagakkai. Moreover, the data suggesting a source of votes on the right is not of sufficient reliability to warrant more than further study.

8. Conclusion

The modal member of the Sokagakkai[*] is

(a) a woman who
(b) lives in a city,
(c) is in her thirties or forties,
(d) has less than a high school education, and
(e) is a housewife (or, if male, is a laborer or engaged in some commercial or service enterprise and is not a member of the labor union) whose
(f) familial income is 40,000 yen (about $111) or less; she

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[*] Due to the utilization of aggregate demographic data of severely limited quantity in each case, no more than these two types of member may be discerned.

(g) was proselyted and brought into the Gakkai by a relative or neighbor (or, if male, possibly by a friend or co-worker).

(h) His or her motives for entry related primarily to problems of conflict, and secondarily with problems of economics and health, although to a certain degree her motives were not connected with any specific Gakkai doctrine.

In the years covered by the surveys a few changes may be tentatively inferred in the composition of the Sokagakkai. The proportion of women in the Society may be increasing, as may be the proportion of members in their twenties.[98]

Geographically, the Society is increasing its absolute power more in the cities, although perhaps coming to rely upon them relatively less for electoral strength. At the same time there have appeared a number of rural absolute "power centers" which the Gakkai may be able to parlay into seats in the Lower House of the Diet. Although the Society still relies predominantly upon the cities for its total national numerical strength, politically at least it is becoming less urban relative to the general populace.[99] Within the cities a shift toward the suburbs seems to be in progress, which is reflected in an increased frequency of white-collar members with higher status than the membership as a whole.[100]

The activist element in the Sokagakkai differs from the general membership in several respects. The typical activist is

(a) male,
(b) in his twenties or thirties, and
(c) is much more likely to have a high school or college education, although nine years or less is still modal. His occupation is normal for Gakkai members; but he
(d) earns between 50,000 and 70,000 yen (about $140-195) per month.

In short, when one considers the relatively high education and income level of the activists and the disproportionately large role of teachers therein, one is reminded of Daniel Lerner's description of the "twentieth century revolutionary elite" which emerged from the "middle-income skill groups," "the frustrated and vengeful middle groups that had experienced some upward social mobility, gained some economic rewards, and wanted political power."[101]

According to Lerner this world revolutionary elite is the ruling power in movements and regimes of both right and left. The fact may also be that the elites of the Sokagakkai and Japan Communist Party are very similar in certain demographic and socioeconomic respects; however, for the memberships as a whole there appear to be significant differences.

Although the Sokagakkai and the communists draw largely from the same economic strata, the communists' supporters tend to be better educated and, at least in Tokyo, more concentrated in the higher-class yamanote area.[102] The union experience seems to be an important factor, too. The Gakkai is relatively strong in the non-unionized small-business sector of the economy, while the militant left bases its power on unionized labor. The fact that unions and communism are related suggests another factor: perhaps the unions and Communist Party serve as viable structures for the satisfaction of social and political needs for the more psychologically modern sectors of the Japanese working class. The degree to which traditional cultural elements persist in one's thought processes may determine the relative attractiveness, in times of stress, of sacred and secular solutions. A final factor, is alienation. By several measures in numerous opinion surveys Communist Party supporters invariably appeared to feel much more "alienation"--by any definition--from themselves, from their fellow citizens, and from the social and political systems, than did supporters of the Sakagakkai or Komeito.

This last factor is not concerned with the sociological composition of the Sokagakkai and thus runs ahead of the present discussion. What may be said, however, in light of the data presented in the introduction and in this chapter, is that the members of the Sokagakkai share enough of the sociological characteristics of both the followers of historical mass movements and of social elements among which--cross-nationally--the unattachment, alienation, and political behavior of "mass man" are relatively common, to warrant further investigation of the attitudinal and behavioral qualities of the membership of the Gakkai.

NOTES: CHAPTER 6

1. Mombusho, Shukyo Nenkan, 1965 ed., Tokyo, pp. 148-49.

2. World Tribune, March 8, 1966.

3. Nihonjin no Kokuminsei, 1963 survey, unpub. survey data.

4. Sidney Verba et al., Cross-National Study of Political and Social Change, unpub. survey data.

5. Asahi Shinbunsha, Asahi Nenkan, Tokyo, 1967 ed., p. 272, pp. 1, 5 of addenda after p. 272.

6. Togawa Isamu, Zenshin-suru Komeito, Tokyo, 1966, p. 212.

7. Kokuminsei data; Koya Azumi, "Functions of Soka Gakkai Memberhsip," unpub. paper, Columbia University, 1967.

8. Murakami Shigeyoshi, Sokagakkai to Komeito, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 189ff.

9. Asahi Shimbun, July 17, 1968.

10. Verba data; Kokuminsei data.

11. Seikyo Shimbun, September 1, 1967.

12. Yamaguchi Akira, Issenman-nin no Kokoro wo Tsukanda Himitsu: Sokagakkai no Shinri Senryaku, Tokyo, 1967, p. 225.

13. Kokuminsei data.

14. Seikyo Shimbun, August 24, 1967.

15. Seikyo Shimbun, June 30, 1967.

16. Kokuminsei data; Ishida Ikuo "Shakubuku no Uchimaku," in Gendai no Me, vol. 5 no. 9, September 1964, pp. 85-86; Murakami, op. cit., pp. 28-29; Verba data.

17. Seikyo Shimbun, June 15, 1967.

18. Suzuki Hiroshi, "Toshi Kaso no Shukyo Shudan," in Shakaigaku Kenkyu, no. 22, 1963, pp. 88-90.

19. *Christian Science Monitor*, April 29, 1966; Takase Hiroi,"*Komeito*, Tokyo, 1964, p. 35; Asahi Janaru Henshubu, Dai San Seiryoku Shinshutsu no Imi," in *Asahi Janaru*, vol. 9 no. 7, February 12, 1967, p. 19; Aruga Hiroshi "Komeito no Ronri to Kino," in Sekai, no. 257, April 1967, p. 62.

20. Saki Akio and Oguchi Iichi, *Sokagakkai*, Tokyo, 1960, p. 166; Kokuminsei data; James Dator, unpub. survey data presented at convention of Association for Asian Studies, March 1968.

21. Kokuminsei data; unpub. data from *Mainichi Shimbun* surveys of September 1963, November 1964, June 1965, May 1966, September 1966; Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanbo Koho-shitsu, 1965 Constitutional attitudes survey, unpub. data; unpub. data from *Yomiuri Shimbun* surveys of March 1966 and January 1967.

22. Azumi, *op. cit*., p. 6; James White, unpub. survey data; Verba data.

23. E. Y. Hartshorne in Talcott Parsons, *Essays in Sociological Theory*, Glencoe, 1958, p. 136 note 3.

24. Dator data.

25. *Mainichi* data, September 1963, November 1964, June 1965, May 1966, September 1966 surveys; Constitution survey data; *Yomiuri* data from March 1966 and January 1967 surveys; *Asahi Janaru*, vol. 9 no. 10, March 5, 1967, p. 14.

26. *Ibid*.; Kokuminsei data; Verba data.

27. Azumi, *op. cit*., p. 6; White data.

28. E. Y. Hartshorne in Parsons, *op. cit*., p. 136 note 3.

29. William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, Glencoe, 1959, pp. 69-72; Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York, 1951, pp. 336-37; Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man*, Garden City, 1963, chs. 4, 5.

30. Lipset, *op. cit*., ch. 5.

31. Maruyama Masao, *Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics*, New York, 1963, pp. 57ff.

32. Gabriel Almond, *The Appeals of Communism*, Princeton, 1965, pp. 186-92.

33. Saki and Oguchi, *op. cit.*, p. 219.

34. Kokuminsei data; *Mainichi data* from September 1963, November 1964, June 1965, May 1966, September 1966 surveys; Constitution survey data; *Yomiuri* data from March 1966 and January 1967 surveys; *Asahi Janaru*, vol. 9 no. 10, March 5, 1967, p. 14.

35. Kokuminsei data; *Yomiuri* data from January 1967 survey.

36. Dator data; *Yomiuri* data from March 1967 survey; Tokyo Daigaku Shakaigakka and Tokyo Joshi Daigaku Shakaigakka, *Sokagakkai*, Tokyo, 1963, p. 108; Suzuki, *op. cit.*, p. 89; Tanaka Kunio, *Nihonjin no Shakaiteki Taido*, Tokyo, 1964, p. 125.

37. Fernando Basabe, *Japanese Youth Confronts Religion*, Tokyo, 1967, pp. 53, 125ff.

38. Ishida Ikuo, *Sokagakkai*, Tokyo, 1965, p. 44; Komeito press releases, undated.

39. White data; Azumi, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

40. Kokuminsei data; *Yomiuri* data from March 1966 and January 1967 surveys.

41. *Mainichi* data from September 1963, November 1964, June 1965, May 1966, September 1966 surveys; *Yomiuri* data from March 1966 survey.

42. *Asahi Shimbun*, January 27, 1967, April 17, 1967.

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CHAPTER 7

SOCIALIZATION AND INDOCTRINATION

Due to the half-hearted or even quasi-involuntary manner in which most persons enter the Sokagakkai, the process of socialization by which the norms, ideals, and ideology of the sect are firmly implanted in new converts, thus transmitting orthodoxy through time, is of crucial importance. Especially in Japan, where religious belief is traditionally casual and simultaneous profession by one person to two or more faiths is common, the implantation of an exclusivist view of religion is no mean task. The Sokagakkai has responded to the task of maintaining the spiritual and behavioral patterns dictated by its belief system with a proliferation of agencies combined with a set of well-developed techniques which guide the performance of these agencies.

There are five categories of structures in the Sokagakkai which perform principally socializing functions. They are the "vertical Line (_tate-sen_)," peer groups, interest groups, functional groups, and a miscellaneous number of other organs (see Appendix 3).[1] Two other types of structures may also be mentioned. First is the "horizontal line (_yoko-sen_)," a geographically organized hierachy which functions more as an administrative organ and therefore will be examined later as such. Second is the family. As in the case of recruitment, one may assume that as time passes the role of the family as an agency of religious socialization will steadily increase, perhaps eventually coming to rival the formal structures of the Gakkai in importance. However, at this time the largest number of new believers is of an age which places them beyond the stage of childhood socialization, necessitating some artificial structure for maintaining orthodox patterns of thought and action.

The various structures in which the individual Sokagakkai member is involved overlap and interlock and are built upon different organizing principles--knowledge of the faith, place of residence, age, leisure-time interest, sex, and occupation are a few--so as to utilize almost every type of human relationship and enable the member to satisfy practically any social need therein. The overlap is not only social; it is functional as well. Thus the agencies spoken of here as "socializing" always have other functions which sometimes rival their socializing operations in importance to the organization as a whole. The dissecting done here is analytical only and is not intended to reflect the intricate interaction of a set of mutually reinforcing relationships in the thoughts and behavior of each individual member.

The structure of the Sokagakkai, in response to the social stresses which led to its appearance, is

> beautifully designed to alleviate individual anomie and yet permit the organization to grow to mass size without the accompanying disadvantages and alienating effects which most mass organizations themselves produce.[2]

But structural design is not the whole solution. Operational style is also of great importance. The skill with which doctrines are expounded and applied to the concrete problems of individual members, the degree to which formal channels of advancement and communication can in fact be kept open, and the diligence and sincerity with which those in the upper echelons endeavor to respond to and interact with those below, are of perhaps of even more importance in light of the purposes served by the Gakkai for its members as a structure of social need-satisfaction. Unless these non-specific requirements are fulfilled, socialization in the sense of increased commitment to the Sokagakkai will not be achieved, and without commitment the Society's efforts to instill and maintain certain ideas will be in vain.

A. The Vertical Line

The vertical line both creates the social and psychological stage where an effective socialization program may be carried out and serves as the primary agency through which such specific socialization is attempted. The type of small face-to-face group which characterizes the Gakkai's vertical line has been pointed out previously as an important structure in organizing the social existence of individuals; if such organizing structures do not exist in society--especially in the tako-tsubo-oriented Japanese society--individuals will endeavor to establish them wherever they can.[3] The Sokagakkai, by providing a comprehensive net of such groups, can capitalize both upon the general cultural tako-tsubo element and the particular social stresses which lead to a decreased number of available face-to-gace groups.

The vertical line, as seen in Appendix 3, is multi-level. From the bottom up, it includes the

Unit (kumi): up to 10 families; the

Group (han): 5-10 units, or 50 to 100 families; the

District (chiku): 5 to 10 groups, or 500 to 1000 families; the

Chapter (shibu): 5 to 10 districts, or 5000 to 10,000 families; the

General Chapter (so-shibu): an unspecified number of chapters; and the

Headquarters (honbu): several general chapters.

Several headquarters are subsumed under each of a number of Joint Headquarters (sogo honbu) which are the common apex of both the vertical and horizontal lines.

The vertical line subunits multiply automatically in order that the lowermost units never grow so large as to render intensive face-to-face communication impossible. Upon conversion the new Gakkai member becomes a member of his converter's *kumi*; when the converter has brought in approximately four families he becomes a unit chief (*kumi-cho*). If the new believer converts several families himself he in turn establishes his own *kumi*; if a *kumi* simply becomes too large it is subdivided into several new *kumi* and becomes itself a group with the old *kumi-cho* as a new *han-cho* or group chief. In the same way, the *han* grow until they become *chiku*, and so on; as a member rises in position in the vertical line he keeps his role (though not the title) of *kumi-cho*, staying in touch with those members whom he personally converted and looking after their continuing socialization process.

The strength of the vertical line is its personal connections. The individual member is in a teacher-follower relationship approximating the social "parent-child (*oyabun-kobun*)" relationship which characterizes so many aspects of social interaction in Japan.[4] He is at once both follower of his own converter and teacher of those whom he has converted. This vertical interaction on the basis of transmission of faith is constantly emphasized by the Gakkai; the converter is not only to instruct the new member in specific articles of faith but also to assist him in a diffuse pattern of interaction which increases the new believer's social ties to the Gakkai and thus hopefully his receptivity to its socializing efforts.

The weakness of the vertical line is its non-geographical basis. A Gakkai member from Hokkaido visiting in Tokyo may make a convert who is then a member of his kumi and thus ideally obliged regularly to attend kumi meetings in Hokkaido, an unrealistic obligation. In this manner, the members of a chapter may be scattered all over the country, though in fact they tend to be so concentrated in one area that districts, chapters, and the higher substructures can be organized on a regional basis. The members of a kumi can still, however, be spread all over a city, making administration difficult; the geographically organized horizontal line was established to remedy this situation.

The exigencies of maintaining the face-to-face nexus at the base of the tate-sen have required constant proliferation of substructures over the years. As of late 1967 the tate-sen was composed of 53 joint headquarters, 194 headquarters, and 3500 chapters.[5] The data on shakubuku targets set and achieved, at the rate of one family converted by each han, indicate that there are roughly 150,000 han in the Gakkai.[6] There are no firm figures on the number of units, groups, and districts in the Gakkai. It is probable that the Society itself does not know the exact number of units, just as it does not know the exact size of the total membership.

Meetings take place on each level of the vertical line. On the kumi, han, and chiku level the entire membership gathers for zadankai or discussion meetings, the times for which are set by each organ on its own. These meetings are the primary socialization situations, and the leader bears heavy responsibility for the progress of the socialization of each of his proteges. The han-cho in particular is the focal point of the whole socialization process; the kumi have become so numerous and possibly, one suspects, autonomous, that the han has become the lowest level which is directly utilized by the highest echelons of the Gakkai. It is through the han that the Society gains access to the majority of the rank-and-file.[7] During peak periods of activity, such as the late stages of shakubuku drives, many kumi and han hold zadankai almost nightly; the pressure on the han-cho is intense at such times and may be partly responsible for the impression one gets from reading the accounts of apostates that it is the lower-echelon leaders who are most liable to the conflicting demands and commitments which lead to defection.[8]

In addition to the lower-level zadankai, there are lecture meetings on the district level; these are usually concerned with scriptural exegesis, organizational announcements, and exhortation. At this level also begin the leaders' meetings. The chiku-bu-cho kai or district leaders' meeting is subordinate to the chapter leaders' meetings which in turn is below the general chapter leaders' meeting. These higher-level gatherings, especially as they are covered in the Seikyo Shimbun, serve hortatory purposes; they also become increasingly administrative in function, although the content of the administrative measures communicated through them is concerned largely with the structure and process of socialization as they should be realized on lower levels.

The *zadankai* is the key socialization structure. Whether on the *kumi*, *han*, or *chiku* level, it is an opportunity to escape the obligations and discriminations of secular society and enter a context of equality, free intercourse, and self-expression. The meeting is structured, but not excessively so, and the agenda is established by the leaders along the general guidelines for the month's activities but with considerable autonomy. Typical topics are official announcements, short explanations of articles of faith, *shakubuku* of visitors, (which is often more of a good-humored but persistent exchange than a vituperative attack, as in the past), discussion of common problems in light of scripture, political activities (depending upon the time), and personal testimonials (*taikendan*) and professions of faith.

The keys to the meeting are participation and dialogue. According to President Ikeda, "all attendants should be conscious that they are essential members of the meeting."[9] He criticizes the one-way communication of the mass media and stresses that at the *zadankai* all are equally to be heard and to be able to speak. The meeting leader is responsible for structuring the gathering in order to insure maximum equality of participation; leaders who make the "grandstand play" are excoriated.

The dialogue quality of the *zadankai* is exaggerated by the Gakkai. Questions are answered, problems are interpreted and encouragement is given, but the only real dialogue takes place during *shakubuku*. For the most part, the *zadankai* is a vehicle for self-expression. Every participant has a chance to open his life to a sympathetic audience. Such self-revelation has never been a characteristic of the "inscrutable" Japanese, but in the *zadankai* believers describe intimate problems and listen openly to the predicaments of others. That the Japanese are as capable of self-revelation as any people is nowhere so strikingly obvious as in the *zadankai*.[10]

The *zadankai* has been compared in its testimonial aspect to self-criticism on the Chinese communist model, and in its *shakubuku* and prayer to brainwashing. Group therepy is a much better analogue to the *taikendan* than is self-criticism; there is no sharp criticism from the other members of the group, nor any abject expression of guilt. The whole process is positive and hortatory. The unison chanting of prayer and vigorous affirmative response to the leader's rhetorical questions suggest the inducement of a state of suspended consciousness and almost, at times, a trance. But such periods are usually brief and the overall impression gained by relatively unbiased outsiders suggests that the brainwashing metaphor, too, is hyperbolic.

But brainwashing in the sense of resocialization is certainly a purpose of the *zadankai*. The primary form of the socialization process taken in the *zadankai* is the increase of belief in the efficacy of faith--that is, of the one and only True Buddhism--in the solution of problems in this life. The content of the process is the inculcation and maintenance of a particular pattern of belief. The testimonials all revolve about the same axis: pray and you shall receive; faith creates value. The divine benefits recounted are of diverse kinds: a high school student has passed his college entrance examinations; a woman's husband has stopped his carousing; a young girl has become the talk of her shop because of her diligence. Sometimes the testimonials are predictive: a young man vows to convert a family this month; another pledges to redouble his prayers in the expectation of winning the job he desires. In every case exclusiveness is clear. There is but one way to obtain all these benefits and that is by devotion to the *gohonzon*.

As opposed to these material values which are created by faith, the very context of the *zadankai* is creative of value in the lives of the participants. The congenial atmosphere of solidarity, intimacy, enthusiasm, trust, and sharing of circumstances and problems is of "value" to the individual in that it fulfills needs for security, self-expression, self-confidence, and the reassurance that one has significance as a person and is following a well-marked path through the maze of modern urban life.

The sincere happiness of the participants at a *zadankai* could not be a fabrication; the question is: which aspect of the Gakkai experience is it that produces these apparently adequately adjusted persons who swear that until they found the Gakkai their lives were chaos?

The answer, naturally, is both. The reinforcing effect of the experiences of others upon one's own belief in the kudoku-ron or doctrine of divine reward is clear. However, the willingness of the Gakkai to condone the existence of myriad kumi which are only indirectly controlled from the center suggests that the Society is aware that the patterns of social interaction which are maintained through the zadankai make a great contribution to the stability of the whole organization irrespective of the exact content of the doctrinal patterns which are being perpetuated therein.

A final socialization strategy which is realized in the vertical line is shakubuku. One observer has gone so far as to say that propagation is the primary function of the zadankai, with the alleviation of the problems of individual members being of only secondary importance.[11] Propagation does not serve adaptive purposes only; it is a way of disciplining and strengthening the faith of the members. First, the obligation to proselyte means that every member will be pressured to internalize doctrine in sufficient degree to be able to win over others to Nichiren Shoshu. Second, the practice of shakubuku itself is a form of devotion and therefore produces divine reward, which reinforces one's faith. Take the example of Mr. Okayama Takeo (50 years old), of Katsushika ward, Tokyo, which was recounted in the *Seikyo Shimbun* under the title "Springtime in the Family Through Shakubuku."[12]

> June 1964 . . . the leaders' meeting held that month became the great turning point for Okayama Takeo. The Edogawa Public Hall was choking with heat and stuffiness.
>
> "No matter how hard a time you may have, you must not be distracted. . . ." ran the guidance of the diligent senior member.
>
> Okayama, seated quietly, recalled the panorama of his life until that time. [He'd] drunk liquor by the quart and been riotous. [He'd] not done any work and had spent like water the money that his wife and children had earned with their own sweat. And to complete the misery, [he had] incessantly fought with Masae, his wife.
>
> Naturally, the events in such a family subtly influenced his adolescent daughters.
>
> He was even told by the elementary school teacher of his eldest daughter that: "Noriko has good manners, but she can't express her own opinions and doesn't know how to be comfortable with people. Is there some problem in the family . . . ?"
>
> Okayama suddenly remembered this event. "Noriko, I'm sorry. Even at school you're ashamed. From now on your father, too, will work hard at his faith, and I'll achieve a wonderful human revolution!"
>
> Since then, Okayama went assiduously about his *shakubuku*, until he won the nickname "Proselyting Okayama." Once, he debated fiercely with a young man for five hours and at last brought his adversary to convert.
>
> From struggles like this Okayama began to change slowly.
>
> As his senior, General Chapter Chief Ishikura, says, "That one has matured through *shakubuku*; he has admirably and brightly matured." Says Noriko, beaming, "Nowadays Father is really reliable."
>
> Today, the shining Okayama family, with father as the center, is in good health and is putting all its spirit into its work. Even the family restaurant is prospering greatly.

Actually, the first point is secondary in importance; knowledge of Gakkai doctrines is not a prerequisite for *shakubuku*. The Society stresses that people are not convinced by theology alone or even primarily; it is the example the believer sets as the manifestation of a living faith which is crucial in persuading others.

Shakubuku is made easier yet by the fact that divine benefit accrues whether or not the person approached does convert. The Gakkai posits two forms of *shakubuku*: *monpo geshu*, or bringing knowledge of the True Religion to another, and *hosshin geshu*, or bringing another to accept the True Religion.[14] Both produce blessings; therefore it is a specified action alone which is required. The *zadankai* has become in recent years the central stage where this action pattern is demonstrated and perpetuated.

B. Peer Groups

Peer groups are, according to the Gakkai itself, the "pillars" of the organization.[15] There are three branches in the peer-group structure, the Men's Division (*Sonen-bu*), Women's Division (*Fujin-bu*), and Youth Division (*Seinen-bu*), although usually the Gakkai speaks of the "unity of the four," considering the Young Women's (*Joshi-bu* or YWD) and Young Men's (*Danshi-bu* or YMD) divisions of the Youth Divisions as separate actors. In addition to these two subdivisions, the Youth Division includes a Student Division (*Gakusei-bu*) for university students, a High School Division (*Koto-bu*), Junior High School (*Chuto-bu*) and Boys' and Girls' (*Shonen-bu*) divisions. Every member of the Sokagakkai is, according to age and marital status, automatically a member of one of the peer groups.

As shown in Appendix 3, the Young Men's and Young Women's divisions are subdivided into levels on a parallel with the vertical line. In fact, it is customary to have representatives of not only the YMD and YWD but also of the Men's and Women's divisions in each han and chiku and, if possible, kumi. At the same time, each of the peer groups has its own separate hierarchy under the Board of Directors. Each has its own rallies, goals, and activities, and in cooperative activities such as shakubuku there is a peer-group esprit which creates a competitive mood within the tate-sen structure in the gaining of converts.

The Youth Division was the creation of Toda Josei, who envisioned it primarily as a recruiting organ, the vanguard of the shakubuku campaign. Since its inception the Youth Division has provided the real dynamism which has brought the Gakkai to its present size, but at present recruitment by the young is carried out in their roles in other substructures more than in their roles as members of the Youth Division.

Like the equivalent tate-sen level, the chapter, the corps (butai) of the YMD and YWD have their own banners which they receive from the President; the military theme is reflected in the structural terminology: corps, company, squad. We-feeling is further built by the frequent addresses of senior leaders: the Youth Division is the well from which the future motive forces of the Gakkai and of the nation will be drawn, therefore be proud and diligent. This diligence is to be shown in activity and study; the orthodox patterns of belief are perhaps more strongly disseminated among the members of the Youth Division than any other peer group. This intensive indoctrination effort is a legacy of Toda; he was convinced that the Soka Kyoiku Gakkai had disintegrated easily under official pressure because the prewar leaders had not spent sufficient time thoroughly internalizing their faith, and he was determined that this mistake should never be repeated.

The Youth Division was established in 1951 for single Gakkai members between the ages of eighteen and thirty; by 1963 over half of the Board of Directors was composed of Youth Division ex-members.[16] The Division claims for itself over 4 million members, including 2.4 million in the YMD, 1.5 million in the YWD, 200,000 in the Student Division, 150,000 in the secondary school divisions, and nearly 100,000 in the Boys' and Girls' Division.[17] The YMD and YWD in turn have their own internal elite groups, where further socialization is carried out.

These are the men's Suiko Club (Suiko-kai) and the Women's Kayo Club (Kayo-kai), which one Gakkai official described as "similar to the Boy Scouts." They are composed of higher leaders in the YMD and YWD to whose roles membership automatically accrues, and go on periodic camps where they receive special training, instruction, discipline, and education. They have been described as the president's "bodyguard," but ostensibly they spend much--if not most--of their time in discussions of theology and non-religious topics, mutual encouragement, and building of group unity.[18]

Beyond the common socialization purpose a division is visible between the YMD and YWD, the Student Division, and the Men's Division. The admonition to the YMD and YWD now seems to be: "Exert yourselves!" In the words of President Ikeda, "be revolutionary youths, unsparing of body and life. . . . I want you to exert yourselves to the utmost in the time of your youth. . . . You must not be fascinated by such things as school record, position, wealth, honor, or titles."[19] Gone are the Todaesque injunctions to take command, to lead, or to become the supreme nucleus of the organization.

The leading role appears to have been accorded to the Men's Division which is, according to General Executive Hojo Hiroshi, the "backbone," the "pillar," and the "mainstay" of the Gakkai.[20] In the speech quoted above, President Ikeda declared to the Men's Division that "/You/ are the Gakkai's backbone, you are its nucleus, you are its foundation. . . . Take command brilliantly, as renowned leaders."

While the Men's Division is encouraged to see itself as the present leader, the students are admonished to become the future guiding element of the Gakkai, seemingly leaving to the less educated sectors of the Youth Division the intellectually less demanding tasks. Ikeda has become rather pointed at times in his description of the new division of labor between the peer groups: the students are the "axis" of the Gakkai and, as its "heirs," must "carry the future of the Society."[21] They must "be the power source and brains of the bloodless revolution" and the future leaders of the nation and the world.[22]

In preparation for this future role students are adjured to study Gakkai doctrines diligently. In addition to becoming the administrative leaders of the Gakkai, they are expected to become the "nucleus of the theoretical struggle," that is, the guiding force in the Study Department and the other structures with explicit socialization functions.[23] To this end the Student Division is strengthening its basis on individual campuses with philosophical and theological study clubs, or with less formal discussion circles on any campus where there are a few Gakkai members.[24] Tokyo University, Tokyo Institute of Technology, Meiji University, Keio University, Kansai Gakuin University, and Ochanomizu Women's University are a few of the major colleges in Japan with Gakkai student organizations. In addition, the Student Division has spawned its own internal elite group, the Ushio-kai or Ushio Club, and enables its members to retain symbolic ties with the division after graduation through the Student Division Alumni Division (Gakusei-bu O.B. Bu).[25]

As mentioned, the Student Division presently claims over 200,000 members. The ostensible rate of growth (see Appendix 1a) has been remarkable, and the Gakkai, extrapolating from this growth and the increase of the general college population, predicts that by 1972 400,000 of the total of 1.2 million university students will be Sokagakkai members. On the basis of the Shae-no-San'oku principle this will constitute substantive Kosen-rufu of the student world.[26] A recent survey of university students in the Tokyo area indicated that the Sokagakkai's proportion of the student world is nearer to 1% than the 15% claimed.[27] Nevertheless, the Sokagakkai Student Division quite probably has more activist members than any other student organization in Japan, including the better-known Zengakuren.

The final peer groups of significance, the Women's Division and the Boys' and Girls' Division, are structurally independent of each other but are without doubt closely interrelated. The growth of the latter group signifies the integration of the process of religious socialization with that of basic familial socialization; its members (from first to sixth grade) are too young to be "proselyted" in any meaningful sense. And, given the pattern of childhood socialization in Japan, the Gakkai's great emphasis on the importance of housewives appears a very astute strategy.

First, the majority of the membership of the Sokagakkai is female and a great number are married women, i.e., members of the Women's Division. Therefore the establishment of a peer group for this sector of the membership is natural, both as an agency of socialization and as a means of mobilizing the female membership for various Gakkai activities. Second, the mother plays an extremely important role in the socialization of children in Japan, much greater than is the case in the United States.[28] In some situations the child becomes a veritable extension of the mother's ego and on a more modal level is "more receptive" to instruction by the mother than by the father; "until late adolescence, the child is a part of the mother's world."[29] In such a situation the Gakkai's focus upon the housewife population is an indirect--though certainly not unconscious--strategem of considerable perspicacity as regards the maintenance of orthodox patterns of belief.

C. Interest Groups

The interest groups in the Sokagakkai such as the Democratic Music Association and Democratic Drama Association also perform socialization functions. Primarily they do so in an indirect fashion; their activities are largely non-sectarian and non-Gakkai members are admitted. However, they are for all practical purposes collectivities of Sokagakkai members and as such they enable the Gakkai to extend its influence over the lives of its members. Faith enters at times explicitly: the advice given to a member of the Fuji Symphony Orchestra might be to practice more, but also to do more _gongyo_. In addition, a well-done performance, especially at a Gakkai function, is a sign of divine assistance and reward and thus serves to reinforce belief in the validity of the doctrine of happiness.

D. Functional Groups

In addition to the interest groups, peer groups, and the vertical line, all of which are explicitly multipurposive, there are two structures designed specifically to perform socializing functions, the Study Department (Kyogaku-bu) and the Culture Bureau (Bunka-kyoku). Both are charged with the task of defining, interpreting, and articulating the patterns of thought and behavior which the Gakkai wishes to perpetuate. The Study Department is moreover in charge of a large-scale educational program designed to instill Gakkai doctrines both extensively among the membership as a whole and intensively in the future leadership.

The Study Department, established in 1951, was an outgrowth of Toda's disillusionment with the recantation of almost all of the top Gakkai leaders upon incarceration by the prewar Japanese government; in Ikeda's words, "it was clearly proven that faith had not been proportionate to office."[30] Toda was and Ikeda is of the opinion that everyone can and should have at least two or three leisure hours each day which could be spent in reading and reflection. No matter how hard one works there is no excuse for not studying, especially when one is young; the Gakkai is really quite vehement on this point. Part of each zadankai is devoted to study, and the lecture meetings frequently held on various levels of the Gakkai are part of the doctrinal study program. Moreover, members are encouraged to subscribe to the Seikyo Shimbun and to read as many of the other official publications as possible.

Paradoxically, study and learning are not of paramount importance. The Gakkai draws a sharp line between academic knowledge (*chishiki*) and true wisdom (*chie*), which is *living knowledge* enlightened by *faith*. Of the three elements of wisdom, one often suspects that knowledge is the least important. Faith is supreme, and living faith, i.e., belief in action, is acceptable even without knowledge. But knowledge is an essential factor in faith, at least in sustained faith, and also in effective action such as *shakubuku*. Thus the Society puts great emphasis on its formal study program.

In addition, personal achievement in the study program is an important element in the socialization process of the individual Gakkai member. The Study Department has at present six ranks: assistant lecturer (*joshi*), lecturer (*koshi*), subassistant professor (*jo-kyoju-ho*), assistant professor (jo-kyoju), associate professor (*kyoju-ho*), and professor (*kyoju*). In a society such as Japan's, where academic status is very prestigious, such titles contribute greatly to one's self-esteem. Especially in the case of Gakkai members, many of whom have very little formal schooling, to achieve the rank of "professor" despite one's educational handicap is a major victory. Such rank, coupled with the Gakkai's stress of wisdom over knowledge, contributes to the feelings of superiority which are called for by the claims of Nichiren Shoshu to be the one and only true religion. Academic accomplishment within the Gakkai study structure thus increases one's sense of competence *vis-à-vis* his peers and also *vis-à-vis* the secular society which may denigrate his significance. That the Sokagakkai does not ignore him, and even provides channels for recognized achievement, has implications for continued and increased commitment to the Society apart from the internalization of specific doctrines, although such internalization will probably be a consequence, if not a precondition, of commitment.

Study standards are set for every level of the Sokagakkai. The general membership is encouraged to read at least the Seikyo Shimbun and Dai Byaku Renge and for those who aspire to academic position the requirements become increasingly difficult. Examinations begin at the Junior High School Division level (though rank does not accrue to successful performance here). The required reading for the August 1967 JHSD examinations was a piece of scripture, a chapter from the Shakubuku Kyoten, and part of President Ikeda's fictionalized biography of President Toda. The turnout for the test was 50,000 persons.[31]

The examination for admission to the Study Department presupposes familiarity with additional scriptural material, more of the Shakubuku Handbook, and certain articles from Dai Byaku Renge; each step of the ladder requires more preparation. Preparation is not easy--the classical Japanese used in the scriptures is exceedingly difficult to read and, in contrast to the rote-learning procedures which typify the formal Japanese educational system, Gakkai members must be able to interpret their beliefs and apply them to everyday life situations.

The examinations themselves are no simple affair either. Sample questions from an admission examination are:

> What is the "five-fold comparison" [for determination of the True Religion]?
>
> Explain [the three historico-theological periods of] *Shoho*, *Zobo*, and *Mappo*.
>
> Give the Three Great Policies for the Year of the Leap Forward (1967).
>
> Tell about St. Nikko.[32]

The examinee has two hours to answer ten such relatively easy questions. The aspiring professor has a rather more difficult task: twenty questions which cover everything from abstruse points of pure theology to such as the following:

> Discuss Feuerbach's critique of Hegelian philosophy.
>
> Briefly discuss, and criticize from the Buddhist point of view, Jaspers' "reason" and "reality" and Sartre's "existence" and "emptiness."
>
> Discuss the theft of Tendai's concept of *ichinen-sanzen* by the Kegon Sect and the Shingon Sect.[33]

The advent of examination time, which comes once a year, brings a tremendous outpouring of energy on the part of a large proportion of the Sokagakkai membership. People may be seen in coffee shops and subways and on the streets reading Gakkai publications. In the May-June 1967 series examinations were taken by well over one million members, of whom 700,000 passed.[34] A number of those who passed had taken makeup examinations, and many on the professorial level had taken the periodically required in-service examinations, but this result still increased the membership of the Study Department to approximately 1.5 million persons, up from 1.15 million the previous year and only 3131 in 1957.[35]

The membership is distributed as follows (this is a crudely proportional representation; different official Gakkai figures are contradictory):

Professors	1,000
Associate professors	8,000
Assistant professors	50,000
Subassistant professors	200,000
Lecturers	400,000
Assistant Lecturers	900,000
	1,559,000.[36]

The significance of this total both for the further dissemination of Gakkai doctrines inside and outside the organization and for the internalization of orthodox belief patterns in a broad segment of the Sokagakkai membership is obvious.

Less obvious, but perhaps of equal importance for the Gakkai's indoctrination program, is the role of the Culture Bureau. The various organs of the bureau are engaged in the definition and explication of official Sokagakkai policies in their respective fields for purposes of both internal and, secondarily, external dissemination (adaptation). The constituent branches of the Culture Bureau at present are the:

Economics Department (Keizai-bu): its purpose is to organize businessmen and economists who wish to see the realization of a new, rational economic system on the basis of the principle of Obutsu-myogo;

Education Department (Kyoiku-bu): claiming about 15,000 members from all levels of the teaching profession, its premises are that more "men of firm faith" are necessary in education and that the doctrines of Nichiren Shoshu provide the most excellent basis for any educational system. This department is in charge of determining the structure and curriculum of Soka Schools (Soka Gakuen), the Gakkai's new Junior High-High School-University complex;

Public Opinion Department (Genron-bu--official interpretation): aiming at present toward a goal of 150,000 members, its functions are relatively more oriented toward adaptation than the other arms of the Culture Bureau. Its role is to aid commentators and journalists to understand fully the necessity of religion to life and the peculiar relevance of Nichiren Shoshu;

Art Department (Geijutsu-bu): working on the basis of the spiritual and esthetic principles of Nichiren Shoshu, this organ intends to become the spearhead of a new movement of artistic rejuvenation, the fruits of which will be a thousand times greater than those of the Rennaissance;

Science Department (Gakujutsu-bu): composed of some 500 scientists, this branch aims at defining the proper relationship of science and religion in the modern age and the role of science in contemporary society, especially insofar as science is complementary to religion and may contribute to the goal of Obutsu-myogo.[37]

Until the establishment of the League of Fair Statesmen in November 1961 there was also in the Culture Bureau a Politics Department (Seiji-bu) which managed all of the Sokagakkai's political operations under the pseudonym of "cultural activities." The League, upon its establishment, assumed the tasks of formation and external dissemination of policies and management of election campaigns; general political socialization has since been handled primarily by the vertical line, and internal electoral publicity and mobilization have been carried out primarily through the horizontal line.

Certain of the doctrine-definition and communication aspects of the Sokagakkai's socialization program have devolved upon the newly-established Theory Department (_Riron-bu_). Formed in April 1967, it is headed by Tada Shogo, at 37 the youngest of the General Executives and already a Member of Parliament and perhaps the number three theoretician in the Gakkai.* The Theory Department has assumed the policy-making role of the Study Department; it studies political, economic, philosophical, and social problems from the point of view of Buddhism and works each into the theoretical framework of the Gakkai's theology. In particular the department is concerned with the refutation of "mistaken" perceptions and criticisms of the Society.[38]

The Theory Department is divided into eight branches. Its members are apparently simultaneously members of several branches; their articles appear with great frequency in the _Seikyo Shimbun_ and _Komei Shimbun_ citing the authors as members of a given branch of the department. The concern of the department with contemporary problems and with treatment of the Sokagakkai by the Japanese communications media is reflected in the names of the branches: The Oriental-Occidental Philosophy Study Club (_Tozai Tetsugaku Kenkyu-kai_), Contemporary Thought Conference (_Gendai Shiso Kaigi_), Modern Mass Communications Comrades' Club (_Kindai Masu-Komi Doshikai_), The Political Reform Discussion Group (_Seiji Sasshin Konwa-kai_), the Middle-of-the-Road Politics Study Club (_Chudo_

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*The supreme theoretician is, of course, President Ikeda. The probable number two figure is Kodaira Yoshihei, a Toda convert, member of Parliament, General Executive, and head of the Study Department.

Seiji Kenkyu-kai), the Welfare Economy Study Club (*Fukushi Keizai Kenkyu-kai*), the Contemporary Mass Communications Study Club (*Gendai Masu-Komi Kenkyu-kai*), and the Pearl Pen Club (*Paru Pen Kurabu*).

A final Gakkai organ which is functionally specialized for socialization is the Pilgrimage Department or *Tozan-bu*. The role of this group is to manage the trips of over three million believers each year to the head temple of Nichiren Shoshu, the Taisekiji. The pilgrimage is for the Gakkai member a short period--sometimes overnight--of intensive socialization. The socialization is explicit: a midnight prayer service (the *Ushitora no Gongyo*) typified by a mass chanting of scripture which creates a trancelike atmosphere is supplemented by small groups and larger lectures on theology. It is also implicit: the pilgrims are conducted around the precincts of the temple and allowed to behold groves of cypress towering out of the massive buildings which they themselves, by their sacrifices, helped to build. These buildings "provide a vision of splendor for people whose everyday lives are drab:" the scope of the whole Taisekiji compound is enormous; nestled dramatically at the foot of Mount Fuji and thronged with the faithful it is a truly impressive sight and does not fail to impress the pilgrim with a sense of awe at the magnitude, affluence, and power of the Gakkai.[39]

The group which is responsible for running the pilgrimage program is the *Yusohan* or guide group. This organization is noteworthy because of its zeal, aggressive style, and tightly regimented way of organizing pilgrims, moving them about, and making sure they attend every scheduled event. The Japanese do not seem to mind but American pilgrims have on occasion objected to the discipline and lack of freedom of movement, and some Japanese critics of the Gakkai have described them as a "Storm Troop."[40] The Gakkai strongly denies this characterization and asserts that without a certain degree of regimentation the Taisekiji would be chaos with over 10,000 visitors daily, and for a safe and smooth pilgrimage it is necessary to organize the program thoroughly. Members of the Yusohan are chosen for their enthusiastic faith, honesty, and diligence; the Society emphasizes that their sole function is the management of the pilgrimage program.[41]

E. Other Socialization Agencies

The remaining structures of the Sokagakkai concerned with manifest or latent indoctrination are the Gakkai's publications; its recently-established educational complex, the Soka Schools; and its mass meetings.

The publications of the Sokagakkai and its various subsidiaries may be classified under three headings: exoteric materials serve primarily adaptive purposes in that they are designed to disseminate Gakkai doctrines in the larger society with little focus upon the Gakkai membership. Esoteric media consist of those classics and more sophisticated and theoretical journals which are directed toward the top leadership of the Gakkai and which communicate the more complex patterns of the official belief system. Third are the intermediate media which also perform primarily (though not exclusively) socializing functions but are aimed at the membership as a whole.[42]

The fully exoteric publications of the Gakkai are few: Ushio, Shukan Genron (a magazine of current events) and a political journal called Komei; plus the nonsectarian books published by the Ushio Publishing Company. Also in this category one could include the Seikyo Graphic, although this flashy weekly also serves as a colorful socialization tool for the membership. Criticism (especially social and religious), testimonials, and Gakkai activities predominate in this journal; a content analysis of the Graphic during 1960 and 1961 showed that these three areas accounted for 75% of the space of the magazines:[43]

Concerned with		
1. Gakkai activities	38.6% of the total space.	
2. Teachings:	1.	
Nichiren Shoshu		(1.)
Shakubuku and kosen-rufu		(---)
Other		(---)
3. Criticism:	7 18.5	
Social		(10.)
Political		(.5)
Educational		(---)
Religious		(8.)
4. Testimonials	18.9	
5. Reader interest (cartoons, stories, features)	9.1	
6. Advertisements	13.9	
	100.0%	

An intermediate medium is the *Seikyo Shimbun*. One might call it exoteric but for the fact that it cannot be bought on the open market and can be obtained only through the Gakkai membership or directly from Gakkai headquarters. This indicates that the membership is the primary audience, although the Society often encourages the use of the *Seikyo Shimbun* in *shakubuku*.

The content of the *Seikyo Shimbun* is also intermediate in tone: less coverage of activities than the *Graphic*, more on teachings, and less criticism. The same study cited above analyzed the *Seikyo Shimbun* as follows:

Concerned with		
1. Gakkai activities	33.0% of the total space.	
2. Teachings:	9.5	
Nichiren Shoshu		(1.8)
Shakubuku and kosen-rufu		(6.3)
Other		(1.4)
3. Criticism:	3.7	
Social		(1.4)
Political		(.3)
Educational		(.1)
Religious		(1.9)
4. Testimonials	15.6	
5. Reader interest	11.6	
6. Advertisements	26.5	
	99.9%	

Again the emphasis is more on action than on theology; in addition, the large proportion of advertisements indicates the role of the *Seikyo Shimbun* as a money-earner. It is most probable that a more recent content analysis of the paper would show a greater stress on criticism in general (especially due to the frequent articles by members of the

Theory Department) and on politics in particular; the coverage of elections and of the parliamentary activities of the Komeito has become quite extensive since the early 1960's.

The closest the Sokagakkai comes to a thoroughly esoteric journal is the theoretical monthly Dai Byaku Renge. There are few testimonials, no advertisements, and much doctrine and criticism; the 1960-61 study recorded the following:

Concerned with		
1. Gakkai activities	19.4% of the total space.	
2. Teachings:	24.9	
Nichiren Shoshu		(17.1)
Shakubuku and Kosen-rufu		(6.4)
Other		(1.4)
3. Criticism:	17.6	
Social		(11.)
Political		(--)
Educational		(--)
Religious		(6.6)
4. Testimonials	7.3	
5. Reader interest	30.7	
6. Advertisements	--	
	99.6%[44]	

In this central theoretical journal, as in the Seikyo Shimbun and Seikyo Graphic, references to Makiguchi's Theory of Value (included in "Teachings, other") are practically nil, signifying the degree to which his teachings have been eclipsed in the Sokagakkai.

Another point of note is the high incidence of "reader interest" articles. These are aimed more at the general membership and reinforce the opinion that this is not solely a leadership medium but has an important educational role to play on the rank-and-file level, too. As mentioned above, Dai Byaku Renge is required reading for the Study Department examinations; the reader-interest portions of the journal are mostly didactic stories and fictionalized historical exerpts from scripture.

The Study Department examination system blurs the distinction between esoteric and intermediate communications media. Perhaps the only texts not read by the membership are the writings of Nichiren--couched in a classical language probably beyond the comprehension of the great majority of the believers--and Makiguchi's Theory of Value, largely unread by the membership but most likely seldom read by the leadership either. In fact, neither of these texts really serves as much more than a convenient source of concepts to fit every occasion and change of doctrinal strategy. The living corpus of beliefs is contained in the Shakubuku Kyoten and, to a greater extent, in the writings of President Ikeda.

The Shakubuku Handbook forgoes all of the niceties indulged in by the more theoretical and exoteric Sokagakkai media. Such shibboleths as democracy, tolerance, and freedom of religion were totally ignored until the most recent (1967) edition; the business at hand is the concrete tactics of propagation and the tools are criticism, condemnation, attack, and vilification. The primary themes of the book are (a) all other religions are evil; (b) why they're evil; (c) why the Sokagakkai is the one and absolute True Religion; and (d) how to attack these heresies. The 1967 edition of the

Handbook contains a new section on freedom of religion with copious guarantees and assurances, discussion and support of the constitutional references to religion, and a stress on politics as one aspect of the realm of relativity where compromise is the guiding principle.[45] However, the balance of the book remains substantively unchanged and, if one were to surmise the results of prolonged socialization in the behavioral imperatives contained therein, it would be hard to avoid the conclusion that such a socialization process, if widespread in society, would be profoundly subversive of a democratic political system. However, it may well be that the Shakubuku Kyoten is being de-emphasized at present; references to texts most useful in shakubuku now stress the Seikyo Shimbun over the Handbook. And in other spheres of doctrine Dai Byaku Renge and the presidents' writings are of greater importance.

The only president who is truly important is Ikeda. Makiguchi's Kachiron is a cited but unread classic; Toda's speeches are often quoted but his writings, such as the Injunctions to Patriots, have a rather extreme tone which does not accord with the Gakkai's new, moderate image. The books of President Ikeda supply the substance of this image. His Politics and Religion (Seiji to Shukyo), while basically an exposition of the political philosophy of the Sokagakkai, includes a survey of the history of political thought in both East and West with a strong emphasis on the evolution of secular, liberal European democracy. Ikeda has obviously read widely and cites with approval Locke, Montesquieu, Jefferson, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, Thomas Paine, the Mills, and Bentham, among others. There is a constant reiteration of the ideals and concepts (however general and vague) of Western democracy and, although this book is probably not widely read, it presents the main themes of Ikeda's political writings as they appear in the more broadly circulated Gakkai media.

Ideda's major single work to date is the Lectures on the Rissho Ankoku Ron (Rissho Ankoku Ron Kogi), a commentary on Nichiren's memorial to the then rulers of Japan on the necessity of adopting his faith as the official religion. The alternative, according to Nichiren, was a horrendous succession of natural, social, economic, and political catastrophes, and Ikeda lists ad infinitum the disasters of the day in order to illustrate, in post hoc, ergo propter hoc fashion, the results of general non-acceptance of Nichiren Shoshu.

In the course of this long book Ikeda sets forth the entire Sokagakkia belief system, including current political policies; there are many overlaps with the Shakubuku Kyoten and Politics and Religion, and a general playing down of the intemperate tone of Nichiren throughout the commentaries. Again, it is probable that few people have read this work in its entirety; still, it is a valuable compendium of Ikeda's thoughts and is the only book in which all of his ideas are brought together.

A more readable, albeit equally repetitious, work is Ikeda's fictionalized biography of President Toda, Human Revolution (Ningen Kakumei). Exerpts from this work (four volumes of a planned ten have been completed) are often read at zadankai and cited in speeches and Seikyo Shimbun articles; it is "the Sokagakkai made easy." It contains Sokagakkai history, Japanese history, Nichiren Shoshu teachings (with Sokagakkai additions), and "how-to" sections on shakubuku, methods of study, proper zadankai forms, and leadership. Ningen Kakumei may develop into a less intellectually pretentious Rissho Ankoku Ron Kogi with a biographical rather than a documentary format. The repetitiveness indicates either a single author or a very consistent group of ghostwriters; the political features of the work include strong attacks upon the prewar regime in particular and militarism and aggressive, exclusivistic nationalism in general, and the same advocacy of democratic forms of government which characterizes Politics and Religion. As an aspect of the Gakkai's educational program, Ningen Kakumei will probably have more significance than Ikeda's other books; moreover, since it presumably appeals to a wider audience, it may also come to play an adaptive role.

Another socializing agency which could take on adaptive relevance is Soka Gakuen, the Gakkai's school system. Soka Junior and Senior High Schools opened in the Tokyo suburb of Kodaira City in the spring of 1968 with a combined enrollment of 500 students; Soka Univeristy is scheduled to open in the suburb of Hachioji City in 1972.[46] That Soka Gakuen will be a Gakkai socialization structure at all is denied by General Executive Hojo Hiroshi, who asserts that the socialization structures of the Sokagakkai are the _zadankai_ and family and that there is neither intention nor need to utilize the schools.[47]

However, while the schools will provide a standard curriculum in accordance with law there will be an effort to nurture talent, develop each student to his fullest potential, and emphasize "humanism (_ningensei_)," all features of Makiguchi's "value-creation education" system and of the Sokagakkai's pedagogical philosophy. Thus the socialization process to be realized in Soka Gakuen is, though latent rather than manifest, intended.[48]

That Soka Schools may come to play an adaptive role in the Gakkai is suggested by the fact that enrollment is not limited to Gakkai members. To date the faculty is composed solely of Society members; this is so, according to Hojo, because so far the number of qualified teachers who are Sokagakkai members exceeds the needs of the schools.[49] However, no religious restriction is intended.* In the case of students, Sokagakkai General Executive and Director of Soka Gakuen Morita Kazuya has stated there will be an impartial admission process utilizing the student's previous academic record and an entrance examination; there will be no "free pass" for the children of Sokagakkai members.[50]

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*The author can attest to the non-sectarian criteria of hiring--in the case of foreigners, at least--as he was offered a position at Soka University when it opens.

Nor will non-Gakkai member students be pressured in any way to accept Gakkai ideas. In Morita's words, "'there will be absolutely nothing special. In particular, we are not even thinking of religious education. . . . In teaching history we won't deny or ignore other religious sects.'"[51] Hojo concurs, asserting that while, as in any university, Soka University will offer courses in religion, there will be no such courses at all in the Gakkai secondary schools.[52] However, whether the adaptive role of Soka Gakuen is to be the creation of new Gakkai members or of sympathizers impressed either by the doctrines of the Society or by the liberal, nondoctrinal nature of the schools, it seems plain that this function will be performed there.

The final socializing agency in the Gakkai organization is the mass meeting. The Gakkai holds dozens of these every year: national and regional general meetings, chapter meetings, peer group rallies, and gatherings of leaders on every level. The direct socialization effect of such meetings is more upon the leaders who participate than upon the rank-and-file; however, the entire membership can vicariously enjoy the spectacles through the Society's communication media (which include motion pictures).

At these meetings the medium is, in the most explicit sense, the message, and the message is enthusiasm, power, and unity.[53] The atmosphere is hardly religious; rhythmic unison clapping and singing literally shake the hall, lustily-delivered speeches arouse thunderous applause, and it is difficult to refrain from joining in. The parallel which has immediately occurred to many observers is that with the Nuremburg rallies of the Nazis. While the socializing significance of the two is probably similar, the content is so different that the analogy is entirely misleading. Gakkai mass meetings are overwhelmingly positive in the messages delivered; the hate and anger of Hitler's harangues are totally lacking. Interpretations of the Nazi rallies have been heavily, if not predominantly, determined by the content of Hitler's speeches, whereas the speeches delivered at Soka-gakkai mass gatherings are usually quite mild where hortatory, and are in large measure simply announcements of positive goals set and attained, or of activities in progress.

However, apart from content, there was a darkness of mood in the Nuremburg rallies which is not present in the Gakkai gatherings. The function for the onlookers may well be analogous, and for the onlookers it is the medium, not the content, which is of primary importance. And, whereas hate and darkness were part of both the medium and the content for the NSDAP, neither is part of the message at Gakkai mass meetings.

The most striking mass meeting in Gakkai history was the Tokyo Culture Festival held in October 1967. This spectacular pageant had occupied the spare time of some 60,000 Gakkai members for the previous three months, and was an impressive demonstration of mass dancing and exercises synchronized with symphonic music and a constant succession of vivid animated scenes spread across one side of the stadium by a 40,000-member card section. Although some of the themes were Gakkai ideals symbolized by dancers, the explicit themes were quite secular, especially the finale: "World Peace" spelled out by the card section in 15 different languages, interspersed with panoramic views of famous scenes from each of the 15 countries.

The program represented a tremendous investment of time and energy by the participants, but the psychic rewards were apparently worth it. Participants questioned by the author responded with stories of gratitude, joy, and pride; as the participants all passed before President Ikeda in the reviewing stand enthusiasm and happiness radiated forth. In a more reflective vein, letters to the *Seikyo Shimbun* communicate the same feelings:[54]

> In [this] the Culture Festival of the century, I handsomely fulfilled my duty. Before Ikeda *sensei* I showed off my strength to the utmost.
>
> I don't know why it was, but after the program ended tears began to flow and I couldn't stop them. It was the first time in my life I had been so moved.
>
> Thinking upon it, [I realized that] it had been three months of practices, long, and short. The faces of my father and mother and of my seniors who urged me on in everything during that time floated [into view]. I wish to say "thank you" from my heart.
>
> Until I participated in the practice for the Culture Festival I couldn't do *gongyo* satisfactorily. Now it is different; with hope for the future, I am filled with a feeling of wanting to grow up into a truly pure-hearted man of talent who is of service to society.
>
> --Terazono Tatsuzo, high school student, 15.

> I was able to participate in the long-wished-for Tokyo Culture Festival and wonderfully revolutionize my life.
>
> The Finale: in my breast, as I marched around the ground wrapped in the applause of the spectators, events from the time of the 1964 Tokyo Culture Festival floated vividly into view.
>
> At that time I was working in a laundry; I was opposed on various things by the boss, and worried constantly about working hours. Moreover, the pay was low, so economically, too, it was an impossible situation. In such conditions, I--at the time a *han-cho*--was encouraged by my seniors and, setting my teeth, kept on practicing and participated.
>
> At that time I resolved that "I'll participate in the next Culture Festival in more relaxed circumstances, for sure," and from then on prayed continuously. As a result, I was able to get a job as a cook at the T. Construction Company and was able to solve my time and money problems at the same time. Thus, today I could participate in the Tokyo Culture Festival in good spirits.
>
> As I marched around the stadium my breast became filled with emotion. I could not help feeling from the bottom of my heart "By believing, I have succeeded."
>
> --Yamada Yoko, cook, 25.

This medium-as-message feature is one of the most salient aspects of the overall socialization program of the Sokagakkai. The key aspects of this program are (a) a high degree of *inclusivity*: the Gakkai attempts to subsume all of the social relationships of its members under one or another of its substructures; this inclusivity is achieved by using (b) multiple, *reinforcing communication* channels between the organization and its members: peer and interest groups, the examination system, and mass media supplemented by person-to-person contact. Despite its magnitude, this communication system does not appear as an oppressive indoctrination apparatus; the Sokagakkai has managed to keep it (c) *humanized* through the intimate links institutionalized in the vertical line substructures, a humanization which is provided in large degree by (d) the medium of communication and socialization itself, be it a convivial zadankai, a friendly peer or interest group, a towering building at the Taisekiji, or a mass meeting pulsating with an energy born of faith.

NOTES: CHAPTER 7

1. Compare with the Nazi and communist system of fronts and parallel groups: William Ebenstein, The Nazi State, New York, 1943, p. 59; Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon, New York, 1952, p. 27. Further comparison with indoctrination practices in Nazi and communist organizations is possible through Rudolf Heberle, Social Movements, New York, 1951, pp. 350-52; and Selznick, op. cit., pp. 11, 27.

2. James Dator, "The Soka Gakkai: A Socio-Political Interpretation," in Contemporary Religions in Japan, vol. 6 no. 3, September 1965, p. 213.

3. Ibid., p. 208.

4. Nobutaka Ike, Japanese Politics, New York, 1957, pp. 26-28.

5. Seikyo Shimbun, September 1, 1967.

6. Seikyo Shimbun, June 1, August 1, and September 1, 1967.

7. Seikyo Shimbun, May 24, June 9, 1967.

8. Shin Shukyo Shimbun, all issues autumn 1967, "Kokuhaku" column.

9. World Tribune, April 2, 1965.

10. Yanaihara Isahu, "Minshu Fuman no Sentoteki Nensho," in Asahi Janaru, August 5, 1962, p. 16.

11. Harry Nishio, "Comparative Analysis of the Rissho Kosei Kai and the Soka Gakkai," in Asian Survey, vol. 7 no 11, November 1967, p. 14.

12. Seikyo Shimbun, August 15, 1967.

13. Seikyo News, September 15, 1962.

14. World Tribune, June 26, 1965.

15. World Tribune, March 8, 1966.

16. Tokyo Daigaku Shakaigakka and Tokyo Joshi Daigaku Shakaigakka, Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1963, p. 68.

17. Seikyo Shimbun, May 5, July 6, 11, 1967.

18. Interview with Sasaki Toshiyuki, Sokagakkai Public Relations Bureau; World Tribune, August 14, 1965.

19. Seikyo Shimbun, August 3, 1967.

20. Seikyo Shimbun, August 4, 1967.

21. Seikyo Shimbun, August 25, 1967.

22. Seikyo Shimbun, May 12, August 25, 1967.

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25. Seikyo Shimbun, August 7, 1967.

26. Ibid.

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32. Seikyo Shimbun, June 19, 1967.

33. In Kasahara Kazuo, Seiji to Shukyo, Tokyo, 1965, p. 104.

34. Seikyo Shimbun, May 31, June 3, 4, 11, 16, 18, 20, 24, 29, 30, July 6, 1967.

35. Saki Akio and Oguchi Iichi, Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1960, p. 193; Seikyo Shimbun, June 30, 1967.

36. Seikyo Shimbun, April 28, May 19, 31, June 3, 4, 11, 16, 18, 20, 24, 29, 30, July 6, 1967.

37. Seikyo News, August 1, 1962; Sokagakkai Overseas Bureau, Sokagakkai and Culture Movement, no. 3 in "This is the Sokagakkai" series, Tokyo, undated, pp. 7-8; Seikyo Shimbun, May 5, 1967.

38. Seikyo Shimbun, April 30, 1967.

39. Ivan Morris, "Soka Gakkai Brings 'Absolute Happiness'," in New York Times Magazine, July 18, 1965, p. 38.

40. Interview with Oguchi Iichi; interviews with several American Sokagakkai members; Seikyo News, April 14, 1964.

41. Seikyo News, April 14, 1964; interview with Sasaki Toshiyuki, Sokagakkai Public Relations Bureau.

42. Suggested by Gabriel Almond, The Appeals of Communism, Princeton, 1965, pp. 65ff., with addition of the "intermediate" category.

43. David Hesselgrave, A Propagation Profile of the Soka Gakkai, unpub. Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1965, pp. 185ff.

44. Loc. cit.

45. Sokagakkai Kyogaku-bu, Shakubuku Kyoten, Tokyo, 1967, pp. 358ff.

46. "Shinsetsu Eisai-ko 'Soka Gakuen' no Mae-hyoban," in Shukan Gendai, vol. 9 no. 29, July 27, 1967, p. 36.

47. Interview with Hojo Hiroshi, General Executive, Sokagakai.

48. Shukan Gendai, op. cit., p. 36.

49. Interview with Hojo Hiroshi.

50. Shukan Gendai, op. cit., p. 36.

51. Loc. cit.

52. Interview with Hojo Hiroshi.

53. The term is Marshall McLuhan's; see The Medium is the Massage, New York, 1967.

54. Seikyo Shimbun, October 16, 1967.

CHAPTER 8

ATTAINMENT OF GOALS AND INTERNAL COHESION

The process by which the Sokagakkai formulates goals and then takes steps to achieve these goals is in certain respects open to outside observation, but often must be inferred. If this process is envisioned as a flow upward of interests, propositions, proposals, and even demands which may be turned into official policy, from all of the various branches of the Gakkai to the highest decision-making leaders, and a subsequent flow downward of binding decisions designed to realize those policy goals set by the top leadership, then one may see with relative clarity the downward process, but must largely surmise the upward flow.[1]

The first overt step in the goal-attainment process is often an initiative by President Ikeda himself, who instructs relevant organs (such as the Planning Department of the General Executive Bureau or the Executive Staff of the Youth Division) to draw up concrete proposals concerning some problem.[2] With these plans as the basis, discussion and preliminary decision follows in the Vice-General Directors' meeting. In important matters the full Board of Directors is convened before the president and thorough discussion, with the aim of unanimity, is conducted. (In any case, the

Board of Directors is customarily convened monthly.) When a consensus is apparent the president articulates it as a decision; when there is difficulty in achieving unanimity the president may, on the basis of the viewpoints presented, reach a decision on his own and present it as the official ruling.[3]

Other sources of interests which may be presented as policy proposals are the Planning Department and Youth Division Executive Staff, and the various branches of the Culture Bureau, the leadership of the other peer groups, and the vertical line. The leaders of all of these structures are Directors; therefore interests which develop therein can be articulated directly at the Board of Directors' meetings.

The most significant channel of interest articulation from the point of view of organizational stability is the vertical line. Sometimes the president apparently solicits viewpoints from the rank and file, through the mediation of the leaders on each level of the tate-sen. At all times, however, the tate-sen seems to be a relatively sensitive sounding device through which current problems and opinions, filter upward toward the elite. This upward communication process must be inferred; however, the constant injunctions to leaders both to visit meetings on lower levels and to report upward promptly on all matters, combined with the apparently sincere and enthusiastic reception on all levels of decisions reached in seeming isolation at the top of the organization, imply that there is considerable emphasis put upon upward communication. One may also infer that the upward flow of demands and opinions is carried more by the vertical than the horizontal line; the relatively one-way lecture and mobilization-from-above activity patterns of the _yoko-sen_ do not seem to lend themselves as well to upward communication as does the inherently intimate and reciprocal relationship which constitutes the foundation of the vertical line.

Another channel for the articulation of interests and, in a more explicit sense, demands, is the Komeito grass-roots communication system, the Citizens' Livelihood Discussion Centers (_Shimin Seikatsu Sodan-sho_). This structure, which will be discussed more fully as a structure of the Komeito's own policy-formation subsystem, is a network of offices spread throughout the nation to which any citizen may come and voice demands, complaints, or political opinions. It is probable that this structure has contributed to one consequence of the Gakkai's vertical communication system: a situation where the rank-and-file of the Sokagakkai membership perceive an open communication channel linking themselves to the very top echelons of the Society. One of the most commonly mentioned virtues of the Society, as plain members see it, is the fact that leaders care, that they come to visit meetings on the _kumi_ level, and that they are receptive to the views of the rank-and-file. Whatever the original source of the opinions which are ultimately articulated by President Ikeda as official Sokagakkai goals, the membership seem persuaded that they themselves have a role in the formation of these goals.

The president is the sole legitimator of Gakkai policy. It is for him alone to give final definition to all goals and all problems theological, political, and organizational. Whatever actual limitations upon his autonomy may exist, he appears from outside the Society to be a total, absolute ruler who can command as he sees fit on any question whatsoever. He doublessly takes full cognizance of the differing views which may be presented in leaders' meetings; the degree of opposition which he feels free to override is totally unknown. The possibility that another center of legitimate power may appear within the Gakkai seems remote; the most logical place would be the High Priest but this figure is sequestered at the Taisekiji, whence he issues forth only for ceremonial occasions. Occasionally he writes brief articles for Gakkai publications, usually of gratitude for services rendered by the Society or of approval of activities pursued by that organization.

The absence of revelatory articulation of doctrine or policy in the Gakkai contributes to the improbability that competing centers of power might arise: no member can claim divine legitimacy directly from the Buddha and hope for general acceptance. A more probable locus of competitive power is the Komeito; as it becomes more established it could become a source of pragmatic political interests which could run counter to the religious goals of the Gakkai.

Once policy has been articulated at the top of the Gakkai it is relayed to the Top Leaders' Meeting (Dai Kanbu-kai) at which leaders from all branches of the Society are present.[4] From this point onward two patterns of policy-implementation exist, one overt, the other more tacit. In the first case, decisions reached in the monthly meetings of the Board of Directors are announced as slogans and goals for the coming month (or year). One can then trace in the records of meetings in the Seikyo Shimbun a succession of gatherings: Headquarters Leaders' Meetings (Honbu Kanbu-kai), Headquarters General Meetings, (Honbu Sokai), leaders' meetings of all subordinate organizations (vertical, horizontal, peer, and functional), and general meetings of the memberships of these organs, followed by sequential gatherings of suborgans down to the minor block and kumi level.

At each meeting the directives from above are presented and explained and hortatory slogans based upon the slogans articulated on higher levels are declared as the suborgan's action policies for the period in question. By the time the kumi holds its zadankai the membership is generally aware of the new goals and the zadankai is primarily a face-to-face give-and-take reinforcement of messages already received through the mass media. The "give-and-take" is of a clarificatory type; overt disagreement with official policy at the rank-and-file level is unheard of, or at least never admitted. In time, however, certain policies may prove beyond the energy or ability of the members; insistence on certain activities may result in defections; or members may report great difficulty (due to their own spiritual weakness) in achieving goals. In these ways lower-level leaders are most likely to perceive problems of goal-attainment, which problems they are expected to pass upward to the higher goal-setting echelons of the Society.

The less readily apparent process of implementation of goals occurs in the case of longer-range policy changes such as the gradual supercession of the teachings of President Makiguchi, the moderation of the *shakubuku* program, and the increasing politicization of the Sokagakkai. It may be surmised that the downward flow channel is roughly similar to that used for overt goals; however, leaders' meetings rather than general assemblages are probably the agents of communication. More important agents (from the point of view of the outside observer) are the Gakkai's mass media and the concrete behavioral patterns of the Society, from which shifts in strategy can be inferred.

From the point of view of the average member the key agents are probably the vertical and horizontal lines. The *tate-sen* is primarily socializing and adaptive in function; the *yoko-sen* is primarily an agency of goal-attainment which mobilizes the membership toward the realization of policy and efficiently disseminates information.

The block system of the horizontal line, established in 1955, was designed to overcome the difficulty inherent in the vertical line: its non-geographical basis. Administration could be handled much more efficiently through a geographically-oriented structure, and unification of geographically proximate members created a new type of social relationship--neighborhood acquaintances--which could be brought within the scope of the Gakkai.[5]

Since its inception the yoko-sen has assumed multiple roles. It is the structure through which the Seikyo Shimbun is distributed. It is the vehicle for an extensive program of lectures and for the articulation of local problems. It is the structure through which the Study Department examination system is administered. Perhaps most important of all, the horizontal line is the crucial structure in the attainment of electoral goals. In all elections except those for the national constituency of the Upper House, seats are won through local concentrations of electoral power. Thus, if the Sokagakkai wishes to translate its numbers into assembly seats it must be able to mobilize localized groups of Gakkai members.

It is impossible to organize election campaigns through the vertical line. Members of a single kumi may be spread throughout, e.g., Tokyo; the candidate with whom they must be familiar is the one running where each member--not the unit chief--resides. For the Gakkai to be able to reckon its electoral strength in each district (and thus be able to decide whether or not to put up a candidate) it must have some structure through which it can gather statistics on geographically-based power. As the political efforts of the Gakkai multiplied, the yoko-sen has been refined; in 1957 the general block system (so-burokku sei) was established in Tokyo, and in 1961 the present national net of joint blocks (sogo-burokku sei) was set up. The Sokagakkai's past successes in accurately calculating its electoral strength and thereby attaining its electoral goals attest to the skill with which the Society has built up this structure.

The rationale for the creation of the yoko-sen and the sphere of action through which the Gakkai has come to pursue an increasing proportion of its goals is politics, at present, the sphere of action of the Komeito. Originally religious goals such as concrete individual benefit and universal happiness have been translated into secular political terms and promoted by Komeito representatives in assemblies throughout the country.

A. Determination of Goals: The Gakkai Elite

The formal position of the president of the Sokagakkai is, in the words of President Ikeda, "representative of the believers."[6] Of Nichiren Shoshu he is the chief supporter, of the Gakkai the chief officer, in faith the chief guide.[7] To the members he is teacher, father, brother, comrade; to some he is probably the Buddha as well. Of the Gakkai he is indeed the chief officer; however, this term does not do justice to his stature in the organization. Formal role is, as General Executive Akiya Einosuke explains, not necessarily an accurate reflection of the operational realities of the Gakkai.[8] Nevertheless, an examination of three versions of the *Rules of the Religious Juridical Person "Sokagakkai,"* dated 1957, 1962, and 1966, indicate the way in which Ikeda has expanded his role within the Society.[9]

According to the 1957 *Rules*, the president of the Gakkai is

(a) one of seven responsible officials (*sekinin yakuin*) who are
(b) elected by the Board of Trustees (*Riji-kai*).
(c) The president is elected by the responsible officials and is
(d) dismissable by the Board. He is
(e) appointed for life except as stipulated in (d).

By 1962 the number of responsible officials had grown to thirty-one. The president was now

(a) concurrently the official representative (*daihyo yakuin*) of the Gakkai, though still
(b) elected by the responsible officials who are in turn
(c) elected by the Board.
(d) The president is still subject to dismissal by the Board; in any case
(e) his term is limited to four years. The fact that
(f) he convokes the Board of Trustees and
(g) chairs the Board meetings

limits the efficacy of the provision for his dismissal; but the specification of a term of office appears decisive. For those who choose to view the interregnum between the tenures of Toda and Ikeda as a period of vying for power by various groups, the limitation on tenure may be considered as a check upon Ikeda imposed by his competitors.

Be that as it may, the current set of *Rules* under which the Gakkai nominally operates leaves no question concerning the ascendancy of Ikeda, and is in vivid contrast to the 1962 version. Still

(a) concurrently official representative of the Society,
(b) the president is manager [*sori*] of all its affairs and
(c) has the power to convoke the Leaders' Meeting [of all twenty-one of the responsible officials: *yakuin-kai*], in addition
(d) he appoints and dismisses all of the other responsible officials and
(e) all of the vice-general directors [*fuku-rijicho*], all of the directors [*riji*], and all "other necessary officials." At the same time
(f) he is in office for life and
(g) chooses his own successor.

The "responsible officials" of this latest set of *Rules* are apparently the general director (*riji-cho*) and the general executives (*somu*). The collective position of General Executive is a new one, created in February 1966. The previous top leadership had consisted of the president, the general director, the vice-general directors, and the directors. It is probable that this group became unwieldy--by early 1967 the entire Board of Directors totalled almost 800 persons--and in 1966 Director Izumi Satoru became General Director with a General Affairs Committee (*Somu-kai*) of six General Executives below him.[10]

The new top leadership consisted of the following persons:[11]

President: Ikeda Daisaku.

General Director: Izumi Satoru (born 1911, entered the Sokagakkai 1940). Makiguchi convert; Military Police warrant officer during the war; now Member of Parliament and administrative head of the Gakkai, but still looks more like a non-commissioned officer: beefy, brusque, and uncomplicated.

General Executives:

Hojo Hiroshi (of the aristocratic Hojo family; born 1923, entered 1951): nephew of Hojo Shumpachi (ex-member, prewar House of Peers, now Komeito Member of Parliament); educated at the Peers' School. Became Gakkai General Director in 1954 upon death of Harashima Koji and held that office until February 1966. Toda convert; now Member of Parliament and possibly first among this group of equals. Serene and Buddha-like of countenance, a calmly confident man.

Tsuji Takehisa (born 1918, entered during Makiguchi period): longtime head of the Youth Division and public relations functionary. Committee Chairman of the Komeito from the death of Harashima Koji until replaced by Takeiri Yoshikatsu in February 1967; Member of Parliament. Short and round, but conveys an impression of sharpness.

Morita Kazuya (born 1926, entered 1942): son of a Gakkai member, educated at Chuo University. General Executive in charge of Gakkai administration and rumored to be the top General Executive; head of Soka Schools. No political activity.

Shiraki Giichiro (born 1919, entered prewar): graduated from Keio Higher School, led expansion of Gakkai in the Kansai (Osaka-Kobe-Kyoto) area and is General Executive with regional responsibility for this area. Member of Parliament. An ex-professional baseball player, he still has an athlete's build and a broad, open approach.

Kodaira Yoshihei (born 1921, entered Makiguchi period): sphere as General Executive is theory and study; head of the Study Department. Graduate of Chuo University, Member of Parliament.

Takeiri Yoshikatsu (born 1926, entered 1953): a real Ikeda protege and formal political chief of the Gakkai. Schooling ended at the Army Air Force Officers' School; now Member of Parliament and Chairman of the Komeito.

Simultaneously with this change, the Men's Division (Sonen-bu) was created. The net effect of this was a relative weakening of the Youth Division: of the six general executives only three had notable records in the Youth Division, while the general directorship was transferred from former Seinen-bu leader Hojo to Makiguchi convert and new head of the Men's Division Izumi. The new supreme command seemed to be Ikeda, Izumi as a link with the past, and Takeiri as both concrete example of Ikeda's role and symbol of the Gakkai's politicization.[12]

Since 1966 the number of general executives has increased to nineteen. Some of the noteworthy additions are Akiya Einosuke, articulate and scholarly Waseda University graduate and head of the Seikyo Shimbun; stolid Tohoku University graduate M. P. Tada Shogo; Yamada Tetsuichi, specialist in economic affairs and organizer of the Gakkai in the Nagoya area; and Meiji University graduate Ishida Koshiro, present head of the Youth Division, member of Parliament, and brother of earlier leader (now invalid) Ishida Tsugio.

Two young but very promising vice-general directors might also be mentioned: stocky, forthright and positive Kuroyanagi Akira, Waseda graduate, Member of Parliament, and one of the Komeito's chief hatchetmen whenever the party has a new scandal with which to belabor its parliamentary opponents; and Shinohara Makoto, a Tokyo University graduate, editor of Dai Byaku Renge, and head of the Student Division.

One aspect of the topmost Gakkai leadership which has been noted by several observers is the frequency of intermarriages and other kinship ties. None of the children or other relations of either Makiguchi or Toda hold office in the Sokagakkai, though the Society asserts that they are all believers. However, the relationship of the Ishida brothers has already been pointed out, and that of the Hojos, uncle and nephew. The father of Morita Kazuya is Morita Teiji, a vice-general director; the father of President Ikeda's wife Kaneko is Shiraki Kunji, another vice-general director; and the father of Kuroyanagi's wife is Imaizumi Taro, another vice-general director.[13]

Furthermore, the wives of vice-director general Fujiwara Yukumasa and director Watanabe Jokoku are sisters, and Akiya Einosuke is married to the sister of Ishida Tsugio.[14] Finally, the wife of Abe Ken'inchi, Komeito candidate for the governorship of Tokyo in 1967, is the elder sister of Hojo Hiroshi.[15] These ties may be simply the result of widespread social interaction among the families of the top Gakkai leaders, but it is possible nevertheless that the links visible here may have some significance for the fact that the Sokagakkai has not suffered from any noticeable internal divisions.

Below the level of the general executives is the Board of Directors, which as of October 1967 had 1001 members.[16] This included the general director and the nineteen general executives, and 44 vice-general directors, 580 directors, and 357 associate directors (riji-ho). Added to the leaders of the c. 3500 chapters throughout the country, this makes a total of almost 5000 high-level leaders in the Society.[17]

The total number of leaders, though indeterminate, is in the vicinity of 1.5-2.5 million. The Seikyo Shimbun has stated that if each of the 20,000 executives made seven trips, all of the han in the nation could be visited; this implies approximately 140,000 han and thus perhaps 500,000 kumi.[18] Since each kumi, han, and chiku has a chief and a female auxiliary leader (tanto-in), the total number of leaders--not including members of the Study Department--seems to be roughly equal to the 1,680,000 figure given by the Seikyo Shimbun.[19]

No hard information is available concerning the power and duties of the lower-level leaders. Both appear to be considerable but diffuse. Leaders of blocks and minor blocks must see to it that lecture meetings are held, newspapers are delivered, and the vote is mobilized for elections. Chiku, han, and kumi chiefs are responsible for the sustained faith of their respective flocks and for attaining shakubuku goals. To help these officials the Seikyo Shimbun carries frequent articles on how to run a successful zadankai, how to handle common types of members' problems, and how to be a warm, responsive, and yet decisive and exemplary leader. No leader possesses any intrinsic power whatsoever; all powers are delegated from above and responsibilities are emphasized far more than are prerogatives. For those who need to exercise power, shakubuku previously offered a sanctioned opportunity for very aggressive behavior, but this is no longer so.

The constraints upon the members which enable leaders without specific power to mobilize them in pursuit of organizational goals are dual. First is allegiance. The frequency of defections suggests that the self-perceived membership is largely a voluntary group with an internalized commitment to the Society. This commitment is partly to the Gakkai as a religion and partly to the Gakkai as a human group. The relative weight of these two factors differs according to the causes which brought each member to the Gakkai and lead him to stay, but both contribute to an inclination to obey instructions from above.

Second are extra-Gakkai factors. Gakkai members are usually the relatives, neighbors, friends, co-workers, or employees of other Sokagakkai members. Considerable social obligation may be involved in the initial decision to join, and the same obligations or social bonds contribute to sustained membership.

B. Recruitment to Leadership

One important aspect of the attainment of goals by the Sokagakkai is the process by which the goal-attainment organs are provided with the personnel resources necessary to their own continued existence. This is the structure of internal promotion.

The overriding principle in the promotion scheme is personal achievement; the usual technique is co-optation; the normal sequence is promotion followed by training rather than the reverse. Ikeda admits that this sequence may mean temporary instability and substandard leadership, but insists that it is the best way to "cultivate men of talent."[20] The division of labor by means of selective promotion to top leadership roles appears to be leading in two directions: whereas under Toda, Toda's own converts seemed to constitute the central leadership of the Gakkai, with members from the Makiguchi period recruited to political roles, under Ikeda both Toda and Ikeda converts and proteges rule both the religious and political organizations. Especially, the new Komeito Chairman, Takeiri, the Secretary-General, Yano Jun'ya, and the Komeito delegation in the more powerful House of Representatives, represent the younger, better-educated Ikeda leadership group.

Second, responding to the need for more skilled personnel for official roles, Ikeda is apparently differentiating between peer groups in the recruitment process and cultivating "an intellectual class of ex-members of the Student Division."[20]

There are important exceptions to the co-optation technique. Membership in the Finance Department is voluntary and dependent upon personal financial solvency and strength of faith. Rank in the Study Department is open to all members and is determined through competitive examination. Promotion along the vertical line is in accord with shakubuku performance and is largely automatic. But for horizontal line positions, administrative and top leadership roles, and position in the various functional groups, co-optation is the rule.

In fact, the promotional processes overlap. Organizational mobility and flexibility is increased by the fact that the vertical line both creates and fills new status roles without burdening the top echelons of the organization.[22]

However, prospective kumi, han, and chiku chiefs must meet standards of strength of belief, peer-group respect, and emotional and behavioral stability.[23] Similarly, when new yoko-sen units are created, locally-resident tate-sen officers are quite likely to be named as leaders.[24] In addition, Study Department rank is taken into consideration, as is the prospective block chief's domestic situation--leadership posts roles are time-consuming and the ability to devote sufficient time to one's Gakkai tasks is an ideal prerequisite for promotion.

The formal act of promotion is similar in the vertical and horizontal lines, and has the appearance of an office bestowed from above. The offices of han-cho and below are filled by the chapter chief; chiku chiefs and above are named by the president. When a new shibu is formed the chief receives the chapter flag from the president personally. Block and minor block chiefs are appointed by the head of their general block; the president appoints chiefs of major blocks and above.[25]

The process of recruitment to the topmost leadership roles is unclear. According to the most recent version of the Rules of the Sokagakkai all posts of the rank of director and above, plus all "other necessary officials," are filled and vacated at the discretion of the president.[26] The criteria of promotion are vague and are described by Gakkai officials in terms of strength of faith, leadership qualities, specific skills, and human attributes. Once in office, however, the selection process is not over. In late 1966 President Ikeda announced that senior leaders and Study Department members would be periodically tested; those who failed twice in succession would be demoted one rank.[27]

As for the president himself, the new Rules firmly establish an apostolic succession. (To criticism of the undemocratic nature of this selection process the Gakkai responds that neither were Christ's disciples chosen by ballot.) In the event that a successor is not designated the presidency is to be filled by vote of the Leaders' Meeting (*yakuinkai*).

The concrete act of succession is one of the most crucial in the development of social movements. Charles Braden cites several American religious sects which have disintegrated upon the death of the founder or seem likely to do so.[28] Norman Cohn notes a similar potential in the millenarian sects of medieval Europe;[29] the fragmentation of Nichiren's own sect shortly after his death illustrates the difficulty of establishing a stable succession pattern.

Toda Josei succeeded to the presidency partly by default, despite having been in the number two position in the prewar Soka Kyoiku Gakkai. According to Saki Akio and Oguchi Iichi he was chosen after the circulation of a petition among the general membership.[30] The Gakkai itself is vague regarding the actual mechanics of the process and seems to consider his diffuse legitimacy--the result of prior service and imprisonment--as the only really important factor.

In the case of Ikeda also the exact process of succession is unclear, and again the mantle of legitimacy thrown over him by his predecessor appears to be the major factor. He was clearly Toda's protege and Toda, while never naming Ikeda, went so far as to state that the next president should be from the Youth Division (of which Ikeda became the chief of staff in 1954).[31] According to Nakaba Tadakuni, a sympathetic and privileged observer, the leadership was generally aware of the relationship between Ikeda and Toda and, in the words of the late general director Harashima Koji, that any other should have been chosen president was "unthinkable."[32] Ikeda himself is described as reluctant to assume the presidency, although he recalls that "I felt that I'd have to do it sometime."[33]

According to Ikeda, the group which chose him was the Board of Directors;[34] he was subsequently presented to the annual meeting of the Society and approved by acclaim. This procedure does not agree with that stipulated by the 1957 version of the Rules of the Sokagakkai, which gives the seven responsible officials the power of choice of the president from among their own number. It could well be that this was the procedure followed, after which the choice was presented to the Board of Directors and the general membership in turn. The key element, however, is officially recognized in the most recent set of Rules: selection by the previous incumbent.

Ikeda, at forty, has perhaps another thirty years of leadership ahead of him. However, he has stated that the best age gap between one president and the next is roughly "the difference between parent and child"--possibly as much as thirty years[35]--since he believes that the president must be young, original, energetic, and able to rejuvenate the older members. This suggests that the next president chosen may be in his thirties and thus be selected by Ikeda while he is in his sixties--some twenty years hence. If Ikeda does choose his successor, the next succession will probably be as smooth as the last. As regards possible successors, no one person has emerged as Ikeda's protege.

C. Internal Cohesion

The cohesive or integrative process in a social organization is that pattern of behavior by means of which the relations between the component units of the organization are adjusted to ensure that they will contribute to the desired order of the organization as a whole. In the case of collectivities such as the Sokagakkai integration may be thought of as internal regulation and control.

The Sokagakkai has not in its history been subject to any noteworthy instances of integrative crisis. This is no doubt due in large part to the fact that those who object strongly to the integrative efforts of the Society simply defect. This is itself a kind of integrative failure and will be discussed below. However, the process of integration of the remaining membership has--at least from the outside--appeared remarkably free of conflict.

On the upper levels of the Gakkai high commitment to organizational goals and values, as well as personal allegiance to President Ikeda, plays an important integrative role. The kinship relationships among many of the top leaders may also be a factor. Judging from the sources of friction in other large organizations, the identity of line and staff personnel achieved through overlapping office-holding in the vertical and horizontal lines is an adept method of integrating organizational subunits.[36]

Probably most important in maintaining a high degree of integration at the top levels of the Gakkai is the identification of the leaders with the organization, the ideology, and the president. The Sokagakkai does not have at its command the physical and material controls available to some organizations; dissident leaders can defect without fear of coercion and the leaders do not draw from their roles any remuneration which could be used to pressure them. What the Gakkai does have is a normatively highly committed elite and a president who alone has the power to define official norms and symbols.[37] Thus the position of the president in the Gakkai's formal structure and the congruence of this role with Ikeda's position in the informal allegiance and commitment structures of the individual leaders are highly conducive to effective integration on the higher levels of the Society.

On the lowest level of the Sokagakkai, the zadankai is probably the most important integrative organ. Tension is managed on the most intimate terms; the counselling of the kumi-cho may well be the single key variable which determines the continued membership or defection of the believer.[38] Again, physical and material controls are largely unavailable in the zadankai situation, although in cases where a member is employed by another member economic pressure may be considerable. Symbolic-normative controls may be applied by means of reference to doctrine or to the personal charisma of President Ikeda, but an alternate form of influence, ecological control, is also of utmost importance.

Ecological control is indirect control of an actor exercised by changing his environment.[39] Assuming that the zadankai is a social environment from which its participants derive satisfaction--and indications are that it is indeed a very salient, if not the most salient, focus of the loyalties of the members--the ability of the leader of the zadankai to manipulate the environment of each individual in an approving or condemnatory direction is a structural characteristic which increases the integrative capacity of the organization.

This role of the zadankai in the integrative subsystem of the Sokagakkai is one of the Society's sources of strength, but it also poses certain integrative problems.

> An important element in the internal strength of large organizations is their ability to capitalize on loyalties that are generated toward smaller groups within the organization. It is often the small face-to-face group that commands the deepest loyalties. . . . One of the problems of large organizations is that it is difficult to keep large purposes before the minds of small people. Consequently, organizations frequently devise a system of minor goals for individuals and smaller groups which altogether may fit into the

> larger purpose but which is close enough to the individual and to his levels of aspiration to be powerful as motivators.[40]

The Sokagakkai has certainly created a system of minor goals and groups; however, it must be careful that these groups do not develop excessive autonomy.[41] If the goals of the group members become involved with the group as an intrinsic source of value for them, their commitment to larger Gakkai goals may fade, and integration of, e.g., the kumi into the larger organization may become more difficult.

In a possible effort to forestall the appearance of groups on intermediate levels of the organization which might grow into competing sources of interests, goals, or even power, the Gakkai discourages spontaneous horizontal gatherings of leaders on any level.[42] There seems to be a conscious policy of disapproval of any such gathering which is not held under Gakkai auspices and thus under official control. This atomization of intermediate groups prevents their collusion in possible contravention of official goals and prevents the creation of any sizable obstacle between the elite of the Society and the membership which it wishes to mobilize.

Two final agencies of integration are the vertical communication structure and the provisions for vertical mobility. The communication flow, from opinions on the rank-and-file level upward to decision at the top and thence downward as policy to the rank-and-file, is perceived by the membership as an attentive, responsive, considerate operation which respects them as individuals and equals. Regardless of the actual degree to which this perception mirrors reality, it helps to integrate the members into the organization.

The channels for advancement in the Gakkai are open to all who are willing to exert themselves and have a modicum of aptitude for either _shakubuku_ or study. At least on the lower levels of the organization a merit system operates and the members have taken full advantage of it. On the higher levels, too, merit is probably one of the--if not the--criteria of promotion, or so it apparently seems to the membership. The feeling of identification with superiors is high and it is likely that one contributory factor is the perception by the rank-and-file that they, too, can aspire to such position.

Despite the operation of these organs of integration, the fact of a very large number of defectors and the notices in frequent issues of the _Seikyo Shimbun_ that "The following persons are released from office. . . ." indicate that the Gakkai is not fully successful in regulating itself internally. One explanation is doubtless the non-selectivity of the Gakkai in its recruitment. Where initial symbolic commitment is low and means of physical and material control are largely lacking, a terrific load is placed upon the socializing agencies which are responsible for creating symbolically-committed believers. Where active membership requires behavior which is regarded as deviant by the general society (for instance, _shakubuku_) and, moreover, puts a strain on the believer in terms of effort and time required, the intensity of belief which the indoctrination structures must instill is greater yet.

Aware of the integrative problem, the Sokagakkai has periodically made remedial innovations. In 1951 an inspection office (now the Superintendent's Department; official translation, Tokan-bu) was established to check up on previous backsliders who had since rejoined, dubious believers, and opportunist members.[43] As the Society grew in geometric progression during the mid- and late 1950's, the horizontal line was developed to increase central control and high executives were appointed as regional headquarters chiefs.[44]

As noted in the capsule descriptions of the general executives, the top Gakkai leaders still have regional spheres of competence; usually the executive responsible for an area is the man who led the Gakkai's early expansion in that area and he usually comes from "his" region. Top leaders in the various regions and localities are still appointed from Tokyo; however, regional recommendation is required.[45] Relaxation of the propagation drive and moderation in propagating style probably also have had integrative implications, but whether integrative considerations influenced these changes is unknown.

D. The Sokagakkai Organization: Conclusion

It is the interaction of all of the structures mentioned in this section, and more, which constitutes the organizational entity known as the Sokagakkai. The most significant characteristics of this entity, as it performs the functions necessary for its continued existence and further growth are its peculiar inclusivity, its humanization, and a communication pattern where content is important but the medium as message is almost equally important.

The inclusivity of the Sokagakkai's relationship with its members has important consequences for the organization's socialization, goal-attainment, and integrative processes. Where almost all of a member's social life is involved with Gakkai-related organizations a mutually reinforcing multiplicity of influences is brought to bear which amounts to constant socialization. Where such a confluence of forces occurs in the individual members, these members can also be more easily induced to adopt the behavior patterns deemed necessary by the Society for the attainment of its goals. The incorporation of both intimate human relationships and functionally more specific relationships in the formal organizational structure through the creation of the dual vertical-horizontal hierarchy and the combination of line and staff roles in each member through his inclusion in several branches of the Gakkai both contribute to the integration of the Society. It is also possible that if, as some critics say, entry into the Sokagakkai can be best understood as an "escape from freedom," then this high degree of inclusivity may be an important factor in recruitment as well.

Despite the mammoth size of the movement, the Sokagakkai nevertheless manages to retain a human touch. Groups such as the communists totally submerge the individual in the organization; all relationships are stringently commanding-hierarchical, and ties are impersonal. The Sokagakkai stresses individual happiness and self-expression, the teaching-paternal vertical line constitutes the core relationship structure, and the ties of the vertical line are diffuse and intimate. There is constant concern, care, and responsibility expressed by the elite *vis-à-vis* the rank-and-file; encouragement, praise, and reproof are communicated through incessant contact and the membership feels and responds to this sympathy and understanding.

As a result all of the tasks requisite to its continued existence are made easier for the Gakkai. The humanistic element is itself a strong selling point in a society where such structures are lacking and in order to solidify one's sense of security in and belonging to this gratifying social nexus an amenability to the officially-sanctioned normative and value system may develop. Such amenability, added to repeated contact and identification with leaders who personify the Gakkai's goals, facilitates the Society's efforts to mobilize the membership in pursuit of these goals. Finally, the member who feels satisfied in a human way, who benefits from a lowered level of interpersonal tension and sees his membership as one major cause of his well-being, is more likely to be a well-integrated member of the organization. That the Gakkai is able to create this human satisfaction contributes to its internal cohesion.

The Sokagakkai's communication system is of a type sometimes considered to be the most effective communication system: comprehensive mass media supplemented by face-to-face communication on each organizational level and frequent interlevel communication. In addition to access to mass media, Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld have cited several characteristics of communication systems which have implications for the efficient transmission of messages:

a. Frequency of association with peers;

b. association with other persons who share one's own norms and standards;

c. membership in a group which supplements and reinforces the message received through the mass media;

d. membership in a social group whose human communication system is linked to that of the mass media; and

e. proximity to an appropriate social outlet through which to give expression to the social action motivated by the communications received.[46]

One will note the importance of peer groups and other types of personal relationships to effective communication; a strong case can be built for the position that "the movement of ideas in what might be called the 'lesser concepts' or 'everyday life' problems is more horizontal than vertical," and ideas in general "often penetrate the public as a whole slowly and--even more important--very often by interaction of neighbor on neighbor without any apparent influence of the mass media."[47]

The Sokagakkai communication system incorporates all of the features described by Katz and Lazarsfeld. Distortion of messages is minimized by the simultaneous operation of (a) multiple communication channels which enable the Society to reach each member with the same message through a minimum of four media (tate-sen, yoko-sen, peer group, and mass media); and (b) direct top-to-bottom communication links which prevent distortion in transmission: the mass media and the attendance of top leaders at zadankai and low-level lectures.

The effectiveness of the Gakkai's communication system is indicated by the manner in which the Society is able to turn out a highly disciplined vote in the national constituency elections for the House of Councillors (see Appendix 9). Gakkai mass media are nationwide in coverage; thus the exactitude with which each Komeito candidate is able to carve out a region with a sufficient number of Gakkai members and sympathizers to guarantee his own election without stealing an appreciable number of votes from the other Komeito candidates in the national constituency is determined by the lower-level, relatively informal communications system.

Another index of the effectiveness of the Gakkai's person-to-person communication is a 1965 survey on voting behavior in which the question was asked, "How do you decide what candidate to vote for in the national constituency election?"[48] As the distribution of responses shows, personal communication channels (friend's request; acquaintance) were far more important to the Komeito than to any of the other parties:

Deciding factors	Respondents by party:				National sample as a whole
	Liberal Democrats	Socialists	Democratic Socialists	Komeito	
Radio, television, press	53%	60%	47%	29%	51%
Official party bulletins	35	44	37	15	33
Hear speeches	15	23	11	17	15
Friend's request	8 } 19	8 } 15	3 } 19	15 } 55	7 } 16
Acquaintance with candidate	11	7	16	40	9
Nothing in particular	12	5	16	10	17
(Totals due to multiple responses)	134%	147%	132%	126%	132%

This communication system has important implications for all of the Gakkai's functions. The blanketing effect of the system certainly aids efforts at indoctrination; the personal channels in particular are crucial in the propagation process. Mobilization of the membership in the pursuit of any goal would be impossible were there no effective intraorganizational communication system. The perceived responsiveness of the communication system and its accessibility to any member certainly aid integration, as does the constant stream of instructions to lower-level leaders concerning ways to increase the integration of one's own unit members with each other and the integration of the unit with the larger organizational context.

The content of the Gakkai's message to both members and prospective converts has been examined above. What is to be noted here is the importance of the very media which carry the message. The congeniality, warmth, and happiness of the _zadankai_; the pulsating power and concentrated numerical strength of the mass meetings; the tranquilizing, mesmerizing effect of the _daimoku_ chanted in unison; the impression of affluence and magnificence of the Taisekiji; the youthful energy, devotion, and achievement symbolized by President Ikeda himself--all have a significance for the members far beyond the specific, overt content of their message. The phenomenon of media as message is characteristic of most of the major structures of the Sokagakkai and contributes to the efficient performance of all of the tasks requisite for its existence.

NOTES: CHAPTER 8

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6. Ikeda Daisaku, Seiji to Shukyo, Tokyo, 1965, p. 263.

7. Takase Hiroi, Dai San Bummei no Shukyo, Tokyo, 1962, pp. 117-18.

8. Interview with Akiya Tomiya, Chief, Sokagakkai Overseas Bureau.

9. "Shukyo Hojin 'Sokagakkai' Kisoku," Tokyo, 1957, 1962, 1966.

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12. Murakami Shigeyoshi "Tenkanki wo Mukaeta Komeito," in Sekai, no. 257, April 1967, pp. 54-55.

13. Nakaba, op. cit., pp. 172ff.

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28. Charles Braden, These Also Believe, New York, 1949, pp. 77, 126, 283.

29. Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, Fairlawn, 1957, passim.

30. Robert Ramseyer, "The Sokagakkai," in Studies in Japanese Culture: 1, Ann Arbor, 1965, p. 165; cites Saki Akio and Oguchi Iichi, Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1960, p. 137.

31. Takase, Komeito, p. 124.

32. Nakaba Tadakuni "Sokagakkai Gekido no Shichinen," in Zaikai, May 15, 1967, p. 117.

33. Loc. cit.

34. Seikyo News, April 28, 1964.

35. Nakaba in Zaikai, op. cit., August 1, 1967, p. 173.

36. Ikado Fujio, "Kyodan Soshiki Ron Josetsu," in Toyo Bunka Kenkyu-jo Kiyo, vol. 34, March 1964, p. 197.

37. Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations, Englewood Cliffs, 1964, ch. 6, and "Organizational Control Structure," in James March, ed., Handbook of Organizations, Chicago, 1965, pp. 651ff. This commitment may resemble that of dedicated communists who prefer groveling self-condemnation to excommunication and apparently see little significance in life apart from the norms and symbols of their "faith." See Arthur Koestler, Darkness at Noon, New York, 1946; and, for an example of similar commitment in a situation free of physical coercion, Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, The American Communist Party, Boston, 1957, pp. 209-11.

38. Nishio, op. cit., p. 15.

39. Dorwin Cartwright "Influence, Leadership, Control," in James March, ed., Handbook of Organizations, Chicago, 1965, pp. 19-22.

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42. Tokyo Daigaku Shakaigakka et al., op. cit., p. 58.

43. Takase, Komeito, pp. 156-57.

44. Suzuki Hiroshi, "Toshi Kaso no Shukyo Shudan," in Shakaigaku Kenkyu, no. 24, 1964, pp. 70, 72.

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PART III. THE SOKAGAKKAI IN POLITICS

CHAPTER 9

POLITICAL HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION

Although the spiritual predecessor of the Sokagakkai, Nichiren, had strong political concerns and his belief system included such specifically political ideas as Obutsu-myogo, the kaidan, and the Utoku-O (or Virtuous Ruler, a national ruler who would see that the faith was protected from the incursions of evil priests and their secular henchmen), he had no concrete ideas as regards the proper form of the state after the achievement of Kosen-rufu. He envisioned only the adoption of his teachings by the rulers and people, assuming that all of the changes necessary to the realization of utopia would flow from this one condition.

The Soka Kyoiku Gakkai, too, was originally devoid of any specific political prescriptions; it was in fact almost completely apolitical. The anti-war and anti-government stand of the Gakkai was forced upon it by the authorities in the early 1940's; until then the Gakkai made no political overtures and stressed none of the political aspects of its scriptures.

At the war's end Toda Josei was still apolitical, although President Ikeda imputes political goals and motivations to him as early as 1948.[1] By early 1949, according to Ikeda, Toda recognized that the time would inevitably come when the Gakkai would have to enter the political world, or else Kosen-rufu "will never be possible."[2] A more detached observer, Takase Hiroi, maintains that Toda realized that political efforts would be in vain or even "suicidal" during the initial period of Gakkai growth; therefore he reduced his approach to a simple religious emphasis upon happiness and unhappiness, gain and loss.[3]

However, for a variety of reasons, the Sokagakkai did make its political debut, in the nationwide series of local elections of April 1955. It put up 54 candidates--who ran as independents--for seats in various local assemblies; 53 were elected and the amazing Gakkai record of electoral success was begun (see Appendices 10-16). Since that time the Gakkai's share of the total electorate has swelled to over 10% and it holds at present some 2000 seats in national and local assemblies, making it the third strongest political party in Japan in this respect. Concomitantly, the political aspects of the Gakkai's structure and activity have come to enjoy ever greater attention within the Society.

In November 1954 the Cultural Department (Bunka-bu) was established; one of its functions was the planning and administration of political operations.[4]

From 1955 until 1961 the Gakkai was in the process of building its horizontal line network and consolidating and politicizing the great numbers of new converts made since the beginning of the Great Shakubuku Drive. Platforms were minimal, candidates were nominally independent, and political efforts were still somewhat tentative. In 1961 the Bunka-bu was elevated in status to the Bunka-kyoku (Cultural Bureau), and within it was created a new Political Department (Seiji-bu). In November of that year the Komei Seiji Remmei (or Koseiren; official translation: League of Fair Statesmen) was established as an ostensibly independent political organization which formed its own policies and nominated its own candidates for public office. In this fashion the Gakkai divorced itself formally from politics; the relationship between the Society and its political arm was clear, but the Gakkai nevertheless insisted upon their separateness, although it retained an active interest and would, through its Political Department, assist "worthy candidates."[5]

In July 1962, immediately after the Upper House election in which the Sokagakkai raised its power to fifteen seats, the Komeikai, or Fair Council, was created with the Koseiren representatives in the Upper House as its members.[6] The Komeikai was to be a non-partisan liaison group; the Gakkai still pictured itself as an independent force which would not stoop to enter the partisan Lower House.

The great turning point in the Gakkai's political history came in May 1964, when it was announced that the Gakkai would put up thirty-two candidates in the next general election for the House of Representatives. Accordingly, in November of that year the Komeito (official translation: Clean Government Party) was founded. This commitment to a drive for representation in the only real seat of parliamentary power in Japan's British-style political structure marks the full assumption of a political role by the Society and the first explicit admission that the target of the Sokagakkai's political activity is political takeover through the machinery of the parliamentary system.

Throughout their history the political structures of the Sokagakkai have been multifunctional. Most prominently, they have been designed for the attainment of those goals of the Gakkai which are amenable to secular interpretations and realization. In addition, the political structures contribute to attainment of the ultimate religious goal of _Kosen-rufu_ by attracting people as voters and hopefully, over time, impressing them with the non-secular virtues of the Sokagakkai to the extent that they enter the Society.

The more important aspect of this adaptive function is the process by which the Komeito, as a responsible, trustworthy, mature actor in the constitutionally legitimate political institutions, aspires to smooth the relationship between the Sokagakkai and its overall social and political environment, thus making it easier for the Gakkai to interact with other forces therein.

The Sokagakkai's political subsystem is only a minor agent in the socialization of believers; the great majority of Gakkai members are socialized into the Society and then, as one part of this socialization process, politicized. Still, the political structures serve to occupy one more sphere of the daily life of the memberhsip, rendering the Gakkai's ideal relationship with the individual member even more inclusive, and provide additional channels of communication through which to bombard the member.

It may be inferred that the creation of an elaborate political substructure in the Sokagakkai has also helped to integrate the Society internally. If one surmises the existence of a more politically-oriented group within the membership or leadership, or the development of goals the attainment of which could be realistically envisioned only through the political system, then the increasing politicization of the Gakkai could be explained as a necessary move to prevent schism over general organizational orientation or specific means of goal attainment. In addition, the increasing leftward inclination--characterized by welfarism and opposition to the ruling conservative party--perceived in the Komeito by certain observers may also be interpreted as a response to the growing power and self-assertion of a progressive group within the party.

This last is, however, only speculation. It is quite possible that structural change within the Gakkai has resulted from division of opinion at the top and has been carried out in order to reestablish consensus. But the argument that such steps as the formation of Koseiren or

Komeito have forestalled major dissension which could break out at any time over either organizational ends or means lacks substantive evidence. It is most probable that goal-attainment and adaptation are the primary functions performed by the political organs of the Sokagakkai.

A. Koseiren and Komeikai

The advent of the Koseiren was called for, according to President Ikeda, by the unprecedentedly chaotic conditions of contemporary Japanese politics: "There has never been a period in which, while preaching democracy, people and politics have been so isolated as in the case of present-day Japan."[7] Domestically, party politics had degenerated into factional strife in which the interests of the people were ignored; internationally, the political situation was one of hostility, deadlock, and threat which posed the incessant danger that mankind would be annihilated in one nuclear cataclysm.

The result of this shameful condition was that honest people withdrew from the hopelessly corrupt and corrupting, misdirected, and irresponsible political system and left it to the ever freer depredations of self-seeking, parochial, and venal party politicians.[8] Internationally, politics seemed beyond the comprehension--much less the control--of either statesmen or common citizenry, and was ever drawing further away. What was needed was some new political force which could arouse the people to the evils being perpetrated in the political world, provide a new ideology which explained the situation and prescribed remedies, and send into the political system statesmen with high ideals and practical skills who could help the misguided polities of nations to regain the proper path.

This force, predictably, was the Koseiren. Drawing upon the feeling of obligation instilled by Nichiren's teachings to serve one's fellow men and ultimately lead them all to salvation, the Gakkai felt compelled to "present its candidates to purify the political world and achieve the state of Obutsu-myogo."[9] It did this not for its own sake; the Koseiren was to guide politics "solely for the sake of the Japanese race and world peace," through the enlightening agency of Nichiren Shoshu.[10]

Since the Koseiren was above partisan squabbling it would eschew the Lower House and send representatives only to those assemblies which were ideally free from party coloration.[11] In fact, the Koseiren was not really a political party at all, but rather a "political organization" composed only of the Sokagakkai members of and candidates for legislative assemblies throughout the nation.[12]

In one respect even the Gakkai's critics could agree that the Koseiren was unlike most political parties: its platform was nebulous to the point of vacuity. Even in the early 1960's it was ambiguous and contradictory and contained a mélange of proposals of the motherhood-flag-apple pie variety calculated to appeal to practically the entire population.[13]

Revision of the 1946 "Peace" Constitution by conservative forces desiring rearmament; nuclear weapons; war; income taxes; the tax burden borne by medium- and small-scale entrepreneurs--all these were opposed. Fair elections; recognition of Communist China; restoration to Japan of Okinawa and of the northern territories occupied by the U.S.S.R.; the establishment of several new ministries and government bureaux; greatly expanded programs of aid, incentive, and subsidy to small enterprise and agriculture; increased public housing measures; and expansion of the social security and other welfare programs--such measures were advocated.

How the provisions for a drastically narrowed tax base and those for bureaucratic proliferation and increased welfare were to be reconciled was a problem which bothered many observers. It was no doubt in part simple political naiveté and immaturity. As the Gakkai reiterated, they were a new political actor and were aware of their inexperience; however, they promised to study diligently and to gather knowledge from all available sources in order to overcome this shortcoming. The efforts of this study were finally demonstrated in the form of two works, the two-volume Toward Mass Welfare (Taishu Fukushi wo Mezashite) and the four-volume The Road to a Welfare Economy (Fukushi Keizai e no Michi), both published during 1965-1967.[14] These are comprehensive presentations of the Komeito's policies; the contradictions and ambiguities are by now largely those which may be expected in the platform of any party which has a history of less than fifteen years and has never actually controlled an assembly anywhere or otherwise been compelled to realize its policies as legislation.

In the early 1960's, however, the Gakkai/Koseiren platform was still a conglomeration of oversimplification, overgeneralization, platitude, and pie in the sky. Gakkai legislators were everywhere in the minority and were neither feared nor respected by their colleagues; they could not enact any of their policies or convince many people that they were in fact a viable, long-term political force. It is possible that in time even the membership could have become skeptical of the efficacy of the faith as manifested by the Koseiren.

At any rate, in the Gakkai's opinion the condition of the political system, at home and abroad, continued to deteriorate. In April 1963 Koseiren leader Ryu Toshimitsu could say "We are at present not considering running for the Lower House in the slightest."[15] One year later, in its "Demands of the Times and of the People," the Sokagakkai called for the creation of a new political party to clean up the political world throroughly.[16]

The international situation was defined by President Ikeda as one wherein a highly mechanized civilization has combined fearsome weapons and political incompetence to create a "balance of fear" between two fragmented and unstable blocs of nations the guiding ideologies of which are obsolete, mistaken, and so contradictory as to render détente impossible.[17] Rampant nationalism and racism aggravate the situation.

Within each national political system, too, conditions are chaotic. Both the Western "idealist" tradition and the Marxist materialist tradition have become irrelevant in this new age; both will stagnate and decay unless replaced by some new synthesizing philosophy which can overcome their shortcomings.[18] In democracies in particular government is getting out of hand; power is becoming increasingly concentrated as foreseen by Robert Michels, Vilfredo Pareto, and C. Wright Mills and as the gap between governors and governed grows the franchise becomes participation in form only since representatives ignore the electorate.[19]

There are, in addition, particular conditions in Japan which required the emergence of a revolutionary new party. These were, according to the "Demands of the Times and of the People:"

1. The poverty of politics and the isolation of the masses.
2. The political distrust and apathy of the people.
3. The confusion and diversity of thought.
4. The ideological bankruptcy of youth, stemming from egoism and an appetite-oriented view of values.
5. The essential collapse of the bicameral system and stagnation of government brought on by the opposition of the two major parties.
6. The corruption of the power structure brought on by factional politics.
7. The strength of national restrictions on the resolution of problems by local government.
8. The requests of the press and of the intelligentsia--the necessity of a third party and the expectation of politics with a religious sense.
9. The heightened political capability of the Komei Seiji Remmei.

10. The increased rate of abstention of Sokagakkai members from Lower House elections (for the reason that there are no parties or men worth voting for).

11. The desires of the members of the Sokagakkai Youth Division.[20]

The corruption and pettiness of all of the existing parties and thus of the party system itself were the primary foci of the Gakkai's attack.[21] The parties are destroying whatever consensus may have ever existed in support of Japan's new democratic institutions; the occupation of Japan by the Americans was followed by the occupation of the Japanese polity--the American legacy--by dishonest politicians.[22]

In fact, concluded Ikeda, Japanese democracy is still a mere facade. The new institutions are not backed by any ideological or philosophical basis and thus the old feudal and authoritarian political patterns simply operate within the new structures to negate their intended functions.[23] To fill this philosophical void and thus to give substance to Japan's democratic promise a new political actor, guided by an excellent philosophy upon which every aspect of human existence and behavior could be based and led by statesmen of a purity, altruism, public spirit, and practical wisdom heretofore unseen, was a historical necessity. This actor was the Komeito.

B. The Komeito

The purpose of the Koseiren had been to initiate the cleanup of the Japanese political world by establishing a representative bridgehead in the legislative assemblies and making the people aware of the new alternative to the customary degenerate politics. The creation of the Komeito signified that "the Japanese democratic revolution has finally been fixed in the soil of the masses" and that with this basis the full drive for realization of the promise of Nichiren Shoshu can begin.[24]

The new party stressed that it was a party of all of the people. One need not be a Sokagakkai member in order to join, though one must be in agreement with all of the principles and policies of the party, which effectively rules out most non-believers. To join, the recommendation of two party members suffices; yearly dues of 100 yen ($.28) are levied.[25] By early 1967 the reputed membership of the Komeito was 200,000 persons.[26]

The structure of the Komeito is highly differentiated, although multiple office-holding by the leaders suggests that there is in fact a diffuse command exercised by a small number of persons at the top. The nominal apex of the hierarchy is the party convention (see Appendix 4). The convention, held annually with occasional "extraordinary conventions (rinji taikai)" in between, is more of a "policy announcement meeting" than a policy-making or nominating convention.[27] At the founding convention of the party in November 1964 the thirty-two candidates for the coming Lower House elections and the 14 for the coming Upper House elections were presented to the assembled members, along with an explication of the party's platforms for these two campaigns.[28] At the 1967 convention, held in February, new appointments in accord with previous decisions of the Central Executive Committee (Chuo Kanbu-kai) were announced. Then Vice-Committee Chairman Hojo Hiroshi announced that Abe Ken'ichi would be the Komeito candidate in the forthcoming Tokyo gubernatorial election. A sequence of speakers presented the party platform for the April series of local elections; then the convention was adjourned, having taken only a few hours.[29]

There was no propose-second-vote procedure, nor any debate on any matter. In the summer 1967 Extraordinary Convention there was a period of "questioning" during which members on the floor asked leaders on stage about particular policies; however, the process showed little spontaneity. To doubts about the democratic nature of the convention the Komeito replies that, because of extensive debate on lower levels of the party, by the time the convention is held all problems have been worked out. In fact, the content of the policies and the reception of the candidates both by those attending the conventions and by the electoral supporters of the Komeito at large gives no suggestion that measures are taken "by high-handed leadership without regard for the choices of the rank-and-file.[30]

Supreme party power is de facto in the hands of the Central Executive Committee and the Secretariat (Shokikyoku). The first Committee chairman, Harashima Koji, died in December 1964 and was succeeded by present Sokagakkai General Executive Tsuji Takehisa, a member of the House of

Councillors. In February 1967 he was replaced by General Executive Takeiri Yoshikatsu, member of the Lower House, signifying the new paramount focus upon this body in the Gakkai's political scheme.

Below the committee chairman are the Central Executive Committee, which specifically controls policy and strategy, and the Secretariat, which supervises the organizational structure and all its activities. At the top of the Committee, under Takeiri, are vice-chairmen Hojo Hiroshi and Shiraki Giichiro. The whole committee is composed of 30 persons (as of July 1967), of whom thirteen are general executives of the Sokagakkai and all are high Gakkai leaders.[31] The multiple job-holding tendency is shown by committee members Kuroyanagi Akira, Tada Shogo, and Harada Tatsuru: Kuroyanagi is concurrently a vice-secretary-general, vice-chairman of the Diet Policy Committee, vice-chief of the International Bureau, and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee. Tada is also head of the Party Paper Bureau (*Kikanshi-kyoku*) and the Defense Division; Harada is simultaneously vice-chief of the Organization Bureau and the Local Administration Division. All of these posts, of course, are in addition to Sokagakkai offices held.

The members of the CEC are co-opted; all other party offices are filled by the CEC also.[32] The CEC has an extensive series of policy-making committees and subcommittees; however, according to Chairman Takeiri, a few top members of the CEC have the decisive word on any matter.[33] The source of interests which can be converted into policy proposals is dual. One, which is seldom noted by the party, is the Sokagakkai. It is certain that doctrinal interpretations and religious goals determined at the top of the Society, and problems which work their way upward from the Gakkai rank-and-file, all eventuate in articulation through the Komeito if any secular solution is perceived by the Gakkai leadership.

Second is the hierarchy of the Komeito itself. The party maintains a dual structure, one arm of which reaches down from one level of legislative assembly to another, with the Komeito representatives in each level of assembly as members of the structure. The other arm, the Organization Bureau, descends through regional party headquarters to the Assembly Leagues in each prefecture (*To-do-fu-ken Ren*), and down to local branches, the basic units of the party organization. It is through these branches that the Citizens' Livelihood Discussion Centers (*Shi* [*Ku*-, *Cho*-, *Son*-] *min Seikatsu Sodan-sho*) are organized.

Once each month all of the Komeito members in all of the nation's legislative assemblies gather to debate activities and policies and to report upward their recommendations regarding these matters.[34] The whole policy-making process, in the words of Chairman Takeiri, is as follows:

> All policies originate from activities carried on in close contact with masses and are decided after repeated, thorough discussion. [At] the center of the policy process are the local assembly members and, through the livelihood discussions, . . . problems pertaining to

> the livelihood of the people are drawn upward and passed through the Assembly Leagues. The party Executive Committee meets once a month; here [these problems] are studied with an eye to policy. Then [we] reach down to the local [level] again and solicit opinions. In this fashion, for example as regards the single case of the Security Treaty question, which took about a year, we consolidate the basic attitude of the party.[35]

The choice of candidates is probably made as is the choice of party leaders, that is, by co-optation. The party cites such factors as the prospective candidate's character (will he be able to resist the temptations of political perquisites?), his organizational record, the strength of his principles (read "faith"), and his political experience as reasons for their choices, but the mechanics of selection remain obscure.

The candidates chosen may be considered to be representative of the party elite and as such are a distinct element within the leadership of the Sokagakkai. They are young: the 8 Komeito candidates for the general election of January 1967 standing from districts in Tokyo averaged 43 years of age, compared to the average age of all candidates from Tokyo, 55.[36] They are not as well educated as the average representative: of the 25 Komeito members elected in the 1967 general election, 60% had received some higher education, as against 74% of the total of 486 candidates elected.[37] They are, however, much better educated than the Gakkai membership as a whole.

Occupationally they are above the general membership. Five of the 25 Komeito Lower House members have managerial backgrounds and five are ex-government employees (although this is a broad category--Chairman Takeiri is a former ticket puncher on the national railway); four held posts as functionaries in the party or in other Sokagakkai subsidiary organizations. There are also an ex-lathe operator, a cosmetics shop clerk, and a milk-seller, but the overall pattern reflects a socioeconomic status considerably higher than that of the Gakkai rank-and-file.[38]

To those candidates who are successful the Komeito addresses several injunctions: do not be carried away by prospects of honor and wealth, but fight unrelentingly for the happiness of the masses. Never co-operate with dishonest politicians. Be truly international in outlook.[39] Above all, do not engage in factional activity. In the words of CEC Chairman Harashima Koji at the founding convention, "If factions appear we will dissolve the party immediately."[40]

The fact that the Komeito does not represent a variety of political interests makes prevention of factionalism easier. No leader is permitted to acquire a group of his own; to do so would be a divisive interference with President Ikeda's prerogatives as supreme leader. No individual Komeito member is allowed to develop an independent supporters' group (_koen-kai_ or _soshiki_) or financial base (known as a _kaban_ or satchel) of the type which constitute extra-party bases of power for members of other Japanese political parties. Local personally-controlled power centers (_jiban_) are non-existent due to the party's assignment of candidates to electoral districts and personal popularity (ninki) is submerged in party loyalty, while pork-barreling for local constituencies (the politician's rieki or "benefit" function) is handled by the party through, for instance, the Livelihood Discussion Centers.[41] The internal operations of the party also contribute to its monolithic appearance. Electoral or legislative victories are those of the party and of the people as a whole, while no individual is saddled with the responsibility for defeats. All are blamed equally and no one is blamed particularly.[42]

1. Komeito Substructures

Adaptation to its environment by the Komeito as a system in and of itself has three aspects. First is the recruitment of party members. The recruiting agencies are exogenous to the party, being part of the socialization structure of the parent Sokagakkai. The process through which Gakkai members are recruited to specifically political roles is unknown; it is probably a combination of personal interest, effort, and achievement.

Second is the strategy by means of which the party attracts the votes necessary to its existence as a viable parliamentary force. "Recruitment" of voters is managed primarily by the Gakkai, although there are indications that the Komeito is beginning to exercise an autonomous appeal.[43] The vast majority of the Komeito's electoral support comes from Sokagakkai members; one may assume that, since the major part of the Society's memberhsip was attracted by non-political factors, their support for the Komeito is the result of political socialization in their roles as Gakkai members.

Third is finance. In this respect the Komeito is nominally completely independent of the Sokagakkai, subsisting entirely on membership dues and revenues from publishing. According to figures published by the Japanese government the Komeito's total income in 1966 was 471,312,816 yen (about $1.31 million), which placed it third in declared income (after the Liberal Democrats and Socialists) among Japanese political parties.[44] Of this total, none whatsoever came from contributions, as opposed to 38.2% of the LDP's income and 100% of the Democratic Socialists' income. Like the Komeito, the Socialists and Communists relied primarily on dues and publications--96.5% and 95.9% of revenues respectively.

As these figures suggest, the Komeito has an impressive publishing establishment. The principal Komeito media are the Komei Shimbun (Komei News), with a circulation of approximately 1.5 million; Komei, a monthly covering political events; and Komei Graphic (Komei Gurafu), a pictorial dealing with the activities of the party. The most important of these is the Komei Shimbun, a thoroughly secular and energetically muckraking paper. The contents of the newspaper deal almost exclusively with party activities (both in and out of legislative bodies), party achievements (new parks, roads, housing--all are presented as party victories), political scandals and bad social conditions, and international news, in that order.

The final Komeito branch worthy of note is a projected labor union. On November 19, 1967, President Ikeda declared that the Komeito needed an affiliated labor union which would truly relect the voice of the Japanese workers, who were being used as pawns in the self-seeking strategems of the major political parties.[45] Established unions, he maintained, had isolated themselves from the masses and become simply pressure groups with primarily political motivations who gave not a care to the condition of the laboring class.

The next day Komeito Chairman Takeiri announced that, in accord with Ikeda's statement, the party would initiate planning such a union, which would "breathe fresh air into union activities" and especially protect the thousands of unorganized workers.[46] He added that one contributory factor in the decision to unionize was the continued complaints of Sokagakkai-member unionists about pressure upon them by their unions and violation of their rights of freedom of religion and of political expression. A Komeito press release of the same day, however, was careful to point out that "no religious activity will be brought into the labor movement," but that unions ought to protect all of the workers' basic rights, including freedom of political party support.[47]

The party tried to justify its new policy by drawing an analogy between the support rendered to the Socialist and Democratic Socialist parties by their affiliated labor federations, Sohyo and Domei respectively. However, objections may have persisted; on November 30 President Ikeda explained that the interests of the new union (which would not be fully operative for at least five years) would be predominantly economic; it would be "neither a union for a political party nor a lackey union for capitalists."[48] Membership would not entail any party tie or political pressure; "the new organization should avoid assuming such a narrow-minded attitude as to force affiliation with the Komeito or refuse membership to those who endorse other parties."

Thus the planned union seems to be a non-partisan body. However, assuming that it attracts principally Sokagakkai members, it could become simply an additional structure for socialization and mobilization of the Gakkai's laboring memberhsip--an occupational organ to supplement the peer and interest groups presently extant. And even if it draws only Gakkai members, the new union could be a disruptive force in organized labor. The Gakkai insists that it does not intend to adopt a belligerent attitude toward existing unions and will aim primarily to organize presently non-unionized laborers. Nevertheless, it is estimated that some 630,000 Sokagakkai believers are now enrolled in unions; the threat of defections on such a scale would almost certainly provoke some conflict.[49]

C. Sokagakkai and Komeito

The Sokagakkai is quite adamant in its insistence upon the distinction between the Society itself and the Komeito. According to one Gakkai publication the Komeito is simply a political party supported by a non-political organization, just as Domei supports the Democratic Socialists and Sohyo the Socialists. "Thus, every political organization inevitably has its own electoral body that serves as a basis for the respective parties to get into the political world."[50] Adds one Gakkai official: the Japan Medical Association, Sohyo, and the Union of New Japanese Religious Groups (Shin Nihon Shukyo Dantai Rengokai) are respectively primarily medical, economic, and religious in nature, although each carries on secondary political activities. Why should the Gakkai be condemned for similar behavior?[51]

Various reasons have been advanced for the asserted division of the two organizations. Indirect recruitment into the Gakkai, amelioration of the Gakkai's public image through the independent activities of its political affiliate, and the ability of the religious Gakkai to disavow the possible secular losses and blunders of the party are a few interpretations.[52] In fact, in recent years the Komeito has drawn farther from its parent group, as the now consistently secular tone of Komeito publications suggests.

In objectives, too, there is a distinction between Society and party. As Ikeda says, "the Gakkai is faith; the

Komeito is action."[53] The Komeito is but one aspect of the overall scheme of world conversion. Through the elimination of social and political contradictions, of injustice, and of collective poverty and misery, it strives for a revolution through the ballot box which will truly humanize politics. The Gakkai, by disseminating the teachings of the True Buddhism, strives to achieve human revolution in each and every member of the human race, thus eradicating in each individual the heretical sources of unhappiness. Together, the two organizations will contribute to the realization of *Obutsu-myogo* in both the social, economic, and political macrocosm and in each human microcosm.

In reality, however, the Sokagakkai and Komeito *are* one and the same. The proper analogy, according to President Ikeda, is with a single human in his religious and political roles; the Gakkai and party are "a single body with different names (*dotai imyo*). . . . The Komeito is strictly a religious political party. . . . [and] apart from the Sokagakkai there is no Komeito."[54] In the words of Tsuji Takehisa, "essentially, the Sokagakkai is the Komeito."[55]

The areas of overlap between Society and party are enormous. All of the Komeito's Central Executive Committee members are vice-general directors or better in the Gakkai and, looking from the other direction, Ikeda is recognized as "the creator of the Komeito, the doctrinal leader;" as Tsuji Takehisa has said, "there is no leader of *Obutsu-myogo* but Ikeda sensei."[56]

In addition to leadership personnel, the general membership overlap between the two organizations is almost complete. It has been estimated that as much as 25% of the Komeito's membership is non-Gakkai; however, in January 1967 President Ikeda stated that at this stage practically all party members and supporters are Gakkai members.[57] In addition, he stipulated that all leaders and representatives must be "revolutionized" men, that is, believers.[58]

Finally, structural overlap is crucial to the Komeito's conduct of electoral campaigns. The Gakkai's block system is the secret behind the amazing electoral record compiled by the Komeito and its predecessors. The Komeito has a more highly-developed grass-roots organization than any other Japanese political party; nevertheless, the horizontal line of the Sokagakkai permits direct access to a far larger proportion of the electorate than would ever be possible through either the Livelihood Discussion Centers or the street-corner speeches at campaign time. In addition, candidates and incumbent representatives make visits to local zadankai regularly; this exposure to the rank-and-file is both an opportunity for vertical, mutual communication and for intense presentation of party policies.

NOTES: CHAPTER 9

1. Ikeda Daisaku, *Ningen Kakumei*, vol. 3, Tokyo, 1967, pp. 156-57.

2. *Ibid*., p. 271.

3. Takase Hiroi, *Komeito*, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 83-85.

4. Murakami Shigeyoshi, "Komeito no Seiji Kodo," in *Sekai*, no. 233, May 1965, p. 161; Takase, *op. cit*., pp. 306ff.

5. James White, *Militant Religion in Japan: The Soka Gakkai*, unpub. A.B. thesis, Princeton, 1964, pp. 174-75.

6. *Seikyo News*, August 1, 1962.

7. Ikeda Daisaku, "Shukyo to Seiji Rinen," in *Chuo Koron*, May 1963, p. 303.

8. *Ibid*., p. 304.

9. *Seikyo News*, June 15, 1962.

10. *Loc. cit*.

11. *Seikyo News*, August 1, 1962.

12. *Loc. cit*.

13. White, *op. cit*., pp. 168ff.

14. Komeito Seisaku-kyoku, *Fukushi Keizai e no Michi*, 4 vols., Tokyo, 1965-67, and *Taishu Fukushi wo Mezashite*, 2 vols., Tokyo, 1966.

15. *Mainichi Shimbun*, April 19, 1963.

16. Quoted in Takase, *op. cit*., p. 155.

17. Ikeda Daisaku, *Seiji to Shukyo*, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 258-59.

18. *Ibid*., pp. 115-16.

19. Takase, *op. cit*., pp. 169, 176; Ikeda, *Seiji to Shukyo*, pp. 143-45.

20. Quoted in Takase, *op. cit*., p. 155.

21. Ikeda, *Seiji to Shukyo*, pp. 128, 130-34.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 265.

25. Fukatsu Eiichi, "Komeito," in *Asahi Janaru*, vol. 7 no. 21, May 1965, p. 37.

26. "Soko ga Shiritai Komeito Seiken Kakutoku Koso," in *Shukan Gendai*, February 28, 1967, p. 21.

27. *Asahi Shimbun*, July 4, 1967.

28. *The Times of London*, November 18, 1964.

29. *Asahi Shimbun*, February 13, 1967.

30. *Asahi Shimbun*, July 4, 1967; *Japan Times International Edition*, November 28, 1964.

31. Komeito Soshiki-kyoku, "Komeito Kanbu Yakuin Ichiran," Tokyo, 1967.

32. "Komeito: Iincho Kotaigeki to kore kara no Dekata," in *Shukan Yomiuri*, February 17, 1967, p. 12; *Asahi Janaru* Henshubu, "Komeito no Taishitsu to Kino," in *Asahi Janaru*, vol. 9 no. 10, March 5, 1967, p. 11.

33. "Komeito . . ." in *Shukan Yomiuri*, February 17, 1967, p. 12.

34. Tsuji Takehisa, "Komeito no Kihon Seisaku," in *Ekonomisuto*, vol. 43. no. 38, September 7, 1965, p. 55.

35. Takeiri Yoshikatsu, "Seisaku wa Tetteiteki-ni Rongi," in *Asahi Janaru*, vol. 9 no. 10, March 5, 1967, p. 19.

36. *Tokyo Posuto*, January 8, 1967.

37. "Komeito Daigishi: 'Byoku Hinkon-reki' no Meisai," in *Asahi Geino*, February 28, 1967, p. 32. Generally undependable magazine but appears reliable in this particular case. See also Ota Soichi, "Sosenkyo wo Kosatsu suru," in *Sandei Mainichi*, February 12, 1967, p. 24.

38. "Komeito Daigishi . . ." in *Asahi Geino*, February 28, 1967, p. 32.

39. *Komei Shimbun*, April 29, 1967.

40. Takase, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

41. Nobutaka Ike, Japanese Politics, New York, 1957, pp. 192-202; chapter by Watanuki Joji in S. M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, Party Systems and Voter Alignments, New York, 1967, p. 464 note 28.

42. Interview with Sasaki Toshiyuki, Sokagakkai Public Relations Bureau.

43. One should note especially in the 1968 Upper House election the 20% of the vote garnered by the Komeito in Shikoku (a rural area not noted for large numbers of believers) and the 2.6 million votes won in five urban prefectures containing only 1.3 million Sokagakkai members. Mainichi Shimbun, July 9, 1967; Asahi Shimbun, July 17, 1968.

44. Asahi Shimbun, March 1, 1967.

45. Seikyo Shimbun, November 20, 1967.

46. Japan Times, November 21, 1967.

47. Komeito press release, November 20, 1967.

48. Komeito press release, December 1, 1967.

49. Japan Times, December 10, 1967.

50. Sokagakkai Overseas Bureau, Sokagakkai and Komeito, no. 6 in "This is the Sokagakkai" series, Tokyo, 1965 (?), pp. 4-5.

51. Interview with Sasaki Toshiyuki.

52. "Komeito: Iincho Kotaigeki to kore kara no Dekata," in Shukan Yomiuri, February 17, 1967, p. 17; Masujima Hiroshi, "Seiji Shinshutsu no Imi to Haikei," in Gendai no Me, vol. 5 no. 9, September 1964, p. 46.

53. Takase, op. cit., p. 270.

54. Ikeda Daisaku, Rissho Ankoku Ron Kogi, Tokyo, 1966, pp. 859, 861.

55. Tsuji, op. cit., p. 55.

56. Komeito Soshiki-kyoku, op. cit.

57. Ikeda Daisaku in Komei Shimbun, January 8, 1967; "Soko ga Shiritai . . .," in Shukan Gendai, February 28, 1967, p. 21.

58. Takase, op. cit., pp. 270-71.

CHAPTER 10

IDEOLOGY AND POLICY

A. The Political Ideology of the Sokagakkai

1. The International and Domestic Environment

The ultimate goal of the Sokagakkai, as described in Chapter 3, is Obutsu-myogo, (fusion of Buddhism and politics), the adoption of the principles of Nichiren Shoshu as the philosophical, ethical, and normative basis for all phases of human thought and behavior. As the Gakkai seeks to realize micro-Obutsu-myogo, or human revolution, the Komeito is to effect the collective structural changes in society which will create the social, economic, and political environment most appropriate for a world where Nichiren Shoshu is fully accepted.

This structural change is essentially of a synthesizing nature; as the Buddha-nature is immanent in all worldly phenomena, so are the seeds of the ideal social system borne by all of the world's existing social, political, and economic systems. However, each is flawed by its less desirable aspects: the freedom of capitalism is contradicted by its inequalities, while the equality of socialism is negated by its restrictions on free behavior. The spiritual self-fulfillment possible in Western "idealist" culture is offset by its otherworldliness, while the extreme wordly pragmatism of Marxist materialist culture obstructs the development of the spirit. Western liberal democracy, while admirably free, degenerates into licence; communist people's democracy, while more orderly and egalitarian, is repressive. Finally, the modern nation-state offers unparalleled opportunities for social development, but it also has led to the emergence of bellicose xenophobia and expansionist aggression. Internationalism, on the other hand, symbolizes the true unity of all mankind, but at this point there is insufficient realization of this unity and therefore military power is a requisite for the security of peoples.

The Komeito works for the synthesis of these four dichotomies, seeking to develop the virtues of each into Neo-Socialism (*Shin Shakaishugi*), a Third Civilization (Dai San *Bummei*), Buddhist Democracy (*Buppo Minshushugi*), and Global Nationalism (*Gurobaru Nashonarizumu*) respectively. The overall descriptive term for a world organized into these systems is *Obutsu-myogo*; however, since January 1967 the Komeito has adopted the more secular term "middle-of-the-road politics (*chudo seiji*)" in describing its tactics, ideals, and goals.[1]

The essence of "middle-of-the-road politics," according to President Ikeda--who originally enunciated the idea in the *Komei Shimbun* of January 1, 1967--is strict respect for human life and for humanitarian means in the treatment of people. To paraphrase Lincoln, government "of humans, by humans, and for humans" is envisioned, and only the teachings of Nichiren contain the humanitarian principles necessary for its creation. Chudo seiji aims toward the realization of a new social condition based on interpersonal trust and harmony, and toward that true democracy which can be attained only when both governmental structures, the men who operate them, and the populace who support them have been revolutionized through belief in Nichiren Shoshu. Moreover, middle-of-the-road politics is the framework within which the happiness of each individual and the prosperity of the entire society can be realized simultaneously. It is also the only road by which man can achieve a world without war.

The exact nature of politics itself, as perceived by the Sokagakkai, is the aggregation and organization through the organs of public authority (the formal political structure) of all of society's oppositions and differences and their direction, in co-operation, toward set goals.[2] The polity is thus an intermediary, a technician, an organizer which sets and achieves goals and thereby realizes ideal social conditions. This conception of politics, as James Dator notes, is very close to David Easton's idea of political behavior as the authoritative allocation of societal values.[3] Value, of course, is the immediate, this-worldly goal of the Gakkai; as religion is the agency through which individual value is created, so the polity is the authority which creates values for the society as a whole.

The key agency through which political behavior is channeled into allocation of values is the nation-state (kokka); its means is state power (kenryoku). However, according to President Ikeda, the state should strive as far as possible to achieve its goals without the use of power; the goals of the state are peace, happiness, and respect for life, and power is inherently incompatible with these objectives.[4] Both the subject and object of politics is man, and the norms by which politics is regulated must reflect this truth.[5]

The proper focus of the polity, then, is the people--both as individuals to be treated equally and with dignity as befits their common humanity, and as a collectivity which can be benefited as a group by the adoption of popularly-oriented policies. Its proper objective is the unity of personal happiness and social prosperity. And its proper spirit is the respect for the human which springs from a deep sense of compassion.

For a polity to be constituted in accord with these standards of focus, objective, and spirit, the people who live under it must hold a suitable view of man (ningen-kan or menschenbild). The view of man appropriate to a democratic polity is characterized by an appreciation of the self as a free and autonomous being possessed of the competence to act as the subject, not simply the object, of social and political phenomena. The reverse of this "subjective competence"[6] and sense of freedom is, as regards others, a recognition of equality.[7] Other people must never be treated as objects; another's right to life and to humanitarian consideration is as great as one's own.

But how is man to develop the respect for life which is necessary if democratic political systems are to be possible? Man has the potential for humanitarianism and for bestiality. Some spiritual basis which can enlighten the mind and heart of man to the true esteem in which he should hold himself and his fellows is essential, and religion is the source par excellence of such spiritual foundations for human life.

President Ikeda attributes the development of humanistic philosophies in the West to Christianity in general and Protestantism in particular.[8] Sanctity of human life, respect for the individual, freedom, and equality--these philosophical requisites of democratic politics are elements of the Christian tradition.[9] However, as Ikeda sees it, there is no comparable philosophical foundation in Japan; consequently, Japan's new democratic institutions are like "a castle in the sand."[10] Therefore the most urgent task which faces Japan is to create a foundation of popular attitudes toward people in general which will reinforce the formally democratic political system.[11]

Japan's problems reflect those of the international environment. The Sokagakkai sees the established domestic political forces as uniformly corrupt and collusive. The Socialists are guilty of sectarian parochialism; they represent not even the entire labor movement but only the organized workers as "agents of the labor aristocracy."[12] As for communism, its record of bloody revolution and great human sacrifice are abhorrent and in Japan the communists are, in Ikeda's words, "the most irresponsible" party of all.[13] At least a few Gakkai leaders take an anti-communist stance almost reminiscent of Germany's National Socialists: Hojo Hiroshi emphasized the anti-communist role of the Komeito in the 1965 Tokyo Municipal Assembly election, saying "If it were not for the Komeito . . . the Communists would have gained even more /seats than they did7."[14] In a recent election campaign in Kita-Kyushu City the party used such slogans as "Communists: the enemies of the people (Jinmin no teki Kyosanto)."[15]

Complementing the street demonstrations of the left as a threat to parliamentary democracy is the one-party tyranny exercised in the National Diet by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party. The LDP is as sectional as the Socialists, representing only the interests of finance and big business at home and toadying to the purposes of the United States in its foreign policy.[16]

In the center, the Democratic Socialist Party shares numerous policies with the Komeito, but the Gakkai is quite definite in its distinction between the two. Whereas the Komeito has a firm philosophical backing for its policies, the DSP is vacillant, vague, and opportunistic; it has no consistent position or integrity and, simply by reacting to either the Socialists or the LDP, appears to stand in the center.[17] In fact, the DSP is described as a "second LDP."

2. The Komeito as Buddhist Political Thought

In this situation, where all of the established Japanese political parties rely on imported ideologies and foreign guides which are already obsolete in their countries of origin and do not represent more than a small fraction of the Japanese people, and where the formal political institutions inspire little allegiance in a people which has no cultural or philosophical links with such structures, a new political force is needed both to restore the people's faith in government and to cause the formal polity to operate along the lines for which it was intended.[18]

In theory, neither the Komeito nor even Nichiren Shoshu need be consciously present. The essence of Buddhism may be established in politics "regardless of whether or not those men who engage in politics know Buddhism;" it is a natural development of the "workings of the heart," not a form of religious discipline.[19]

> Concretely, politics which aims at mass welfare is itself congruent with the spirit of compassion. Even if one is not especially conscious of Buddhism, if he engages in politics with mass welfare as his aim, cannot we say that this itself is linked to the true meaning of Buddhism and is equatable with Obutsu-myogo?[20]

But in the degenerate age of Mappo such a spontaneous development of Buddhist principles by fortuitous circumstance is hardly to be expected. Thus the role of the Komeito becomes crucial. Its philosophy alone "has immanent power to guide politics, economics, education and culture, . . . /and to/ instruct all aspects of society and life and lead them toward the highest stage" of development.[21] Only the Komeito has a firm and broad electoral base in the masses which enables it to represent accurately the whole people. And the indigenous roots of its beliefs and its origin among the Japanese masses give the Komeito claim to a cultural integrity unique among Japanese political parties.[22]

The changes which the Gakkai envisions in society are much more of a spiritual than a structural nature, that is, the quality of politicians, not the formal institutions within which they act, determines the happiness or misery of the people.[23] And only the members of the Komeito know how to instill in society a faith in the responsiveness of government, a belief that politics need not be mean and partisan, and a "revival of human trust, a restoration from alienation, and a return to the faith that man is man."[24]

The idea of a religiously-based political party trying to instill faith in the populace has proved repugnant to many Japanese. The Sokagakkai and Komeito have repeatedly met the accusation that they plan a state religion or intend to limit or abolish freedom of belief. Their denials have been myriad and vehement. The scope of Nichiren Shoshu is too vast, too magnificent to be shackled by designation as state religion in one nation; to limit the eternal laws of the True Buddhism with a changeable constitutional sanction would be "degrading."[25] The Komeito asserts that it will never restrict freedom of religion, nor does it even intend to draw its policies straight from scripture. According to President Ikeda, even though the Komeito has entered the Lower House,

> We are not in any way thinking of taking religious philosophy or religious teachings into the world of politics just as they are.[26]

Policy should be determined in accord with its suitability to the times and to the people's welfare; "there is absolutely no need to debate and decide each policy using Buddhist scriptures or the writings of Nichiren."[27]

The key to its politcal attitude, as the Gakkai sees it, is the distinction between the absolute and relative levels of existence.[28] Religion is on the plane of absolute, immutable, eternal truths and untruths; Nichiren Shoshu, as the True Religion, can never compromise with heresy or accept the existence of misguided religious spirit. On this spiritual level, that is, on the level of religious discourse, debate, and propagation, it must strive unceasingly to eradicate every heretical belief. However, humans live most of their lives in a relativistic world of transience, evanescence, and judgments of good and evil which are relative to the position and goals of the judge. Politics is of this dimension; it takes place in a context of compromise, tolerance, and principled expedience. Thus the Komeito can enact secular legislation which benefits all people, even heretics, and can protect the religious rights even of heretical clerics without fear that divine punishment will befall. All of the apparent contradictions between the Komeito's promises of benefit to and protection of society and mankind as a whole and its protestations that Nichiren Shoshu alone has validity and is worthy of belief evaporate in the total difference of dimension which the Sokagakkai postulates between politics and religion.

But dimensional separation is not in any way construed as restriction of the relevance of Buddhism to the spiritual plane. The root of all contemporary political corruption, all scandal, and all natural calamities as well is still the antagonism of some people to Buddhism and conversely "The reason a nation prospers is because it has the Law."[29] To have the Law, however, is not to have clerics in government, to have a divine ruler, or to have papal control of the secular government, the factors which the Sokagakkai cites as the ingredients of church-state unity.[30] It is rather to be blessed with statesmen who have assimilated religious principles which come to influence their behavior in a diffuse manner, impelling them toward selfless service of the popular interest and recognition of the equality and freedom of all beings.

To this prospect, too, many Japanese react with distrust. The Komeito, in self-defense, raises the example of religiously-based political parties in other nations which do not appear to contradict the democratic process.[31] The Christian Democratic Union of West Germany, the French Centre Démocrate, and the Italian Christian Democrats are frequently cited; indirectly the two major parties of both the United States and Britain are linked to pervasive cultural influences which are largely the result of religious traditions. This last is the ideal form of religious-political relationship and is preferable to a connection such as exists between the Italian Christian Democratic Party and the Roman Catholic Church which, in Hojo Hiroshi's words, has a "medieval residue" of politico-religious intimacy about it.

Indeed, the politico-religious relationship expounded by the Sokagakkai is, at least on the surface, more compatible with secular liberal democratic processes than is Christian Democracy as it was originally presented in the encyclicals of Pope Leo XIII.[32] Many of the social and political evils described in such encyclicals as *Rerum Novarum* (1891) and *Inscrutabili* (1878) resemble those perceived by the Gakkai in the present *Mappo* period. However, the positions that all political authority must derive from God and not the people (*Diuturnum*, 1881), that one cannot be at the same time a good Catholic and a Socialist (*Rerum Novarum*), and that the state ought to profess, protect, and favor the faith (*Immortale Dei*, 1885), find no parallel in Gakkai or Komeito literature.[33] Not all of the protestations of the Sokagakkai are accepted at face value by all observers, but insofar as official doctrine is any indication *Obutsu-myogo* seems to be no more dangerous to democracy than Christian Democracy which has proved, in practice, to be compatible with the democratic process.

The democratic process in one country, as envisioned by the Sokagakkai, wells up from below in the form of Buddhist Democracy. The democracy-from-below idea reflects the Gakkai's overall strategy of world propagation in this age. *Obutsu-myogo* could be achieved either by converting the political leaders of a given state or by converting the populace, who then elect enlightened men as their representatives to remake government along ideal lines. Nichiren used the first method; in the present day the second is more suitable.

It is suitable because, in the Gakkai's estimation, this is an age of "mass democracy" when every citizen above a certain age has an equal right to political participation as a voter.[34] Since the mass can vote whom it wishes in or out of office, and the Gakkai defines the masses indiscriminately as "all of the people who constitute the present society," its primary focus of activity is naturally *shakubuku* on all levels of society.[35] Through *shakubuku* ever large numbers of people can attain human revolution and thereby enlarge the enlightened mass upon which truly democratic institutions must be based. This mass, in turn, will revolutionize the political system from below, without bloodshed (as opposed to the communist type of revolution: from above and accompanied by great bloodshed), by electing able men to office.

As these good men revolutionize the polity, simultaneously Gakkai members contribute to a revolution in society; with Erich Fromm, the Gakkai is of the opinion that all social groups are simply aggregates of individuals[36] and that ultimately the only way to solve social problems is by the solution of each person's problems.[37] Therefore, political revotion and human revolution must go hand in hand if true Obutsumyogo is to be achieved.

If they do not progress concurrently the political system will be unstable. President Ikeda emphasizes the importance of a congruence of formal political structures and popular political culture, that is, the totality of attitudes and orientations regarding political behavior which exist in a society.[38] For a democratic polity in a modern state to be stable, it is imperative that the populace be aware of their rights, duties, and obligations; if not, politicians will not feel constrained to be either responsive or honest.[39]

The dangers attendant upon the establishment of democratic institutions upon a base of mass ignorance are clearly noted by the Gakkai:

> Democratic politics run by an ignorant mass will inevitably sink into ochlocracy. Freedom and equality, given to an ignorant, irresponsible, unaware mass, are only invitations to licence, disorder, corruption, and chaos.[40]

Nevertheless, the Gakkai and Komeito profess a basic trust in the masses and their "capacity for reason."[41] The masses are wise," and any leaders who treat them as if they were stupid will eventually be deserted by them.[42] This goes for the Komeito itself; Ikeda has asserted that the party was "born from a true mass movement . . . our country's first national party, its first mass party;" however, if the party ever does incline toward autocracy, then "we masses /will/ have no reason to support it."[43]

Even if only a portion of the electorate (i.e., Komeito supporters) is at present sufficiently aware to form a foundation for democracy, the Komeito steadfastly hews to the ideal of representing the whole people: the orginal and basic duty of the party is to "represent the will of the people and realize it through politics."[44] This representation is the link between the mass and the government; it is in its role as the aggregator of a multitude of popular interests and their articulator in the formal political system that the Komeito sees its unique relationship with the "masses:"

> A political party, in its true sense, should harmonize political interests of the people through its policies. For that purpose, political parties should be closely connected with the demands of the public.[45]

The other Japanese parties represent only fractional interests; they aggregate no varied interests and do not care to. They do not realize that within every social class and grouping there is a multiplicity of interests and that parties in a democratic system must endeavor to reflect in their policies as many interests as possible.

Buddhist Democracy on the governmental level seeks the re-establishment of the proper focus, objective, and spirit of politics. All of the political ideals of the Sokagakkai previously discussed in this study are to be achieved under Buddhist Democracy: compassion, humanism, freedom, equality, trust, co-operation, and harmony among men; responsiveness and honesty in government; and responsible political behavior among the people. Because democracy as defined by the Gakkai is a set of attitudes, not structures, it can be realized under any formal political, social, or economic system, be it capitalist, pre-capitalist, or communist.[46] There is, however, an optimal economic basis upon which Buddhist Democracy can be most firmly built: "Humanistic Socialism," also known as "Neo-Socialism" and "Mass Welfare Economy." Under capitalism, the interests of large-scale enterprise tend to be paramount, government tends to concentrate on the continued stability of finance capital, and the upper classes tend to enrich themselves at the expense of the rest of the populace. Socialism, on the other hand, often degenerates into an impersonal bureaucratism under which individuals are disregarded in the monolithic interests of society as a mistakenly reified whole, and the state tends to put its own interests above all others.[47]

Humanistic Socialism aims toward the unification of social and individual welfare. Beginning with the Benthamite goal of "the greatest happiness of the greatest number," the Komeito proposes to progress to the logical extreme of "the absolute happiness of all.[48] The exact process by which this condition is to be achieved is very unclear; the policies of the Komeito (to be discussed below) give some suggestion of the process, while the more abstract political thought of the party and the Gakkai provide additional hints.

The road to Neo-Socialism will be primarily redistributive and revisionist. According to Komeito Secretary General Yano Jun'ya, the problem is not private ownership of things but private control of values. Private ownership *per se* is not evil; however, there must be sufficient redistribution of values to correct injustice and gross inequalities.[49] Material equality is not the same as equality of values; different people see different values in identical quantities of material goods. The goal of a humanistic socialist economy is to maximize the value position of each member of society and to redistribute values and materials toward this end.[50]

Second, Neo-Socialism intends to revise the capitalist system, not to abolish it. According to Tsuji Takehisa, the capitalist economy has numerous features which should be "corrected;" free enterprise is not denied but "we will move in the direction of nationalization of basic industries" such as coal, electricity, and other power sources.[51] The process of nationalization will proceed on the same humanistic principles which govern the economy as a whole. A mixed economy will be constructed gradually; "we will not carry out any radical reform, and we flatly reject revolution by force."[52] Decisions to nationalize particular enterprises will not be made on a priori, ideological grounds but pragmatically by representatives of all classes, taking into account the interests of people, governmental bureaucracy, and owners. No parochial profit-making in the name of the people will be permitted.[53]

Similarly, no parochial interests should predominate in the international system. The Komeito claims to base its foreign policy position on the "absolute pacifism" of Nichiren; while this seems a rather paradoxical interpretation of the generally belligerent monk, the party asserts that in his writings the themes of peace and mutual help are expounded fully.[54] Today, true, there is peace and there is international aid; however, the peace is simply a fragile balance of fear and armaments, and aid is offered only to prevent "imperialist aggression" or the "export of revolution from Moscow and Peking."[55] The only solution to this dangerous and hypocritical situation is a single, all-encompassing pluralistic international community in which all peoples can fully enjoy peace and prosperity without sacrificing any people's happiness for any other's, and all co-operate for common development and benefit.[56]

At present international conditions are such that unilateral disarmament would be unrealistic; in addition, nations should always maintain sufficient means to regulate themselves internally. However, as a first step toward reduction of tension, all peoples should come to understand that mankind is, through its common possession of the Buddha-nature, one, and that due to the development of weapons which threaten the entire world, mankind has also become a single "community of fate" which further necessitates a sense of comprehensive brotherhood.[57]

B. Komeito Policies

In its earlier years, as mentioned, the policies of the Sokagakkai's political organs were only a little less abstract than their political philosophy. Where concrete policy proposals were made they tended to be largely negative criticisms of the polity as it existed or naively platitudinous recommendations that administrative bureaux be multiplied, taxes be cut, and welfare measures increased. Internationally, Gakkai policies revolved about pacifism, disarmament, and world federation.[58]

Recently, and especially since the establishment of the Komeito, the policy formulations of the Gakkai have become increasingly specific.[59] The Komeito is an actor of considerable significance in numerous local assemblies; the process of actually operationalizing policy as legislation has therefore progressed farther as regards local policy, but on a national and international plane, too, the development is visible. This process, by which the Komeito's platform becomes increasingly more concrete, sets the Sokagakkai off from past authoritarian movements in other countries with which it has been occasionally compared. In Hannah Arendt's words, "totalitarian movements, each in its own way, have done their utmost to get rid of the party programs which specified concrete content."[60] Although the Gakkai tries to appeal to the largest possible number of people, the evolution of its platforms has been in the opposite direction.

1. Local Policies

Public opinion surveys in Japan have on many occasions shown that the vast majority of the people, like electors in other countries, are interested far more in immediate, domestic issues than in ideological bickering and distant international problems.[61] The policies of the Komeito reflect a shrewd decision to concentrate upon such more salient issues on both the local and national levels.

The local policies of the Komeito have not changed much over the last several years, aside from becoming more concrete. Utilities problems, roads and traffic, taxes and prices, bureaucracy, housing, air and water pollution, welfare, and aid to small business are the central concerns now, as they were five years ago.[62] For the nationwide series of local elections held in April 1967 the Komeito presented a ten-point general platform, to which it added specific policies designed for different localities. The ten points were the following:

1. The firm establishment of local politics for the sake of local residents.
2. Sound financial administration and lightening of financial burdens upon the residents.

3. A "warm" social security system.
4. Stable prices.
5. Construction of public kindergartens and nurseries and the elimination of parents' financial responsibility for them.
6. Achieve a ratio of one family per dwelling through public aid.
7. Eliminate public hazards and traffic problems.
8. Prevent accidents and create a hospitable local environment.
9. Increase credit for and promote the modernization of medium- and small-scale business.
10. Promote a prosperous agricultural, forestry, and fisheries industry.[63]

The additional specific policies concerning Tokyo included these:

1. Measures to counter the overconcentration of Tokyo.
2. Creation of a net of concentric circular highways and communications circuits.
3. Unification of all intrametropolitan transit systems.
4. Establishment of a secondary urban center (fukutoshin).
5. Eliminate administrative inequalities between the suburban Santama district and the 25 wards of Tokyo to standardize metropolitan government.
6. Call for additional economic privileges from the national government for Tokyo.
7. Measures for youth and children: parks, playgrounds, libraries, and halls.
8. Welfare administration: more facilities for children's care, first aid, maternal care, and care of the handicapped.
9. Construction of pedestrian safety facilities.
10. Additional medical welfare measures.
11. Waste disposal: elimination of waste-collection fees and higher wages for sanitation workers.
12. Water supply measures: increase the number of sources.
13. Increase sewage disposal facilities.
14. Measures regarding water for industrial use: diffusion of extraction points to prevent sinking of land.

15. Urban hazards: requirement of anti-smog devices on cars, smoke controls on factories, limits on noise and on disposal of industrial wastes.
16. Public open areas: establishment of parks and green belts.
17. Riparian works.
18. Measures for low land areas: construction of dykes and sewage pumps.
19. Harbor facilities: develop the port of Tokyo.
20. Acceleration of social and economic development of the peripheral Santama area.[64]

One can easily see in these policies the primary thrust of the Komeito's appeal to the electorate. What one will also probably see is that Komeito's quite specific plans for the renovation of the city of Tokyo make no mention of how this vast renovation is to be financed. Policy Bureau Chief Suzuki Kazuhiro, at a press conference, spoke of higher taxes on large corporations, greater frugality in government (including abolition of customary enkai seiji or lavish entertainment for political purposes), and elimination of unnecessary gaikaku dantai, the quasi-governmental organizations attached to almost all administrative bureaux.[65] Although such measures as Suzuki mentioned would make considerable financial resources available, money on the fantastic scale required by the Komeito's full "vision" is simply not to be seen. The Komeito must therefore reply to justifiable charges of financial irresponsibility.

2. National and International Policies

The platform of the Komeito in national elections is fully as elaborate as that presented in local elections. The same characteristic puzzle--grandiose plans for public expenditures without correspondingly large-scale proposals for increased public funds--is visible. At this level also one sees the Komeito's tendency to focus on issues, both domestic and foreign, which are calculated to appeal to the broadest possible sector of the Japanese public. In a pamphlet prepared for the general election of January 1967 the Komeito presents ten "major policies;" of these, six deal with such economic issues as housing, aid to small business, price stabilization, anti-accident and anti-poverty measures, and promotion of primary industries.[66] The ten policies, and their sub-topics, include the following:

1. Realization of parliamentary politics "for the people."
    a. Elimination of both steamrolling tactics in the the Diet by the ruling party and obstructionist tactics by the opposition.
    b. Clean elections.
2. Establishment of an independent foreign policy featuring:
    a. Thorough support for One-worldism.
    b. Autonomy: more trade with communist countries and advocacy of an immediate truce in Vietnam.
    c. Aid to developing countries.
    d. Immediate return of Okinawa and Ogasawara to Japan.
    e. Primary emphasis of and support for the United Nations.
3. Defense for the sake of peace.
    a. Complete disarmament and abolition of all nuclear weapons; capital punishment for anyone who uses nuclear weapons.
    b. Admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

    c. The gradual elimination, over 10 to 20 years, of the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.
    d. Strengthening of civilian control of defense.
    e. Dissolution of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.

4. Establishment of a welfare economy.
    a. Price stability: oppose cartels and promote efficient competition.
    b. Eliminate the double economic structure /the bifurcation of the large-urban-modern and small-rural-backward sectors of the economy/.
    c. Decrease the taxes upon workers and increase their graduation; nationalization or public incorporation of energy industries.

5. Elimination of housing and traffic problems.
    a. Achieve a ratio of one family per dwelling, mainly through construction of public housing.
    b. Construct more railways, subways, and roads.

6. Banishment of accidents and poverty.
    a. Increase social security.
    b. Improve medical facilities.
    c. Complete the compulsory education system with compulsory kindergarten, free schoolbooks, and a broadened school meal program.
    d. Universities: construction and equipment of and aid to private universities.

7. Establishment of labor policies which protect the workers.
    a. Achieve full employment and establish a minimum wage and a one-wage-for-one-job system.
    b. Revise the Domestic Labor Law in order to increase the welfare of at-home workers.
    c. Enact labor accident legislation.

8. Promotion of prosperous agricultural, forestry, and fishing industries.
    a. Widen the regulation of producer's prices to other products in addition to rice.
    b. Promote forestry and conservation.
    c. Fishing: provide loans to and try to industrialize fishing.

9. Protection of medium- and small-scale business.
   a. Enact minimum price laws and provide loans for small business.
   b. Establish a Medium-and Small-Scale Business Ministry.
   c. Sponsor rationalization and modernization in small enterprises.
10. Oppose revision of the constitution and establishment of a small-electoral-district system.

Several points in the above platform require further explanation. First, in reference to the matter of clean elections, the Komeito has been a consistent proponent of strict limits on political contributions and heavier penalties for violation of political funds control laws. These positions reflect the Komeito's reliance on party dues and publishing revenues for its own income, but, whatever the reason, it is clear that the Komeito is the only political party which has fully backed legislative proposals to limit political contributions. Prime Minister Sato, who has called for such legislation, has been unable to push such measures through his own party, which suggests the degree to which present restrictions on political contributions may be wholly inadequate.

In the field of foreign policy the Komeito has often spoken out against the excessive reliance of Japan upon the United States, economically, militarily, and diplomatically; in the words of Tsuji Takehisa, "the subservience /of the Sato cabinet7 is rather a wonder."[67] Japan can best serve its own interests through an autonomous foreign policy which emphasizes relations with and aid to the other developing nations of Asia, including communist nations.[68] The export of entrepreneurial and technical talent is one aspect of this aid.

As regards Vietnam the Komeito may be in the process of hardening its stand. In 1962 the Sokagakkai could speak of the "aggressive invasion" of South Vietnam from the North; by the mid-1960's its position had become one of neutrality:

> We strongly advise that Japan propose to all of the nations involved that all foreign military forces should be withdrawn unconditionally, that peace be maintained by a United Nations armed force, and that a conference be held immediately on the basis of the Geneva Accords."[69]

The Gakkai's advocacy of a bilateral ceasefire[70] changed abruptly in August 1967, when on successive days a Komei Shimbun editorial and a speech by President Ikeda called for American initiative in halting hostilities. The Komei Shimbun of August 23 called upon the United States to cease the bombing of North Vietnam; in the South a bilateral ceasefire was desirable, but since the military contribution of the United States was far larger and the United States a far greater nation than North Vietman, it should make the first move. The next day President Ikeda outlined a six-point Vietnam policy: a cessation of bombing of the North, cessation of all fighting in and troop movements into South Vietnam, a conference of concerned nations--including the Viet Cong--in Tokyo, a mutual agreement leading to withdrawal of all American military forces from Vietnam, extension of multilateral economic aid to both Vietnams, and stationing of a United Nations armed force in the Demilitarized Zone.[71]

To read into this policy statement a cooling of Gakkai attitudes toward the American effort in Southeast Asia may be unjustified. The Komeito may simply have been staking out for itself a distinctive position on the Vietnam issue, or it may have been leading or following the nationalistic feelings which are visible in Japan today. Gakkai officials insist that the statement signifies no change whatsoever in their policy toward either Vietnam or the United States.[72] Nevertheless, the August statements do mark a new, unprecedentedly positive position on the Vietnam issue; in light of the rest of President Ikeda's speech of August 24 one may infer possible alienative effects of America's Southeast Asian policies on a particular sector of the Japanese populace.

The other major point made by President Ikeda concerned Okinawa. Again, restoration of the island has long been one plank in the Sokagakkai's platform; however, on this occasion the point was made with a new intensity. Ikeda declared that "I here strongly advocate immediate, complete restoration by the American military government in Okinawa and Okinawa's restitution to Japan;" in addition, all nuclear bases on the island are to be dismantled immediately and all military installations are to be removed within five years of restoration.[73]

It is possible that the Komeito was again simply clarifying and not changing its policy. However, the statement was made in a context of rising national sentiment concerning Okinawa: in October a national survey by the newspaper Asahi Shimbun found that 85% of respondents favored restitution of Okinawa to Japan; 81% wanted restoration as soon as possible and 57% wanted it returned free of all nuclear weapons (vs. only 15% who accepted the idea of return with nuclear bases intact).[74] The sensitivity with which the Komeito is attuned to popular opinion suggests that the Komeito is trying either to gain for itself a place on a possible "return-Okinawa" bandwagon or to lead what it perceives to be a possible nascent opinion trend and that its choice of time and message is not coincidental.

It should be mentioned that the Komeito position on Okinawa is not simply an anti-American stance; the party is equally militant (though less verbose) regarding the islands north of Japan which are occupied by the Soviet Union. The Komeito demands the immediate return of the islands nearest to Hokkaido and wants the entire Kurile chain either returned or placed under United Nations trusteeship.[75]

Regarding defense and disarmament the Komeito is of the opinion that military alliances create more instability and danger than they dissipate; in particular, the American bases in Japan make Japan a top-priority target for anyone planning to attack the United States.[76] The party would much prefer to be protected by a United Nations police force. The Self-Defense Forces, about which the Sokagakkai was earlier ambivalent, should be disbanded; as presently constituted the SDF is "unconstitutional" and Ikeda has emphasized that "we ought not to have the right of self-defense," considering that in her constitution Japan totally renounces war as an instrument of foreign policy.[77]

At present, however, the abolition of American bases in Japan and unilateral Japanese disarmament would be unrealistic. Until recently the Sokagakkai has been reticent regarding the Mutual Security Treaty, treating it simply as a _fait accompli_. In 1960, when Gakkai leaders asked President Ikeda what position to take concerning the Treaty protest movement, he replied "I leave it to your judgment."[78] Even at that time the Gakkai was basically opposed to the whole idea of military treaties and at present wishes to abrogate the treaty, but since "there is no guarantee that we absolutely will not be aggressed upon" abrogation should take the form of gradual dissolution through a flexible process.[79]

One of the primary factors which contributes to international tension and thus to the necessity for military pacts is the status of China. The Sokagakkai has always advocated increased trade with, diplomatic recognition of, and U.N. membership for Communist China.[80] It also hopes for unification of China, as it does for Vietnam and all other states subject to partition, a condition which contravenes the principles of One-Worldism.[81]

The one point in the Komeito's foreign policy which appears dissonant with the general tone of humanitarianism is the provision that users of nuclear weapons be executed for violation of mankind's right to exist. This position is a legacy from President Toda; the Gakkai has retained the stand, which becomes increasingly incongruous as the Society moves generally toward greater emphasis of humanism.[82] In light of President Ikeda's lengthy attack upon the injustice of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East in his novel Human Revolution, the contradiction between this demand and the Gakkai's overall attitude appears even more sharp.[83]

Domestically, one of the Komeito's main interests is prices. To counter the rising cost of living in Japan the party advocates not a restriction of demand but an increase of supply through lower interest rates (and thus lower production costs), lower taxes leading to lower consumer prices, and ceilings on land prices and rents.[84] Few new sources of governmental revenue are suggested; the Komeito opposes the sale of public bonds, which it sees as inflationary; it favors abolition of taxes on earned income; and it puts great emphasis on the expansion of trade to increase the general prosperity.[85] Higher taxes on corporations are proposed, but their scope remains unclear.[86]

As regards the economic structure as a whole, the Komeito urges reform of the "double" nature of the system. Great discrepancies in size, capitalization, modernity of equipment and practices, and wage scales exist within each Japanese industry and the Komeito seeks equalization or at least coordination of the various sectors. Wage differences within single industries should be overcome with industry-wide unions instead of the present system of company-based unions.[87] Sufficient controls should be placed upon free competition to prevent its major evils; at the same time the inefficiencies of a planned economy should be avoided. A "controlled market structure" based on "effective competition" is the goal; many Gakkai leaders suggest the British mixed economy as a model for their own policies.[88]

Education, small enterprise, and constitutional and electoral system revision are additional domestic problems. Regarding education, the Komeito has grandiose intentions to build numerous facilities, renovate the generally dilapidated rural schools, and extend aid to institutions of higher learning. However, the most important change which it proposes is in attitude, in the whole orientation toward education. The present system is overcentralized and the educational authorities spend far too much time in squabbles with the leftist Japan Teachers' Union. Instead, a pedagogical approach emphasizing individual development and achievement should be adopted.[89] The Soka Schools, it is asserted, will exemplify these ideals.

The Komeito's interest in medium and small business reflects the support which the Sokagakkai obtains from employees in this sector of the economy. The party suggests a Medium- and Small-Scale Business Ministry through which the respective spheres of large and small enterprise can be coordinated so as to minimize unnecessary competition, duplication, and waste. Exploitation, too, would be abolished; the countless small subcontracting firms would be protected by laws requiring quick payment of subcontract bills and assisted with loans not requiring collateral.[90]

In the late 1950's the Sokagakkai was reticent on the subject of constitutional revision; at present, however, it has a comprehensive policy concerning the constitution which is based upon a single premise: no revision.[91] The position of the Emperor as no more than the symbol of the state is suitable because "it meets the sentimental emotion of the people and because at present it does not disturb the smooth operation of politics."[92] Article IX, the war-renouncing clause, should be logically extended into a Japanese foreign policy which actively advocates world-wide disarmament and the universal renunciation of war.

No incursions whatsoever may be permitted upon the rights of the citizenry; it is the duty of the state to protect to the utmost the freedoms guaranteed by the constitution. In particular the Komeito takes notice of accusations that it plans a National High Sanctuary--for such a temple to be built with state funds would require revision of the constitution. The party points out that the Grand Main Hall (Shohondo) presently under construction is the High Sanctuary; it is being built wholly through Sokagakkai members' contributions and this "fact speaks for itself. Thus the groundless rumor of the National Sanctuary has been completely repudiated."[93]

The duties of the citizenry are limited to a single point: the duty to refrain from infringing upon the rights of any other person.[94]

The National Diet, the Cabinet system, and the judiciary are approved in their present form, despite the factionalism, corruption, and violation of election laws so common today.[95] Local governments should be protected against interference in their affairs by the central authorities.[96]

Revision of the electoral system into single member districts on the British model such as has been proposed by members of the Liberal Democrats is a singular focus of Komeito attacks, for the simple reason that such a change would wipe the Komeito out of nearly all legislative assemblies in the nation. The present system used in all assembly elections but those for the House of Councillors allots several seats to each electoral district (from 3 to 5 seats in each of 123 electoral districts in general elections for a total of 486 Lower House seats); each voter chooses one name on his ballot and the top, e.g., four vote-getters in a four-seat district, are the victors.[97] Thus a party need not receive a majority of the vote in any one electoral district in order to win a large representation in parliament.

The change envisioned by the conservatives would decrease the size of electoral districts, thus increasing the importance of the local and kinship relationships upon which the Tories rely. Another effect, it is feared by the minority parties, would be the underrepresentation of all minorities and elimination of the smaller parties such as the Communists, Democratic Socialists, and the Komeito.[98]

A study of the 1963 Japanese general election by Nishihira Shigeki of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics supports this fear.[99] According to Nishihira's calculations, if the election had been held according to the British single-member constituency system, the Liberal Democrats would have won 403 seats (86.3% of the then total of 467) with the 54.6% of the popular vote which they obtained, instead of the 283 seats (61 percent) which they in fact won. The Socialist Party would have won 12.2 percent of the seats (57 seats) with its 29 percent of the vote, instead of the 31 percent (144 seats) it did win. The Democratic Socialists would have won only 1.5 percent of the seats (7 seats) with their 7.4 percent of the vote, instead of the 5 percent (23 seats) they in fact won. The Communist Party and all other candidates, who won 4 percent of the seats (17 seats) with 9 percent of the popular vote, would have been completely unrepresented under the British system.

In an independent study of its own, using the election results from Tokyo alone in the 1967 general election, the Komeito determined that had a small-constituency system been in effect it would have won no seats at all, instead of the six seats it had in fact won.[100] In short, regardless of the abstract relative desirability of two-party or multiparty systems, the adoption of a single-member electoral system in Japan would greatly enhance the parliamentary power of the ruling party and could well lead to the destruction of the Komeito as a parliamentary party.

* * * * * *

The overall platform of the Komeito has been attacked as a collection of progressive policies stolen from the parties of the left, the Gakkai itself being "a second Democratic Socialist Party wearing clerical robes and existing in the gap between the conservatives and reformers."[101] The Komeito acknowledges the superficial similarity between its policies--especially its welfare measures--and those of the Socialists and Democratic Socialists, but insists that its platform is sincere, as opposed to the cynically tactical welfarism of the Socialists.[102]

Hojo Hiroshi has on occasion even suggested a relative proximity to the Liberal Democrats: "The Komeito really leans a little toward conservatism. . . . But in Japan, a new party must appeal to a very wide range of voters. We must attract people from all points of the spectrum."[103] In fact, Komeito policies do parallel Tory stands on many issues. In one study, Komeito positions on 14 of 16 issues agreed with Liberal Democratic stands on the issues. There was agreement between Komeito and the Democratic Socialists on 15 issues, between the Komeito and the Socialists on nine, and between the Komeito and the Communists on one.[104]

In general, however, one cannot pin the Komeito's whole platform to a single spot on the political spectrum. Welfarism, pacifism, quasi-socialism, and pro-China and anti-constitutional revision stands have a leftist flavor, but conditional acceptance of the Security Treaty and the Self-Defense Forces, and less programmatic but perhaps more significant statements such as Hojo's create an ambiguous impression. Of late such steps as Ikeda's speech on Vietnam and Okinawa have given rise to speculation that the Komeito is drifting to the left; without consideration of the party's activities in and out of parliament--to be discussed in the following two chapters--such a conclusion is untenable.

The conclusions which one may reach after examination of the Komeito's political policies are two. First, the welfarism and social reconstruction planned by the party still contain a large measure of fiscal irresponsibility. Perhaps this is a sign of vestigial political immaturity; still, at present it obstructs the Komeito's efforts to become recognized as a responsible political actor.

Second, the broader political philosophy which lies behind the Komeito's policies gives an inescapable impression of sincere formal adherence to democratic values and processes. Many of the ideas are vague; many points at which religion and politics intersect constitute possible sources of sacred-secular conflict which could destroy democratic politics; however, Gakkai officials, when questioned, respond with reassurances which are clear and, if not examples of studied and towering duplicity, are quite sincere. There are exceptions; President Toda's prescription of the death penalty for nuclear warfare is one, but such exceptions are relatively and increasingly rare.* If one reads widely and regularly in Gakkai and Komeito media one must conclude that while the Society is still characterized by a degree of political naiveté, it has made a strong and formal commitment to secular parliamentary democracy.

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*The Toda quotation, for instance, was seen by the author in only two of the documents: the English-language _Seikyo News_ of August 15, 1962, and a Komeito policy statement, _Komeito no Juten Seisaku_ (Tokyo, Komeito Kikanshi-kyoku, 1966). The possible implications of such exceptions cannot be ignored, however, and a number of similar statements will be cited during analysis of the Gakkai's formal ideology in chapters 17 and 18 below.

NOTES: CHAPTER 10

1. Ikeda Daisaku, in _Komei Shimbun_, January 1, 1967.

2. Ikeda Daisaku, _Seiji to Shukyo_, Tokyo, 1965, p. 112.

3. James Dator, "The Soka Gakkai: A Socio-Political Interpretation," in _Contemporary Religions in Japan_, vol. 6 no. 3, September, 1965, p. 228; David Englewood Cliffs, 1965, passim and especially pp. 48-50.

4. Ikeda, _Seiji to Shukyo_, pp. 90-91.

5. _Ibid_., pp. 160-61, 241-42; Takase Hiroi, _Komeito_, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 183-86.

6. For a discussion of the importance of such competence to democratic systems, see Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, _The Civic Culture_, Boston, 1965, ch. 6.

7. Ikeda, _Seiji to Shukyo_, pp. 160-61; Takase, _op. cit_., pp. 183-86.

8. Ikeda, _Seiji to Shukyo_, pp. 5-8.

9. Ikeda Daisaku, "Shukyo to Seiji Rinen," in _Chuo Koron_, May 1963, pp. 307-08.

10. _Ibid_., pp. 305-08.

11. The problem of congruence or incongruence of certain non-political attitudes and orientations with democratic political systems is discussed in Almond and Verba, _op. cit_., ch. 8.

12. Ikeda, _Seiji to Shukyo_, p. 140.

13. Interview with Ikeda Daisaku, President, Sokagakkai.

14. _Christian Science Monitor_, May 2, 1966.

15. Murakami Shigeyoshi, "Komeito no Seiji Kodo," in _Sekai_, no. 233, May 1965, p. 170.

16. Ikeda, _Seiji to Shukyo_, p. 140; Ikeda Daisaku in _Komei Shimbun_, January 1, 1967.

17. Ikeda, in _Komei Shimbun_, January 1, 1967; "Soko ga Shiritai Komeito Seiken Kakutoku Soso," in _Shukan Gendai_, February 28, 1967, p. 19.

18. Ikeda, _Seiji to Shukyo_, p. 140; Takase, _op. cit_., pp. 302-04.

19. Ikeda Daisaku, "Komeito e no Gimon ni Kotaeru," in _Jiyu_, no. 90, May 1967, p. 70.

20. _Loc. cit_.

21. _Seikyo News_, July 15, 1962.

22. Ikeda, _Seiji to Shukyo_, pp. 259ff.

23. Takase, _op. cit_., p. 211.

24. Tada Shogo in _Komei Shimbun_, January 1, 1967; Takase, _op. cit_., pp. 258-260.

25. _Seikyo News_, August 15, 1962.

26. "Sokagakkai no Seiji Mokuhyo," in _Asahi Janaru_, vol. 4 no. 28, July 15, 1962, p. 8; Maruyama Kunio, "Ikeda Kaicho e no Muttsu no Shitsumon," in _Gendai no Me_, vol. 5 no. 9, September 1964, pp. 72-73.

27. Ikeda, in _Jiyu_, _op. cit_., p. 70.

28. Ikeda, _Seiji to Shukyo_, preface p. 1; speech by Yano Jun'ya, Komeito Secretary-General, at International House of Japan, Tokyo, May 23, 1967.

29. _Seikyo Shimbun_, February 2, 1967.

30. Ikeda, Seiji to Shukyo, pp. 2-3.

31. Interview with Tada Shogo, General Executive, Sokagakkai.

32. Etienne Gilson, The Church Speaks to the Modern World, New York, 1954, pp. 205ff., 142-46, 164-65, 188ff., 222, 315ff.; Pius XI, Forty Years After, Washington, D.C., 1931, pp. 5, 10-11, 15, 20, 21, 29, 38.

33. Gilson, op. cit., pp. 164-65, 205ff., 142-46; Pius XI, op. cit., p. 38.

34. Ikeda, Seiji to Shukyo, pp. 137-38.

35. Seikyo Shimbun, October 21, 1967.

36. John Schaar, Escape from Authority: The Perspectives of Erich Fromm, New York, 1961, p. 163.

37. Ikeda Daisaku, Ningen Kakumei, vol. 2, Tokyo, 1966, pp. 149-50.

38. For elaboration of the concept of "political culture," see chapters by Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba in Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba, Political Culture and Political Development, Princeton, 1965, pp. 3 and 512 respectively; Almond and Verba, op. cit., ch. 1.

39. Ikeda, Seiji to Shukyo, pp. 146-47.

40. Ikeda Daisaku, Rissho Ankoku Ron Kogi, Tokyo, 1966, p. 1002.

41. Takase, op. cit., p. 201.

42. Ikeda, Ningen Kakumei, vol. 3, Tokyo, 1967, p. 279.

43. Ikeda, in Komei Shimbun, January 8, 1967.

44. Ikeda, Seiji to Shukyo, p. 130.

45. Sokagakkai Overseas Bureau, Sokagakkai and Komeito, no. 6 in "This is the Sokagakkai" series, Tokyo, 1965(?), p. 17. For a discussion of "interest aggregation" see Almond and Verba, op. cit., ch. 5.

46. Seikyo News, July 15, 1962; Ikeda, Seiji to Shukyo, p. 158.

47. Sokagakkai Overseas Bureau, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

48. Ikeda, in Jiyu, op. cit., p. 81.

49. Saki Akio, "Sokagakkai Seinen Shoko no Shogen," in Gendai no Me, vol. 8 no. 2, February 1967, p. 131.

50. Ikeda, Seiji to Shukyo, p. 246.

51. Tsuji Takehisa, "Komeito no Kihon Seisaku," in Ekonomisuto, vol. 43, no. 38, September 7, 1965, p. 54.

52. Ikeda, in Komei Shimbun, January 8, 1967.

53. Takase, op. cit., p. 216.

54. Ikeda in Komei Shimbun, January 8, 1967.

55. Takase, op. cit., pp. 198-201.

56. Seikyo News, July 1, 1962.

57. Takase, op. cit., pp. 192ff., 203-04.

58. For expositions of Sokagakkai policies before 1963, see James White, Militant Religion in Japan: The Soka Gakkai, unpub. A.B. thesis, Princeton, 1964, pp. 167ff.; Saki Akio, "Sokagakkai no Shukyo Seito Kosu," in Shukyo Koron, September 1962, p. 39; "Sokagakkai no Seiji Mokuhyo," in Asahi Janaru, vol. 4 no. 28, July 15, 1962, p. 7; Robert Ramseyer, "The Soka Gakkai," in Studies in Japanese Culture: 1, Ann Arbor, 1965, p. 293.

59. For expositions of recent Komeito policies see Komeito press release of November 15, 1966; Ikeda in Komei Shimbun, January 8, 1967, Asahi Shimbun, March 18, 1967, Japan Times, November 18, 1967. Exhaustive treatment is found in Komeito Seisaku-kyoku, Fukushi Keizai e no Michi, 4 vols., Tokyo, 1965-67; and Taishu Fukushi wo Mezashite, 2 vols., Tokyo, 1966.

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61. Dator, op. cit., p. 232.

62. Chugai Nippo, April 25, 1963.

63. Komeito Kikanshi-kyoku, Tosei no Kihon Seisaku, Tokyo, 1966, back cover.

64. Ibid., passim. The full coverage is much more specific and detailed than the summary given here.

65. Interview with Suzuki Kazuhiro, Chief, Komeito Policy Bureau.

66. Komeito Kikanshi-kyoku, *Komeito no Juten Seisaku*, Tokyo, October 15, 1966.

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69. The earlier of these positions is presented in *Seikyo News*, September 15, 1962; the later is quoted from Miyamori Shigeru, "Sengi-in Senkyo to Kaku to Hihan," in *Zen'ei*, no. 238, July 1965, p. 175.

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71. *Komei Shimbun*, August 25, 1967.

72. Interview with Kuroyanagi Akira, Komeito Member of Parliament.

73. *Komei Shimbun*, August 25, 1967.

74. *Asahi Shimbun*, October 17, 1967.

75. *Komei Shimbun*, October 12, 1967.

76. Takase, *op. cit*., pp. 227-29.

77. Maruyama Kunio, "Ikeda Kaicho e no Muttsu no Shitsumon," in *Gendai no Me*, vol. 5 no. 9, September 1964, pp. 74-75; and Article IX of the Japanese Constitution; "Sokagakkai no Seiji Mokuhyo," in *Asahi Janaru*, vol. 4 no. 28, July 15, 1962, p. 7.

78. All *ibid*.; Takase, *op. cit*., p. 132.

79. Quoted in Saki Akio, "Komeito no Seisaku wo Hihan suru," in *Zen'ei*, no. 238, July 1965, p. 207; Tsuji, *op. cit*., p. 53.

80. *Seikyo News*, July 1, 1962; Sokagakkai no Seiji Mokuhyo," in *Asahi Janaru*, vol. 4 no. 28, July 15, 1962, p. 7; Takase Hiroi, *Dai San Bummei no Shukyo*, Tokyo, 1962, pp. 284-85; Tsuji, *op. cit*., pp. 52-53.

81. "Sokagakkai no Seiji Mokuhyo," *loc. cit*.; Tsuji, *op. cit*., pp. 52-53.

82. Seikyo News, August 15, 1962; Komeito Kikanshi-kyoku, *Komeito no Juten Seisaku*, passim.

83. Ikeda, *Nigen Kakumei*, vol. 3, pp. 216-69.

84. Takase, Komeito, pp. 250-51.

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86. Flagler, op. cit., p. 186.

87. Takase, Komeito, p. 249.

88. Ibid., p. 248.

89. Ibid., pp. 257-58.

90. Saki in Zen'ei, p. 209; Tsuji, op. cit., pp. 53-54.

91. Saki Akio and Oguchi Iichi, Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1960, p. 20.

92. Komeito--Clean Government Party, Tokyo, undated, passim.

93. Loc. cit.

94. Takase, Komeito, pp. 224ff.

95. Loc. cit.

96. Loc. cit.

97. Robert Ward, Japan's Political System, Englewood Cliffs, 1967, pp. 53-54.

98. Isomura Eiichi, "Toshi no Shakai Shudan," in Toshi Mondai, vol. 44 no. 10, October 1953, p. 49. For a general discussion of the relationship between party system and electoral system see Harry Eckstein's article in Harry Eckstein and David Apter, Comparative Politics: A Reader, New York, 1963, p. 247ff.; and Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, New York, 1963, bk. II ch. 1, esp. pp. 216ff.

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100. Komei Shimbun, October 18, 1967.

101. Tokoro Shigemoto, "Nichiren ni okeru Shukyo to Seiji," in Shukyo Koron, September 1962, p. 10.

102. Takase, Komeito, p. 258.

103. Christian Science Monitor, May 2, 1966.

104. Tokoro Shigemoto, "Komeito ni okeru Kakushinsei no Jisshoteki Bunseki," in Shakai Kyoiku Kenkyu, no. 6, October 1965, p. 112.

CHAPTER 11

THE KOMEITO'S ELECTORAL RECORD

The campaign strategy of the Sokagakkai, although it has become somewhat more adventurous (and thus, as will be discussed, perhaps more mature) in recent years, has been characterized by high voter discipline and extreme conservatism in the number of candidates put up. The Gakkai never, until the Tokyo gubernatorial election of 1967, ran dark-horse candidates. In the years when the Gakkai's political activities were closely identified with the religious body itself, political losses may have been feared for the reflection they might cast upon Nichiren Shoshu's claims of omnipotence; from this interpretation one might assume that the Gakkai's new acceptance of losses signifies a confidence that distinctions are being made by Gakkai members between the Komeito and the Society. The dominant pattern, however, is to run only sure winners;[*] one candidate's loss in the 1963 local elections was described as a "misreading" of the vote, as was the generally unfavorable performance of Komeito candidates in the April 1967 Tokyo ward assembly elections.[1]

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[*] Determined on the basis of known Gakkai membership in a given electoral district.

In campaign activities the Komeito makes extensive use of the Sokagakkai's structure, media, and activities. The constant and extensive communication patterns in the Gakkai afford numerous opportunities for candidates to meet the membership. In addition, specifically political activities are carried out utilizing the Gakkai structures. According to Ishida Ikuo, during campaigns there are nightly meetings of block leaders where local voting strength is calculated.[2] In the area Ishida studied the campaign objective was to win the votes of a number of non-Gakkai members equal to ten times the number of Gakkai families in the district.

A rather less ambitious strategy is "one-for-two," that is, every two Gakkai members should aim to draw to the Komeito one non-Gakkai member voter.[3] The attempts of members to draw in votes take several forms; the most prominent, because it is largely responsible for the Sokagakkai's brushes with the law, is _shakubuku_. Door-to-door canvassing in elections is illegal in Japan* and _shakubuku_ visits by Gakkai members during campaign time can often be distinguished only with difficulty from political activity. According to Saki Akio and Oguchi Iichi, early observers of the Gakkai, Society members accosted citizens and informed them that good or evil would result from the way they cast their votes.[4]

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*As of mid-1967. However, revisions of the Public Office Election Law which would greatly liberalize the rules concerning canvassing are presently under Diet consideration with, naturally, the full support of the Komeito.

Election law violations were in the early years one of the major characteristics of the Sokagakkai's political activities. In the House of Councillors election of 1956 door-to-door solicitation offenses by Gakkai members were reported throughout the nation and 80% of those arrested for this type of crime were Sokagakkai members.[5] Neither the individual offenders nor the Gakkai evinced guilt feelings: the Society declared that the arrests were "illegal" and the individual culprits protested that "they were only trying to purify the political world and to correct the distortions of heretical religions."[6]

A climax was reached in a special by-election to the House of Councillors in Osaka in 1957. One-hundred-yen notes and cigarettes bearing the name of the Gakkai candidate were distributed by an apparently unauthorized group of believers who came down from Tokyo, and 90% of the cases of election law violation involved Sokagakkai members or supporters.[7] In the aftermath of the election the then Chief of Staff of the Youth Division, Ikeda Daisaku, was arrested; he was released for lack of proof that he had any directing role in the offenses but twenty others were convicted, of whom seventeen had their civil rights suspended for two to three years.[8]

In this case, too, the Sokagakkai took an indignant stand. Ikeda, in a recent work, claims that the Gakkai's political activities were constantly obstructed by the authorities in the early years. The 1957 election was the acme; the arrests were simply a pretext for repression.[9]

However, the years after 1957 were marked by a distinct effort on the part of the Gakkai to avoid election offenses. Since that year violations of election laws by Sokagakkai members have been extremely rare and, although the popular image of illegality persists, the actual patterns of Gakkai/Komeito campaign practice at present are quite responsible, at least as much so as those of the other major parties.

If any characteristic of present campaign strategy is to be discerned it is explicit party orientation. As opposed to the candidates of other parties, who often campaign on their own local reputations or legislative records, Komeito candidates at all times run simply as representatives of the party--they stand wholly on the party platform and record. The Komeito itself claims to add another characteristic: issue orientation. Komeito candidates, it asserts, campaign entirely on the issues, not on particularistic promises or personal appeals. Absolutely speaking, this is true; one of the few outstanding features of the campaign of Abe Ken'ichi for governor of Tokyo in 1967 was his almost exclusive attention to Komeito policies.

However, issue-orientation is definitely unbalanced. A study by the Asahi Shimbun of campaign literature in the 1967 general election showed that more Komeito candidates mentioned (a) cleanup of the political world, (b) medium- and small-scale business, and (c) tax cuts than did candidates of any other party; the Komeito ranked second in proportion of candidates mentioning (d) high prices and (e) housing problems.[10] At the other extreme, the Komeito ranked lowest among political parties in proportion of candidates mentioning the Security Treaty, second lowest as regards Vietnam, and quite low also on mention of protection of the parliamentary political system. The Komeito was roughly average as regards number of candidates mentioning the transportation situation, social security, education, and political scandals.

In fact, a Komeito campaign as followed in the Komei Shimbun is much less a matter of issue and policy than it is of attack and criticism.[11] Komeito philosophies are emphasized: the party is the representative of the masses and the voice of the masses; the evils of the political system in general and all other political parties in particular are described extensively. Policies, insofar as they are dealt with, appear most often in the form of broad slogans. The overall impression received is not one of specific issue-orientation.

A. The Electoral Record

The Sokagakkai successfully made its political debut in April 1955, immediately following its "victory" in the Otaru Debate. (For data on this and other elections see Appendices 8-16.) The record of 98% victories was not preserved in the Upper House election of 1956; only three of six candidates won. However, the Gakkai's four candidates in the national constituency drew a total of 990,000 votes, versus a claimed Sokagakkai membership of approximately 400,000, for a ratio of roughly 2.4 Sokagakkai votes per member family (see Appendix 5).

In the local elections of April 1959 the Gakkai continued its modest advance; a total of 272 out of 304 Gakkai candidates emerged victorious for a winning percentage of 89%. In the House of Councillors elections of the following June, all six of the Gakkai's candidates were elected, while the Gakkai vote in the national constituency climbed to 2,486,975 votes, or 8.5 percent of the total (see Appendix 8), as opposed to the 3.5 percent won in 1956. However, the vote per family decreased from 1956; in 1959 the Gakkai claimed just under 1.2 million families, for a vote-to-membership ratio of 2.32:1.

In the following House of Councillors election, in July 1962, all of the trends apparent above continued. The number of seats held by the Gakkai increased, and both the absolute Gakkai vote in the national constituency and the Gakkai's share of the total vote increased. The rate of increase in the Gakkai's percentage of the vote declined, however,--from 143 percent between 1956 and 1959 to 35 percent between 1959 and 1962--and the vote-to-membership ratio continued to decrease to only 1.52:1.

These decreases were first seized upon by critics of the Sokagakkai following the series of local elections of April 1963. As before, the percentage of winning candidates was high--98 percent. Noteworthy advances were made in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election, where the Koseiren became the third largest force in the 120-seat assembly. In the five next largest cities similar gains were made, the Koseiren winning 38 of the total of 369 seats.[12] In the Tokyo ward assembly elections the Koseiren became the second largest political force after the Liberal Democrats, and also the second most powerful element in eleven of the 22 wards which held elections at this time.[13]

These gains, however, did not forestall judgments that the Sokagakkai had reached or at least neared its limits as an electoral force.

> "In the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election Koseiren candidates in 16 wards drew 413,845 votes, an increase of only 30,380 votes, or 8 percent, over the 383,465 votes drawn by Koseiren candidates in the same 16 wards in the July 1962 Upper House election. An increase of 8 percent in nine months represents an almost negligible growth compared to the usual growth rate claimed by the Soka Gakkai.
>
> In the Tokyo ward assembly elections . . . Koseiren candidates in these 16 wards attracted only 288,419 votes, a decrease of 95,046 votes (c. 25 percent) from July 1962 and a drop of 125,426 votes (c. 30 percent) in less than two weeks /the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election was held on April 17, while the ward assembly elections were held on April 30/. In 22 Tokyo wards Koseiren candidates polled 335,840 votes, again a decrease of some 25 percent from the 383,465 votes the same 22 wards yielded in July 1962."[14]

In these partial returns some observers professed to perceive the limits of Sokagakkai political strength, but these perceptions are open to doubt. They are based on comparison of different types of elections, and in Japan voting rates vary according to level of election, making generalization from one level to another hazardous. It seems hardly likely that the Sokagakkai should suffer a net loss of 125,000 of its supporters between April 17 and April 30, or even 95,000 in nine months. A much more plausible explanation may be found through a consideration of comparative voting rates and Sokagakkai campaign strategy.

First, the voting rate in House of Councillors and Metropolitan Assembly elections is similar, but whereas every Sokagakkai supporter in Tokyo can vote for a Koseiren candidate in an Upper House election, only those members living in districts where the Koseiren ran candidates could express their support in the Metropolitan election.[15] Due to Gakkai strategy, of course, candidates were available only in those districts where success was sure because a large percentage of winning candidates was preferred to a large total Koseiren vote. Thus one could expect the Gakkai's vote in any local area to be smaller in elections for the local assembly than in Upper House elections.

Second, the voting rate in Tokyo's ward assembly elections is usually below that in the Metropolitan Assembly election; in 1963 the rates were 59 percent and 67 percent respectively, a phenomenon not noted by the Gakkai's critics.[16] Moreover, while all the inhabitants of a given ward could vote for a Koseiren candidate from that ward in the Metropolitan Assembly election, only those living in the smaller ward-assembly districts within the wards where Koseiren candidates were running could vote Koseiren in the ward assembly elections. That is, expression of support for the Koseiren was possible for smaller proportion of the Gakkai's membership in the ward assembly elections than in either the Metropolitan Assembly or House of Councillors elections.

Even if the local elections of April 1963 did not constitute a downturn in the Sokagakkai's political fortunes, they did suggest (especially in the small increase in ballots between July 1962 and April 1963) that numerical growth was not what it should be and that political mobilization was less than total. The Gakkai considered the affair as a lesson and set about its preparations for the Upper House election schedules for the coming July.

In this election the Gakkai got out the vote as never before: 5,097,682 votes in the national consituency, or 13.7% of the total. The Komeito won nine seats in the national constituency with this vote; if one estimates the efficacy of party strategy in inverse relation to the number of votes per seat won, the Komeito was by far the most efficient of the parties, averaging 566,408 votes per seat won.[17] The Japan Socialist Party was next with 727,479 votes per seat won, and the Liberal Democrats were third with 732,644.

But even if the Komeito was the most efficient of the parties, it appeared that the party may have been squeezing the absolute maximum number of seats out of its electoral strength. Although all nine of the candidates in the national constituency were elected, only two of the five standing in local districts were successful, for a total of eleven which gave the Komeito a total representation of 20 in the Upper

House. This was a winning percentage of 79%, not good for the Komeito. Moreover, the rate of increase in the Komeito's share of the total vote in the national constituency was 19.1%, a new low, as was the vote-to-membership ratio: .96:1 on the basis of 5.3 million claimed families and 5.1 million votes. The number of seats held by the Komeito had increased, but the decreasing rate of increase in votes won was an ominous sign.

The Sokagakkai's reaction was quick. Less than a month after the Upper House election a special election was held for the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, which had been dissolved (due in considerable part to the efforts of the Komeito) over an internal scandal involving many of the Liberal Democratic assemblymen. The Komeito put up 23 candidates, all of whom were elected, and drew 506,706 votes, or 13.3% of the total. The balance of forces in the assembly before and after the election was as follows:[18]

Seats held by:	Before dissolution	July 22 election results
Liberal Democrats	66	38
Socialists	32	45
Komeito	17	23
Democratis Socialists	--	4
Communists	2	9
Independents	1	1
Total:	120	120

As this table makes clear, the Komeito held the "casting vote" in the new assembly, that is, barring a coalition of Liberal Democrats and Socialists (rather unlikely on major issues), nothing could pass the assembly without the consent of the Komeito, and whichever side could win the assistance of the Komeito could dominate the assembly.

The election was widely viewed as a rebuke directly administered by the electorate to the Liberal Democratic Party for its corruption.[19] The Komeito preferred to look upon its own performance as the fruit of diligent effort: the "carelessness and self-conceit" which had led to losses in the House of Councillors election had been overcome through the guidance and encouragement of President Ikeda and the divine power of faith to "change poison /defeat/ into elixir /victory/ (*hendoku iyaku*)."[20]

B. The Elections of 1967

Although a breakthrough into the Lower House is, for a new political entrant, a formidable task, the Sokagakkai exuded confidence in the days before the general election. Tsuji Takehisa predicted on January 25, four days before the balloting, that all 32 of the Komeito's candidates would be elected.[21] Less sanguine predictions ranged from 22 to 30 victories. A new factor in the electoral system was expected to aid the Gakkai's debut: redistricting had added 5 new constituencies in urban areas with 19 new seats.

The results of the election were as follows:[22]

	November 1963 General Election		
Party:	Vote	Percent of total vote	Seats Won
Liberal Democrats	22,423,915	54.7%	283
Socialists	11,906,766	29.	144
Democratic Socialists	3,023,302	7.4	23
Komeito	-----	---	--
Communists	1,646,477	4.	5
Other parties	59,765	.1	--
Independents	1,956,313	4.8	12
Totals:	41,016,540	100. %	467

	January 1967 General Election		
Party:	Vote	Percent of total vote	Seats Won
Liberal Democrats	22,447,834	48.8%	277
Socialists	12,826,099	27.9	140
Democratic Socialists	3,404,462	7.4	30
Komeito	2,472,371	5.4	25
Communists	2,190,563	4.8	5
Other parties	101,244	.2	--
Independents	2,553,988	5.5	9
Totals:	45,996,561	100. %	486

The contrasts between 1963 and 1967 were accentuated in Tokyo: the Liberal Democratic Party's vote fell off 12 percent, from 44 percent of the total to 32 percent; the loss was taken up not by the Socialists (who themselves dropped 9 percent, from 36 percent to 27 percent) but by the increased vote for independents (up 6 percent), Communists and Democratic Socialists (up 2-3 percent apiece), and especially the Komeito, which tallied 13 percent of the total vote.[23] Again, the Komeito's strongest areas were the downtown, lower-income districts: the tenth (Adachi, Katsushika, and Edogawa wards), where the Komeito polled over 19 percent of the total vote; and the sixth, (Sumida, Koto, and Arakawa wards), almost 18 percent.[24]

Analyses of the election focused upon two related phenomena: the supposed "emergence of a multiparty system (tato-ka)" and the increased number of seats held by the Democratic Socialists and the Komeito. In opinion polls run between 1960 and 1967 by the Asahi Shimbun, combined support for the Liberal Democrats and Socialists declined slightly, from 62.6 percent of respondents to 60.3 percent, while persons professing support for other parties increased from 6.3 percent to 10.9 percent of the total.[25] The proportion of Lower House seats held by the two major parties declined also, from 92 percent to 86 percent. However, it was pointed out that parliamentary seats constituted power and the LDP, regardless of losses, still held 57 percent of the seats. One commentator observed that the change would be more appropirately termed a transformation from a one-and-a-half party system to a one-and-seven-eighths party system; the Asahi Shimbun editorialized that what had emerged was a "third force" in the Komeito and DSP, but not a real multiparty system; Prime Minister Sato, in a televised interview soon after the election, remarked that what had become "multiparty" was not the whole system but only the opposition.[26]

The Komeito considered its own election performance "a success" and "satisfactory," but did not go beyond these rather tepid evaluations.[28] But although the Komeito's debut in the general election was not all the Sokagakkai may have hoped for, it still signified a successful attempt to break established voting patterns. The question was asked, where did the Komeito win its seats and votes, that is, at whose expense was the debut made? The party's secrets seemed to be three: efficient organization, mobilization of previous nonvoters, and encroachment upon the electoral base of the Liberal Democratic Party.

A striking example of the Komeito's organizational ability was shown by its winning of a seat in rural Tokushima prefecture, hitherto a LDP stronghold. The Komeito candidate in Tokushima was a stranger to the prefecture and thus could not capitalize on any of the kin or local ties which count so much in elections in rural Japan.[29] But, through vigorous activity the Komeito managed to mobilize 49,000 votes although the Sokagakkai claimed only 22,000 franchised members in the prefecture.[30] The Komeito votes were spread evenly throughout the prefecture; while one LDP candidate drew all of his votes from his bailiwick in 4 of the prefecture's 23 districts, the Komeito candidate polled between 9 and 12% of the vote in each of nine of these 23 districts.[31]

However, the party organization was not infallible. Though 75% of the Komeito candidates were successful, the party lost in this respect to the LDP, 81% of whose candidates were elected.[32]

In every electoral district but one in which the Komeito ran candidates in the January 1967 election the voting rate increased over the 1963 general election. According to Nishihira Shigeki of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics this was due partly to intensified activity on the part of those who strongly opposed the Gakkai, but also to an increased turnout by Sokagakkai members.[33] The latter reason corroborates the position of the Gakkai itself; it will be remembered that one of the reasons given in the "Demands of the Times and of the People" for the founding of the Komeito was the abstinence from voting in Lower House elections by Gakkai members due to the lack of good men for whom to vote. A study of the election returns by the editorial staff of the magazine Asahi Journal led to this latter conclusion also: those urban electoral districts where the voting rate increased in 1967 were checked and it was found that in every case they were districts where Komeito candidates had run.[34]

Both Nishihira and the Asahi Journal concurred in the opinion that most of the seats won by the Komeito were either "taken" from the LDP or won from among the 19 newly added seats. Nishihira estimated that the Komeito took 10 of the nineteen new seats, plus 8 seats from the LDP, five from the Socialists, and one each from the Democratic Socialists and Communists.[35] According to the *Asahi Journal* the toll was more even, with an inferred 6 LDP seats and five Socialist seats lost to the Komeito, which also took an estimated 12 of the new seats.[36] A comparison of the proportions of the vote won in each ward, city, and county of Tokyo (excepting the three small offshore islands of Oshima, Miyakejima, and Hachijojima) is of very little help in determining who are the Komeito's primary competitors. Rank ordering of the various wards, cities, and counties according to Komeito percentages of the vote shows a slight, but hardly significant, positive correlation (.20) with a similar rank ordering of the LDP vote; there is an equally slight positive correlation with Socialist vote (.24), and marked negative correlations with the proportion of the vote won by both Democratic Socialists (-.49) and Communists (-.51). This suggests that the Komeito draws equally well from all electoral districts regardless of the strength of the two major parties in each district, but that it does not draw votes from areas where either the Communists or Democratic Socialists are strong.

The nationwide series of local elections in April 1967 was held in two rounds: the first, on April 15, included elections for governor of Tokyo and for assemblies in prefectures, the five large cities, and the wards of Tokyo. Komeito performance, acceptable overall, was marred by the first major setback in the party's history.

Eighty-four of the Komeito's 94 candidates in the prefectural assembly elections were successful. The pattern of seat increases reflected previous trends: the greatest gains were made in the urban areas.[37] Initial victories were achieved in Hokkaido, Kochi, Tottori, Oita, Akita, Miyagi, Nagano, Niigata, Gifu, Toyama, Ishikawa, Mie, Nara, Kagawa, and Yamaguchi, with one new seat each, creating a new Komeito presence in several rural prefectural assemblies; however, in the prefectural assemblies of rural Iwate, Aomori, Yamagata, Fukushima, Yamanashi, Fukui, Shiga, Shimane, and Saga there were still no Komeito representatives.

In the Tokyo ward elections the other parties apparently prepared to meet the Komeito by cutting back on the number of candidates; the ratio of candidates to seats (1.47:1) was the lowest since the end of the war. The LDP cut its candidates more than 160 below the number run in the 1963 election; the Socialist reduction was about 160 also, and the Democratic Socialists made a cut of 20 candidates.[38] As opposed to this, the Komeito ran over 60 candidates more than it had in 1963. Of the 202 Komeito candidates, only 124 were successful; the party lost its overall second position to the Socialists, who won a total of 170 seats.[39] The Komeito vote rose by 39 percent; the party emphasized this positive aspect of the election but admitted the magnitude of the defeat.[40]

In the elections for the assemblies of the five large cities of Osaka, Nagoya, Yokohama, Kyoto, and Kobe, however, the Komeito had cause for optimism. In each of the cities the Komeito won enough seats to obtain the "casting vote."[41] But even more significant than either the ward assembly defeat or the city assembly success was the gubernatorial election in Tokyo. It was the first time that the Komeito had ever entered a candidate in a race in a single-seat constituency and the first time that the Gakkai had ever entered a race where defeat seemed certain. In 1963 the Sokagakkai had supported an independent conservative candidate--the LDP's choice also--Azuma Ryutaro, in the gubernatorial election; it claimed to have an electoral strength of 600,000 in Tokyo at the time. The outcome of the election was Azuma 2,298,616 votes and leftist independent Sakamoto Katsu 1,634,634 votes; Azuma's margin of victory was 663,982 votes.[42]

The exact role of the Gakkai vote is indeterminate. How many of the membership responded to the Society's unofficial recommendation is unknown and the electoral strength of the Gakkai as judged from the results of the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly elections of 1963 was nearer 400,000 than 600,000 (the voting rate in Metropolitan Assembly elections and gubernatorial elections is approximately the same).[43] Regarding the effect of the recommendation on the Gakkai membership, a survey cited by the Asahi Shimbun indicated that before the Gakkai's announcement of support, 10 percent of the Society's members voiced preference for Sakamoto, as against just over 20 percent who favored Azuma; after the announcement, the proportions were 7 percent and 45 percent respectively.[44] If one accepts either the 600,000 or 400,000 figures then the Gakkai's support, if efficacious, could well have been crucial, and was quite probably in any case an important factor in the margin of victory.

The reasoning behind the decision to back Azuma has never been made clear. Critics (especially those on the left) asserted that the Gakkai was simply showing its true, reactionary colors and that the decision had created dissension within the organization.[45] The reasons offered by the Gakkai had a hollow sound; Ikeda cited the LDP majority in the Metropolitan Assembly and said that if Sakamoto were elected the parliamentary process would have become entangled and the people's interests would have suffered.[46]

The paucity of reasons given for the 1963 strategy raised additional questions when the Komeito announced in February 1967 that it would run its own candidate for governor of Tokyo. The estimated 600,000 votes supposedly commanded by the Gakkai could be of great importance to some party with an additional souce of power of its own, but they could hardly be expected to produce a winning candidate in a city with 7 million eligible voters.

The reasons given by the Gakkai for its decision were disarmingly straightforward. One spokesman said that such a candidacy was only natural for a party of the Komeito's stature; for such a party again to back another party's candidate would be "fainthearted."[47] Other observers varied in their interpretations of the announcement. The Asahi Shimbun saw the Gakkai's alternatives as (a) alliance with one or (b) more parties, or (c) neutrality with the members left free to vote as they pleased. The choice which the Gakkai had made seemed best calculated both to assert the "middle-of-the-road" but active pose of the Komeito and to cut off accusations that the Komeito was a conservative, essentially insubstantial political actor.[48] Another view was that to have again followed another party would have hurt the Komeito in the other local elections which it had entered; the gubernatorial candidate was thus a sacrifice to the Gakkai's attempts to win representation in as many local assemblies as possible.[49]

The choice of Abe Ken'ichi, a heretofore unknown Sokagakkai director, as the Komeito's candidate widened speculation. Although a graduate of Tokyo University, president of the Kuribayashi Shipping Company, and brother-in-law of Hojo Hiroshi, Abe had not received any attention from the Gakkai media prior to his nomination. In the words of Hojo, "Since he will receive the recommendation of the Sokagakkai, we put more emphasis on his organizational reliability than on general eminence."[50] If the Komeito's independent-candidate campaign were in fact simply part of some larger strategy, then the choice of a relative non-entity such as Abe would be less difficult to understand. However, the puzzle of apparently voluntarily-assumed loss remained.

The nature of the campaign waged by Abe left all questions unanswered. The Komeito's strategy was to draw two additional votes for every one of the Gakkai's 600,000 members in Tokyo for a potentially winning total of 1.8 million votes.[51] Abe himself, however, exerted relatively little effort at any time, going through the motions of campaigning "at my own pace" with a theme of "cleanliness": "Clean elections, clean metropolitan government, and a clean Tokyo."[52] The results of the election reflected Abe's casual approach: leftist independent Minobe Ryokichi won with 2,200,389 votes (44.5 percent of the total), followed by conservative Matsushita Masayoshi with 2,063,752 votes (41.6 percent) and Abe with 601,527 votes (12.1 percent).[53] In the seventeen wards in which the Komeito had run candidates in the January general election, (the voting rate in which was about 3 percent lower than in the gubernatorial election), Abe drew a total of 80,000 fewer votes than had the Komeito Lower House candidates.[54]

Two weeks later, on April 28, elections for city, town, and village assemblies throughout the nation were held. Learning from its failure in the ward elections, the Komeito cut back the number of its candidates. The tactic apparently paid off, as 96 percent of the candidates in city elections were successful. Regarding town and village elections the reports are contradictory. The Komeito claimed to have put up 343 candidates, of whom 326 were elected.[55] According to figures published by the Autonomy Ministry, however, no seats were won by Komeito candidates.[56]

The Komeito's evaluation of the 1967 local elections was mixed. The Tokyo ward elections were described as "a complete tactical mistake."[57] According to Sasaki Toshiyuki of the Sokagakkai Public Relations Bureau, the failure was due to the large number of candidates. Komeito electoral organization is so efficient that the total Komeito vote is spread very evenly among all Komeito candidates; thus, every election is an "all-or-nothing" effort and, where the votes are spread among barely too-many candidates, all may lose.[58] Why so many candidates were put up is an unanswered question; the party may have misread its strength, but it may also be that the Komeito is falling victim to the same pressures which bears upon other parties to provide candidacies for as many of its supporters as is possible.

Of the gubernatorial election the Komeito said, "it was not necessarily a favorable result."[59] The party's interpretation of Abe's loss centered upon the fierce contest between Minobe and Matsushita, amid which the vote became polarized.[60] It was frankly admitted that Abe's lack of reputation within the Sokagakkai had hurt him.[61] However, in a negative sense the campaign had been a success. The explanation of the election's significance given by Sasaki implies the larger strategic framework within which it was planned: he referred to the campaign as a successful organizational defense of the Sokagakkai, because had the Komeito not run its own candidate, the membership of the Gakkai would have become a prize to be fought over by the other parties and might well have split.[62] An additional benefit was that Abe had at least become well known in Tokyo; the Komeito designated him as one of its candidates in the July 1968 Upper House election and he won his contest easily with over 800,000 votes.

On the basis of its own figures (which, in the case of the town and village assembly elections, wildly contradict the official statistics) the Komeito pronounced the April 28 elections "a great success."[63] Certainly there were grounds for satisfaction. The percentage of successful candidates in all of the April elections was 89 percent overall. In every case the absolute Komeito vote increased, as did its percentage of the vote. The number of Komeito seats in local legislative bodies, including seats not up for re-election in April, totalled 1873 in May, and, with by-elections, rose to 1954 by January 1968.[64]

C. Genkaisetsu: The "Limit Argument"

Some of the most often-encountered questions in any study of the Sokagakkai concern the organization's estimated future growth--is the Gakkai in fact a viable social, religious, or political actor which may be expected to increase in size and power or at least to continue to exist for the foreseeable future? As has been indicated by the foregoing presentation of Gakkai growth rates and performance in various types of elections, there seems to be a rule of diminishing returns working upon the Gakkai's present efforts to build its numerical and electoral strength. As interpretation of the Komeito's position, the "limit argument" or genkaisetsu, has been offered by several critics; the chief elements in this interpretation are the 1963 local elections; the sequence of Upper House elections; the general elections of 1967; the apparent ceiling on Komeito electoral power in Tokyo, the Gakkai's birthplace; and the limitations placed upon the Komeito by its association with the Sokagakkai.

The argument that there is a limit beyond which the Sokagakkai cannot extend its parliamentary power has validity; however, one must add distinctions between electoral and parliamentary power and between present and future. While Komeito electoral power, (the total number of votes it commands) may be approaching a limit, it is clear from the record of legislative seats won that Komeito parliamentary power (the number of seats held) is growing steadily in most areas. In both cases, one must say that any "limit" is yet to be reached.

The decreasing rate of increase of the Sokagakkai membership, as an index of potential Komeito power, has been discussed (see Appendix 1), as have the local elections of 1963, an example of actual party electoral strength. The following chart gives a similar picture, abstracted from Komeito performance in the last five Upper House elections:[65]

	1956	1959	1962	1965	1968
Seats held by Komeito:	3	9	15	20	24
Total Sokagakkai vote (national constituency):	991,540	2,486,801	4,124,269	5,097,682	6,656,500
Gakkai percentage of total vote:	3.5	8.5	11.5	13.7	15.5%
Claimed Gakkai membership at election time (in families):	460,000	1,177.000	2,700,000	5,300,000	6,600,000
Votes per family:	2.44	2.32	1.52	.96	.99
Increase in total Gakkai vote:		+1,495,261	+1,637,468	+973,413	+1,558,818
Absolute increase in Gakkai's percentage of total vote:		+5	+3	+2.2	+1.8
Percentage increase in Gakkai's total vote:		+143	+73	+19.1	+13.1

Every index suggests the same conclusion: growth at a decreasing rate. Whether this signifies stagnation or stabilization depends upon one's view of the Sokagakkai; in either case the Komeito appears to be winning a solid position as a minority party, roughly equivalent to that of the Democratic Socialists if not more secure.

A slight upturn of the vote-to-membership ratio as seen in House of Councillors election returns was shown in the 1967 general election and 1968 Upper House election. In the 32 districts where Komeito candidates ran in January 1967 the ratio was 1.98:1, as opposed to 1.77:1 in the same 32 districts in the 1965 Upper House election.[66] A ratio of 2:1 was surpassed in 14 of these districts, of which Tokyo was not one. However, the 2,472,371 total vote won by Komeito candidates in the general election exceeded by only 414,327 the 2,058,044 votes won by Komeito candidates in the same 32 districts in the 1965 Upper House election.[67] This relatively small increment becomes more significant when one recalls that the voting rate in Upper House elections is slightly lower than that in Lower House elections.[68] In addition, in the 32 districts where there were Komeito candidates in the 1967 general election, the Komeito percentage of the total vote, when contrasted to the Komeito percentage in these districts in the 1965 Upper House election, registered an increase in four districts and a decrease in 24; in five districts the absolute Komeito vote fell below the 1965 figure.[69]

Two of these five were Tokyo's sixth (Sumida, Koto, and Arakawa wards) and tenth (Adachi, Katsushika, and Edogawa wards) districts; the decline in these past bastions of Sokagakkai strength is significant. In fact, in the mid-1960's there appears to have developed a ceiling on Gakkai electoral strength in Tokyo although this may have been in fact only a plateau far overleaped by Abe in the 1968 Upper House election. After winning 529,575 votes in the Tokyo district in the 1962 Upper House election and 413,826 in the 1963 Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election, the Komeito drew 608,235; 506,705; 618,864; and 601,527 votes in the 1965 Upper House election, the 1965 Metropolitan Assembly election, the 1967 Upper House election, and the 1967 Tokyo Gubernatorial election respectively.[70] Tokyo was the first area where the Sokagakkai grew after World War II. The apparent leveling-off of growth in this its initial base may portend a future trend in other urban centers of early expansion, but the 831,893 votes won in Tokyo by Abe in July 1968 may, on the contrary, mark a new trend: the expansion of Komeito appeal beyond the membership of the Sokagakkai.

The Sokagakkai, naturally enough, refutes all allegations of stagnation and hails the July 1968 election as proof. The genkaisetsu, it claims, is the fabrication of its detractors. The statistical basis of the Gakkai's protestations is as biased as is that of its critics. The Society stresses absolute increases in votes and seats held, percentages of successful candidates, and the invalidity of comparisons between different types of elections and different types of

Gakkai backing for candidates, such as official nomination and simple recommendation.[71] Contradictory evidence is more often ignored than specifically refuted. The Gakkai does, however, acknowledge its defeat in the 1967 Tokyo ward assembly elections, but it uses the loss as a refutation of the "popular misconception" that a religious political party must always win or face discredit and disintegration.[72] The Society points to the increase in absolute vote garnered in the election and asserts that this clearly shows that organizational vigor need not be reflected in legislative seats.

The value of the genkaisetsu may be best realized if increases in Sokagakkai numerical strength and Komeito electoral strength are hypothetically visualized as a pair of curves with a time lag between them (see Fig. 1). The time lag is due to two factors: the assumption that politicization follows conversion, and the fact that no election may occur until some time after one's conversion; in either case a new Gakkai member does not figure as a new Komeito

Figure 1.



voter immediately upon his entry into the faith. The figure's "present" point shows a possible national pattern; in areas such as Tokyo or Osaka the electoral power of the Komeito as well as the Sokagakkai's numbers may well be nearer to its maximum.[73]

The validity of Figure 1 could be entirely negated if the Gakkai or Komeito succeed in creating an appeal to new social elements not now in great evidence in the Gakkai membership. Various social and economic trends which may contribute to such an expanded appeal will be examined when the possible future development of the Gakkai is considered; at this point one supposed political trend which may benefit the Komeito directly may be considered.

This is the "multiparty" trend mentioned above in connection with interpretations of the 1967 general election. The source of the "multipartification" appears to be a right-to-left-to-center flow of voter sentiment: traditionally conservative voters in the countryside show an unprecedented tendency to vote for parties of the left and center and the customarily strong Socialist urban areas elected Democratic Socialists and Komeito representatives in remarkable numbers on January 29.[74] Disaffection can be found among the supporters of both of the major parties; the fact that they do not simply switch allegiance to the other major party is explained by Nishihira Shigeki in terms of ideology: unlike the situation in Britain and the United States, the ideological distance in Japan between the LDP and Socialist Party is so great that switching over is psychologically very difficult. As a result, when one is dissatisfied with his previous party of support, a minor party more compatible ideologically than the other major party seems a preferable alternative.[75]

The defeats incurred by the Liberal Democrats in the 1965 Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election and in the urban districts in the 1967 general election indicate a discontent with the ruling party which may be expected to grow; the gradual electoral decline of the LDP over the last decade is an empirical fact. The Socialist Party, however, is apparently unable to draw the LDP's lost votes to itself; there is no compelling reason to believe that the Socialists will be any more successful in this effort in the future than they have been to date. Into the resultant gap the Komeito and Democratic Socialists and, to a lesser extent, the Communists, have worked themselves; whether the Komeito in particular will be able further to exploit this trend will depend upon the degree to which the Sokagakkai can appeal to the discontented elements in the electorate, possibilities for which remain to be considered.

NOTES: CHAPTER 11

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60. Interview with Sasaki; speech by Yano Jun'ya, Komeito Secretary-General, at International House of Japan, Tokyo, May 23, 1967; interview with Tada Shogo, General Executive, Sokagakkai.

61. Yano speech; interview with Tada.

62. Interview with Sasaki. Similar reasoning appears to lie behind the Komeito's decision to run 75 candidates in the next general election, though it expects only 40 to win. See _Japan Times International Edition_, September 7, 1968.

63. _Asahi Shimbun_, April 30, 1967.

64. Yano speech; _Seikyo Shimbun_, January 4, 1968.

65. Sangi-in Jimukyoku, _Sangi-in Giin Senkyo Ichiran_, nos. 4-7, Tokyo, 1957, 1960, 1963, 1966; Kasahara Kazuo, _Seiji to Shukyo_, Tokyo, 1965, p. 290; _Mainichi Shimbun_, July 9, 1968.

66. _Asahi Janaru_ Henshubu, "Dai san . . . ," p. 20; Murakami Shigeyoshi, "Tenkanki wo Mukaeta Komeito," in _Sekai_, no. 257, April 1967, p. 56.

67. Murakami, "Tenkanki . . . ," pp. 55-57.

68. Jichisho, _op. cit._, 1963.

69. Nishihira, "Senkyo . . . ," p. 52.

70. _Komei Shimbun_, June 11, 1967.

71. _Komei Shimbun_, May 17, June 11, 1967.

72. _Komei Shimbun_, May 17, 1967.

73. Nishihira, "Senkyo . . . ," p. 52.

74. _Asahi Janaru_ Henshubu, "Dai San . . . ," p. 22.

75. Nishihira, "Senkyo . . . ," p. 59.

CHAPTER 12

THE KOMEITO IN ACTION

The members of the Komeito differ both from representatives of other religious groups in the political system, and from their colleagues in the established secular political parties. Various religious organizations have at times managed to send their own members into local or national assemblies; such representatives have, however, tended to operate as members of the established parties.[1] The Komeito entered upon the political scene as an independent with a full theological system and a comprehensive set of political philosophies and policies derived therefrom; its professed aim is to realize its philosophy through the political system. In addition, overarching strategic considerations determine Komeito tactics on every level of the polity much more than is the case with the established parties.

Party image is extremely important to the Komeito, the self-styled true friend and representative of the masses. Every Komeito legislator is constantly adjured to be diligent, honest, and industrious. The purpose of local elections is largely a public relations one: a seat won in a new area constitutes a stage from which to appeal to all the people of the area through the exemplary behavior of the local

Komeito representative and thus to build a broader base of support which may be exploited in later elections.[2] Because votes must be sought on the local level, the activities of Komeito members in local assemblies are considered more important than activites in the National Diet.[3]

In addition to these larger strategic considerations, there are several idiosyncratic aspects of the activities of the Komeito. One is vacillation (variously called flexibility or opportunism) between the parties of the right and left in legislative situations; another is a microscopic view of politics unseen in any of the established parties which determines both intra- and extra-parliamentary activities; third is a program of grass-roots extra-parliamentary activities unmatched by any other political force in Japan.

A. Intra-parliamentary Operations

1. The National Level

The Komeito record in the National Diet has been one of cooperation with the right drifting toward separation and limited, unstable coalitions with various elements of the left. Throughout, the party has been able to realize practically none of its policies due to its minority status; this has not prevented it from loudly proclaiming its virtues, criticizing all of its opposition, and taking credit for all legislation which is congruent with Komeito policy.

Until the mid-1960's the Komeito seemed, regardless of its condemnation of the Liberal Democrats in public, to cooperate closely with them in the Diet. Of the 238 bills passed by the Upper House during the 38th Diet and 39th Extraordinary Diet (December 1960 to October 1961), the LDP and a small faction called the Doshikai approved all 238; Sokagakkai representatives approved all but 5 (of which 2 dealt with defense and three with price increases).[4] The Communists, by contrast, opposed 181; the Socialists opposed 56, and even the centrist Democratic Socialists opposed 34. In the 40th Diet Gakkai representatives approved 155 of the 166 bills passed.[5]

During these years the Gakkai was still in a formative stage politically; its representatives had little experience and probably no operational code of intraparliamentary behavior. The point was made by the Gakkai--and still is--that smooth parliamentary processes contribute to the people's welfare even if all legislation is not exactly what the Gakkai would like it to be. Therefore diehard oppositionism on every minor issue is not nearly so important as is the endeavor to reconstruct the system itself by revolutionizing the men who run it. This latter is the Gakkai's primary task, and for this reason it refuses to squabble over every single bill which the LDP proposes.[6]

In the early 1960's a process of disengagement from the LDP was underway. In contrast to the 96.8% of the government-sponsored bills to which the Gakkai Upper House members assented in the 1960 session of the Diet, the proportion approved decreased to 94.2% in the 1961 session, 92.8% in 1962, 88.9% in 1963, and 86.5% in 1964.[7] In 1964 the Democratic Socialists, by contrast, approved 88.8% of the LDP's legislation. Since 1962 budgetary opposition has been consistent; the Komeito claims that Tory budgets give preferential treatment to big business and are inflationary.

On other policies opposition to the LDP has prompted some observers to note a supposed drift to the left by the Komeito. The party opposed the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1965, using in the process the obstructionist technique of walking very slowly up to the speaker's rostrum to vote (ushi-aruki); more recently the party has cooperated with the Socialists and Communists in backing a resolution to reiterate Japan's refusal to permit any nuclear armaments on its territory, has called vociferously for the resignation of an LDP cabinet minister who suggested that Japan play a greater role in her own defense, and has taken a hard line against the visit to Japan of the American aircraft carrier Enterprise.[8]

The Komeito previously denied flatly any leftist tendency at all in the party's activities--the Komeito was merely realizing the basic tenets of its philosophy in its operations, and if opposition to the policies of the LDP seemed to resemble leftism, this was not the Komeito's fault.[9] It is most probable that the Komeito was then honest in these protestations, although they have since ceased.[10] It is not that the party is leaning to the left but that it is trying to establish a distinctive position on various issues; any stand opposed to the ruling party's has at least this one characteristic in common with the stands of the other opposition parties, and if opposition is intense enough this shared characteristic can lead to cooperation even though the substance of the positions of the various opposition parties on the issue may vary greatly.

This is in fact what has happened. If a minority such as the Komeito wishes to influence legislation without appearing to toady to the ruling party it can do so only through an alliance with other opposition forces in which some observers will inevitably perceive leftist tendencies. Even before the general election of 1967 the Komeito proposed an opposition policy alliance; the party states that even the Communists would be welcome in the alliance if real agreement could be reached.[11]

Since taking its place in the Lower House the Komeito has ceaselessly advocated opposition coalitions as the most efficacious means of opposing the LDP. The Socialists, Democratic Socialists, and Komeito joined in a budget proposal in February 1967 and in a call to Prime Minister Sato to push stringent legislation designed to restrict political contributions in April 1967.[12] The Communist Party joined this triumvirate in creating a solid opposition front voicing dissatisfaction with the proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1967.[13]

The Komeito has proposed coalitions on other issues,[14] but the fortunes of these coalition-building efforts have been mixed. No such coalition, of course, can successfully stop the LDP from passing any legislation upon which it is intent. However, since the fall of Prime Minister Kishi, which was due in large part to his high-handed way of steamrolling bills through the Diet, the ruling party has been relatively circumspect in the exploitation of its parliamentary majority, and a completely united opposition front would probably give the conservatives considerable pause. But keeping the coalition together has proved to be a difficult task. The Democratic Socialists' support of conservative candidate Matsushita Masayoshi in the 1967 Tokyo gubernatorial election prompted description of that party by the Socialists as a "second Liberal Democratic Party;" the DSP reacted angrily and the young coalition seemed seriously cracked. The Komeito criticized both the DSP's proximity to the LDP and the Socialists' attacks upon the DSP, noting that such friction simply "served the LDP's purpose of dividing and weakening the opposition camp."[15]

Ad hoc coalition has proved possible on numerous occasions, but one may wonder whether the Komeito's drive for individuality and integrity will allow very close identification with any other single party under present conditions. The evidence presented by Koya Azumi of a much stronger anti-leftist than anti-rightist feeling among a small sample of Gakkai activists suggests that perhaps prolonged identification with parties of the left will have a deleterious effect upon the unity of the Gakkai.[16] Nevertheless, the party has evidently concluded that if it is to become recognized as a viable political actor it must also sever such previous relationships with the LDP as were visible in the Gakkai's recommendation of Azuma Ryutaro in 1963.

Even when in coalition the Komeito is in the minority; by itself it is far too small to push through legislation of its own. Therefore its substantive, autonomous achievements have been few. The party has, however, been able on occasion to influence the legislative process. In 1967 the Public Office Election Law was liberally revised to permit, among other things, door-to-door canvassing, a technique much more beneficial to the Komeito than to any other political party.* The Komeito has been the most vocal supporter of such revision and one may fairly assume that its voice is reflected in this legislation. In addition, the Liberal Democratic Party is once again seriously considering (during the 1967-68 Diet session) a bill to stiffen restrictions on political contributions. The Komeito has seized upon this issue and belabors it constantly; should such a bill be passed it would be difficult to conclude that the tirades of the Komeito were an inconsequential phenomenon.

In at least one instance specific policy influence was attributed to the Komeito, but the primary role of the Komeito in parliament to date has been that of a muckraker, a self-appointed guardian of the public interest which pounces with nonpartisan relish upon political irregularities of all kinds. This role is derived from the party's goal of cleaning up the political world, a goal which can be pursued negatively while the Komeito is still a tiny minority and thus unable to enact positive legislation to that end. The role also justifies the vacillation of the Komeito between support of the two major parties; at times the people's interests seem better represented by LDP policies, at times by Socialist, and the Komeito decides each issue on its own merits in light of popular welfare as seen by the party.

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*The relative potential utility of canvassing to each of the parties is suggested by their respective memberships: Liberal Democrats, 226,000 (as of April 1968; source: Japan Times Weekly, May 4, 1968); Socialists, 533,000; Democratic Socialists, 36,000; Communists, 200,000 (all as of December 1966; source: Asahi Nenkan, 1967 ed., pp. 279-83); Komeito, several million Sokagakkai members.

The specific aspect of "cleanup of the political world" upon which the Komeito focuses in the Diet is "normalization of procedure."[17] Exceptions to "normal procedures" include both the unilateral forcing through of legislation by the LDP and the obstructionism of the opposition; every act of the Komeito (even, it may be assumed, the occasional adoption of obstructionist tactics) contributes _ipso facto_ to normalization, and the party takes credit for the orderly settlement of all intraparliamentary conflicts.

The Komeito also helps clean up politics by pointing out particular irregularities. The _Komei Shimbun_ carries extensive accounts of Komeito legislators' attacks on alleged scandals, inconsistencies in policy or practice, and political incursions upon the people's interests, and presents this muckraking record as one of the primary evidences of its concern for the masses. Recent catalogs of "injustices" attacked by Komeito Diet members included the following:[18]

May 7, 1965: Ninomiya Bunzo attacks the improper sale of Toranomon Public Park and the lease of the property of the former Army Administration School. (Upper House Accounting Committee.)

March 28, 1966: Ninomiya expresses doubts concerning the purchase by the Japan Public Housing Corporation of land for a development. (Upper House Accounting Committee.)

October 17, 1966: Tada Shogo brings up the question of Defense Agency chief Kanbayashiyama's parade in his home town at public expense and calls for the resignation of the relevant Cabinet minister. (Upper House Cabinet Committee.)

November 17, 1966: Kuroyanagi Akira points out that the LDP, DSP, and Socialists have all accepted political contributions from the Kyowa Sugar interests, already implicated in a political scandal. (Upper House Accounting Committee.)

March 22, 1967: Ninomiya claims irregularities in the management of the Japan Bell Welfare Association, a deaf-mute welfare organization with public financial support, asserting that large portions of its income have disappeared. (Upper House Accounting Committee.)

March 23, 1967: Secretary-General Yano Jun'ya hits the LDP's Diet expenditures, suggesting that the party made payoffs to opposition party members to influence them toward support of the government-sponsored treaty with Korea and calling for the LDP to publicize its disbursement records. (Lower House Budget Committee.)

July 18, 1967: Tashiro Fujio points out that the taxi companies involved in raising the rates for air-conditioned taxis /governmental approval of which was a controversial issue/ made large contributions to the LDP, DSP, and Socialists.

As can be seen from this short list, the greater number of these allegations were no more than suggestions and implications. Some, such as the Kanbayashiyama incident and the Kyowa Sugar scandal, were parts of previously-unearthed irregularities. Many of the Komeito's attacks received attention in the popular press, however, and probably serve both to indicate the party's interest in the populace and to reinforce the popular distrust of politicians which is widespread. The question of LDP payoffs to other parties disrupted the proceedings of the Budget Committee for a few days but the LDP refused to open its records and no further investigation followed. Never has specific legislation resulted from the Komeito's efforts to publicize scandal.

This, however, in no way detracts from the efficacy which the Komeito's supporters perceive in the party. From conversations with individual Sokagakkai members it becomes clear that the Komeito is accepted as a serious, able, admirably honest group working ceaselessly for the people's welfare through its exertions in the Diet. The following letters to the Komei Shimbun exemplify this view:

> "As opposed to the established parties who tend toward backstage dealings and opportunist connivance, the Komeito drove decisively and clearly along its predetermined basic line of 'reject the bill' . . . . This party of 25 men has neatly managed to move the 'adult' established parties. The recent decision was formally reached according to the established pattern, but one should probably consider the style of the Komeito, a third force in the face of the wheeler-dealer style in which party interests and strategems take precedence, as qualitatively different." (Mainichi Shimbun, August 6.)
>
> It was in this fashion that the newspapers evaluated the activities of the Komeito amid the disorders which attended the Diet deliberations concerning the proposed Special Temporary Health Insurance Law; as I read these articles I remember how my heart trembled.
>
> At this, I was unable to refrain from applauding them from my heart: they're still working for us.
>
> I had heard that the backstage dealings in the Diet were really like "a bunch of crooks cheating each other,"

> but with the entry upon the stage of the Komeito you don't hear of the old kind of humbug any more; the thieves' masks have been skilfully torn off by the Komeito.
>
> The shameful conduct revealed by the Socialists has led even to intraparty chaos. The work of the Komeito, so diametrically opposed to this, is, I am sure, something which can gradually win the hearts of conscientious citizens.
>
> Mr. Yamada Mitsuru, company employee, 32.[19]

> I send my heartfelt applause for the fact that, as of August 1, the compensation provided under automobile liability insurance went from 1.5 million yen to 3 million yen; this is the fruit of the extraordinary activity of the Komeito.
>
> Awhile ago, on an afternoon TV show, this problem was brought up, but even though the views of each party were presented in informal conversation, they didn't show me any satisfying, concrete answers. Only the Komeito gave us a clear policy. At that time they explained that our initial goal is 3 million yen, but when I saw it realized today, I again stood in wonder at the Komeito's great power of execution.
>
> In these days, when auto accidents increase year by year, I have great hopes in the Komeito's traffic accident policy.
>
> Miss Omori Sumie, public servant, 36.[20]

2. The Local Level

Many of the same trends are visible in Komeito activities in local assemblies as may be perceived in the National Diet. A close proximity to Liberal Democratic positions has given way to a clearly separate stand, at least in principle. That this separatism is a broadly oppositionist, not a narrowly leftist, movement is much clearer on the local than on the national level. The present governor of Tokyo is a socialist and the forces of the left hold more seats in the Metropolitan Assembly than do the Tories; here, too, the Komeito has recently become more oppositionist, although in this instance opposition can entail co-operation with the conservatives.

On the local level, too, the Komeito is in every case a minority; however, as seen by its performance in the 1967 municipal assembly elections in the five largest cities, the Komeito has considerable leverage in some locales and has thus been able to realize some of its policies. For this reason the testimony of Sokagakkai members concerning the efficacy of the party on the local level has a much more convincing empirical basis than do accounts of party performance in the Diet. Because local politics are closer to the people, the Komeito's microcosmic approach to politics is much clearer in its activities in local assemblies.

In its earlier, less distinctively oppositionist, years Komeito representatives showed an amenability to LDP legislation apparently inconsistent with their own policy positions. During the 1959-1963 session of the Kawasaki City Assembly the Sokagakkai representatives approved successive annual budgets, bonuses and pay increases for assemblymen, and an increase in health insurance fees; they (along with the conservatives) rejected a tax cut, the elimination of expenditures for the military, and a resolution calling for dissolution of the Diet.[21] In Tokyo, during the Toshima ward assembly's 1959-1963 term, Sokagakkai representatives said practically nothing but managed to approve expenditures on recruitment for the Self Defense Forces, raises in pay for the ward chief and ward assemblymen, an increase in the ward residents' tax, and an increase in assemblymen's allowances.[22] At one time, when a revision in taxation rates was being voted upon, three of the Gakkai representatives were absent and the fourth was not on the floor when the vote was taken.

Even in the mid-1960's the Komeito voting record in local assemblies closely paralleled that of the LDP. However, it voted with sufficient flexibility that even a Socialist journal declared that it could not be clearly described as part of either the ruling or opposition forces.[23] The oppositionist trend has been most marked in the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly, since the election of socialist Minobe Ryokichi as governor. After initial informal approval, the Komeito reversed itself and vetoed two of the three men whom Minobe nominated for lieutenant governors; the reasons for the veto were weak: of one nominee, previously head of the Metropolitan Sanitation Bureau, the party said "we conclude from his record that he is not up to the heavy responsibilities of the post;" of the other, previously chief of the Statistical Standards Bureau in the Prime Minister's Agency, the party said "we haven't heard of any national achievements and don't know him well and therefore can't expect much of him."[24] The press saw in the Komeito-Liberal Democrat coalition which voted down these two nominees a "long hostility" to the Socialist-Communist alliance which backed Minobe's campaign and interpreted the veto as an attempt to obstruct Minobe's administration before it could get into action; the reasons for the veto were described as "unworthy," "spiteful," and "opposition for the sake of opposition."[25]

In the Tokyo assembly the Komeito holds the "casting vote" with which it can influence the other parties occasionally to accept its own legislation; therefore the achievements claimed by the Komeito in Tokyo (as in other local assemblies) have a positive, social-welfare aspect, as well as the negative muckraking aspect so prominent on the national level, and are generally more impressive in both aspects.

The party itself, never reticent, has published an account of its activities in the Tokyo Assembly, taking credit for the recall of the scandal-ridden Tokyo Assembly in 1965 and for more effective measures against peculation of tax monies, against dishonesties in the purchase and sale of public property and in bidding for metropolitan contracts, against shoddy construction in public buildings, and against lavish expenditures of public funds on politically-motivated entertainment.[26] On the positive side the Komeito cites yearly increases in the appropriations for school equipment; increased numbers of playgrounds, parks, traffic lights and pedestrian overpasses; more and better public housing, better administered; and more loan funds available to medium and small business. These measures in many instances epitomize microcosmic politics: a neighborhood demand for a guardrail on a dangerous street corner comes to the attention of a Komeito representative who introduces the demand as Komeito policy into the local assembly; if the guardrail is ever built the Komeito, as initial articulator of the interest, takes the credit--and often justly so.

The justice of many of the Komeito's claims is recognized by outside observers. One critic, Togawa Isamu, attributes to Komeito activity such phenomena as the public revelation of illegalities in the bidding for supply of school lunches and for dormitory construction in Tokyo's Nerima ward, and in the sale of public lands in Fukushima prefecture; a new nursery school in Kawasaki City, an education center in Tokyo's Katsushika ward, and a decrease in the financial load borne by parents in Chiba prefecture for their children's education; a movement in opposition to bus and tram fare increases in Kobe City and a similar movement in Tokushima City; drives to abolish overseas excursions at public expense by members of the assemblies of Tokyo's Setagaya ward and Chiba City; a move to eliminate political banqueting and automobiles for the use of assemblymen in Osaka City; and the recall of the Tokyo Assembly in 1965.[27]

Again, as in the case of Komeito Diet activities, the party's efficacy in achieving its goals is perceived by its backers. In the local case, however, the achievements are not simply intraparliamentary activities which must be favorably interpreted and are probably noticed only by the supporters of the party; Komeito successes at the local level are most often tangible (parks, playgrounds, and traffic safety facilities, for example) and noticeable to all local residents. One may surmise that these material realizations of party policy are potentially more fruitful in creating a broader base of electoral support than are national activites; thus the great Komeito emphasis upon local campaigns and operations appears justified.

The fruitfulness of local legislation is reflected in the following letters to the Komei Shimbun. Although the writers of these letters are probably all Sokagakkai believers, one will note that the measures they describe are of a type visible to the entire electorate.

> Tokyo's Koto ward, where we live, is famous for flooding and sinking land; but for the last several years, due to the activity of the Komeito, levee construction is nearing completion and sewage drainage projects are also progressing.
>
> Also, (and this too is in accord with the position of the Komeito assemblymen), since the pumping up of water for industrial use has been prohibited, land sinkage has ceased, too. Thanks to this, high-rise public housing units have been built in great numbers.
>
> Ten years ago, tired of flooding, I was looking for somewhere else to live. Today I even feel pride in being a resident of Koto ward.
>
> From now on, I want to work for the construction of an even better society, in support of the Komeito legislators.
>
> Mrs. Takayasu Mutsuko, housewife.[28]

> The last day of the school term ended and the children came racing home. "Mama, tomorrow we can go swimming in the new pool!"
>
> This school pool is one example of the fruition of the "pool in every elementary school" policy emphasized by the Komeito in the ward assembly. The pool was opened smoothly on the 19th; just as summer vacation begins the children can use it.
>
> Here in the Nishi-Sugamo area the traffic problem is terrific and the houses are packed in tightly; until three years ago, when, through the efforts of the Komeito, a playground was opened at the school, there wasn't a single place for the children to play. For this reason, when summer used to come parents would worry themselves sick trying to figure how to keep their children occupied through the month-long summer vacation.
>
> This year, when I think how I can let my children play without any worries, my heart is full of joy.
>
> Mrs. Yasui Kiyo, housewife, 46.[29]

> The other day Mr. Y, who was elected to the city assembly in the April local elections, visited our home. "In thanks for the support of all of you, isn't there anything that you want from the city government [which I can try to obtain]?" he said. In contrast to assemblymen from other parties, who bob their heads [concernedly] until elected, whereupon they cease to think of us at all, I was deeply impressed by this amazing sincerity.
>
> Quickly, we asked him that the bridge near our house, which was narrow and had been the scene of many auto accidents, be widened. Before a month had passed we heard the happy news that an appropriation had been made. Isn't this the style of the true legislator, jumping in himself with the intent to listen to even the smallest voice of the people?
>
> Mrs. Toyama Junko, housewife, 24.[30]

B. Extra-Parliamentary Operations

Outside of the legislative arena the Komeito's activities show no such left-right vacillation as is visible in its parliamentary practices. The focus of extraparliamentary activity is microcosmic; its two primary aspects are livelihood discussion and investigatory action. The system of Citizens' Discussion Centers (*Shi*-[*Ku*-, *Cho*-, *Son*-]*min Sodansho*) was established after the local elections of 1963, with centers in every locale where the Komeikai held assembly seats. Each center offers free legal aid, but the primary function is political: the gathering of complaints and demands which are of immediate concern to the citizenry. The Komeito describes the system as a "warm hand stretched out to those people discarded by politics" and the centers probably do provide an otherwise unavailable opportunity for the articulation of grievances.[31]

The Komeito's strategy is to take these popular appeals to the relevant public offices or, if necessary, to introduce them in local assemblies.[32] The party adjures its members to maximize local awareness of the existence of the centers and always to inform those with grievances of the final disposition of their cases.[33]

Just how many of the cases heard are successfully settled is unclear; in 1964, of 2084 cases heard by centers in Tokyo, the Komeikai claimed 1875 resolved.[34] Year by year the volume of cases has increased, from a nationwide total of 131,908 cases in 1963 to 178,712 in 1964; 215,362 in 1965; and 238,628 in 1966, by which time the total number of centers throughout the nation was 7,200.[35] A breakdown of the 10,866 cases heard by centers in seven urban areas in July 1967 shows the following pattern of popular complaints:[36]

Social security:	22	percent	of	cases	heard.
Housing:	20	"	"	"	"
Sanitation and general environmental healthfulness:	15	"	"	"	"
Other:	12	"	"	"	"
Roads and traffic:	9	"	"	"	"
Livelihood and welfare:	8	"	"	"	"
Education:	7	"	"	"	"
Medical:	4	"	"	"	"
Taxes:	3	"	"	"	"
Total:	100	".			

In 1966 the Tokyo metropolitan government opened a number of Citizens' Discussion Rooms (Tomin Sodan-shitsu) throughout the city for the same purpose as the Komeito's Discussion Centers; it is impossible to assess the relative success of these two systems, but it is clear that the Komeito is the only political party with a well-developed, functionally specific structure designed to tap public opinion at its discontented source and is thus in a position to steal a march on the other parties with policies likely to meet with popular approval.[37]

Intimately tied to the Discussion Center system are the Komeito's extraparliamentary investigative operations. The Discussion Centers provide the party with current rumors of political irregularities; effective performance of a muckraking role in the legislature necessitates, in the Komeito's opinion, thorough investigation, and the party can give information obtained through personal research by its members to support its allegations.

The investigatory actions of Komeito members provide still another opportunity to impress upon the electorate the party's image of attentive concern for the welfare of each and every citizen. Face-to-face meetings with citizens and surveys of people in problem areas supplement the data gained from official sources and through the Discussion Centers. The Komeito also takes advantage of natural catastrophes to make itself obvious to the electorate at large; a major earthquake and fire in Niigata City in 1964 and a fire on the island of Oshima in 1965 were closely followed by emergency medical and manpower aid by Komeito members and supporters.[38] A flood in southwestern Japan was acted upon by the party as the following letter to the Komei Shumbun indicates:[39]

> The activities of the Komeito during the recent flood in Imari City were amazing. Upon seeing these men, wearing armbands with "Komeito" written on them in white letters, come racing to the area to exert themselves to the utmost, I felt, sure enough, just as you'd expect, it's the Komeito.
>
> Due to the heavy rain, a muddy deluge some six feet deep had poured through the main streets of the city, which were a sea of mud. Amid these conditions the police, who should have been looking to the security and protection of the people, were engaged throughout in clearing out of their police boxes the water which had flooded into them.
>
> In contrast to this, the activity of Komeito assemblymen and Youth Bureau members was so impressive as to defy description. Going into the muddy flood up to the chest, running about with emergency messages because the telephone lines were down, taking to safety the victims of the disaster amid the deep darkness brought on by electrical failure and, in the morning, distributing food prepared by themselves while ignoring their own empty stomachs--this was the behavior of the Komeito. I clearly saw with my own eyes the true activist style of the Komeito.
>
> My neighbors, too, were deeply impressed: "The Komeito assemblymen carry out their campaign promise to tie politics to the people right on the spot, don't they?"
>
> Saito Matsuo, restaurant employee, 52.

A final form of extra-parliamentary political action which has a long history and at times considerable social sanction in Japan is direct action such as demonstration, riot, and assassination.[40] Although individual Sokagakkai members have on numerous occasions broken the laws regulating political expression, neither the Gakkai nor its political organs has ever officially espoused direct action of an extreme type or engaged in any demonstrations. On occasion Gakkai leaders have threatened mass action, especially in reference to constitutional revision and to proposals for a small-constituency electoral system. Of the constitutional problem Ikeda stated:

> I hope that the time will never come when the Sokagakkai and the Komeito must really rise up. But /if/ the national authorities intervene in the party and the Gakkai /by/ maleficently revising the constitution, we will throw our total organization into the struggle.[41]

Regarding the adoption of a single-member electoral system--a much more plausible development--Gakkai leaders are more explicit. Hojo Hiroshi in an interview described the Komeito's strategy as one of first seeking to prevent such a proposal from ever reaching the Diet; failing this, the party would attempt to kill such a bill in committee; if the government still tried to push it through it would be "inevitable" that the party would take to the streets:

> We have never as yet resorted to ultimate measures. But if a situation arises wherein, in order to obstruct the advance of the Sokagakkai or the Komeito, they /the government/ seriously try to push through a small-constituency system by force, what then? Shall we not resort to ultimate measures and, calling forth a brilliant and unprecedentedly great mass movement and giant demonstrations, put an end to it?[42]

The intent here is clear, but the term "demonstration" is not. In Japan, the term covers everything from orderly parades of banner-carrying unionists making a symbolic call for American disengagement in Vietnam to ranks of helmeted left-wing students, armed with staves, bombarding the police with paving stones. Several of the manifestations of political action which may be subsumed under the heading "demonstration" are in no way incompatible with the stable functioning of democratic systems; the Gakkai never specifies what forms of action it might take and, lacking any record of direct action, one cannot justifiably assume that organized extra-parliamentary protest would take a violent or excessively disruptive form.*

The one example of Komeito extra-parliamentary action which could be called "direct," and which the party described as "mass action," was a series of lecture meetings held in the city of Sasebo on the occasion of the visit to that seaport of the American nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Enterprise in January 1968.[43] The lectures, which drew some 18,000 persons to six locations, were called by the Komeito in protest against (a) the assumed transportation of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory by the carrier, (b) the increased possibility of Japanese complicity in the Vietnam war due to the visit by a warship on active duty, and (c) the rightward tendencies of the Sato government demonstrated by its approval of the visit. Although some observers described the meetings as "demonstrations," the Seikyo Shimbun emphasized the "stark contrast" between the meetings and the riotous demonstrations of the Communists and the ultra-militant Sampa Rengo faction of Zengakuren. A Komeito press release described the lectures as "an orderly, systematic and peaceful gathering of protest," and pictures of the meetings carried in newspapers indicate that this description was accurate.

In fact, the "Mass Meetings to Protest in Opposition to the Visit of the *Enterprise* (*Entapuraizu Kiko Hantai Kogi Dai-shukai*)" resembled the Current Events Lecture Meetings (*Jikyoku Koen-kai*) often held by the Komeito than they did any "demonstration," except for the fact that they were held outdoors. These lecture meetings are held at odd (but frequent) times and places and are led by top Komeito leaders who give topical speeches on current issues and Komeito policies and activities. They complete the picture of the Komeito's extra-parliamentary activities: person-to-person, constant, locally-oriented, diligent, conscientious, and in no way evocative of extremist images.

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*I say "excessively" because in an urban setting even the most orderly large-scale demonstrations must disrupt ordinary pedestrian and traffic patterns.

C. *Komeito Objectives*

Despite its ceaseless exertions both in and out of parliament, the Komeito sees the world as little better off today than it was when the party was established. Japanese politics still lack a coherent spiritual basis and as a result the political arena is still a haven for hypocrites, mercenaries, and glory-seekers from which the interests of the people are excluded; the social environment is deteriorating; and the lack of a valid philosophical framework for the educational system leads to ever-increasing dissoluteness and crime among youth.[44]

In such a situation the Komeito must redouble its efforts and work toward a commanding position in the political system. In the short run, the party's goals are presented in terms of additional legislative seats won: the

13 victorious candidates in the 1968 Upper House election brought the Komeito's seats there to a total of 25; in the next general election the party intends to put up seventy-five candidates and soon after that the goal is to run candidates in every electoral contest.[45] Within the next seven years the Komeito aims to control the casting vote in both houses of the National Diet and in legislative assemblies all over the nation.[46]

As regards long-range plans the Komeito emphasizes that the welfare and reform goals it pursues can achieve a large measure of success even while the Komeito is a minority party. According to Hojo Hiroshi:

> I don't think it is so vital for us to become the ruling party in order to attain our purpose. . . .
>
> Our main target is to clean up corrupt politics, to make Japanese politics as it ought to be, and so make Japan a stable and reliable force in Asia for achieving world peace. . . .
>
> The Komeito today is a relatively small party. . . . Even if we want to be the ruling party, we cannot be unless we have the support of more voters. But by and by, as the people acknowledge how we are working for the Japanese nation, they will decide for themselves.
>
> To take power is not our purpose, but rather to sweep away corruption and establish a public-welfare society. If the Japanese people favor this course, however, the Komeito might become the ruling party. . . .
>
> Of course, . . . any party aims at becoming the majority party someday.[47]

As Hojo's concluding sentences indicate, the Komeito's ultimate organizational objective is political power. When the party was established a 14-year schedule of preparatory steps leading to this goal was announced:[48]

1965-1969: Achieve a total of 100 seats in both houses of the Diet; stress democratization of local government; build mass organizations under the Komeito.

1969-1973: Achieve 150 Diet seats; stress treaty and constitutional problems.

1973-1977: Achieve 200-230 Diet seats; win local administrative posts; complete the separation of the Sokagakkai and Komeito.

1978 (before takeover): With a basis of five million party members and 32 million Sokagakkai members (in 16 million families), achieve 350-400 Diet seats and establish a shadow cabinet.

In early 1967 President Ikeda was quoted as saying that the political goals had been pushed back: "Our tentative aim is to win power in twenty years;" within ten years the Komeito will try to become the number three party and

> during that period, if it will serve the peace and stability of the masses, we might form a coalition with whatever group is in power, either renovationist /leftist/ or conservative.[49]

At the July 4, 1967, Extraordinary Party Convention, however, Chairman Takeiri presented a more optimistic schedule whereby the Komeito would become the number two party in ten years with 140 seats in the Lower House and 70 in the Upper, 350 seats in prefectural assemblies, 3000 seats in city and ward assemblies, and 2000 in town and village assemblies.[50]

* * * * * *

In their evaluations of the Komeito most Japanese observers go to considerable lengths in their attempts to pin the party and the Sokagakkai somewhere on a left-right political continuum. As philosophy and policy, in intra- and extra-parliamentary action make clear, this is no simple task. The Gakkai criticizes everyone equally, but only partially; thus previous positions do not prevent the adoption of new, radically different ones. The Gakkai itself insists that the right-left distinction is a meaningless one in an age when "left" and "right" have become obsolete concepts; the Komeito acts at all times in accordance with the dictates of its philosophy and whether its actions on a given issue parallel the stand of another political party is immaterial.

The right-left dichotomy is indeed of little use in analyzing the Sokagakkai; the same oppositionist tendency appears leftist as manifest in the National Diet and conservative as manifest in the Tokyo Assembly. Opposition to the visit of the *Enterprise*, to the Vietnam war, and to American control of Okinawa may be interpreted as leftist; however, survey data suggest that such stands are very much in the ever more nationally self-assertive mainstream of Japanese popular opinion, which could conceivably be termed rightist. It is this very congruence with Japanese public opinion which leads to the real significance of the Sokagakkai for the Japanese polity, that is, its relevance for a democratic political system.

The oppositionist trend in Komeito behavior is calculated to win votes away from the major parties, with which an increasing part of the electorate apparently feel dissatisfied. Thus one suspects at times that such opposition (*vide* the veto of Minobe's nominees for lieutenant-governor) is not so principled as the Komeito would have one believe. Similarly, the nationally self-assertive trend in party behavior, insofar as it enables the Komeito to keep abreast of popular feelings, will probably benefit the party electorally. The danger here is that the party may become a victim of vacillating public opinion: if in the attempt to mirror exactly the desires of the masses the Komeito loses its integrity it could degenerate into a demogogic expositor of popular passions.

In addition, certain informal characteristics of the Sokagakkai and its membership, both social and political, seem from the outside to be potentially harmful to a democratic system such as Japan's. The most probable of these potentialities, when inferred from the sociological composition of the membership and its cross-national parallels and from the belief system of the Gakkai, seem to be those associated with the extremist form of political expression defined in the introduction to this study as "mass politics." Thus a moderate-extremist continuum is much more useful than a right-left spectrum in specifying the political significance of the Sokagakkai, and superficial examination of organization and membership suggests that the best mode of determining the position of the Sokagakkai on such a continuum is to examine the Society as an entity and its members as a social collectivity through the models of mass movement and mass man.

NOTES: CHAPTER 12

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2. *Asahi Shimbun*, February 6, 1967.

3. Ikeda Daisaku, "Komeito e no Gimon ni Kotaeru," in *Jiyu*, no. 90, May 1967, pp. 81, 82.

4. Murakami Shigeyoshi, *Sokagakkai to Komeito*, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 143ff.

5. *Loc. cit.*

6. Takase Hiroi, *Komeito*, Tokyo, 1964, p. 62.

7. James Dator, "The Soka Gakkai in Japanese Politics," in *A Journal of Church and State*, vol. 9 no. 2, spring 1967, p. 223.

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10. Asahi Shimbun, July 17, 1968.

11. *Japan Times*, January 26, 1967.

12. *Asahi Shimbun*, February 21, 22, 1967; *Japan Times*, April 9, 21, 1967.

13. *Japan Times*, April 16, 1967.

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17. *Komei Shimbun*, August 9, 1967.

18. *Asahi Shimbun*, March 23, 25, 1967; *Japan Times*, March 26, 1967; *Seikyo Shimbun*, July 25, 1967; *Komei Shimbun*, January 30, 1968.

19. *Komei Shimbun*, August 9, 1967.

20. *Loc. cit*.

21. Murakami Shigeyoshi, "Komeito no Seiji Kodo," in *Sekai*, no. 233, May 1965, p. 167.

22. *Loc. cit*.

23. Sugahara Yoshinaga, "Komeito no Ronri to Kodo," in *Gekkan Rodo Mondai*, no. 91, December 1965, p. 60; "Komeito: Iincho Kotaigeki to kore kara no Dekata," in *Shukan Yomiuri*, February 17, 1967, p. 15.

24. *Japan Times*, May 11, 1967; *Asahi Shimbun*, April 26, 1967: *Seikyo Shimbun*, May 11, 1967; *Komei Shimbun*, May 12, 1967.

25. *Japan Times*, May 11, 1967.

26. Komeito Kikanshi-kyoku, *Shiawase Kizuku Komeito*, Tokyo, October 1966, pass.

27. Togawa Isamu, *Zenshin-suru Komeito*, Tokyo, 1966, pp. 183ff.

28. *Komei Shimbun*, June 7, 1967.

29. *Komei Shimbun*, July 23, 1967.

30. *Komei Shimbun*, June 30, 1967.

31. *Komei Shimbun*, August 17, 1967.

32. Takase, *op. cit*., pp. 44-45.

33. *Komei Shimbun*, August 17, 1967.

34. Takase, *op. cit*., pp. 44-45.

35. *Seikyo Shimbun*, September 2, 1967.

36. *Loc. cit*.

37. *Asahi Shimbun*, February 18, 1967, "Tomin no O-shirase" insert.

38. Togawa, *op. cit*., pp. 193-95; Komeito Kikanshi-kyoku, *op. cit*.

39. *Komei Shimbun*, July 25, 1967.

40. For an account of the direct action tradition as manifested in the 1930's see Hugh Byas, Government By Assassination, New York, 1942. For earlier manifestations see Marius Jansen, Sakamoto Ryoma and the Meiji Restoration, Princeton, 1961, part III.

41. Takase, *op. cit.*, p. 268.

42. Interview with Hojo Hiroshi, General Executive, Sokagakkai; Sugahara, *op. cit.*, passim.

43. *Komei Shimbun*, January 19, 20, 23, 27, 1968; Komeito press release, January 26, 1968.

44. Komeito press release, July 3, 1967.

45. *Seikyo Shimbun*, May 4, 1967; *Asahi Shimbun*, February 3, 1967; *Japan Times International Edition*, August 10, 1968.

46. *Seikyo Shimbun*, May 4, 1967.

47. *Christian Science Monitor*, May 3, 1966.

48. Takase, *op. cit.*, pp. 290-91.

49. *New York Times*, February 1, 1967.

50. *Komei Shimbun*, July 4, 1967.

BOOK TWO

PART IV. THE SOKAGAKKAI MEMBER AS MASS MAN

INTRODUCTION

As has been shown, a prima facie case justifying the comparison of the Sakagakkai to a mass movement of the Kornhauserian type may be made through a comparative examination of the social composition of the Gakkai. In this and the following sections a more systematic application of the models of "mass man" and "mass movement" to the Society both as a social collectivity and as an official, organizational entity, will be attempted.

The reiteration of a few important definitions is warranted at this point. "Mass man" is that individual ideal type who is neither attached to his social context by objective membership in social groups nor by subjective feelings of belonging to the larger society or its parts. He is alienated at the same time from himself as a being or as a social actor, from mankind in general, and from the particular social and political environments within which he exists. Thus he is in two ways available for mobilization by movements aiming at subversion of the existing political or social system. And he is prone to "mass behavior," characterized by instability--a vacillation between apathy and intense activity--by a remoteness of focus; and by direct, unmediated, activist modes of response to these remote foci. When such behavior is politically relevant, it is "mass politics:" direct and unmediated (either by social norms or explicit legal regulations) action in contravention of sanctioned patterns of political expression.

This broad model of mass man has been operationally elaborated as follows:

1. The position in and connection to society of the mass man is characterized by unattachment: it is hypothesized that he will have (a) fewer ties to social groups, especially those of a secondary nature, than his fellows; (b) fewer sources of information from and less information about his environment than other members of his society; and (c) a lower sense of identity with other social groupings (such as socioeconomic classes) within his society than other members of that society.

2. The psychological patterns of mass man are characterized by alienation: he is alienated from himself, as evidenced by (a) his relatively high sense of personal powerlessness and impotence and perception of the futility of all of his actions. Derived from this sense of powerlessness and impotence is disrespect for his own intellectual capability, manifest in (b) a predilection for simplistic solutions and explanations and in (c) a generalized mistrust of rational intellectual processes. This feature is also the

result of the strained social situation of mass man: he is concerned not with rationality or truth but only with those solutions which create some element of order in the universe.[1] A fourth, potential characteristic of the self-alienated mass man is (d) the syndrome of psychological attributes known as the "authoritarian personality."[2] The members of the Sokagakkai are here examined in terms of the model of mass man; however, the distinguishing feature of totalitarian man, as defined by Kornhauser, is this authoritarian personality, which has been measured with such instruments as the F-Scale test.[3] This test purports to measure the distinctive psychological characteristics of fascism, as radically ultra-conservative, authoritarian political ideology; considering the frequency with which the Sokagakkai has been described as fascist, it is advisable to test for this additional factor. The test as made here has two steps; first, to see if Gakkai members are even markedly conservative (traditionalism or social conservatism in Japan having considerable relevance for Western-Style parliamentary democracy); and second, to determine the extent to which Gakkai members approximate the psychological model of totalitarian man as measured by Adorno's California F-Scale test.

Mass man is also alienated from his fellow men. He is (a) relatively less trusting of people in general; those relationships which he does have are (b) highly partisan and exclusive, accentuating the general context of distrust within which they exist. In addition, although mass man does not have any deep sense of identity with, e.g., the socioeconomic class of which he is objectively a member, he is aware of his deprivations to the extent that he feels (c) a relatively high degree of envy and enmity toward those he senses are better off.

The alienation of mass man from the social, economic, and political systems within which he exists is both specific and general. He feels (a) a relatively high sense of frustration and unfulfilled expectation concerning the manner in which he is treated by "the system;" that is, the outputs of the system as they affect him are not seen as justly beneficial. In a more diffuse way, mass man also (b) feels relatively less commitment to both the spirit and institutions of society, economy, and polity. In the specific case of Japan, such relative lack of commitment is most significantly determined as it is relevant to the "democratic formula" necessary to the stable functioning of Japan's (or any other) democratic political system.[4]

3. The actions of mass man are characterized by mass behavior. He is (a) relatively apathetic concerning community, polity, and society; when he does act, it is (b) in the direction of remote--for instance, utopian--goals and is (c) direct, that is, unmediated by social norms, rules, or relationships.

That the social, psychological, and behavioral characteristics of mass man--especially the behavioral--are of potential or immediate relevance to the stable functioning of democratic political systems is seem upon redefinition of "democracy" as it is conceived in this paper: democracy is

> a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials, and a social mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office.
>
> This definition . . . implies a number of specific conditions: (1) a 'political formula' or body of beliefs specifying which institutions--political parties, a free press, and so forth--are legitimate (accepted as proper by all); (2) one set of political leaders in office; and (3) one or more sets of recognized leaders attempting to gain office.[5]

The rather fuzzy concept of democratic "political formula" has been subjected to operational definition and test by James Prothro and Charles Grigg; the three features of the "formula" as used by them are (a) acceptance of democracy (undefined) as the best form of government; and acceptance of the principles of (b) majority rule and (c) minority rights.[6] According to this operational definition, mass man should be relatively less accepting of either the shibboleth of democracy or of its two norms, majority rule and minority rights.

It will be noticed that throughout the presentation of the hypothetical characteristics of mass man the term "relative" has been used. It should be borne in mind that "massness," whether of societies or individuals, is a matter of approximation to an ideal type. There is no exact social or psychological threshold beyond which an individual may be declared to be a mass man. There is, however, a behavioral threshold for the political relevance of mass men and movements. Once unattachment and alienation become manifest in direct-actionist political behavior one may conclude that, in terms of threat to a stable democratic polity, the individual or organization in question may be considered congruent with the model of mass man or movement.

* * * * * *

The particular operationalization of Kornhauser's model of mass man used here, utilizing Lipset's definition of democracy and Prothro and Grigg's elaboration of Lipset, was in large degree influenced by the data available for a study of this type. There are perhaps better indices of "massness" than those used here; however, with limited resources these are the best possible. They have been largely exerpted from attitude and opinion surveys carried out in Japan which have included within their samples groups of Sokagakkai members.[7] In some cases local samples of Gakkai members only have been used. Since, according to the Sokagakkai itself, there is no comprehensive list of the membership in existence, any effort to construct a valid nationwide or even local sample of sufficient size to enable authoritative conclusions regarding the attitudes of the whole membership would require an enormous--and enormously expensive--pretest simply for the purpose of locating a sufficient number of Sokagakkai members.

Due to the infeasibility of such a pretest, over two dozen surveys with various political and sociological foci were collected. Supplementing the surveys were clinical data from several sources[8] and a great number of less structured interviews and conversations with Gakkai members on various levels of the organization.

The resultant data, when tested against the model, still do not permit firm conclusions regarding the attitudinal makeup of the membership of the Sokagakkai either in the social collectivity or in individual cases. It will be noted, however, that in many instances data from several surveys are mutually reinforcing in their implications. Where such is the case tentative conclusions will be drawn with the aid of more intensive interview data and personal intuition. Regardless of the drawbacks inherent in the use of individually insufficient samples, it may be unequivocally stated that the data assembled here constitute unquestionably the broadest empirical base used in a study of the Sokagakkai to date.

In addition to questions of data-gathering there are two caveats which must be offered here. First is the problem of the adequacy of survey data. Opinion surveys, and even psychological tests, tap only orientations of various kinds. These orientations are potential; they may never have a determining influence upon the behavior of the person in question and may be in fact wholly irrelevant to his political role. And they are relative; they suggest the relative proximity of individuals to the model of mass man but do not explicitly indicate precise political significance. For these reasons the behavioral aspect of the model of mass man is assumed here to be of special importance; if mass man is to have the political relevance which Kornhauser says he does then there must be either an absolute empirical record of direct action or the absolutely clear potential for such action. To designate a group as a "mass movement" on Kornhauser's model is in fact to condemn it as a maleficent influence upon the democratic polity and to imply a recommendation of repressive measures; the author places the burden of proof upon the model, not the object of study--the Sokagakkai benefits Japanese society and polity in numerous ways and therefore should not be termed a mass movement until proven so, and a weak inference of potential for mass political behavior is insufficient proof.

The particular data used here require additional caution. Many of the samples of "Gakkai members" were obtained through questions concerning political party support. The paucity of non-Gakkai members who vocally support the Komeito justifies considering all Komeito supporters as Sokagakkai members; however, Komeito supporters probably constitute a minority in the membership of the Gakkai--a politicized, vocally mobilized, and probably relatively highly committed group. Where different samples are used the criterion of their selection will be noted.

If behavior is crucial, one might ask, why bother with the attitudes of all Gakkai members, when only the actives really matter? One should note that the most apathetic elements of the Sokagakkai membership, including apostates, do not appear in samples the distinguishing feature of which is at a minimum a verbalized profession of faith. It is assumed that any believer willing to admit his faith could, under certain circumstances, be mobilized behaviorally toward Gakkai goals; thus his attitudes are relevant to a full understanding of the political behavioral potential of the Sakagakkai.

The second caveat concerns the utility of religious belief as a variable in the study of politics in Japan. In a 1963 nationwide survey the most significant factors as regards influence upon responses to attitudinal questions were education, age, occupation, sex, place of residence (by geographical area), political party support, place of residence (urban or rural), and interest in elections, in descending order of importance.[9] The impact of religious faith was negligible. More specifically, in contrast to the positive relationship discerned by Lipset and others between religious belief and intolerance in the West, a Japanese survey of 1958 gave the following results:[10]

	Statement: "All religions are really the same:			N
Respondents who:	Agree	Disagree	NA, DK	
Believe in some religion:	74%	11%	15%	320
Do not believe in religion				
(a) but do consider a "religious spirit" important:	70	13	17	425
(b) and do not consider a "religious spirit" important:	50	21	29	103

The implication of these two data is clear: not only is religious faith likely to prove to be a relatively unimportant factor in the total pattern of orientations and attitudes among Japanese, but a more specific aspect of religious belief particularly relevant to this study is apparently contradicted by Japanese data. One might therefore conclude that whether or not one believes in Nichiren Shoshu is irrelevant to his social or political opinions and behavior. The assumption made here, however, is that in the case of the Sokagakkai at least religious faith can have important implications for other aspects of one's psychological and behavioral totality. If this is true, then the significance of the Gakkai, as a faith which in several respects already constitutes an exception to the general pattern or religion in Japan, is increased.

NOTES: INTRODUCTION

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2. T. W. Adorno, *et al.*, *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York, 1950, *passim*.

3. Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, p. 111.

4. James Prothro and C. W. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," in *Journal of Politics*, vol. 22, spring 1960, p. 276ff.

5. S. M. Lipset, *Political Man*, Garden City, 1963, p. 27.

6. Prothro and Grigg, *op. cit.*, pp. 276ff.

7. The national surveys used in this study include those by the *Mainichi Shimbun* of September 1963 (N /of entire survey/ = 2836 persons, Nsg /N of Sokagakkai-member or Komeito-supporter sub-sample/ = 86), November 1964 (N=2954, Nsg=59), June 1965 (N=2832, Nsg=114), May 1966 (N=2902, Nsg=94), and September 1966 (N=4844, Nsg=139); surveys by the *Yomiuri Shimbun* of March 1966 (=2565, Nsg=70) and January 1967 (N=1765, Nsg=55); the third National Character survey conducted by the Tokey Suri Kenkyu-jo in 1963 (N=2698, Ngs=94, covered in Suetsuna Joichi, *Nihonjin no Kokuminsei*, Tokyo, 1961; Hayashi Chikio, *Zusetsu: Nihonjin no Kokuminsei*, Tokyo, 1965; Tokei Suri Kenkyu-jo, *Kokuminsei no Kenkyu: Dai Sanji Chosa*, Tokyo, 1964; Suzuki Tatsuzo, "A Study of the Japanese National Character, Part III," in Annals of *the Institute of Statistical Mathematics*, supplement 4, 1966, p. 15; the February 1965 Japanese government survey of popular attitudes regarding the Constitution (N=15,863, Nsg=349), also covered in Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanbo Kohoshitsu, *Kenpo ni kansuru Seron Chosa (1-10)*, Tokyo, August 1966; various surveys by the Asahi Shimbunsha published in the *Asahi Shimbun* and the *Asahi Janaru*, esp. *Asahi Janaru*, vol. 9 no. 10, March 5, 1967, pp. 10ff. (N and Nsg unknown); a survey by the Chuo Chosa Sha (N=1678, Nsg=?) covered in "Voting Characteristics Revealed in Pre-Election Opinion Poll--House of Councillors Elections, July 1965," Tokyo, United States Information Service, 1965; a survey on attitudes toward the constitution (N=c.5000, Nsg=c.135) covered by Kobayashi Naoki in his "Seito Shiji-so ni miru Kenpo

Ishiki," in *Gendai no Me*, vol. 8 no. 10, October 1967, p. 134; a 1966 survey by Sidney Verba et al. (N=2657, Nsg=108) as part of his Cross-National Study of Political and Social Change; and a survey by the Japan Broadcasting Association (N=3632, Nsg=120) covered in NHK Hoso Seron Chosa-sho, *Kokumin Seron Chosa 'Nihon no Mirai-zo:' Kekka no Gaiyo*, Tokyo, 1966.

Local surveys used include those by James Dator (N=978, Nsg=45), covered in the works by that author cited in the bibliography of this essay; Koya Azumi (Nsg=386) covered in that author's works cited in the bibliography; Suzuki Hiroshi (Nsg=268), covered in that author's work; Miss Takahashi Naoko (Nsg=36), a student at Rikkyo University, Tokyo; the Sociology departments of Tokyo University and Tokyo Women's University (N=209, Nsg=23), covered in Tokyo Daigaku Shakaigakka and Tokyo Joshi Daigaku Shakaigakka, *Sokagakkai*, Tokyo, 1963; and the *Yomiuri Shimbun* survey of March 1967 (N=1038, Nsg=65).

Relating to F-Scale usage in Japan, Muramatsu Tsuneo, *Nihonjin*, Nagoya, 1962, provided data (numerous N's in several localities), as did a survey by this author (Nsg=135). Comparisons were facilitated by T. W. Adorno, et al., *op. cit.*; the works of Arthur Coladarci cited in the bibliography of this essay; and the critical essays in Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality,"* Glencoe, 1954.

8. Yamaguchi Akira, *Isseman-nin no Kokoro wo Tsukanda Himitsu: Sokagakkai no Shinri Senryaku*, Tokyo, 1967; Naikaku Kanbo Naikaku Chosa-shitsu, *Shinko Shukyo ni kansuru Shakai-shinrigakuteki Kenkyu*, Tokyo, 1965, (?).

9. Tokei Suri Kenkyu-jo, *op. cit*.

10. Suetsuna, *op. cit*., p. 183.

CHAPTER 13

THE SOKAGAKKAI MEMBER: UNATTACHED?

A. Secondary Relationships

A lack of secondary ties to society is one of the primary features of Kornhauser's mass man: "differences in receptivity to mass symbols and leaders are due primarily to the strength of social ties."[1] One of the five factors in Leo Srole's definition of "anomie," a state of mind combining many of the characteristics of mass man, is lack of supportive relationships; the anomic has no network of relationships which is either predictable, supportive, or reliable.[2] Such relationships are related more directly to the political system by Almond and Verba, who note that the degree to which persons in five nations tend to see themselves as valid political actors and not simply the passive object of political affairs varies with the extent to which they have developed a set of intermediate relationships.[3] Samuel Stouffer is more explicit: social contacts which "put a person in touch with people whose ideas and values are different from one's own. . . . [are] a necessary, though not the only, condition for tolerance of a free marketplace for ideas."[4]

This theoretical connection between social unatachment and massness (and thus susceptibility to mass movements) is corroborated by empirical example. Kornhauser demonstrates the affinity of those social elements and persons lacking ties to the larger society for mass movements: Communists in France, Italy, Russia, Canada, and England; Poujadists in France; Nazis in Germany; all of these movements drew disproportionately large numbers of people from the relatively unattached segments of society.[5] America's Moral Rearmament movement attracted numerous persons of this type, people who wanted to improve their condition, interpret their misfortunes, and justify their positions without involvement in extant ideologies or institutions and without collective action.[6] Extremists may not necessarily be unattached; Wolfinger et al's study of meeting-going supporters of the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade indicates that extremists need not be "social isolates" as regards group memberships or participation in community or other non-political activities.[7] These Crusaders, by the fact of their attendance at a meeting, represent a relatively activist element in the organization. Therefore the example does not refute the previous assertion that the followers of mass movements tend to be relatively unattached to society; however, it does alert one to the possibility that activists in mass movements may differ from the rank-and-file as regards their location in and connections to society.

The inclination to join groups appears to vary culturally and demographically. Almond and Verba found that the proportion of respondents who were members of some secondary voluntary association varied from a high of 57 percent in the United States through 47 percent in England, 44 percent in Germany, and 29 percent in Italy to a low of 25 percent in Mexico. In every case men were more active (in terms of simple membership) than women; the tendency to have a net of secondary ties and the extent of this net also varied directly with education.[8] A survey of 1966 indicates that the Japanese are very prone to join secondary groups: 75 percent of the respondents professed membership in at least one such group.[9] Demographic variations parallel the Almond and Verba data.

The Sokagakkai membership is composed primarily of those social elements least likely to be members of secondary groups; if a large proportion of the membership approximates the model of mass man then one may expect these persons to be the relatively less participant of these social elements. According to survey data, such is not the case. In one Tokyo University study, Sokagakkai members in the sample averaged 1.83 organizational relationships apiece, as opposed to 1.86 per respondent for non-Gakkai members.[10] Of course, membership in the Gakkai constitutes one such relationship for each Society member; however, while 48 percent of the secondary relationships reported by non-Gakkai members were with local neighborhood organizations, 36 percent of the relationships reported by Gakkai members were also. Such organizations are not Gakkai affiliated; thus one should not conclude either that Sokagakkai members do not have secondary ties or that these ties are restricted to Gakkai-related associations.

Data on office-holding experience corroborate the impression that Gakkai members are not unattached: 9.3 percent of a large sample of Komeito supporters reported such experience (in, e.g., local or neighborhood governmental or unofficial bodies and unions), as opposed to 3.1 percent of the total national sample.[11] Again, all of the associations included in this question were secular.

Since admitted members of the Sokagakkai are _ipso facto_ attached to some secondary group, the degree to which secondary relationships are restricted to Gakkai-related groups is important, especially in light of the pluralist assertion that a network of cross-cutting intermediate relationships is a more stable foundation for democratic systems than is a multiplicity of mutually exclusive social groups. As indicated above, Gakkai members do not appear to be related exclusively to the Society and its front groups. In the Tokyo University study cited above, Sokagakkai members, while much more active (in terms of attendance) in their overall networks of secondary relationships, were at the same time almost as active as non-members in the non-religious associations to which they belonged.[12] Another survey suggests a similar non-exclusivity; of a sample of Gakkai members, 31 percent reported belonging to other groups besides the Society.[13]

This figure is more significant when one notes that only 58 percent of the sample described themselves as participating members of the Sokagakkai. The survey did suggest, however, that the degree of exclusivity of the relationship with the Gakkai increases with time: a possible positive correlation exists between length of membership and likelihood that one's only secondary relationships will be with religious organizations.

Exclusivity can be indicated also in terms of reference groups--those persons to whom one turns in time of trouble. Two surveys (see Fig. 1) suggest a pattern already noted: Sokagakkai members tend to see the Society as their primary reference group; this primacy is not, however, of such magnitude that one may speak of isolation from or unattachment to society, although in the case of activist members such isolation and unattachment may be closely approximated.

Figure 1a.

Person/s sought when troubled with human problems:	All Gakkai members		By degree of activism (in terms of extent of participation)						
			Attend all activities		Participate on occasion		Don't participate much		
Gakkai leaders or seniors:	41.9%	61.3	75%	87.5	55.6%	77.8	14.3%	35.7	
Groups of believers, at Gakkai meetings:	6.5		---		11.1		7.1		
The Gohonzon (individual worship):	12.9		12.5		11.1		14.3		
Family, relative/s:	6.5	16.2	---		---		14.3	35.7	64.3%
Friend/s:	6.5		---		---		14.9		
Other:	3.2		---		---		6.5		
No one in particular:	22.6		12.5		22.2		28.6		
Totals:	100.1%		100. %		100. %		100. %		

(Source: Naikaku Kanbo Naikaku Chosa-shitsu, Shinko Shukyo ni Kansuru Shakai-shinrigakuteki Kenkyu, Tokyo, 1965 (?), p. 60.)

Figure 1b.

One's most intimate friend is:	Gakkai leaders	Non-leader members
in the Sokagakkai:	94.56	45.16%
not in the Sokagakkai:	3.36	45.76
Can't really say:	2.17	2.26
Other, NA, DK:	---	6.82
Total:	100.09%	100. %

(Source: Suzuki Hiroshi in Shakaigaku Kenkyu, no. 24, 1964, pp. 83-84.)

Other surveys indicate the same pattern of social attachments;[14] one cannot conclude that Sokagakkai members are unattached to society by virtue of either an absolute lack of secondary relationships or a single, exclusive relationship with the Gakkai. In fact, a further hint that Gakkai members do not consider the Society to be their sole reference group is contained in the data from one survey in which 24 percent of the Gakkai members questioned indicated that they felt only moderately compatible with other Gakkai members; another 38 percent stated that they felt "uncomfortable" with other Gakkai members.[15] Even among leaders, 39 percent chose "moderately compatible" or "uneasy" to describe their relations with other believers.

B. Sources of Information

One important factor in the detachment of persons from their social environment is the restriction of communication; moreover, such a restriction is a primary element in the mobilization of large numbers of people by mass movements: "the force possessed by totalitarian propaganda . . . lies in its ability to shut the masses off from the real world."[16] Lack of sources of information about the world is a characteristic of mass man; mass man organized, i.e., the member of a mass movement, may be expected to limit his communications from society exclusively to those reaching him through the channels of the mass movement due to the partisan nature of his relationship with the movement and the continuing distrust of society as a whole which he feels.

The sources of information utilized by members of the Sokagakkai are of such a variety, one suspects, that the membership as a whole cannot be described as isolated from or unattached to the larger social environment. A small, local survey indicates that somewhat over one half of the members obtain their information about elections through media which are or may be connected with the Gakkai; this tendency seems to increase in proportion to length of membership, with almost all respondents of over six years' membership reporting reception of political information through "religious organizations(s)."[17] For the membership as a whole, however, although Gakkai-related media are primary, isolation does not appear to be the case.

Regarding sources of general information, again, widespread focus on Gakkai media combines with non-isolation, and even with much apathy toward Gakkai communication channels. In a survey in Fukuoka City, only 20% of a sample of Sokagakkai members restricted their newspaper reading to the Seikyo Shimbun, although an additional 53 percent read the Seikyo in conjunction with some other newspaper.[18] A study by the Mainichi Shimbun indicated that 54% of Komeito supporters were readers of at least one of the nation's 8 leading newspapers (the lowest proportion of any party's followers and ten percentage points below the national average); this situation may be explainable partly as a function of education, however, since only 56% of those in the total sample with nine or less years of schooling claimed to be readers of at least one of the eight newspapers.[19]

Regarding magazines, a slightly larger number of Gakkai members apparently limit their reading to Society media: 38% of the sample in the Fukuoka survey. However, 53% reported not reading any Gakkai-related magazines at all.[20] Moreover, fully half of the Gakkai members admitted to never having read any of four of the Society's classics (Shakubuku Kyoten, Ningen Kakumei, Nichiren Shoshu-Sokagakkai, and Kachiron), while only 6% claimed to have read all of them.[21] In all instances, however--newspapers, magazines, and classics--leaders and those with longer periods of membership showed a marked tendency toward closure of secular communications links with society: whereas only 35% of the rank-and-file were buyers and readers of religious magazines, 80% of the office-holders were.[22]

C. Class Identity

Emil Lederer cites as one characteristic of "the mass" an unawareness of membership in social classes; Kornhauser defines "masses" in part as "people who are not integrated into any broad social groupings, including classes."[23] Data on class consciousness of Sokagakkai members is insufficient to allow any but the most tentative suspicions; it has been asserted that Gakkai members are relatively weak in such consciousness in the militant unionist sense of the term: despite the preponderance of workers in the employed part of the Gakkai membership, one survey indicated that the followers of the Komeito were less favorably disposed toward strikes than the supporters of any party except the Liberal Democrats.[24] Such attitudes are congruent with Gakkai teachings, which assert that prayers and hard work, not strikes, are the proper means to recompense in its most significant forms; therefore one cannot be sure that Gakkai members are unaware of their proper Marxist role or just inclined to repeat that which is told to them.

Gakkai members do not, insofar as available survey data is any indication, have an inability to place themselves in socioeconomic classes. In two small surveys Gakkai members in the samples, with very few exceptions, located themselves in one class or another, albeit with some notable cases of discrepancy between subjective and apparent objective class membership.[25]

* * * * * *

On the basis of the data presented in this chapter one is unable to conclude that the members of the Sokagakkai closely resemble mass man. Gakkai members do rely heavily upon Gakkai-related communications media and upon persons connected with the Society as points of reference. These tendencies seem to vary with activism; there may be elements in the Gakkai leadership sufficiently isolated from secular society in terms of human and communications links that they may be described as mass men in this respect; however, Gakkai members, even the supposedly more completely socialized Komeito supporters, show an involvement with secondary groups incosistent with the characteristics of mass man, especially when one considers that they are primarily of those social elements cross-nationally connected with a tendency toward non-involvement.

NOTES: CHAPTER 13

1. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, Glencoe, 1959, pp. 14, 237.

2. Robert Lane, Political Life, Glencoe, 1959, pp. 167-68.

3. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, Boston, 1965, pp. 252ff.

4. Samuel Stouffer, Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties, New York, 1955, p. 127.

5. Kornhauser, *op. cit.*, part III on marginal social elements, esp. pp. 180-214.

6. Hadley Cantril, The Psychology of Social Movements, New York, 1941, p. 168.

7. Raymond Wolfinger *et al.*, in David Apter, Ideology and Discontent, Glencoe, 1964, pp. 275-76; see Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon, New York, 1952, p. 297, for an equivalent example of attached leftist extremism.

8. Almond and Verba, *op. cit.*, p. 248.

9. Data from survey by Sidney Verba *et al*. One should note that not all secondary groups are voluntary, however. The figure is inflated by the frequently quasi-compulsory nature of such often-cited organizations as neighborhood associations, labor unions, and the PTA.

10. Tokyo Daigaku Shakaigakka and Tokyo Joshi Daigaku Shakaigakka, Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1963, pp. 61-62.

11. Data from Japanese government constitutional attitudes survey.

12. Tokyo Daigaku Shakaigakka *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-62.

13. Data from Takahashi Naoko.

14. Tokyo Daigaku Shakaigakka *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 63-64; James Dator, unpub. survey data presented at annual convention of the Association for Asian Studies, March 1968.

15. Suzuki Hiroshi, "Toshi Kaso no Shukyo Shudan," in Shakaigaku Kenkyu, no. 24, 1964, pp. 83-84.

16. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York, 1951, p. 353.

17. Takahashi data.

18. Suzuki, op. cit., pp. 74-75.

19. Mainichi Shimbun survey of June 1965.

20. Suzuki, op. cit., p. 75.

21. Ibid., p. 73.

22. Ibid., pp. 74-75, 82ff.

23. Emil Lederer, State of the Masses, New York, 1940, p. 30; Kornhauser, op. cit., p. 14.

24. Tokyo Daigaku Shakaigakka et al., op. cit., p. 122; Kobayashi Naoki, "Seito Shiji-so ni miru Kenpo Ishiki," in Gendai no Me, vol. 8 no. 10, October 1967, p. 134.

25. Suzuki, op. cit., p. 69; Takahashi data.

CHAPTER 14

THE SOKAGAKKAI MEMBER: ALIENATED?

A. Self-alienation

1. Impotence

The self-alienation of Sokagakkai members has here been approached through the notions of (a) a sense of powerlessness and futility, and (b) extreme simplism in thought patterns, especially as regards explanations and solutions. Leo Srole cites the perceptions that the social order is fickle, uncontrollable, unpredictable, and orderless; and that the leadership of the community is completely unresponsive to one's needs and conditions as features of his concept of "anomie (which, as previously noted, is perceived here as a general description of the state of mind of mass man)."[1] Kornhauser is more explicit: the feeling of powerlessness is the primary manifestation of self-alienation.[2]

According to Robert Lane and Almond and Verba, the sense of "political efficacy" or "subjective competence," which may be considered* the antithesis of self-alienated subjective impotence, tends to vary with education and socioeconomic status; thus one might expect members of the Sokagakkai to be more liable to feelings of powerlessness and futility than are the Japanese in general.[3]

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*Lane suggests the validity of this consideration when he notes a covariance between such a sense of efficacy and a broader sense of mastery of oneself and one's environment (Robert E. Lane, Political Life, Glencoe, 1959, pp. 149-55).

Such appears to be the case in some respects, but not in all. One observer notes what he describes as the "ineffaceable inferiority complex" of Gakkai members, a great reluctance to admit membership or assert themselves except in groups, when the complex is completely reversed and they become extremely aggressive.[4]

A similar complex may be manifest in the responses of Gakkai members to questions concerning possibilities of success. To the query, "In this world, do you think that if one works honestly one can save and thus stabilize his livelihood?" Gakkai members and general populace polled in one survey responded as follows:[5]

	Think so	Think not	Even if a bit can be saved, no stability will result	Not interested in saving	DK, NA, Other	Total
Sokagakkai members	36.5%	40.4%	11.5%	6. %	5.6%	100%
Whole sample	45.7	29.7	15.9	1.5	7.2	100

The apparent pessimism of the Gakkai members is ambiguous, however; one does not know whether believers really have little faith in the possibility of success or if they simply feel that work alone, without the supplement of religious belief, is useless. That the feeling is really impotence is suggested by data from another survey in which Gakkai members and non-members were asked about their expectations of job advancement and the extent of advance thought possible.[6]

	Sokagakkai members	Non-members
Promotion to executive possible:	8.7%	12.4%
Promotion to section chief possible:	---	8.6
No hope of promotion:	17.4	6.7
No interest in promotion:	4.3	11.5
Question irrelevant to respondent's hopes:	30.4	29.2
Other, DK, NA:	39.2	31.6
	100.0%	100.0%

In contradiction of these data are the author's observations and the results of clinical observation of a single young man one month before he entered the Gakkai and five months after conversion. A single individual hardly forms the basis for generalization; nevertheless, the individual in question did show over the six month period great improvement in emotional stability and positivity of outlook, a marked decrease in general depression, and a slight increase in tendencies toward leadership and initiative.[7] This accords with the impression gained by the author in his contacts with Gakkai members: they were almost without exception outgoing, active (but not agitatedly so), positive, and apparently possessed of a sense of capacity to achieve their goals.

These members were almost always encountered in a Gakkai context, and often collectively; what the author observed may have been only the obverse of the inferiority complex mentioned above. But survey data suggest that there is present a feeling that people in general are definitely potent, at least *vis-a-vis* the political system, and the opinion that people should act to realize this potency is implied.[8] Asked what the causes of political corruption were, 65 percent of the Komeito supporters in an *Asahi Shimbun* poll cited "insufficient voter awareness," as opposed to 46 percent of a national sample. In the same survey 72 percent of the Komeito supporters agreed with the statement, "If the people would only take more interest in national politics, politics would become better," as opposed to a national average of 60 percent. In a survey conducted by Sidney Verba and his associates, Sokagakkai members showed twice the likelihood of other persons to feel a sense of political potency on three different questions concerning such feelings *vis-a-vis* local and national politics. On each question this sense varied with sex, education, and income; the concentration of Gakkai members in female, low-education, and low-income categories thus renders more noteworthy the contrast with the general population.

The data concerning the hypothetical feelings of powerlessness and futility among Sokagakkai members permit no conclusions. An apparent sense of impotence and hopelessness concerning social and occupational improvement is countered by a possible increase in initiative and a strong impression of subjective competence (shutaisei) felt by the members. This competence is suggested in a more explicitly political frame by survey data; it is conceivable that a compartmentalization of the socioeconomic and political takes place in the minds of Gakkai members: the Society has already proven its efficacy in the political system, thus possibly giving the membership a vicarious sense of competence, while society at large has remained beyond the manipulations of the Gakkai and thus is a sphere where faith has yet to prove its potency.

2. Simplism

The condition of stress which characterizes mass man affects his tolerance of complexity; what is sought is any set of easily understandable beliefs which renders the total environment conherent, whether or not it agrees with normally elementary criteria of truth or rationality or "the most obvious rules of common sense."[9] The total theology of the Sokagakkai constitutes a highly complex body of doctrine. As reflected in the responses of members, however, this theology is little more than a unicausal explanation of the universe which enables interpretations of reality which are as inconsistent with the most elementary criteria of scientific truth as they are simple.

Gakkai members, in innumerable testimonials, claim relief from infantile paralysis, general debilitation, tuberculosis, hernia, and high blood pressure;[10] claims regarding the power of faith include such statements as

> When typhoons came, our family threw itself into devout prayer and was protected from damage . . . wouldn't all Japan also be saved from damage in typhoons as the result of faith?[11]

and

> During the May-June rice-planting period the sun beat down every day. The prayers of the farmers, eyes to the sky, were in vain; the fields dried and cracked and the green shoots are already turning brown.
>
> Strangely, the predictions made by St. Nichiren are coming true and the "three calamities and seven disasters /sanzai-shichinan/" described in the *Rissho Ankoku Ron* are appearing today.[12]

and

> As Typhoon No. 7 dissipated, the low pressure stimulated the rainy season weather front, bringing record heavy rains to many areas which inflicted great damage and cost in human life. . . . after *Kosen-rufu* this kind of natural calamity will not occur. . . .[13]

In the Japanese context these accounts are not as startling as they sound to Westerners; nevertheless, insofar as there are any general scientific standards of causality it would seem that they would relegate such explanations of healing and of natural disasters to the field of the irrational, as they probably would the story told to the author by one Gakkai member of an acquaintance killed in an auto accident whose body, due to the man's condition of enlightenment, never decomposed but remained until the moment of cremation several days later in a state of apparent peaceful sleep.

Science is apparently accorded some validity by Sokagakkai members. In one recent poll, 78 percent of the Sokagakkai members in the sample chose the answer "Both science and religion are necessary" in response to a question on the salvability of man and the means thereto.[14] However, in light of the protestations concerning the power of faith voiced consistently by large numbers of Gakkai members, one must suspect that, despite the absence of hard data, a _prima facie_ case may be established for the position that Sokagakkai members value simplism to the point of renouncing criticism and rejecting or ignoring secular criteria of truth and rationality.*

3. Conservatism and Authoritarianism

This section has been included for two reasons: first, resemblance of Sokagakkai members' personality characteristics to the "authoritarian personality" described by Adorno and his associates would render the members similar also to Kornhauser's "totalitarian man," a man potentially more threatening to the survival and stability of democratic political systems than is mass man.[15] Second, the preliminary treatment of cultural and social conservatism in Gakkai members is relevant both to the primary focus on authoritarianism (Adorno cites strong social conventionalism as one facet of the authoritarian personality)[16] and to a more general concern for forms of behavior conducive to the stability of democratic systems, since Japan's traditional culture was dominated by profoundly undemocratic norms and values. There are other threats to democracy than those posed by an unattached, alienated mass, and attachment (social and normative) to a culture where un- or antidemocratic values predominate is one of them.

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*Although this proximity to the mass man may be more cultural than peculiar to the Gakkai: one should recall the general non-rationality of Japanese religion noted above.

Overall, Sokagakkai members appear to be fairly typical of the population as a whole as concerns traditionalism or social conservatism. A national survey on the Japanese national character carried out in 1963 included numerous questions dealing with such attitudes; on nine which dealt most clearly with traditionalism Gakkai members responded more conservatively to 4, less conservatively to 2, and similarly to the overall sample to 3.[17] On the questions to which Gakkai members responded more conservatively, controls for educational level, age, and sex revealed Gakkai members as relatively traditional in every category. In most cases, however, the difference was only a few percentage points; since the sample of Gakkai members contained only 94 persons one cannot conclude that the Gakkai membership is appreciably more conservative than the general populace.

In two additional surveys, the data from which could not be subjected to controls, Gakkai members again appeared to differ but insignificantly from the general population. In one, an annual national poll conducted for the government dealing with popular attitudes toward the constitution, Gakkai members occasionally made responses indicative of relative conservatism (in this case directly related to the democratic norms embodied in the constitution).[18] However, Gakkai members were concentrated in those social strata (the less educated, the lower in socioeconomic status, etc.) which were more likely to make such responses; whether Gakkai members were in fact more conservative than others in their immediate socioeconomic context cannot be determined.

A local survey run for the government in 1964 indicated that socio-cultural conservatism varied inversely with education and that Sokagakkai members were concentrated over twice as heavily in the least educated bracket as was the non-member portion of the sample (57 percent as opposed to 28 percent).[19] Nevertheless, on three of seven questions dealing with conservatism, Gakkai members were as or less traditional than non-members on every educational level; they were less traditional than non-members on two of the questions and as or more traditional than non-members on every educational level in their responses to the remaining two questions. Considering the fact that Gakkai members are predominantly from the less-educated strata, their apparent equivalence to the sample as a whole suggests that, for their demographic group, their social orientations may be in fact quite advanced.

Sokagakkai activists do not appear significantly deviant from the general public in their degree of social conservatism. In the national character study cited above, the answers of activists roughly paralleled those of less active (in terms of frequency of practice) members and, similarly, the only conclusion possible is that they cannot be decisively described as either more or less conservative than their fellow Japanese.[20]

A similar conclusion is all that may be drawn from a comparison of Sokagakkai members with the "authoritarian personality" studied by Adorno and his associates. According to Adorno, there is a "potential fascist" personality syndrome, the major characteristics of which are the following:

1. Conventionalism: an extreme emphasis of conventional norms and values.
2. Authoritarian submission: a total and uncritical submission to authority.
3. Authoritarian aggression: extreme antipathy toward those who violate conventional values.
4. Anti-intraception: opposition to the subjective and imaginative.
5. Superstition and stereotypy.
6. Power and "toughness:" emphasis of the assertion of power and of dominance-submission relationships; identification with power figures.
7. Destructiveness and cynicism: diffuse, general hostility toward the world.
8. Projectivity: the perception of one's own emotional impulses realized in one's environment, especially those impulses which seem evil.
9. Sex: an over-concern with supposed sexual goings-on in society.[21]

The reader will note here many of the specific characteristics of classic fascism, i.e., Nazism.[22] In a more general sense the characteristics of what Robert Lane describes as "undemocratic man, the impoverished self," are also visible in this syndrome.[23] He will also note several elements which seem to be possible facets of the Sokagakkai belief system: the unquestioning acceptance of authority, the aggressive tendencies visible in shakubuku, superstition, and hostility toward the heretical outside world.

In an effort to measure the degree to which the personality characteristics of authoritarianism are present in individuals, Adorno and his colleagues devised (among others) an instrument named the California F (for "fascism") -Scale, a series of questions to be answered on a continuum ranging from "strongly disagree (scored as -3)" to "strongly agree (scored as +3)." Agreement with any question indicates an authoritarian tendency; thus high total and mean scores represent relatively authoritarian personality configurations.

Empirical studies indicate that the F-Scale is a valid tool for the measurement of undemocratic personality traits, although just exactly what type of undemocratic traits it measures is open to debate. Han Eysenck asserts that the test does not distinguish between extremism of the left and right: the title "F"-Scale

> is in part at least erroneous as we have found Communists to make almost as high scores on this scale as Fascists, and consequently we shall . . . refer to the F-scale rather as the authoritarianism scale.[24]

Richard Christie, on the other hand, believes that although "it is impossible to specify with any precision exactly what it captures," nevertheless "it captures something common to fascistic philosophy;" additional studies indicate tentatively that professed fascists do score high on the test, while professed communists score low.[25] Although the exact focus of the F-scale is unclear, a great number of empirical studies do "indicate that the scale makes reliable discriminations between clinically identified groups of adults and against the definition of 'anti-democratic trends' used by Adorno."[26]

However, more recent research has produced several caveats concerning the validity of the F-scale. Of primary relevance to any effort to apply the test to Japanese in general or Sokagakkai members in particular is a phenomenon known as "positive response set" or "acquiescence set," that is, the tendency to agree to or answer "yes" to any question regardless of its content. By using ordinary F-scales and F-scales with the questions reversed (so that agreement denotes non-authoritarian tendencies) in combination, it has been very strongly indicated that certain social groups have an inherent inclination to agree with F-scale and other questions, whatever the substance or wording.[27] Commonly this pre-existent "acquiescence set" on the part of respondents varies inversely with their education; its influence is highest when questions are ambiguous (as, in many instances, are those of the F-scale).

It is a common observation that the Japanese seem to prefer whenever possible to give affirmative answers to questions; a cultural "acquiescence set" clearly appears to exist which one would expect to color the results of F-scale tests in such a manner as to make the Japanese appear artificially authoritarian. In addition, the membership of the Sokagakkai is drawn from the less educated and sophisticated strata; therefore one would expect their F-scale scores to be higher than those of the general population regardless of actual authoritarian tendencies and the scores of the better-educated activits to be below those of the rank-and-file. For this reason, unless F-scale scores of Sokagakkai members should register markedly higher than those of non-member Japanese, one would not be entitled to draw any inference that the Gakkai is a collectivity of relative authoritarians.

The California F-scale, as adapted for use in Japan by Dr. Muramatsu Tsuneo, has been utilized for several studies in that country; as opposed to a sample of Americans used by Adorno who scored a mean of 3.81 on the test (a score of 4 being the middle of the 7-point scale: -3 is scored as 1, +3 as 7), groups of Japanese tested by Muramatsu averaged from 4.38 for a sample of urbanites to 4.72 in one village.[28] The difference is significant--the Japanese scoring from 15 to 24 percent higher than the Americans--but in the absence of any compensation for cultural differences, comparisons are pointless.

The author administered the Muramatsu version of the California F-scale to a total of 135 Sokagakkai members attending zadankai in various areas in Tokyo in late 1967. The group was not representative of the Gakkai membership as a whole, since all were by the fact of their attendance relatively active; moreover, 93 percent held some rank in the organization--and 85 percent held two or more positions. It may be valid to consider the sample roughly representative of Gakkai activists in the Tokyo area; if the author was directed to certain zadankai because Gakkai officials felt that these zadankai would provide "proper" answers then it is even more probable that the sample included more doctrinally dependable members, that is, activists.

The mean score for the Gakkai members was 4.63, above the means of Muramatsu's urban samples (4.38 and 4.44) and roughly the same as those of his rural samples (4.53, 4.58, and 4.72).[29] Even the difference between the Gakkai members and the lowest-scoring group of non-members was only .25, however, or less than 8 percent higher than the mean score of the lowest non-member sample. On the other hand, one cannot assume a higher acquiescence set among this sample than among urban Japanese as a whole: the distribution of the sample by educational level was exactly the same as that of the population of Tokyo as a whole as shown by a Yomiuri Shimbun poll of early 1967.[30]

Certain other demographic characteristics of the sample affect one's generalizations about the Gakkai as a social whole. Unlike the case with Muramatsu's samples, education had no consistent apparent influence upon Gakkai members' scores; therefore the overrepresentation of well-educated Gakkai members does not provide one with any grounds for extrapolation to the whole membership. Males, who scored relatively high, were overrepresented in the sample; the young (especially members in their 20's), who scored markedly lower than their elders, were also overrepresented, thus enabling contradictory generalizations about modal personalities in the general Sokagakkai membership. Thus not only can no significant contrasts between the Gakkai sample and the general population be discerned, but one cannot generalize from the demographic composition of the sample to that of the Gakkai as a whole in order to compare it with the general population, either.

A more significant phenomenon may exist within the sample of Gakkai members. F-scale scores varied directly with age, length of membership, and degree of activism in terms of number of offices held. The suspicion that higher scores are due to longer membership or to activism and the commitment it bespeaks is at least understandable; in either case one might infer that there is something about the Sokagakkai's socialization process, either its technique or its content, which leads to higher--i.e., more "fascistic"--scores. In the case of length of membership, such does not seem to be the case. Instead, what one really seems to be doing in plotting the correlation between score and term of membership is correlating score and age by another yardstick: the long-time believers are largely the old (who score highest) and the old are mostly long-time believers.

In addition, when one correlates scores with length of membership and then controls for degree of activism, the correlation vanishes. If scores correlated with activism are controlled for either age or length of membership, however, the correlation remains, that is, in nearly all age and length-of-membership groupings activists score higher than non-activists and hyperactivists (three or four offices) score highest of all. Moreover, the naturally higher scores which accrue to older age do not appear to be influencing the scores of activists upward; the older members of the sample do not tend to be among the relative activists.

The data derived from the F-scale enable only two statements: first, the scores are not high enough, nor does comparison of the relative compositions of the sample and the overall Gakkai membership provide one with guidelines clear enough, to justify any claim that members of the Sokagakkai, either the rank-and-file or the office-holding activists, are significantly more authoritarian than the general Japanese public insofar as authoritarianism can be measured by means of the California F-scale. Second, although differences in score are not, considering the size of the sample, significant, there does seem to be a positive correlation between activism and higher scores. Whether this represents the post-conversion natural selection of pre-conversion personality characteristics or the inculcation as part of the socialization process of certain elements which contribute to higher scores is unclear; in either case one should be alert to the possibility that there is a tendency for activists in the Sokagakkai to possess qualities which contribute to relatively high F-scale scores.

In an effort to bring light into the still murky matter of authoritarianism among Gakkai members, a few additional data may be cited. In a survey run in the Tokyo area, 42 percent of a sample of Sokagakkai members scored high in "authoritarianism" on a scale developed by Alan Roberts and Milton Rokeach.[31] This was slightly (but, considering that n=45, not significantly) higher than the 35 percent of the irreligious respondents who scored high on the scale and almost exactly the same as the proportion of all believers in religion who scored high (41 percent). The Gakkai members' responses, moreover, compare "favorably" with those of believers in the traditional Buddhist and Shinto sects, 45 percent of whom scored high on the scale.

To approach the question of authoritarianism in a rather more oblique fashion, several studies contain partially relevant data. To two questions in a national survey concerning one's inclination to go ahead with activities based on a personal conviction in spite of the opposition of others, Sokagakkai members evinced (even when controlled for age, education, and sex) relatively strong intentions to go ahead on their own, a phenomenon hardly consistent with the submissive tendencies of the authoritarian.[32] The more active members, however, were markedly less self-assertive than the rank-and-file (a situation also reflected in a local survey of Gakkai members only), though still as or slightly more self-assertive than the national sample as a whole.[33]

Related to the factor of authoritarian submission is the amenability to a fuehrer-type leader. A single survey bearing upon this point used no non-Gakkai member control group and is thus of no use in comparing Gakkai members with the

Japanese general public. Nevertheless, even allowing for a cultural predilection for leaders who are more adept at harmonizing than mobilizing or disciplining their followers, the 14 percent of Gakkai rank-and-file and 17 percent of leaders who voiced a preference for leaders who were "decisive" rather than "skilled in human relationships" does not seem to imply a collectivity of persons fleeing frantically from freedom toward sheltered captivity under a despotic ruler.[34]

Nor do Sokagakkai members demonstrate the diffuse hostility typical of the authoritarian personality. _Zadankai_ are positive, congenial gatherings; those taking place during _shakubuku_ drives are much more businesslike but at no time is one conscious of the destructiveness and cynicism which characterize the authoritarian. Neither do the speeches at mass meetings contain, for example, the venom of Hitler's _Sportpalast_ harangues. Testimonials and other letters to the _Seikyo Shimbun_ are not notably hostile, even toward heretical religions; one such letter called upon fellow proselyters "never to forget the importance of a sense of humor." Strong criticism of the misinterpretations of and calumnies about the Sokagakkai carried by the mass media abounds in Gakkai journals, but this is much more an official practice than a rank-and-file articulation.

Finally, clinical examination of the young man mentioned previously did not reveal any change in his tendencies toward introspection between points one month before his entry into Nichiren Shoshu and five months after conversion.[35] Though this case in itself is insufficient, in company with the other data which bear upon the question of authoritarianism in Sokagakkai members it supports the tentative conclusion that Gakkai members on the whole are neither more culturally conservative nor more authoritarian than their fellow Japanese.

* * * * * *

In light of the evidence presented in this section it seems that members of the Sokagakkai are relatively more self-alienated than are the Japanese as a whole. Whether they are absolutely and thoroughly "mass" is questionable, that they are not authoritarians is clearly indicated. The modal Gakkai member may be self-alienated, but he is apparently no more authoritarian than the general Japanese population. The suggestion of covariance of activism and authoritarianism should be noted, but even in the case of activists no absolute level of authoritarianism as indicated by any data exists sufficient to permit sweeping generalizations about the Sokagakkai elite.

B. Human Alienation

1. Distrust of People

Kornhauser cites, as one of the primary aspects of mass man's alienation, "social alienation," or a lack of confidence in other people; Hans Toch is even stronger, seeing paranoia as typical of the members of social movements.[36] Robert Lane notes that in the United States the sense of personal political efficacy and the tendency to participate in politics vary with one's trust in others and the resultant ability to interact with one's community and with strangers.[37] Almond and Verba recorded the same relationship in the United States and Britain: faith in other people was positively related to beliefs that one could effectively work with others to influence the government.[38]

Data concerning faith in other people felt by Sokagakkai members are rare. A study done by the Gakkai itself in a housing development in suburban Tokyo is, if nothing else, a representation of the Society's official social ideal. It indicates that Society members are just as they should be--highly trusting of their fellow citizens and of their relationships with their fellows, much more so than development residents as a whole.[39] A more objective survey done by James Dator in Tokyo in 1965 indicates the opposite: 56 percent of a sub-sample of Sokagakkai members scored "low" in "faith in people," as opposed to 40 percent of those in Dator's sample professing belief in some religion and 39 percent of those denying adherence to any religion.[40] Gakkai members also scored lower in "faith in people" than any of the other sub-samples of believers of other religious groups distinguished in Dator's data.

Evidence presented elsewhere in this study indicating the establishment by Sokagakkai members of relationships with secondary social groups, including groups not related to the Sokagakkai, seems intuitively to contradict Dator's results. In addition, the sample of Gakkai members used by Dator (45 persons) is too small to permit generalization. Still, his data are the only available which deal directly and specifically with the problem of intrapersonal distrust, and therefore one must draw one's conclusions--albeit very tentatively--with consideration of this base. And this base suggests that Sokagakkai members are relatively --but only relatively--distrustful of their fellows.

2. Partisanship

The reverse face of intrapersonal distrust is extreme partisanship in those relationships which are successfully established by mass man. Kornhauser notes the nature of the relationship between mass movements and their members: submission to the organization and hostility toward the outside world.[41] Such hostility is destructive of patterns of behavior necessary for the stable functioning of democratic systems; democracy assumes partisanship, but there must be limits upon partisanship: opinions must be "expressible openly" or one of the elements of the "democratic formula" is lacking.[42]

Almond and Verba show that in five nations the intensity of interparty partisanship varied inversely with education;[43] one might thus expect supporters of the Komeito, regardless of their possible "massness," to be more highly partisan than the adherents of other Japanese political parties and, as Sokagakkai members, to be relatively partisan as regards non-Gakkai religious groups also. Moreover, insofar as an individual case of psychological examination is instructive, one might note that between one month prior to entry into the Sokagakkai and five months after conversion one man became markedly less socially adjusted (in the sense of accommodating and adaptive), less cooperative, and more combatively aggressive.[44]

On the other hand, however, whatever partisanship Gakkai members feel apparently does not lead to completely exclusive support for the Komeito. In three surveys of Sokagakkai members, the proportions who voiced support for the Komeito or its predecessors were 72 percent, 46 percent, and 30 percent.[45] If one assumes that a few additional Gakkai members who were reluctant to admit even Gakkai membership were reached by each survey, then the proportion of politically partisan Society members would be even lower. A local survey of Gakkai activists indicated that this particular subgroup is more partisan: in response to a question regarding political parties specifically not to be supported, 18 percent of the low-ranking Gakkai members answered "All except Komeito," in contrast to the 42 percent of the higher-ranking activists who chose this answer.[46] A nationwide (though not so recent) poll, however, revealed no substantive difference between the propensities of activists and relatively apathetic believers to support the Koseiren.[47]

Apparently the Gakkai is limited in its capability to convert believers (religious partisans) into political partisans. Intense political partisanship, though undoubtedly present in certain cases, does not appear to dominate the minds of the Sokagakkai membership. This situation may be one facet of a generally moderate partisanship, or it may reflect only a compartmentalization by Gakkai members of their emotions regarding religion and politics.

Available survey and interview data suggest that moderate religious partisanship is the predominant pattern among the membership. A study published in 1962 indicated that Gakkai members recognized the social necessity of cooperation with individuals and groups of other religious persuasions; it noted a "surprising" degree of tolerance and liberalism, considering the constant doctrinal Gakkai attacks upon heresy and heretics.[48] A survey done by the Gakkai in a housing project in Tokyo indicates (regardless of its accuracy) the Society's current ideal of social interaction: in the opinion of 19.5 and 13 percent of two groups of non-member residents, social intercourse (a) developed naturally in the danchi and (b) such a development was enjoyable for them; in contrast, 95.8 percent of a sample of Gakkai members took this dual view of social behavior.[49]

A series of case studies of Gakkai members suggests that the Society's ideal of harmonious social intercourse is a closer approximation of the members' inclinations than is any image of intensely exclusivistic, highly partisan zealots.[50] Believers expressed great tolerance for other religions and their adherents and a marked reluctance either to criticize other faiths or to press shakubuku efforts upon unfamiliar or unfavorably disposed persons. The reasons for this tolerance may be largely cultural--the deviant intolerance of Nichiren Shoshu may be giving way to a stronger cultural impulse toward moderate religious partisanship. But for whatever reason, it seems clear from the data available that the members of the Sokagakkai are not absolutely intense in their partisanship, either religious or political. Relative to other Japanese they are probably more partisan; a survey in Tokyo indicates that Gakkai members prefer to marry within their own faith more than do believers in either the traditional Japanese religions or the other new religions (but less than do Christians) and that more Gakkai members than believers in any other religious group declare their faith to be the only true religion.[51] But the (absolutely) moderate characteristics of the Gakkai membership appear more significant.

3. Envy

From the millennium-seekers of the Middle Ages to the indignant artisan followers of Pierre Poujade, the members of mass movements have been characterized by intense envy of those in more favored circumstances. Envy of the rich is perhaps a permanent sentiment of the poor; mass man, although not consciously identified with a social class of his own, is quite likely to belong to the lower economic strata or to some other marginal or deprived group and antipathetic toward all those who seem to enjoy that of which he is deprived,be it social, economic, or psychological. The idea that a camel might pass through the eye of a needle more easily than a rich man might achieve salvation contains an element of the envy apparent in many of the chiliastic outbursts which have marked Christian history; the medieval millennialists attacked rich bishops and laymen alike, and the laymen have become in modern times the capitalist ogres of communist mythology.[52]

The lower-middle and lower class envy of the privileged so notable in medieval millennial mass movements also contributed to the moral indignation of those who supported Hitler: from the belief that the wicked would suffer in hell came the effort to create hell for them on earth.[53] The Nazi envy was dual: both the affluent business aristocracy and the securely organized and relatively economically stable unionized working classes seemed to threaten the position of the increasingly marginal lower middle-class entrepreneur and unorganized laborer and to escape his deeply felt deprivation.[54] The same sense of threat and envy was felt by the Poujadists; the epithet les gros, or "the fat ones," symbolized their disgust with all those apparently prospering while the artisans and merchants were increasingly ignored.

No solid data exist concerning feelings of social or economic envy on the part of Sokagakkai members, but extensive interviewing leaves one with the impression that nowhere near the degree of envy visible among the followers of the NSDAP or the Poujadists exists in the membership of the Sokagakkai. No signs of vindictive or hostile sentiment were perceived which could in any way be construed as envious.

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The data relating to human alienation among members of the Sokagakkai--distrust of people, intense partisanship, and envy--suggest a degree of resemblance between the members and mass man. The resemblance is partial--impressionistic evidence concerning partisanship and envy in particular introduces contradictions--and it is relative: Gakkai members seem slightly more alienated than does the average Japanese, but in no case is there clearly close approximation to the ideal mass man. Extensive non-partisan relationships (especially political commitments) are maintained by believers, and widespread tolerance refutes the impression of a uniformly and highly exclusivistic collectivity.

C. Systemic Alienation

1. Instrumental Alienation: Frustrations and Unfulfilled Expectations

This examination of alienation from concrete social sub-systems among Sokagakkai members will be divided into two parts: instrumental alienation, or a dissatisfaction with system outputs ("what has The System done for me?"), which will be subdivided into alienation from the economic and social systems and alienation from the political system; and general systemic alienation, or antipathy toward the political system in particular regardless of its performance *vis-à-vis* the individual.

Numerous theorists have proposed that the mass elements in any society tend to harbor more unfulfilled expectations and frustrations regarding the performance of the social and economic systems than do the populations of these societies *in toto*; empirical observers have noted that the members of such mass movements as National Socialism, McCarthyism, and Poujadism tended to be from social strata most subject to social and economic deprivations and frustrations.[55] These strata are also roughly those from which the Sokagakkai draws the bulk of its members. The Gakkai has been impressionistically described as a "little man's movement"--a collectivity of those left behind in Japan's postwar rise to affluence who have good reason to be frustrated as they watch the nation as a whole grow rich while they themselves still struggle economically.[56]

Examination of attitudes among members of the Sokagakkai indicates that dissatisfaction with economic condition and job exists both absolutely and relative to non-Gakkai members although it is not decisively intense. Two thirds of a small sample of Gakkai members in Tokyo articulated dissatisfaction with society in general, and roughly half said that there was "suffering" in their daily lives.[57] In two surveys where comparisons are possible, Sokagakkai members and Komeito supporters appear much more prone to dissatisfaction with their livelihood than non-members, although Komeito supporters are not so alienated as supporters of the Communist Party.[58]

However, one nationwide and two local surveys provide contradictory data: in a national poll run by the *Mainichi Shimbun* Komeito supporters were more positive than supporters of any other political party in evaluating the change in their livelihood over the previous year.[59] One of the local surveys, in Tokyo, suggests that the majority of Gakkai members are satisfied with their jobs; the other, in Fukuoka, implies that fewer Gakkai members are dissatisfied with their jobs than are non-members.[60]

A more social and less economic form of dissatisfaction may be indicated by data concerning status aspirations among Gakkai members. Koya Azumi, in a study of Society members in Tokyo, noted a marked discrepancy between the relatively high educational level of activists and the generally low status of the jobs which they held and hypothesized that activists would be subject to status frustration.[61] Corroborative evidence is provided by another survey of Gakkai members in Tokyo; the sample, while quite small, may be distributed significantly:[62]

Sokagakkai Members (n=23)

Perceive selves as members of: Want to be members of:	Capitalist class	Middle class	Working class	DK, NA, Other	Total
Capitalist class:	---	4	6	---	10 persons
Middle class:	---	2	6	1	9 "
Working class:	---	---	1	---	1 "
DK, NA, Other:	---	---	---	3	3 "
Total:	---	6	13	4	23 persons.

Non-Sokagakkai Members (n=209)

Perceive selves as members of: Want to be members of:					
Capitalist class:	5	22	29	2	58 persons
Middle class:	---	35	76	---	111 "
Working class:	---	---	24	---	24 "
DK, NA, Other:	---	---	---	16	16 "
Total:	5	57	129	18	209 persons.

Only 26% of the Sokagakkai members were satisfied with their present status, as opposed to 31% of the non-members, while 70% voiced a desire to have higher status, versus 61% of the non-believers. With such samples this difference might be meaningless; one should note, however, that not only do more Gakkai members than non-members seem dissatisfied with their status, but they also desire to rise higher than do non-members: 46% of the working-class believers wanted to be capitalists, in contrast to only 23% of the working-class non-members.

The contrast between this possibly relatively intense status aspiration and (a) the relatively low education of Sokagakkai members and (b) the relatively low perception by Gakkai members of the possibility of job advancement mentioned above is significant in several respects. First, it may indicate an unrealism on the part of those working-class Gakkai members who dream of capitalist status. The confrontation of aspiration and reality (low education), resulting in low perception of possible promotion, may have two outcomes. First, compensatory fulfillment might be sought in a different, non-socioeconomic sphere. The great frequency of non-economic motives for entry into the Gakkai suggests that some people may be seeking spiritual satisfaction through a net of fulfilling human relationships, sublimating their status frustration into intangible rewards of peer-group esteem.[63] Second, if the Sokagakkai does not serve to resolve frustrating contradictions between aspiration and reality or if, on the contrary, it exacerbates the frustration,* then alienation from an unjust and unfulfilling social system may be building in the membership.

Instrumental alienation from the political system has three aspects: alienation from specific incumbents, specific policies, and specific institutions. In a series of five national polls run in 1965 and 1966 Komeito supporters indicated strong disapproval of the Sato cabinet; they were more netative than any political groups except supporters of the Communist Party.[64] They were in addition, according to the three of these five surveys which were carried out by the Mainichi Shimbun, relatively pessimistic concerning the future performance of the political system--again, less pessimistic only than the communists. On a different level of the polity, a nationwide survey by the Asahi Shimbun revealed that 44% of a sample of Komeito supporters thought that the representatives in their local assemblies were doing an unsatisfactory job; the proportions for other parties' adherents were Communists 37%, JSP and DSP 34%, and Liberal Democrats 24%.[65]

It has been argued that political pessimism and cynicism among the lower social strata need not be indicative of authoritarianism, as Lipset states, but may be eminently justified by the treatment--or lack of same--which the less privileged classes receive at the hands of politicians.[66] Justifiable though such alienation may be, however, what is more important for the purposes of this study is the fact of alienation; insofar as this alienation has behavioral consequences, their potential threat to the stability of a democratic polity is the same regardless of the source of the alienation. Justifiable cynicism may be susceptible of amelioration through political measures; nevertheless, if it erupts into action the consequences could be the same as if the motivation were pathological authoritarianism.

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*Sebastian DeGrazia (The Political Community, Chicago, 1948, pp. xv-xvi) and Eric Hoffer (The True Believer, New York, 1966, pp. 116-17) assert that mass movements do not alleviate feelings of frustration, anxiety, and fear, but in fact intensify them and their violent behavioral consequences.

That the policy orientation of Sokagakkai members is negative, as is their incumbent orientation, is suggested by two national Mainichi Shimbun surveys. To the question, "How has the Sato cabinet performed?" on twelve domestic issues, Komeito supporters responded negatively on nine and positively on none; the only group consistently more negative was the Communist subsample.[67] A subsequent poll asked how respondents thought twelve domestic issues would be handled in the future; Communist Party supporters were most pessimistic about the possible success with which these issues would be met--and Komeito supporters ranked next.[68]

The dissatisfaction of Sokagakkai members (or at least the Komeito-supporting portion of the memberhip) in regard to governmental structures parallels their sentiments vis-à-vis incumbents and policies. Two Mainichi Shimbun surveys indicate that Komeito backers may be relatively positive in their evaluation of the performance of the Upper

House and of the increasing honesty of elections, but the same data show Komeito supporters also to be most prone to choose alternative negative responses to both questions.[69] In a poll by the *Asahi Shimbun* in November 1966 respondents were asked how they evaluated the overall performance of the political system; 26% of the national sample (but only 8% of the Komeito's supporters) thought that the system was performing "well [*umaku*]," while 42%--as opposed to 74% of the Komeito backers--thought that it was not.[70] The Komeito subsample was the most negative of any group of party supporters. A similar relative negativism appeared in the responses of Komeito supporters to a question in a March 1967 (i.e., before the election of Minobe) *Yomiuri Shimbun* survey concerning personal evaluation of the performance of the Tokyo metropolitan government, although in this case once more the Communists appeared to be considerably more negative than did the Komeito group.[71]

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Members of the Sokagakkai voice considerable discontent with their positions in Japanese society and economy and with the performance of the political system. In the socioeconomic sphere the data are contradictory; some indicate strong dissatisfaction with livelihood and occupation while others point in the opposite direction. In combination with the strong potential for alienation suggested by status-aspiration and (among better-educated activists) education-status discrepancies, one might surmise that Gakkai members are in fact more alienated from the socioeconomic system than the average Japanese. Politically, Gakkai members appear to hold relatively strong negative feelings concerning local and national incumbents, local and national governmental performance, and the handling of specific policies by the national government, being second only to the communists in this respect.

One must condition any conclusion that members of the Sokagakkai are as instrumentally alienated as mass man. First, it was impossible to control the data presented in this section for socioeconomic factors such as education, age, and social class. Whether Sokagakkai members are in fact more alienated than others in similar circumstances is problematical; the theoretical literature indicates that persons of the Gakkai members' circumstances will be more likely to be alienated and the apparent alienation which one does see may be simply the result of demographic disproportions. The fact remains, however, that the behavioral proclivities of mass men are disruptive of stable democratic polities regardless of their social origins.

Second, what appears to be economic alienation may be simply the increased relative salience of less easily soluble economic problems which develops when autosuggestion and perceived divine benefit alleviate the health and psychological problems which originally motivated conversion. A study by the Gakkai itself suggests that the problems which bring one into the faith are those which are later alleviated by divine benefit: while spiritual and health motives are primary in conversion, economic and occupational problems become increasingly salient to members as time passes.[72] But again one must say that, whether inherent or developed, it is the fact of alienation which is significant.

Third, the persons described as Sokagakkai members in most of the data on political alienation were in fact Komeito supporters. They were thus the relatively politicized element of the Gakkai membership and perhaps relatively partisan, perhaps being drawn to politics by their greater dissatisfaction with the present state of the political system. That this may be the case is suggested by the data provided by James Dator's 1965 Tokyo survey of Gakkai members.[73] Using a scale measuring mistrust of public officials, Dator found that Gakkai members were no more mistrustful of officials than those persons professing belief in any religion. Moreover, Gakkai members appeared to be less mistrusful than those persons professing no faith in any religion. It is possible that among the membership of the Sokagakkai as a whole there is less alienation--especially political alienation--than exists among the politicized sector of the membership. Nevertheless, it seems fair to surmise that the believers of the Sokagakkai are relatively more instrumentally alienated from their social, economic, and political context than are the balance of the Japanese population.

2. General Systemic Alienation

In contrast to instrumental alienation from the political system, which is no doubt felt by every citizen at times, a general alienation from the system per se is more peculiarly a feature of the social-psychological-behavioral mass man syndrome. The followers of Nazism and similar mass movements were clearly highly alienated from the polities under which they lived.[74] Even the Poujadists, who ostensibly were concerned with instrumental goals, may have been motivated by a general systemic alienation:

> L'un des traits structurels de la vie politique française est la médiocre adaptation des classes moyennes au régime représentatif. L'accès au pouvoir dont elles disposent est généralement limité et insuffisant: une telle situation, tolérable dans les époques tranquilles, risque d'être tenue pour insupportable dès qu'un certain seuil dans la gravité des problèmes se trouve depassé. ... C'est dans cette position défavorisée des classes moyennes à l'égard du régime représentatif que le Mouvement Poujade trouverait son support le plus solide.[75]

Numerous studies have also indicated the relatively high incidence of attitudes subversive of democratic systems among the social elements from which the Sokagakkai draws the major part of its believers. Such attitudes, as examined here, are general antipathy toward the political system per se or attitudes indirectly subversive of democratic systems such as opposition to the operational features of the "democratic formula" explained above.

Social and political tolerance of minorities and deviants and anti-authoritarian attitudes vary inversely with educational level, according to a study by Samuel

Stouffer.[76] Prothro and Grigg found education to be the most important contributory factor to support for the basic principles of democracy.[77] In Japan in particular, these generalizations seem to hold true; a study in 1954 indicated that the working class and the peasants--among the less educated elements of Japanese society--were more authoritarian and undemocratic and less concerned with the civil liberties essential to democracy than were either the middle or upper classes.[78]

The effort to study general systemic alienation among the Japanese is divided in two parts: orientations toward specific structures of the existing Japanese political system and orientations toward the "democratic formula" as the fundamental attitudinal underpinning of the Japanese polity as an ostensibly democratic system. To Prothro and Grigg's method of operationalizing the "formula" certain additions must be made for adaptation to the Japanese situation. An annual survey by the Japanese government of popular attitudes toward the constitution contains questions dealing with adherence to the basic elements of the formula, albeit in rather abstract form.[79] However, a study utilizing certain of the questions from the government survey showed that supporters of the Communist Party were "far and away" the closest adherents to the democratic values of the constitution.[80] On the assumption that the communists are not sincerely supportive of the Japanese political system as it is or of the type of democracy--imperfect though it may be--

which it embodies, one must include in one's study additional factors (such as orientations toward the Emperor system and toward alternative socioeconomic and political systems) designed to differentiate between communists and persons who seem sincerely committed to both the Japanese political system and to its "democratic formula."

a. Structures

The political structures considered here are the constitution itself and in particular those provisions of the constitution dealing with the Emperor and the military. Two national surveys of 1965 and 1967 indicate that Komeito supporters are roughly parallel to the other opposition parties (and thus stronger in a positive direction than the nation as a whole) regarding (a) the need to protect the constitution and (b) the suitability of the present constitution to Japan; such attitudes (only 10 percent of the Komeito backers declared the constitution "unsuitable") are in marked contrast to the general disrepute with which the people of Germany regarded the Weimar constitution.[81]

However, these two polls had small samples of Komeito supporters; the government's 1965 constitution survey, with a much larger sample (n=349), suggests that Komeito supporters are relatively very negative about the constitution.[82] The responses to three relevant questions are below; the negativity of Komeito supporters holds up under controls for age, sex, education, class, and political party support (Komeito supporters being more negative than either Liberal Democrats, Socialists, or Democratic Socialists) in the first and third, the only ones where controls were possible.

Question 5: "Do you think the present constitution is suitable to Japan?"

	Think so	Think not	DK,NA, Other	Total
National sample	33. %	25. %	42. %	100%
Komeito supporters	25.8	35.3	38.9	100

Question 29: "All in all, do you think the present constitution is good or bad?"

	Good	Bad	Can't say unconditionally	DK,NA, Other	Total
National sample	41.1%	6.3%	25.7%	26.8%	99.9%
Komeito supporters	31.2	12.4	29.2	27.2	100.0

Question 30: "What should be done about the constitution?"

	Should be revised	Should be thoroughly studied	Should be protected	DK,NA, Other	Total
National sample	6. %	42. %	13. %	39. %	100%
Komeito supporters	9.5	43.5	9.5	37.5	100

The reasons for this negativity are not known; it is possible that a nationalistic rejection of an American-made constitution is shown here, but Komeito supporters responded in almost exactly the same fashion as did the national sample to the question on this survey, "Do you think that the present constitution was forced upon Japan by the United States?" thus leading one to suspect that the source of the relative negativity is elsewhere.

As regards the Emperor, three studies indicate that members of the Sokagakkai are very little different from other Japanese.[83] The only difference discernable is that, according to the 1965 government poll, those Komeito supporters who were in favor of retaining the Emperor system were in favor of increasing the political powers of the presently symbolic role more than were either the general public or the supporters of either the LDP or the Socialists, even when controlled for sex, age, and (with one slight exception) education. Komeito supporters were also very similar to the national sample in their responses to questions concerning the military provisions of the constitution: they were equally aware and accepting of war-renouncing Article IX and equally desirous of a Self-Defense Force, both at its present force level or strengthened.[84]

Attitudes of Gakkai members on the powers of the Emperor hint at a possible rightist orientation which could be the source of their dissatisfaction with the constitution. This, however, is a most tenuous conjecture; one may say only that significant relative dissatisfaction with the fundamental structure of the Japanese polity does exist among the politicized element of the Sokagakkai. Again, the politicized may be the more alienated, but there is no data which justifies a firm statement to that effect.

b. The Democratic Formula

The three elements of the democratic formula--commitment to the undefined ideal of democracy and support for the principles of both majority rule and minority rights--serve to distinguish communists paying lip service to constitutional norms from those who in fact support a democratic system such as Japan's. Surveys which include questions regarding the respondent's preferred social or political system show this clearly and members of the Sokagakkai, while voicing slightly less support for democracy in general and the present Japanese sociopolitical system in particular than does the general public, do not show any markedly radical alienation.

Gakkai members have a slight tendency to favor socialist ideologies and institutions to democratic ones (n.b., in the Japanese context "socialism" almost invariably means Marxian socialism), but their preference seems to be more for a welfarist democracy than for any thoroughgoing Marxian socialist system. One nationwide survey indicated that Gakkai members had relatively a slightly less positive orientation toward "democracy" as an undefined "ism" than did the general public, being also markedly less positive regarding "capitalism" and relatively slightly positive regarding both "socialism" and "liberalism (jiyushugi)."[85] Another national poll, offering a more explicit set of alternative systems, elicited the following responses:[86]

Question: "In the future, toward what direction should Japan advance?"

Supporters of: / Preferred future state:	Liberal Democrats	Socialists	Democratic Socialists	Komeito	Communist Party	Support no party	National average
Welfare state (reformed capitalism):	50%	36%	50%	46%	20%	48%	45%
Social democracy:	16	48	40	27	15	16	24
Capitalism as at present:	19	4	3	7	---	10	11
Communism:	.2	1.4	---	.4	54.7	.8	1.3
DK, NA:	15	10	7	18	9	26	18
Total:	100.2	99.4	100	98.4	98.7	100.8	99.3

A third, though very small, sample of Gakkai members in Tokyo responded as follows to questions about preferred social systems and responsibility for the poor:[87]

Responsibility for the survival of the poor is:

The best society is:	the government's	the individual's	
socialist:	13	3	16
capitalist:	7	6	+ 13
	20 +	9	= 29=n

As opposed to rank-and-file Sokagakkai members, activists may possibly have a relatively negative outlook on other ideologies than their own in general: actives responded more negatively to "capitalism" and "socialism" than did the general membership in the survey (cited above) of purely ideological preferences.

The principle of thoroughgoing majority rule has never been fully supported by the Japanese people; "majority tyranny" by the ruling party in the Diet is a recurrent cry of the opposition and one might expect the Komeito, as part of this opposition, to have reservations concerning majority rule. What little data is available suggests that supporters of the Komeito do have such reservations, being roughly as committed to majority rule in the Diet as are the Socialists, much more committed than the communists, and much less committed than the Liberal Democrats.[88] Relative to other elements of the opposition, therefore, supporters of the Komeito are not notably undemocratic; however, it is quite possible that the entire opposition is undemocratically oriented: about 30 percent of the Komeito and Socialist supporters either excuse or advocate obstruction and resistance in the Diet in opposition to Tory efforts at self-assertion.

Majoritarianism, when the interests of the minority are ignored, is not democratic; the oppositionism of the Komeito may thus be in fact beneficial for the maintenance of democracy in Japan. However, the large and apparently increasing element of charisma in the Sokagakkai runs contrary to the idea of majoritarianism. It would be difficult to imagine any devout believer giving priority to a majority judgment of any kind over a fiat of President Ikeda, and the degree of charismatic attraction visible to even the outside observer suggests that the norm of majority rule does not enjoy much support among the members of the Sokagakkai.

Regarding the observation of civil rights in general, Sokagakkai members convey an initial impression of considerable liberalism. In the 1965 constitutional attitudes survey, Komeito supporters were 33% more likely to assert that individual liberties and rights were being insufficiently respected than were members of the sample as a whole; they were also 50% more likely to claim that such liberties and rights were sometimes unjustly restricted on the pretext of "national interest" or "the good of society."[89] The 1963 national character survey corroborates this data with the indication that Sokagakkai members (both activists and non-activists) are 33% more likely than the general public to give individual rights priority over the public interest--and, in a nation with an anti-individualistic tradition such as Japan's, such an orientation is beneficial for the maintenance of a democratic polity.[90] The relatively liberal indications remain with rare and slight exceptions under controls for age, education, and sex.

However, contradictory evidence exists. The 1965 constitutional attitudes survey indicates that Komeito supporters resemble the general populace in their conception of the proper relative weight of individual rights and public interest, and in their appreciation of the need occasionally to restrict liberties in the public interest--and in both cases, only a minority took clearly individualistic positions.[91] This does not signify any qualitative difference between Gakkai members and other Japanese,* but it is noteworthy as a sidelight on the viability of democracy in Japan.

Moreover, in the same 1965 poll Komeito supporters were almost 20% more likely than other persons to agree that individual liberty was sometimes overemphasized to the detriment of the public good, and those Komeito backers who did agree were 50% more likely than non-Komeito supporters to say that such incidents of detrimental overemphasis were "very frequent."[92] The relatively collectivist orientation of the Komeito supporters holds for each group of respondents categorized by sex, age, and education, with rare exceptions; Komeito backers also appear more collectivity-oriented than the supporters of either the LDP or the Socialists.

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*Although it might be significant that of the 43% of the Komeito backers who gave public interest precedence, only one-third (14%) thought that more restrictions on individual liberties were necessary.

On specific kinds of rights the impression conveyed by Sokagakkai members' attitudes is ambiguous. According to the 1965 constitutional attitudes survey Komeito supporters resembled the general public in their support of the right of silence in lieu of self-incrimination and of restrictions upon the right to strike and demonstrate.[93] Regarding restrictions on the freedom of political organizations, Komeito supporters were relatively slightly conservative, tending away from sanction for organizations which indulged in violence.[94] In regard to freedom of individual expression, however, Komeito supporters were not only more likely than other respondents in every sex, age, and educational group (with rare exceptions) to advocate complete freedom, but those among them who did advocate such freedom were also more likely than non-believers to accept even attacks upon the parliamentary system. It is also significant that the margin by which Komeito supporters surpass other respondents in their liberalism on this issue varies directly with age and inversely with education; that is, those whom one might expect to be least liberal--the old and the less educated--

are, relative to the general populace, most liberal.

There are, however, strong indications that respect for freedom of expression is not universal among the Sokagakkai members. A small segment of the membership has a penchant for letters of protest--and sometimes vitriolic attack--which they send to persons who write "misinformed" or "mistaken" articles or books concerning the Gakkai. Many of these letters are simple criticism, but some are a bit less tolerant in tone; in the words of one such writer, "When you slander good people, honest people, you must receive divine punishment."[95]

The size of this apparent minority is impossible to determine. But the tendency to overlook others' rights does exist in the Gakkai; in contrast to 90% of a sample of non-Gakkai members who, in one survey, declared that one ought to consider possible annoyance to others in any proselyting effort, half of a sample of Society members in the same poll claimed that since propagation is for the good of the proselytee it is all right even if he is angered by the effort.[96]

The same conditional acceptance of individual rights by some believers may be visible in the results of a question on freedom of religion included in a poll of Gakkai members.[97]

Response: Religious belief . . .	All Gakkai members	Members by degree of activism (in terms of extent of participation)		
		Attend all activities	Participate on occasion	Don't participate much
1. is free, but it is the freedom to choose the right thing, and Nichiren Shoshu is the only right thing:	29.1%	50. %	33.3%	14.3%
2. is completely free:	38.7	37.5	55.6	28.6
3. DK	32.2	12.5	11.1	57.1
Total:	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

In their receptivity to the various elements of the democratic formula Sokagakkai members seem to be for the greatest part sufficiently sympathetic to preclude any judgment that they are strongly (or perhaps even relatively) undemocratic. They are collectively a bit less positive about "democracy" than is the populace in general; however, the apparent welfare-socialist tendency does not seem to this observer to be incompatible with the processes of political democracy along the lines of Lipset's definition.

Regarding majoritarianism one can make no firm statement, although impressions lead one to surmise that the norm of majority rule does not enjoy great support among those who constitute the greater part of the Gakkai's membership. Data through which one can compare Gakkai members with the public at large are lacking but, in light of the charismatic attractions of President Ikeda, one might suppose that commitment to formal majoritarianism is relatively low in the Society.

The attitudes of Sokagakkai members on minority rights are not definitively clarified by the data available. The relatively frequently-held views that (a) individual rights are occasionally overemphasized to the detriment of the public good and that (b) consequently, public interests should receive more emphasis are contradicted by rough parallels with the general public on (a) the proper relative weights of individual rights and collective interests and (b) the need for restrictions upon personal liberties.

Furthermore, Gakkai members indicate relatively strong sentiments about the (a) excessive restriction of and (b) insufficient respect for rights, and (c) may hold a slightly liberal outlook on several types of individual rights. The liberal inference is limited by the surmised existence within the Gakkai's membership of a militantly intolerant minority; on the other hand, demographic controls on responses to several questions on civil liberties suggest that the greatest relative edge held by Gakkai members over the general public is in those groups--the more aged, the less well-educated, and the lower in socioeconomic status--which are generally least allegiant to democratic norms. It is conceivable that the fact of Gakkai membership, with the socializing influences it entails, may be a significant factor in the relative liberalism of these social elements.

Two possible overall orientations toward the "democratic formula" are suggested by the data: the "sophisticated-democratic" and the "cynical-collectivist" positions. The first implies that Gakkai members, while recognizing the occasional damage done to public interests due to excessive observation of rights, are willing to accept this damage because they realize also that these rights are of great importance and therefore simultaneously respect them relatively highly and perceive the injustice of their restriction relatively clearly.

The second position implies that (a) the negative views regarding the constitution, (b) the collectivist implications of the perception of violated public good, and (c) the intolerance of heretical expression accurately sum up the opinions of the Gakkai membership, while the lukewarm support for majoritarianism and the strong emphasis on individual rights reflect only the normal sensitivity to their position which the Gakkai members, as any minority, will feel.

It is most probable that the majority of the believers of Nichiren Shoshu are not overly sophisticated--but neither, in the author's view, are they necessarily relatively collectivist, nor are they more cynical than their fellow Japanese. Their views on isms, though abstract and undefined, contribute to this conclusion, as does their relatively strong defense of freedom of expression. In addition, although Gakkai members indicated above that they are relatively intolerant, only as many as half of the most active subgroup chose the intolerant answer: "Religious freedom is the freedom to choose the right religion. . . .," suggesting that the majority of the overall membership do not subscribe to this view.

When one considers the overall impression conveyed by the attitudes of members of the Sokagakkai toward the social, economic, and political systems which they inhabit, however, one cannot be sure that they do not resemble mass man to a fair degree. Gakkai members appear to be relatively alienated instrumentally from the socioeconomic and political systems, and alienated generally from the de facto Japanese political system as represented by the constitution. Numerous qualifying factors have been suggested: the unrepresentative nature of the politicized Komeito element which constituted the samples of "Gakkai members" in several surveys; the relatively liberal position on individual rights hinted at in certain polls; the abnormally liberal views of Gakkai members in the older and lower-class brackets; the ideals implied in believers' ideological preferences; and the striking contrast with the extremely alienated supporters of the Communist party.

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In sum, the systemic alienation of Sokagakkai members seems to be greater than that of the Japanese people in general, which also appears to be the case as regards the alienation of Gakkai members from themselves and from their fellow men. But in each case the degree of relative alienation is modest (insofar as one may make any subjective attempt at measurement) and, where comparison is possible, Gakkai members fall far short of supporters of the Communist Party in their antipathy towards others and towards their environment. A composite alienation scale used by James Dator in his survey of Sokagakkai members in the Tokyo area suggests that the Society member might be closer to the general public than he is to the communist.[98] The proportion of Gakkai members scoring "high" on Dator's scale was 38%--virtually the same as the 34% of believers in the traditional religions who scored "high" and only slightly (and hardly significantly) higher than the 30% of those professing no religious belief who scored "high." In any case, to be more alienated than the national, societal mode is not necessarily to be an archetypical mass man; to be less so than the modal Communist is not necessarily to be a stable, responsible, satisfied citizen.

To leave the matter by saying that Gakkai members are relatively "mass-like," as has been suggested by the data on social unattachment and alienation, begs the question of the relevance of the mass man model for democratic systems. There are no doubt methods for determing relative individual degrees of undemocratic potential. Such distinctions, however, are of less interest to the politician in a democratic polity than is some kind of absolute judgment: is X subversive of democracy or is it--or he--not? In addition, the theoretical model of mass man would seem more operationally useful if some threshold between dysfunctionality and eufunctionality (or at least functional neutrality) were discernable either conceptually or empirically--preferably the latter. The qualities of mass man--unattachment and alienation--already examined in the individual members of the Sokagakkai do not provide such a threshold. They indicate that the members of the Society are relatively close to such a threshold (i.e., that they are relatively available for behavioral mobilization by mass movements) but do not show the believers neatly to resemble mass man.

Perhaps the behavioral aspect of the model is most significant: do Sokagakkai members exhibit the pattern of action (particularly political action) which characterize mass man? This aspect (conceived of here as absolute presence or absence of "massness") is of most interest to the politician, although the potentialities suggested by the social and psychological analysis of the model (here described as "relative" or "potential massness") are also of great importance to those with preventive or remedial goals:

> The utility of this analysis is not that it permits us to say of some population, 'this is a mass.' Rather, it may help us to be forewarned concerning the emergence of mass qualities. . . . To analyze mass behavior is to identify a disease. It will be best observed when its symptoms are well developed; yet we wish to know its most general nature so that we may recognize its symptoms as early as possible.[99]

Theoretically, too, the discovery that, e.g., behavior is crucial would be of interest; if it could be established that one aspect of the model were most significant, then future studies could arrange their research priorities accordingly.

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CHAPTER 15

THE SOKAGAKKAI MEMBER IN ACTION: UNSTABLE?

Mass man is available for mobilization by mass movements because he is neither committed to the social or political systems within which he lives nor closely attached to them by social relationships. Availability is one important factor in gauging the potential for mass, i.e., antidemocratic, political behavior; the second factor is the unstable behavioral tendency of mass man, the periodic swing from apathy to direct action aimed toward remote goals. Apathy alone does not fully describe mass man; it is the predilection for remote, often utopian goals which makes mass man available for mass movements with millenarian objectives. An individual, potentially or relatively to approximate the model of mass man, must be relatively available and must exhibit the behavioral tendencies of apathy and remoteness of focus of attention; if in addition he does in fact demonstrate a proclivity for direct action then one may speak of absolute resemblance of the subject to mass man.

As has been tentatively concluded, the modal Sokagakkai member exhibits a degree of social unattachment and alienation which sets him off from some imaginary average Japanese; in this chapter we shall investigate the behavioral tendencies of the members of the Gakkai, first to fill out the estimation of potential for mass behavior and then to examine the empirical record of action which it is assumed will more or less reflect this potential.

A. Apathy

Apathy may be subdivided into its behavioral and cognitive aspects, their opposites being activism and awareness or interest. According to a number of studies, both aspects tend to vary with demographic characteristics in several Western countries: the less-educated, the old, women, and those with lower-status occupations are more likely than others to tend toward indifference and inaction.[1] In Japan, too, these demographic factors are related to apathy in the same manner as in the West, as a considerable quantity of data indicates.[2] All of these trends, with the exception of age, suggest that Sokagakkai members will be relatively apathetic; if they simply parallel the general public then one may assume that, relative to their immediate socioeconomic context, they are cognitively and behaviorally activist.

None of the data available indicate that members of the Sokagakkai should be classified as apathetic. Cognitively, Gakkai members are as well or better informed regarding the constitution and its various parts as any of the general public; this relative awareness holds when controlled for age, education, and socioeconomic status.[3] As in their responses to questions on rights, believers in the older and less educated sectors of the membership are most informed relative to their non-Gakkai member demographic equivalent groups. Moreover, as will be shown in the next section, there are indications that Gakkai members' awareness on specific political policies, while peculiarly focused, is not notably less than that of non-members.

Behaviorally, it has been suggested already that Gakkai members may be more active as regards experience in public office than is the general populace; they also appear as likely as anyone to work with others on local problems and to contact local and national political figures.[4] Gakkai members definitely do not indicate any relative tendency not to vote, nor did one individual member, under clinical examination, evince any apathetic inclinations--on the contrary, between the month prior to his conversion and the fifth month thereafter he showed a definite increase in diffuse activist tendencies.[5] In the purely verbal area of behavior, one Yomiuri Shimbun survey of Tokyoites provided the following data, which are corroborated by other polls:[6]

QUESTION: Do you talk about the coming [April 1967] gubernatorial election at home or at work?

I talk about it: Supporters of:	Very often	Sometimes	Not often	Not at all	DK, NA	Totals
Liberal Democrats:	13.6%	30. %	36.6%	18.5%	1.3%	100 %
Socialists:	9.7	42.	31.9	16.4	---	100
Democratic Socialists:	11.1	45.8	31.9	9.7	1.4	99.9
Communists:	16.1	32.3	41.9	3.2	6.5	100
Komeito:	23.6	36.4	25.5	12.7	1.8	100
Total sample:	11.7	34.2	34.3	17.2	2.7	101.1

Whether such professed interest represents actual behavior is unknown; it still stands that Komeito supporters appear more interested than either the general electorate or its supposedly relatively politicized part, i.e., the supporters of other political parties. In comparison with other religious groups, James Dator's survey of Gakkai members in Tokyo also suggests relative non-apathy. On a scale of "citizen duty" adapted from Campbell, *et al*.'s *The Voter Decides* only 9 percent of the Gakkai members scored low, as opposed to 12 percent of those professing no religious belief, 16 percent of those professing some religious belief, and 17 percent of those professing belief in the traditional Buddhist and Shinto sects.[7]

B. Remoteness of Focus

The predominant focus of interest and activity for most individuals is immediate and personal. For example, in a 1954 study in the United States, where the participant citizen image is a norm, 80 percent of the respondents indicated that they worried most about solely personal and familial matters.[8] The Japanese are no different from Americans in this immediacy of focus, nor are members of the Sokagakkai insofar as the available data are any indication.

The doctrines of Nichiren Shoshu are replete with utopian and millennial goals--Obutsu-myogo, Kosen-rufu, the Third Civilization, and all the other socio-economic-political concomitants of universal belief--but it is highly unlikely that the great majority of the membership is motivated by a compulsion to attain these goals. When members talk of the benefits they have received through faith, the ultimate goals of the movement are hardly ever mentioned; when they speak of their own aims, the context of their aspirations seems to be quite immediate.

A few surveys clarify this tendency. Of one random sample of only 36 Gakkai members, none mentioned remote objectives when questioned about their aims in life; 11 persons answered in purely immediate and material terms--"build my own home," "become economically secure," "own my own shop," etc.--while another 11 spoke more abstractly of family security, children's growth, and familial happiness.[9]

Although the focus of attention of Gakkai members cannot be described as remote, it is possible that it is a little less narrow and personal than is the case with the general public. One Gakkai spokesman surmised that, while immediate interests might be paramount for new members, with time the horizon of the believer broadens into social consciousness and altruism.[10] It is possible that this is so; one national and one local survey suggest a relative breadth of focus among believers: to the question "What is the most important thing in the world?" the overwhelming majority of a sample of non-Gakkai members answered "family," but about one quarter of a sample of believers responded "society" or "the world."[11] A question in the same survey on the proper manner of living of man elicited from Gakkai members the relatively frequent response: "one should live to eliminate the injustice in the world." The 1963 survey on national character hints at the same attitude: Gakkai members were slightly more likely to profess an inclination to live for society rather than for personal wealth, prestige, or comfort.[12]

At the same time, although Gakkai members may be relatively altruistic in an abstract fashion, they do seem to be more immediate of focus as regards specific political issues than is the general public. On immediate issues--the Tokyo gubernatorial election and policies regarding political corruption, price stabilization, tax cuts, and housing problems--Komeito supporters appear to be roughly as interested as supporters of other parties and more interested than the overall electorate.[13] However, on foreign policy questions they are relatively apathetic as indicated by the frequency of "Don't know" responses or lack of response. One national survey by the Yomiuri Shimbun in March 1966 included eight questions on the general subject of Vietnam; Komeito supporters' "Don't know" responses were more frequent than those of supporters of any other party and surpassed those of the overall sample on each question by 3 to 11 percentage points.[14] In addition, to five questions on various foreign policies Komeito supporters again registered the highest frequency of "DK" answers, 2 to 8 percent higher than that of the whole sample on each question.

What may in fact characterize the membership of the Sokagakkai is not a remoteness of behavioral focus but a normally (or, considering the relative apathy concerning international affairs, relatively) immediate focus combining ignorance and activism. Gakkai members are definitely not apathetic; their proclivities to talk, vote, and participate in public office indicate this. They are immediate in social and political focus with a possible relative breadth of abstract social orientation; however, they appear to be even more parochial than the general public on specific political issues. "Parochial" is derived here by reference to the frequency of "Don't know" responses; another term for parochialism of this type could be ignorance, and in this form its existence among Gakkai members is suggested by two surveys. A 1961 poll comparing extent of (a) political information and (b) contact with the ward assembly in any form, and (c) voting rates of Tokyoites shows the following paradoxical pattern of activism and ignorance:[15]

Percentage scoring high in:	Supporters of: Liberal Democrats	Socialists	Demo. Soc.	Komeito	Communists
Extent of information:	26.9%	25.2%	25.5%	12.5%	19. %
Contact with ward assenbly:	48.4	41.4	47.9	53.2	33.3
Voting rate:	70.3	69.1	73.4	84.4	61.9

A more recent survey by the Central Research Service (Chūo Chōsa Sha) concerning views of the 1965 Upper House election shows a parallel tendency: early closure of opinion concerning candidates, relative interest in and optimism about the prospective electoral performance of one's own party, and great relative ignorance of and uninterest in any other political party.[16] This possible ignorant-activist pattern does not imply remoteness of focus; however, activism in the absence of knowledge is hardly responsible and, where the activity is frustrated, may give rise to even greater alienation than failure might ordinarily engender.

C. Direct Action

As suggested above, members of the Sokagakkai do not appear to be either notably apathetic or inclined toward remote objects of action. Thus the masslike unattachment and alienation of Gakkai members are not corroborated and one may suspect accordingly that the availability of Gakkai members for mobilization by a mass movement is not relatively great.

Such mobilization takes the form of stimulation to behavior unmediated by social norms, relationships, or formal rules. In its unorganized form mass politics may take the form of assassination, sabotage, or mob riot. The Sokagakkai provides sufficient organization and continuity of effort and purpose to fulfill Kornhauser's definition of a movement; if its members were in fact mass men one might expect a collective proclivity for violence or other types of illegal or socially deviant behavior. Instances of such behavior are on record, although they have been perpetrated by a small minority; "heretical" priests have been set upon and harangued mercilessly for hours, as have been reluctant subjects of shakubuku. The record of criminal behavior in connection with certain election campaigns is equally clear, as are the instances of intimidation, invasion of privacy, and coercion.

One must note, however, that such behavior has never been universally practiced; in addition, almost no such incidents have occurred since the early 1960's. Today less than one-half of those once converted by the Gakkai profess membership; of those who do articulate their belief, approximately one-half cannot be termed active in any way, as regards participation in events, attendance at meetings, office-holding, reading of sacred texts, or proselyting. In conversation members evince considerable tolerance and reluctance to press even so socially deviant (though not necessarily undemocratic) an act as aggressive shakubuku or even to say ill of other faiths. It is difficult to envision such people as members of a mass movement--they simply do not seem inclined toward such action.

To be sure, such impressions can be misleading. In addition, there is almost certainly an element within the Sokagakkai membership which could be mobilized toward any goal whatsoever. In the words of one young girl activist, "If President Ikeda told us to demonstrate, I'd demonstrate in front of the Diet until I died." Such zeal may be only rhetorical, but, considering the charismatic attraction for many believers exercised by the President, it is more probable that the girl was quite serious. Fully 90 percent of one sample of Gakkai activists replied in the affirmative when asked if they would participate in a Gakkai-sponsored street demonstration.[17] While the term "demonstration" includes such innocuous activities as the Komeito outdoor lecture meetings in Sasebo, one must assume that many of this group would be willing to pursue more extreme actions. It is also probable that while the proportion of the Gakkai's entire membership which approaches this degree of enthusiasm is small, it is absolutely in the neighborhood of 500,000 persons.

Thus in this aspect of the mass man model one reencounters a problem previously noted: the discrepancy between elite and rank-and-file. The rank-and-file does not appear either to tend toward illegal or deviant action or to be easily mobilizable for such action. The activists, although they have not been involved in illegal action for several years, do appear to be sufficiently committed to the Gakkai to be available for mobilization toward whatever goals it specifies. This condition leads somewhat ahead of the present discussion: in a situation where believers are committed more to an organization or a leader than to an ideology or a set of norms, the nature of the official goals and strategies set by the organization or leader takes on great importance. For the moment, however, one should note that there seems to be a sizable minority of available persons in the Gakkai, certainly enough to constitute a mass political collective actor if the Society's leaders should choose to mobilize the membership in the extraparliamentary pursuit of political goals.

However, in the total behavioral picture of the Gakkai member, there is not enough potentiality or actual behavioral record to justify description of the modal believer as a mass man. Gakkai members are neither relatively apathetic in outlook nor relatively remote in focus of attention and, in the absence of any instance of illegal activity in the last several years, one cannot judge on the basis of deep commitment alone that the membership is a mass. The potential for mass behavior may well exist in the Gakkai; however, as of the present no threshold between relative possibility and absolute practice has been crossed. Thus one suspects that the Gakkai member is closer to the average Japanese than to the average Japanese communist, or to mass man.

* * * * * *

William Kornhauser's model of mass man is quite useful in a study of the members of the Sokagakkai in that it provides a framework upon which all of the data available on the members which bears upon their relevance for a democratic polity can be hung and in that the data necessary to fill out the framework it provides is almost all available, though not authoritative in any single aspect. Regarding congruence of subject and model, however, one may venture the conclusion that the model does not fit in the sense that it does not seem justifiable to declare that either the modal member of the Sokagakkai (as he might appear from out of a number of attitude surveys) or almost any of the individual members personally met in the course of this study possess the characteristics of mass man, with all of the political implications thereof.

The members of the Sokagakkai do not have notably fewer ties to social groups--even extra-Gakkai ones--than do the general populace. They may have fewer sources of information about the outside world than do non-Gakkai members, but do not seem to have the lack of identity which typifies mass man. In sum, one may surmise a slight similarity to the model, but no close approximation.

Gakkai members seem to be relatively self-alienated; however, the more extreme totalitarian man, with his "authoritarian personality," does not resemble either the believers studied collectively or those met and talked with. In fact, those encountered seemed so self-confident and positive as to create doubt in one's mind that they personally felt a sense of futility or powerlessness. Nor did they seem to bear any considerable distrust toward their fellow men, nor any notable envy, nor any political or religious partisanship in excess of that exhibited by many Americans of the author's acquaintance. Nor does the available aggregate data on the attitudes of Sokagakkai members indicate a strong parallel to the mass characteristic of human alienation, although once again a relative proximity may be inferred.

Systemic alienation is marked, both absolutely and relative to the general public. Gakkai members are dissatisfied with the performance of the economic, social, and political systems vis-à-vis themselves, with public officials, and with the policies which the ruling political forces espouse. They also evince relatively low support for the constitutional framework of the Japanese polity, though one cannot say that they are significantly antipathetic toward the elements of the "democratic formula."

Despite the possible existence of this unattachment and alienation, the general membership of the Sokagakkai does not appear to be available for mobilization as a mass movement, nor has it--either rank-and-file or elite--shown and predilection for mass behavior whatsoever in the last several years. A deeply committed activist core contains the potential for mass behavior--as it does for any form of collective action. The possible socially isolating effects of activism and the possible covariance of activism with alienation and F-scale scores suggest that mass behavior is a very real possibility among the hard core;* in judging the entire membership, however, one cannot overlook the strikingly liberal outlook of certain older and less well-educated members among whom one otherwise expect to find conservatism, apathy, and ignorance.

The sum of these characteristics and trends suggests non-congruence of subject and model, conditioned by the warning that the subject probably contains a closely congruent minority. There exists relative proximity but not close approximation, potential but not performance. This judgment is subjective; Kornhauser provides neither mensurative aids (exactly how much of characteristic X renders a person "mass?") nor aggregative aids (how many of characteristics W, X, Y, and Z must be present before one may make a conclusion of "massness?").

The conclusions reached here, however tentative, suggest that there may be inconsistencies between reality and the political tendencies attributed by Almond and Verba, Lipset, Kornhauser, McClosky, and others to certain socioeconomic and demographic elements, if the members of the Sokagakkai as a particular social collectivity are in any way representative of reality. The possible reasons for this seeming inconsistency are three: either the correlation found by Lipset et al. is spurious, or the relationship is valid but accidentally culture-bound, or the fact of membership in the Sokagakkai represents an intervening variable between demographic, socioeconomic, and psychological factors on the one hand and political behavior and thus relevance for the political environment on the other.

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*A situation of which the Gakkai leadership itself is possibly unaware.

NOTES: CHAPTER 15

1. Gabriel Almond and Sidney, Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Boston, 1965, pp. 52, 134-35; Robert Lane, *Political Life*, Glencoe, 1959, p. 168.

2. Ishigami Ryohei, "Senkyo ni Arawareru Shimin no Seiji Ishiki," in *Toshi Mondai*, vol. 44 no. 10, October 1953, pp. 166-70; Yokogoshi Eiichi, "Dai-toshi ni okeru Senkyo to Shimin," in *Toshi Mondai*, vol. 46 no. 3, March 1955, p. 33; *Asahi Shimbun*, April 3, 1967; Naikaku Kanbo Naikaku Chosa-shitsu, *Nihon no Seijiteki Mukanshin*, Tokyo, 1961, passim, and *Seijiteki Mukanshin no Jittai to Keiko*, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 65ff.; unpub. data from Sidney Verba *et al*., Cross-National Study of Political and Social Change.

3. Unpub. data from Japanese government survey of popular attitudes toward the Constitution.

4. *Loc. cit*.; Verba data.

5. Unpub. data from third National Character (Kokuminsei) study by the Tokei Suri Kenkyu-jo, Tokyo; Yamaguchi Akira, *Issenman-nin no Kokoro wo Tsukanda Himitsu: Sokagakkai no Shinri Senryaku*, Tokyo, 1967, pp. 116-19; Verba data.

6. Unpub. data from *Yomiuri Shimbun* survey of March 1967; Verba data.

7. James Dator, unpub. data presented at annual convention of the Association for Asian Studies, March 1968.

8. Samuel Stouffer, *Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties*, New York, 1955, p. 59.

9. Unpub. data from study by Miss Takahashi Naoko.

10. Interview with Sasaki Toshiyuki, Sokagakkai Public Relations Bureau.

11. Tokyo Daigaku Shakaigakka and Tokyo Joshi Daigaku Shakaigakka, Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1963, p. 122.

12. Kokuminsei data.

13. Unpub. data from Yomiuri Shimbun survey of March 1967 and Mainichi Shimbun survey of June 1965.

14. Unpub. data from Yomiuri Shimbun survey of March 1966.

15. Matsushita Keiichi, "Kozo Hendo to Sengo Minshushugi," in Sekai, no. 257, April 1967, p. 41.

16. "Voting Characteristics Revealed in Pre-Election Opinion Poll--House of Councillors Elections, July 1965," Tokyo, United States Information Service, 1965, pp. 8-9.

17. Koya Azumi, "Functions of Soka Gakkai Membership," unpub. paper, Columbia University, 1967, p. 3.

PART V: THE SOKAGAKKAI AS A MASS MOVEMENT

CHAPTER 16: THE SOKAGAKKAI AS STRUCTURE

A. Introduction

In the words of William Kornhauser, "mass movements are miniature mass societies; totalitarian movements are miniature totalitarian societies."[1] For this reason we assume that there will be parallels between mass men, movements, and societies in internal structure, psychology (or ideology), and behavior, and undemocratic implications.

It has been cogently argued that mass movements, as activist organizations of disaffected persons aiming to better their condition through methods not always compatible with the established political processes, need not be undemocratic.[2] Such social movements may seem to threaten stability without in fact threatening the basic principles of the political system; they may even constitute a leaven without which the polity would ossify. Michael Rogin sees American Populism as such a democratic mass movement;[3] one might consider also the militant student movements on many American university campuses or the street demonstrations of the political opposition in Japan as a similar phenomena: frustrated outbursts aimed against an unresponsive system which seems to have no care for the interests of minorities; outbursts serving to open the channels of communication which are indispensable to democracy.

However, the definition of mass movement used here specifically excludes such movements as the Populists as described by Rogin; the type of deviance envisioned when "direct, unmediated action" is spoken of here is that type which is either directed against the entire system within which it takes place or is of such a form that it threatens the basic tacit norms or formal rules which regulate behavior within the system. For this reason, certain forms of "demonstration" do not, in the Japanese context, constitute deviance from the generally accepted "rules of the game;" accordingly, participation in peaceful demonstrations does not make an organization a mass movement. Similarly, the Populist movement which, according to Rogin, "operated within the established constitutional framework of the republic," would not, in its operational aspect, be categorized as a mass movement for the purposes of this study.[4]

However, operation within the established procedural framework is not the only index of similarity to a mass movement. In light of other independent variables such as official ideology one may make additional inferences about the state of the dependent variable, i.e., the relevance for the political system of the movement in question. The term mass movement, in this study, refers only to those movements which, because of a certain configuration of structural, ideological, and behavioral attributes, have destructive implications for democratic political systems. To say that a given organization is a mass movement is to imply both the configuration (of independent variables) and the resultant, dependent relationship. Such movements as are composed of masses (in Rogin's sense of the term,[5] that is, "deprived," "anomic," "dispossessed," i.e., roughly unattached and alienated) but do not evince the full syndrome of features --the behavioral in particular--which constitute the mass movement as defined here would, to Rogin, be "democratic mass movements;"[6] in this essay they will simply not be considered as mass movements but, rather more broadly, as "social movements" or "collective behavior."

* * * * * *

Kornhauser's model of a mass movement may be operationalized in parallel with the model of mass man. Structure, externally, is analogous to the social position of mass man: unattached to the larger social environment. Internally the movement's structure is characterized by (a) weak intermediate groups which are (b) non-inclusive. Due to the quality of the intermediate group structure, (c) the organization's elites are accessible to direct influence by the membership.

Ideology of the mass movement reflects the mentality of the mass man. First, (a) belief in the powerlessness of man alone and the futility of life outside the movement fosters self-alienation among the membership. Less specifically part of the content of doctrine and more its stylistic characteristic is (b) simplism, which takes precedence over truth, rationality, and even common sense. Supplementing this aspect of the model is a more extreme one which would class the modelled organization as totalitarian, not mass. This additional aspect is (d) the authoritarian personality: to what extent are its factors reflected in the ideology of the movement? The validity of generalizing from personality to ideology in this case is indicated by the manner in which the concept of the authoritarian personality was created: the factors of the model were abstracted in the first place in part from a wide selection of doctrinal writings from Fascist sources.

Human alienation is empirically visible in the ideologies of mass movements, as it is in the outlook of mass men, in the form of (a) distrust of people in general and outsiders (non-believers) in particular, (b) extreme partisanship and uncooperativeness, and (c) envy of apparently more privileged socioeconomic elements. The ideology also shows alienation from (a) concrete environmental systems--social, economic, and political. Systemic alienation includes disaffection with the attitudinal underpinning of democratic systems in particular, that is, (b) the "democratic formula."

Mass movements, as aggregations of mass men, will show similar behavioral characteristics, except that, as movements, they attempt to mobilize behavior and thus will not have the apathetic aspect that mass man does. They will, however, (a) direct their activities toward remote, abstract, and extreme objects; these activities will be (b) unmediated, direct, and highly deviant or illegal.

The fact that, according to Kornhauser, mass movements are collectivities of mass men and are thus in their actions aggregations of mass behavior[8] suggests that the study of such movements apart from the study of their memberships is needless, that the political implications of such movements may be inferred with sufficient accuracy from sociological examination alone. If this is so, then the tentative conclusion reached previously that the members of the Soka-gakkai do not fit the model of mass man and that their behavior does not resemble mass behavior would obviate the present part of this study. However, it is assumed here that the organization, as a reified entity, may also be fruitfully studied. Kornhauser notes that one aspect of a mass movement which sets it off from the mass is its program, but he does not treat this program as an independent factor, except for suggesting that certain programs have greater appeal to the mass elements in certain objective socioeconomic classes than in others. The present assumption is that where there is commitment to an ideology, this ideology itself is worthy of study. The degree to which such an ideology may be internalized by the faithful and the selective process by which it is internalized may be significant for the resultant psychological and behavioral characteristics of the membership, which may or may not be compatible with the official goals and activities of the organization.

In other words, Kornhauser largely ignores problems of difference between and relationship between two very different levels of analysis, the micro (mass man) and macro (mass movement). Direct generalization from one to the other may be misleading; having studied the micro level in relative isolation, we shall now do the same with the macro, after which we shall approach the question of their interaction.

The reasons for approaching the Sokagakkai as a mass movement of the specifically undemocratic type described by Kornhauser have been given in the introduction to this study. To reiterate, in the first place, the Gakkai calls itself a mass movement. Second, many observers maintain that the Society is a threat to democracy; it has been described as "fascistic," "revolutionary," "anti-democratic," and "poisonous" of democracy.[9] These two descriptions together suggest the appropriateness of Kornhauser's model. Further, the Gakkai is a religious organization; the connections between doctrinaire religion and illiberalism in general and rightwing extremism in particular has been well documented.[10] The interchangeability of undemocratic mass movements suggested by Eric Hoffer indicates that Kornhauser's model might be useful for the analysis of either secular or religious mass movements, as Kornhauser asserts it is.[11]

The nature of most of the data used in this part--Gakkai written materials and interviews--precluded direct comparison with other organizations in the Japanese political system; therefore, in the absence of a yardstick by which to measure relative "massness" the author was forced to rely upon subjective judgments of absolute proximity of data to model. The impossibility of comparison with other organizations in the immediate Japanese context is a weakness; in compensation examples of historical mass movements will be offered and the Gakkai tested against them and against the model. The subjective element is unavoidable; fortunately, in most instances the official media of the Gakkai itself are sufficiently explicit to enable the reader to judge for himself the congruence of data and model.

B. Structural Characteristics

1. Unattached?

Figure 1 gives an idea of the situation of the Soka-gakkai in its environment. The left vertical column ("Organization") indicates the organizational ties between the Society and its environing political, social, and religious systems; the right column ("Socialization) signifies the direction (toward social attachment or detachment) of the influence exerted by the Gakkai's socialization process upon its members. The top row ("Ideal connections") shows the official attitudes of the Gakkai as regards its connections with its environment: does it see itself as part of or separated from its context and does it inculcate identity or separatism in its members? The bottom row ("actual connections") indicates the actual state of the organizational ties of the Gakkai to the rest of Japanese society and the actual forces exerted upon the pattern of social relationships of members as the consequence of their Gakkai membership.

Figure 1.

		Organization is:		Socialization:	
Ideal connections	Social	Attached	1	Attaches	2
	Political	Attached	3	Attaches	4
	Religious	Unattached	5	Detaches	6
Actual connections	Social	Unattached	7	Detaches	8
	Political	Attached	9	Detaches	10
	Religious	Unattached	11	Detaches	12

Box 1: The Sokagakkai definitely considers itself a part of Japanese society. It does not set itself off as an isolated colony of the elect;

> It is a great mistake to think of the Sokagakkai as a religious organization, a specific religious organization, or suchlike; the Sokagakkai itself is the solidly unified manifestation of the true populace of Japan. . . .[12]

But the identification with Japanese society is absolute; the Gakkai does not connect itself with any social grouping smaller than the entire society. It often speaks of its special ties with "the masses," a social group which is not defined, although certain references suggest an element of class orientation:

> The masses are like weeds. But can fruit grow where weeds cannot? Their power and their thought,

> at times, are stronger than those of philosophers and premiers, and contain the truth as well.[13]

Real class consciousness of the Marxist prescription is absent from Gakkai doctrines; that which does appear, such as the above, seems to be rather a diffuse defensiveness directed toward the "better-off" and more prestigious social strata. Thus the "attachment" spoken of here might be a meaningless attachment to some abstract Japanese society and not in fact to any concrete social entity at all.

Box 2: The socialization process of the Sokagakkai does not seem calculated to produce persons with relatively few ties to their social environment. The social aspects of the Gakkai value system are very consistent with those of Japanese culture in general: the importance of interpersonal relationships and interpersonal harmony. The self-assertion apparent in shakubuku is deviant in Japan. Data previously presented suggest, however, that such deviant behavior is not typical of the entire Gakkai membership; moreover, one might argue that the example of self-assertion provided by Gakkai members is of beneficial influence in an aspiring democratic society where the idea of the individual as actor is still somewhat of a deviant norm.

Box 3: Politically the Sokagakkai sees itself as connected to its environment in general and (albeit informally and intermittently) to other political organizations in particular. Although proclaiming itself as an entirely new political phenomenon, the Komeito seems to have internalized the operational norms of the parliamentary system and certainly considers itself as one of many actors in this system. It also recognizes that ties and cooperation with other political actors are essential if its own activity is to bear fruit.

Box 4: Nor do the political aspects of socialization seem intended to lead toward detachment from the Japanese political context. There is strong impressionistic evidence for the view that the Society serves to introduce many previously apathetic persons into the political system, though hard data on this question are lacking. In addition, the Gakkai explicitly tries to increase the political consciousness of its believers and such efforts are directed toward creating actors within the existing political system; that is to say, the Gakkai does not seem to be working to create totalitarian cadres intended to overthrow the polity.

The data on alienation among Gakkai members and on uninterest in other parties except the Komeito, however, suggest that the Gakkai's socialization process may have unintended consequences. It is possible that the constant attacks upon the present workings of the political system serve to build strong negative feelings toward this system. Thus, while the ideal Gakkai member is an aware, articulate, responsible actor in the parliamentary system, the actual member is perhaps connected with the political system narrowly, that is, only insofar as he is concerned with the Gakkai and the Komeito, and is influenced toward further alienation by the indiscriminate criticism heaped upon the system by the official media of the Society.

Box 5: The Gakkai's ideal connections with its religious environment are for all practical purposes nonexistent. The very essence of the interfaith aspect of the teachings of Nichiren Shoshu is exclusivity; such a principle not only militates against the development of ties with other religious bodies and belief systems but further increases the isolation of the Gakkai because intolerance and exclusivity are in themselves deviant characteristics in the Japanese religious system.

Box 6: Full socialization into the ideal patterns of relationship to other religions would render the Society member almost completely isolated from the larger Japanese religious environment.

Box 7: Actual relationships between the Sokagakkai and the rest of Japanese society are few, though increasing. The Society contains within its own organization a full network of subsidiary social structures which largely obviate external ties with any group. The planned labor union, when complete, will further reflect this pattern: rather than tying itself to the larger social nexus, the Gakkai restricts its social relationships to those who are already tied to the Society by the bond of belief.

Box 9: Politically, however, the Sokagakkai has created an extensive set of relationships with its environment. On the micro level, the Citizens' Discussion Centers serve to tie the Komeito to the lowest personal and local levels of political articulation. In assemblies the party has participated in numerous ad hoc alliances with other parties, being perhaps more prone than the other parties of the opposition to see such coalitions as an effective bargaining tool. The Gakkai, through the Komeito, is a full-scale political actor and as such is fully integrated with its political context.

Box 11: In line with its subjective exclusion of all other, i.e., heretical, religions, the Sokagakkai has to date remained aloof from all other religious organizations. In one recent instance the Gakkai supposedly made overtures to an interdenominational religious group but was rebuffed by certain of the members.[14] This is to date the only example of an effort by the Gakkai to relate itself positively to its religious environment, from which one may conclude that the Gakkai is at present detached.

Boxes 8, 10, 12: The socialization process of the Sokagakkai seems in all its aspects--social, religious, and political--to lead to decreased actual attachment to the non-Gakkai environment. The data previously presented concerning closure of social and communication contacts with the secular society through time and concerning political mobilization all contribute to the suspicion that the socializing experience tends in actuality to cut the individual off from his non-Gakkai context. In the case of social and political connections this actual pattern, if it exists, is in contradiction of the Gakkai's ideal pattern of environmental ties: the Gakkai constantly adjures the faithful to "Be good members of society!;" similarly, it ostensibly endeavors to create from its membership a collectivity of aware, active, responsible political actors.

However, at the same time, the Gakkai tries to subsume every aspect of the individual member's social activity under its network of suborganizations. In the same way, the information about the political system which the Gakkai member receives through such media as the *Komei Shimbun* is concerned only with the system as it affects and is affected by the Komeito. Thus, at the same time that the Society advises each believer ideally to be a full member of society and polity, it may well be actually working (perhaps unconsciously) to draw its members away from their social and political context. Whether or not this is in fact the case must be determined through more detailed examination of the interaction of the official Sokagakkai teachings and the attitudes and behavior of the membership (see Part VI below). Present examination of the teachings of the Gakkai, however, indicates that the *ideal* purposes of the socialization process and the *ideal* and *actual* state of the Gakkai *as an organizational entity* do not constitute a condition of unattachment to or isolation from society or polity.

2. Intermediate Groups: Weak?

The three features of mass collectivities are (a) the isolation of primary relationships, (b) the weakness and non-inclusivity of secondary (intermediate) relationships, and (c) the centralization of tertiary relationships (that is, relations with the national government in a mass society, or relations with the central elite in a mass movement),[15] these tertiary relationships being characterized by conditions of (d) availability of non-elites and (e) accessibility of elites.[16]

The Sokagakkai is unquestionably a mass movement on the basis of principle (c). All relationships with the organization are ideally centralized, the central authorities direct all collective behavior, and ideally there is no competing locus of power whatsoever in the organization. What discrepancies may exist in this tertiary center-periphery relationship are the result of actual patterns of intermediate relationships and structures. The significance of primary relationships, too, is in their integration in secondary structures. The family is not isolated from the larger organization; it is a socializing agency of ever-increasing importance and as such contradicts the provision that personal relationships in a mass be isolated from and irrelevant to the larger social context. But a type of familistic relationship is, in Japan, characteristic of secondary relationships as well as primary; therefore one may fruitfully study primary relationships also in the examination of intermediate structures.

Kornhauser provides a typology of societies according to patterns of secondary relationships as follows:[17]

		Intermediate groups are:	
		Strong	Weak
Intermediate groups are:	Inclusive	Communal society	Totalitarian society
	Non-Inclusive	Pluralist society	Mass society

Assuming analogous patterns in social organizations on sub-societal levels, one may say that intermediate groups within the Sokagakkai are ideally quite weak, placing the Gakkai in either the totalitarian or mass categories. The founder of the Gakkai, Makiguchi Tsunesaburo, wholly ignored secondary relationships, concentrating on the individual and the social whole; the doctrines of the Gakkai today, with their exclusive emphasis of individual happiness and societal prosperity, reflect this past.[18] Despite the multiplicity of intermediate groups in the Gakkai's present structure, the idea of strong or autonomous (*vis-à-vis* the Gakkai as a whole) secondary relationships is anathema.[19] No such relationships interfere with communication and mobilization; moreover, they are the soil from whence spring up the factions which have riven so many Japanese religious groups.

In a structure such as this tertiary relationships are ideally mass-like: direct and unmediated in any autonomous fashion. On the other hand, primary relationships (seen in one's relation to the Gakkai through his family) are ideally integrated with the larger Gakkai context; primary ties are relevant to the larger world in a manner which suggests the inaccuracy of the mass movement model in describing the Society.

It is not clear that any strong intermediate groups which contravene the model of a mass movement by interfering in tertiary relationships such as mobilization exist in the Sokagakkai. Data presented above concerning reasons for joining the Gakkai do provide evidence to support this speculation. They indicate that in many cases religion has little to do with conversion; rather, basic social needs and psychological needs which may be satisfied through interpersonal relations in a warm, intimate, _gemeinschaftlich_ small group context seem to be the strongest motive force. In combination with the integration of primary intrafamilial relationships into the socialization process, such a speculation, if confirmed, would signify a non-mass element in the Sokagakkai. However, the ideal state of intermediate relationships is weak: confirmation thus requires examination of the empirical interrelation of official ideal and informal actuality.

3. Intermediate Groups: Non-Inclusive?

The ideal pattern of secondary relationships within the Sokagakkai is one of multiple and non-inclusive but mutually reinforcing intermediate groups. The total effect, as one will recall from the discussion in Part II, is one of almost complete inclusivity; such a structural configuration--weak and inclusive intermediate groups--is more typical of totalitarian than mass societies and movements. One should recall the suggestion of pluralist theorists of democracy that multiple associational relationships, to be beneficial for the maintenance of democracy, should be cross-cutting and not overlapping in such a manner as to add up to a monolithic unity.[20]

A comprehensive network of ideologically uniform secondary groups is one feature of totalitarian societies; such groups serve as multiple communication channels, enabling the organization to reach its members with its message in all spheres of their behavior. In addition, they facilitate mobilization; partial mobilization of specialized parts of the membership may be effected through peer, local, or functional groups, and general mobilization is made more feasible because none of the ideal member's secondary relationships conflict with or restrain his full devotion to organizational activities.

The Sokagakkai's system of secondary groups differs both from the inclusivity of Sigmund Neumann's "parties of total integration," such as communist and fascist parties *qua* parties, and from the aspects of those movements which achieve inclusivity through relatively extensive use of front groups.[21] In parties of total integration the party demands total control over all aspects of the individual member's behavior; the Sokagakkai makes no such demands and manifestly requires complete conformity only in the area of religious observance. The Gakkai does have its front groups in the sense of screens between itself and society through which the movement's teachings and goals are presented to the general public in a hopefully more appetizing fashion, and through which potential members can be recruited. However, the interpretative and recruiting functions of the Gakkai secondary groups are minor; they are not so much front groups as they are overtly integrated branches of the movement; they are designed much more for participation by and socialization of full members of the organization than for attraction and preparatory deception of prospective converts. The Komeito is the only branch which steadfastly maintains its independence and tries to gain support from non-members; however, in this case, too, the vast majority of the party's backers are Sokagakkai members.

The overall effect of the Gakkai's structure on the membership seems to be in the direction of great inclusivity. The effect is more latent than manifest, since there are no overt demands. It is also perhaps unintended; there is no mention in any Gakkai literature of any necessity to participate in Gakkai secondary groups--peer, neighborhood, or interest--to the exclusion of all others. But the effect is almost certainly the Gakkai's ideal: it is obvious that any member who is ideally committed to the beliefs of Nichiren Shoshu should naturally prefer to belong to the correct group--be it a party, an orchestra, a youth group, a local block association, or a labor union--in all fields of his endeavor. One will note the contradiction between this inclusive latent ideal and the manifest ideal of social attachment described on pages 530-534 above; for the present one must accept both ideals as they are found in Gakkai ideology.

The ideal communication framework which surrounds the Gakkai member, like his relational network, conduces to inclusivity. Believers are constantly exhorted to read for a minimum of twenty minutes per day; occasionally readings outside of the Gakkai are recommended, but such recommendations are perfunctory.[22] More typical is the advice of one Gakkai medium which recommended in order the writings of St. Nichiren and President Ikeda for religious knowledge, Dai Byaku Renge for theological study, the Seikyo Shimbun and Komei Shimbun for daily events, Ushio for current problems, and, "if you wish," other "suitable" publications from within and outside of the Gakkai.[23] A further elaboration of this approach to communications is contained in the answer of Morita Kazuya, director of Soka Schools, to a high school student's inquiry regarding proper reading materials: read "valuable /kachiaru/" literature such as those books quoted or recommended by President Ikeda or the members of the Opinion Department. Furthermore, one should not simply read aimlessly and form one's ideas from the material read; all books should be read in light of the teachings of Nichiren Shoshu and evaluated and criticized from the Gakkai point of view.[24]

The actual inclusivity of secondary relationships in the Sokagakkai is less than ideal. Data presented above in relation to social unattachment of Gakkai members strongly suggest that the inclusivity of one's relationship with the Gakkai is considerably less than total. But until the interaction of macro ideal and micro actual are more thoroughly studied one must rely for evaluation of the organizational nature of the Sokagakkai upon the ideals it espouses, and in the case of intermediate groups the Gakkai resembles not a mass movement but a totalitarian movement: secondary relationships are weak but inclusive.

4. Elites: Accessible?

The conditions of mass society and, by Kornhauser's analogy, mass movements are (a) availability of non-elites and (b) accessibility of elites.[25] Non-elites are available for mobilization by mass movements by virtue of their unattachment to and alienation from their social and political environment; since it is these personal attributes which determine the similarity of individuals available mass man, availability has been treated in Part IV and will, as regards individual availability in interaction with organizational attempts at mobilization, be dealt with again in Part VI. Elite accessibility in interaction with attempts by non-elites to influence elites will also be treated in Part VI; here the degree of structural accessibility of the elite in relative isolation from any concrete attempt at their influence will be studied.

Kornhauser types societies (and, by inference, social movements) as follows:[26]

		AVAILABILITY OF NON-ELITES	
		Low	High
ACCESSIBILITY OF ELITES	Low	Communal society	Totalitarian society
	High	Pluralist society	Mass society

Kornhauser takes as the index of elite accessibility the degree to which non-elites participate in the selection of elites.[27] Later, however, he speaks of "manipulation" and "mobilization" of elites by non-elites, made possible by the absence of mediating secondary groups between the two.[28] Kornhauser's first index of accessibility is the most easily operationalized of the three; however, in the case of the Sokagakkai it is quite misleading. In the matter of personnel selection the Gakkai elite is almost absolutely inaccessible: leaders are in every case coopted or chosen on the basis of personal achievement in examination and propagation. One might say that a non-elite member "influences" or "has access to" the elite by virtue of his ability to rise into the elite; if so, then the Gakkai has a high degree of elite accessibility. But these individual instances of "influence" or "access," in an organization of millions, are insignificant unless aggregated; it is aggregated or collective influence and access which interests us here. And as regards collective non-elite influence on the selection of leaders, the Sokagakkai is as inaccessible as any totalitarian regime.

To speak of the Gakkai elite as totally inaccessible to non-elites, however, is to overlook one of the potentially most important factors in the growth and solidarity of the Sokagakkai: the ability (either real or perceived) of non-elites to influence elites and the perceived attentiveness of elites to non-elite interests.

Two contrasting views of the influence (in its broadest sense) of non-elites upon elites are those of Reverend Joseph Spae of the Oriens Institute and Nishihira Shigeki of the Institute for Statistical Mathematics, both of Tokyo. According to Spae, Gakkai elite decisions are carried out by a "machine-like" organization; the leadership can impose anything (policies) or anyone (candidates) upon the membership without the least objection or loss of electoral support.[29] The believers are "childlike;" their views count for nothing in the Society and the elite may ignore their interests with impunity. In Spae's opinion the ease with which the elite exercises its control is due as much to the inherent pliability, political immaturity, and receptivity to command of the Japanese populace as to the authoritarian methods of the Gakkai leadership; still, the end product is elite inaccessibility.

Other observers see the same pattern in the Gakkai leadership. Neill McFarland sees the cell-group structure of the new religions as conducive to blind obedience, especially in concert with the receptivity of the Japanese to command and regimentation from above.[30] A less subtle account simply likens Ikeda and his staff to Hitler and the NSDAP elite.[31]

At the other pole is the interpretation suggested by Nishihira: that the Sokagakkai leaders are in fact "the followers of the followers."[32] According to this view, the Gakkai elite (much like Kornhauser's mass society elite[33]) have no real internalized motives or goals but rely upon rank-and-file opinion for their direction, like mirrors rather than leaders. The constant assertions of the Komeito that its policies reflect public opinion suggest an admirable responsiveness to popular interests; in an extreme degree, however, such responsiveness could conceal a complete lack of integrity, autonomy, and leadership.

This author's assumption is that while both Spae and Nishihira offer partially valid interpretations of the condition of the Gakkai elite, it is in fact autonomous and accessible simultaneously. The extent of access sets the Gakkai apart from the model of totalitarian movement; the manner of access--mediated, indirect, and regularized--resembles the dominant pattern in pluralist societies and movements.[34] The idea of democratic-centralist organization is perhaps most expressive: the Gakkai assiduously solicits from the rank-and-file both opinions on general matters and feedback on specific tactics and policies determined at the top of the organization and such opinion is no doubt utilized to avoid elite decisions which might run the risk of rejection by the general membership. In this respect, as in the repeated declarations that a given measure is taken in response to the desires of the people, it appears that the Gakkai elite not only communicates extensively with the non-elites, but is responsive to their interests.

Once decisions are made, however, they are implemented downward through the various arms of the Society very much as is the case in a democratic-centralist communist party, with apparently immediate and unquestioning obedience. It is improbable that the elite can impose any decision whatsoever upon the membership, but there is no documented case of resistance to any elite-determined measure to date. The sanctions which the Society is able to impose--collective approbation, excommunication, or withholding of legitimacy from the individual's efforts at worship--are obviously not sufficient to prevent large-scale defections, but no instance of collective defection has been recorded and those data on apostasy which do exist indicate that general patterns of organization and activity (constant mobilization in particular) are more to blame than any inaccessibility of or despotism by the elite.[35] In short, the capacity for efficient, strictly centralized administration in the absence of coercive sanctions indicates that the "democratic" aspect of centralization is not just a convenient fiction.

The existing condition of high, but mediated and regulated, elite accessibility in the Sokagakkai renders it unlike a mass movement. The centralist features of the organization give elites the autonomy necessary for effective operation; the democratic features both increase commitment on the lower ranks of the Society and enable more efficient vertical communication without which intelligent administration would be much more difficult. This condition also seems to be the ideal of organizational structure. Although strict obedience is not spoken of explicitly, it seems to be a tacitly and uniformly accepted norm among all those Gakkai leaders interviewed, and the idea of remonstration elicited nothing but shock from them (although the idea of reporting dissatisfaction upward did not). One typically Japanese reason for this shock may be (as indeed many Gakkai leaders protested) that unreasonable policies, i.e., decisions made in disregard of or in opposition to the views of the rank-and-file, would never be formulated. The obvious Gakkai ideal of solicitation of members' views does not apparently prepare believers for the possibility that ideal and actual need not coincide. Whether or not they might, the ideal seems plain: the Gakkai is the voice of the people.

* * * * * *

In many of its formal, that is, ideal, aspects the structure of the Sokagakkai resembles that of a mass or, more ominously, totalitarian movement. As regards formal social attachment this is not the case: the Sokagakkai has strong and extensive organizational ties, both ideal and actual, to society and polity. In addition, the Gakkai socialization process does not seem ideally designed to detach the membership from the secular society and from the political system.

However, the structure of internal relationships in the Society gives a different impression. Primary relationships are not fragmented or isolated from the larger organizational context, but tertiary relationships are strictly centralized and, in fact, so are primary relationships, which become direct parts of the Gakkai's socialization structure. Secondary relationships are ideally weak (a feature of totalitarian and mass movements) and, in sum, inclusive (a feature of communal and totalitarian movements), together implying ideal structural parallels with a totalitariam movement. Actual contradictions of the ideal have been suggested, as has the possibly partially unconscious nature of the ideal; the ideal itself, however, appears totalitarian.

Elite accessibility, in both extent and manner, suggests on the other hand pluralism despite the descriptive utility of the "democratic-centralist" model. High elite accessibility is also characteristic of mass movements, but in mass conditions this access is commonly anomic and unmediated. In that rank-and-file Gakkai members can meet elite members face-to-face, access in the Society is direct; it is, however, both mediated and regulated. Mediation does not contradict the finding of weak intermediate groups; mediation and regulation are by centrally determined norms and procedures. Nevertheless, the appearance of high but mediated elite accessibility indicates pluralistic tendencies within the Gakkai.

In sum, the structure of the Sokagakkai presents a confusing picture, which suggests some of the operational shortcomings of Kornhauser's model. There is a direct contradiction between the attachment and elite accessibility aspects of the Gakkai and its intermediate group structure. Several informal, unofficial, and actual characteristics of the Society's membership suggest that thorough micro-macro comparison is merited, especially as regards actual results of socialization, interaction of objective (i.e., apparent) non-elite availability, and autonomy of intermediate groups. Insofar as these factors have already been examined one might suspect relative unattachment and availability, but also a degree of secondary group autonomy which contravenes both the Gakkai ideal and the nature of mass or totalitarian movements. At this stage of analysis one can make no conclusion regarding the similarity of the Sokagakkai to a mass movement; the question of whether this inability is due to true internal contradictions in the Society or to insufficiencies of data or model will be treated in Part VI.

NOTES: CHAPTER 16

1. William Kornhauser, *The Politics of Mass Society*, Glencoe, 1959, p. 47.

2. Michael Rogin, *The Intellectuals and McCarthy: The Radical Specter*, Cambridge, 1967, p. 282; Hans Toch, *The Social Psychology of Social Movements*, New York, 1965, p. 5.

3. Rogin, *op. cit*., p. 268.

4. *Loc. cit*.

5. T. W. Adorno *et al*., *The Authoritarian Personality*, New York, 1950, pp. 224ff.

6. Rogin, *op. cit*., p. 268.

7. Ibid., ch. 1, pp. 168, 179, 185, 264.

8. Kornhauser, *op. cit*., p. 47.

9. Umehara Takeshi, "Sokagakkai no Tetsugakuteki Shukyoteki Hihan," in *Shiso no Kagaku*, no. 33, December 1964, pp. 83-84; Neill McFarland, "Japan's New Religions," in *Contemporary Religions in Japan*, vol. 1 no. 3, September 1960, p. 38; *Shin Shukyo Shimbun*, May 5, 1963.

10. S. M. Lipset, *Political Man*, Garden City, 1963, pp. 23-24; Richard Hofstadter, *The Paranoid Style in American Politics*, New York, 1966, passim; P. G. J. Pulzer, *The Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria*, New York, 1964, pp. 271ff.

11. Eric Hoffer, *The True Believer*, New York, 1966, pp. 25ff.; Kornhauser, *op. cit*., p. 179.

12. Ikeda Daisaku, *Seiji to Shukyo*, Tokyo, 1965, p. 199.

13. Ikeda Daisaku, *Ningen Kakumei*, vol. 1, Tokyo, 1965, p. 14.

14. Murakami Shigeyoshi, "Tenkanki wo Mukaeta Komeito," in *Sekai*, no. 257, April 1967, p. 54.

15. Kornhauser, *op. cit*., ch. 3.

16. Ibid., ch. 2.

17. *Ibid*., p. 84.

18. Shiobara Tsutomu, "Sokagakkai Ideorogii," in Tembo, no. 78, June 1965, p. 39.

19. Although there is no structural ideal to match the Nazi concept of Gleichschaltung. See Franz Neumann, Behemoth, New York, 1942, pp. 51ff., 400ff.

20. Kornhauser, op. cit., pp. 76ff.

21. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York, 1951, p. 367; Sigmund Neumann in Neumann, ed., Modern Political Parties, Chicago, 1956, pp. 404-05.

22. Seikyo Shimbun, September 17, 1967; World Tribune, April 21, 1966.

23. World Tribune, April 21, 1966.

24. Seikyo Shimbun, September 29, 1967.

25. Kornhauser, op. cit., ch. 2.

26. Ibid., p. 40.

27. Loc. cit.

28. Ibid., p. 41.

29. Interview with Joseph Spae, Oriens Institute, Tokyo

30. Neill McFarland, Rush Hour of the Gods, New York, 1967, pp. 84-87.

31. Takase Hiroi, "To-chiji Sen Gojuman no Kagi wo nigiru Sokagakkai," in Shukan Yomiuri, February 17, 1963, p. 12.

32. Interview with Nishihira Shigeki, Tokei Suri Kenkyu-jo, Tokyo.

33. Kornhauser, op. cit., p. 60.

34. Ibid., p. 59.

35. Yui Hiromichi, Dato Sokagakkai, Fujisawa, 1967, passim; Shin Shukyo Shimbun, August 1967, all issues.

CHAPTER 17

THE SOKAGAKKAI AS IDEOLOGY

As the orientation of mass man toward himself and his environment is characterized by alienation, so is the ideology of a mass movement. The Sokagakkai claims to deal expressly with the problem of alienation: the Society aims at restoration of man to himself and to a harmonious relationship with society and nature and is thus diametrically opposed to mass ideology. In the opinion of the Gakkai (drawing upon the work of Lederer, Ortega, Mosca, Pareto, Mannheim, Riesman, and Mills, and Merton, among others), (a) mass production, which turns man into the slave of machines in his productive role and of merchandisers in his consumer role; (b) mass communications, which create a standardized, homogenized mass audience; and (c) modern organization, which makes of man an insignificant cogwheel in a functionally fragmented and coldly impersonal machine, are the environmental causes of alienation.[1] The internal (to the individual) cause is the failure to build up a spiritual defense against the depersonalizing influences of this new environment; the only way to create this defense is through human revolution: "This Wonderful Religion is the one and only path to the conquest of alienation."[2]

Such is the Gakkai's abstract and ideal orientation toward alienation per se. It is possible, however, that if one examines the Gakkai's ideological orientation toward more specific matters such as the intrinsic worth and potency of man, the trustworthiness and virtue of people in society, and the value of the concrete social and political systems within which the Sokagakkai operates, one will see patterns of evaluation and expression which indicate in fact considerable alienation of the Gakkai itself from its environment and actual socializing influences increasing alienation among the membership.

A. Self-Alienation

The term "self-alienation," as used in this section, does not mean alienation of the Sokagakkai as an organization from itself, but rather the implications of the teachings of the Gakkai for self-alienation among the membership. Typical of alienative ideas is

> the conviction that life is determined by forces outside of man's own self, his interest, his wishes. The only possible happiness lies in the submission to these forces. The powerlessness of man is the leitmotif of masochistic philosophy.[3]

This sense of the powerlessness of man and the futility of life except insofar as one submits himself to some exclusive source of potency is one of the operational characteristics of ideological self-alienation in this study. The other, paralleling the characteristics of mass man, is (b) a stylistic simplism which denigrates rationalism, realism, or truth. In addition, the limiting case of programmatic authoritarianism will be sought in the Gakkai's ideology.

* * * * * *

The idea of human impotence is common to Judaism and Christianity, especially to the Lutheran and Calvinist forms of the latter. Today, it is characteristic of many religious groups, both the strictly religious sects which abound in the American Midwest and more ambiguously religio-ethical movements such as Moral Re-Armament.[4] Politically, the idea that there is a single objective truth to which all must adhere and outside of which there is only damnation, was one of the primary tenets of the "totalitarian democracy" and "political messianism" of the 18th and 19th centuries[5] and culminated in the Bolshevist and fascist ideologies of the 20th century.

No such indigenous religious or political tradition of human frailty exists in Japan. None of the traditional sects espouses a doctrine of original sin, perhaps a necessary cultural ingredient if such philosophical self-alienation is to exist; neither do any of the traditional faiths posit the basic evil of human nature, another source of self-alienation. The Sokagakkai itself maintains that man is potentiality, completely rejecting any negative evaluation of human nature; at the same time it asserts that man is the potent agent of all change and that the deterministic Buddhist wheel of karmaic transmigration can be broken through the efforts of man. In the words of President Ikeda:

> For better or for worse, that which influences the social environment, which changes the environment, is none other than we ourselves.[6]
>
> History changes mankind, but men advance history. Human will cannot but cause the development of history. . . .[7]

But the alienative element of human impotence in isolation from a single truth and the organization which possess it is also present in the Gakkai's teachings. All successes, large or small, are divine reward, the gift of the gohonzon. All political measures which benefit the populace are ipso facto the result of the Komeito's exertions.[8]

Moreover, belief alone is not enough. The individual is not competent to worship on his own; organizational activity is essential to the realization of divine benefit. As Ikeda says:

> in the world of faith one must not go alone. If one does not attend meetings and have contact with many people, the establishment of full, true, deep faith becomes impossible. Man is weak. There is nothing so weak as one become alone. /italics added/[9]

The position expressed here is clear: without faith, and even with faith but without the Gakkai man is nothing. He is impotent, insignificant, futile. In the words of one defector:

> I became sceptical when I found that they were working to turn me against society. They told me I was socially scarred, a frustrated member of the proletariat and without hope except through the organization.[10]

It seems apparent that the potency and power initially attributed to man in Gakkai doctrine are conditional upon belief in Nichiren Shoshu. Man is not encouraged to believe in his own intrinsic worth or capability but is repeatedly told that whatever positive qualities he may have are due to the grace of the transcendent gohonzon. Such self-alienation is typical of the ideology of mass movement; those who see religiously-inspired self-alienation of this type as the source of capitalism and therefore of modernization and all the benefits for man which this process has entailed would do well to remember that Calvin's Geneva was perhaps as close to a totalitarian system as any premodern polity.

In its simplism, too, the Sokagakkai is ideologically congruent with the model of mass movement. The Sokagakkai asserts that the exalted nature of its philosophy and not any element so unworthy as simplism is responsible for its success. At the same time, however, the Gakkai's constant assertion of the omnipotence of faith alone in the absence of and even in the face of complicating knowledge suggests the extent to which simplicity is pursued. To the person who says "If I can understand, then I'll believe," the Gakkai responds, "The 'let's understand' attitude is of the world of academics. . . . The 'let's believe' attitude is life. . . . One must think of religion in terms of the latter attitude."[11] In other words,

> You can receive divine favor according not to your knowledge of the philosophy but to your faith in the gohonzon. Knowledge without faith is nothing but the obstacle to your faith.[12]

In scripture, too, this ideal is reflected:

> Sharihotsu, the cleverest disciple of Sakyamuni, was said to have gained enlightenment or eternal absolute happiness *not through his wisdom but his faith* in Sakyamuni's teachings. /italics added/[13]

In the Sokagakkai faith consistently takes precedence over knowledge, and also over truth. This priority has political parallels: in the words of French fascist Charles Maurras, "Justice kills what is vital," and lies which preserve this vitality are much to be preferred to truth or justice: "A lie which the intellect sees for what it is but which is at one with the deeper motivations of life, may be called a living lie."[14] In other religions, too, faith which contravenes truth and common sense is no rarity; one is impressed with "the amazing credulity of a large section of our /American/ population" as evidenced by their religious faith,[15] and the strained circumstances in which many of the adherents of these bizarre sects live suggest that they are subject to the intense desire for comprehensible order which characterizes mass man.

The very trinity of values postulated by the Gakkai--beauty, gain, and good--excludes truth. In the view of the Society, man's objective is happiness, to be attained through the creation of value; what is true need not be either beautiful, or profitable, or good from the point of view of contributing to man's happiness and truth is thus not intrinsically valuable. This position is almost exactly that described by Pitirim Sorokin, who noted the paramount concern of people in crisis situations for solutions regardless of irrationality or untruth; man in crisis sees value only in that which contributes to his relief or, in the Gakkai's vocabulary, his happiness.[16]

Faith also takes precedence over the usual secular criteria of causality--natural, political, and social. An earthquake in Niigata prefecture was attributed to the plethora of heretics in the area; a train wreck in the Tsurumi area was caused, according to the Society, by the presence nearby of a heretical shrine.[17] Politically, too, the dictates of simplicity produce explanations which may contribute to separation of Gakkai members from secular reality. Success in the 1965 House of Councillors elections was explained in terms of vigorous prayer by the faithful, and electoral successes in general are "nothing else but victories of faith."[18] A Seikyo Shimbun editorial of January 17, 1967, shortly before the general election, said:

> In such a time as this it is no good to be addicted to policies or carried away by strategies. Let us proceed with the daimoku of certain victory as our basis at all times.
>
> We trust that every Gakkai member, proclaiming the dawn in the Japanese political world, is spreading the struggle with overflowing sincerity, as the opening point of the new era of Obutsu-myogo. We strongly hope, moreover, that, on the eve of the coming struggle, all members will recite the daimoku with souls determined for certain victory.
>
> This Lower House election is, needless to say, a holy war for the realization of the injunctions bequeathed us by the Daishonin /Nichiren/; it is the crucial struggle which determines the fate of the realization of Obutsu-myogo. It probably would be correct to say that this is not a simple electoral contest but a struggle of faith.

The simplism of this theory of causality is plain:

the root of all evil is heresy, the cause of all good is faith. Such unicausal explanations of social and natural phenomena are typical of mass and totalitarian ideologies: as Hitler saw in the Jews the cause of the downtrodden condition of the Aryan peoples and the source of all threats to civilization so the Gakkai sees in heretical religions (*jashu*) the cause not only of individual unhappiness, political corruption, and cultural decay, but also of natural disasters. It should be noted here that the Sokagakkai has never evinced a degree of paranoia or hate regarding its ideal scapegoat equal to the Nazis';[19] the unicausal world view itself, however, is characteristic of rigid and intolerant persons who also tend to be among the most fanatically attached to social movements.[20] The adherents of the American extreme right wing, with its cabalistic interpretation of social phenomena based upon a universal communist conspiracy, are typical of this type.[21]

In recent years tendencies toward complexity in the interpretation of natural and social phenomena have appeared in the Sokagakkai's teachings. Foremost among these signs is the thoroughgoing secularism of the Komeito, which has necessitated the two-dimensional view of the universe justifying the pragmatic activities of a parliamentary political party. In Komeito publications it is recognized that it is the electorate, not divine assistance, which decides elections.[22] Second is the attenuation of some of the more extreme positions taken in regard to the relative efficacy of faith and medical science; the positive emphasis of medicine has increased recently. Third is the admonition that without hard work prosperity will not be forthcoming regardless of the vigor of one's faith. Believers are warned, "Do not presume upon the gohonzon /Gohonzon ni amaeru na7;" the power of the gohonzon is infinite but without effort in addition to prayer one will receive nothing.[23] Finally, one might note that in the most recent edition of the Gakkai's official English-language introductory book, The Nichiren Shoshu Sokagakkai, previous references to the O-nikuge, a supposedly still living tooth of St. Nichiren kept at the Taisekiji but never shown to non-believers, have been deleted.[24] However, it should be noted that even if these trends indicate a change in the ideal organizational stand on truth, realism, and rationalism, the views of Gakkai members as expressed in Society media and conversation do not exhibit any significant change. Faith is still seen as the key to electoral victory, extravagant claims are made of illness and injury cured through devotion, and all success in business is attributed to the power and mercy of the gohonzon. And the tendencies indicated here are themselves only possibilities; even their designation as "tendencies" is only speculation by the author. Overall, one must acknowledge the simplism of the Sokagakkai.

It is relevant for a full evaluation of the Sokagakkai to compare the Society ideologically with a totalitarian movement, that is, the features of the authoritarian personality expanded into the ideal doctrinal characteristics of an organization. The features of the authoritarian personality, it will be remembered, are (a) extreme conventionalism, (b) authoritarian submission and (c) authoritarian aggression, (d) anti-intraception, (e) superstition and stereotypy, (f) preoccupation with power and toughness, (g) diffuse destructiveness and cynicism, (g) projectivity, and (h) preoccupation with sex.[25] The aspects of this syndrome concerning which data are available for comparison with the Sokagakkai are those dealing with sex, superstition, destructiveness, submission, and aggression.

The Sokagakkai takes a moderate, though perhaps slightly conservative, view of sex. It does not have any strict commandments concerning sexual behavior; on the contrary, it specifically recognizes man's inability to adhere to unrealistic restrictions upon any phase of his behavior and ridicules any religion which tries to impose excessively stringent commandments. On the other hand, licence is not approved. President Ikeda, in his Guidance Memo (Shido Memo), presents an image of woman essentially in accord with prevailing Japanese standards of morality and the constant admonition to "Be a good member of society /Yoki shakaijin tare7" seems to sum up the Gakkai's orientation toward behavior in general and sex in particular: basically conventional but moderately so, with no odd or intense fixation.[26]

The fundamental tenet of Sokagakkai belief, the primacy of heretical religion as a causative agent, is superstition pure and simple in the author's opinion. In accord with this myth, heretics in general and corrupt politicians in particular and indeed all natural and social phenomena are stereotyped for easy consumption and interpretation by the Gakkai membership. However, the cynical and destructive doctrinal analog of the authoritarian personality is not to be seen in the Gakkai. The incredible venom directed toward the Jews in Mein Kampf, and the glorification of war, violence, and brutality also contained therein[27] are nowhere visible in the classical scriptures of Nichiren Shoshu or the contemporary written or spoken pronouncements of the Sokagakkai. According to some observers, the very motive power of National Socialism was hatred and resentment, directed externally toward the Versailles Treaty and internally toward its puppet, the Weimar state, and toward a malevolent international Jewry both at home and abroad.[28]

The Sokagakkai ideology includes a considerable element of hostility; however, one somehow suspects that over recent years this antipathy has taken an abstract and rhetorical turn. This is a very subjective evaluation--there are highly qualified students of the Society such as Reverend Spae who take a much less sympathetic view and can rely upon literal interpretation of the Gakkai's statements for justification of their position. In addition, although there is nothing in the Gakkai theology to compare with Mein Kampf, there is certainly more hostility in the Shakubuku Kyoten or the Rissho Ankoku Ron than in the Communist Manifesto or, more recently, Lenin's State and Revolution or

Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, although the communism of which these documents are a part has certainly formed the basis for regimes as totalitarian as Hitler's. Thus doctrinal hostility is perhaps not a definitive measure of ideological authoritarianism; the special interpretation put upon doctrine by leaders may be much more significant. Here, again, as in the examination of the historical development of the Sokagakkai, one sees the potential importance of leadership. But insofar as ideological authoritarianism may be inferred in the absence of behavioral authoritarianism, the present assumption is that what hostility is discernable in Gakkai doctrines falls short of the authoritarian extreme.

Authoritarian submission is an extreme form of the sense of powerlessness and futility discussed above. It is epitomized religiously in the teachings of Martin Luther and politically in the ideology of Nazism and is typified by the "idea of the unworthiness of the individual, his fundamental inability to rely on himself and his need to submit" to some leader (or force) who can compensate for his weakness.[29] What potency and power man does possess, in the view of the Gakkai, derives from faith; however, the idea of totally submissive and non-self-reliant man has no place in Gakkai beliefs. Regardless of the source of his strength, man is an actor, an agent, and must have the will to be himself:

> There is an expression, "He who is strong when standing alone is the true man of courage." Who is this "man of courage?" He is the man with the Gakkai spirit.[30]

> In whatever one does, one first stands by oneself. One must not rely on /other/ people.[31]

The self-reliance spoken of here does not, one assumes, mean self-reliance in the face of a Gakkai directive. At the same time, however, it does not suggest that the Gakkai member is to be the egoless sycophant of those around him.

The counterpart of authoritarian submission on the part of the follower of a totalitarian movement is the nature of leadership in such a movement. Whether the leader is collective, as in the case of a Leninist communist party, or individual, as in the case of a fascist *fuehrer*, the submission required of the rank-and-file is ideally total, as is the freedom of the elite. As suggested in the treatment of the structure of the Sokagakkai, the degree of access which the non-elite has to the elite removes the Gakkai from the category of "totalitarian movements" in this respect.

Moreover, the Gakkai has a very explicit image of leadership which does not appear consistent with either that of a bolshevist party or a *fuehrer*. In the words of Ikeda, "One must absolutely not become an authoritarian leader;" "Authoritarianism and commandism must absolutely not exist in the Gakkai."[32] Vertical relationships within the Gakkai are epitomized in the term *shitei-funi*, literally, "teacher and pupil are indivisible;" however, the sense of this term is not the total absorption in the leader sought by a highly self-alienated individual in his "escape from freedom," but rather a reciprocal and intimate relationship of mutual help, guidance, and diffuse emotional commitment. President Ikeda, in his Guidance Memo, sets forth a great number of attributes of the good leader which illustrate the proper nature of this relationship.[33] The good leader should among other things

(a) be strong in faith;

(b) be of, and from, and one with the people, and thus able to understand the heart of the masses;

(c) be responsible to those below him;

(d) be tolerant of both fellow members and non-believers;

(e) be just and fair;

(f) have self-confidence, courage, and decisiveness;

(g) avoid evaluation of persons (including himself) on the basis of their position;

(h) be flexible regarding leadership style and adaptable to currents of the times;

(i) study unceasingly;

(j) be never passive;

(k) lead, assist, train, educate--each function in the proper situation;

(l) be imperturbable;

(m) be compassionate;

(n) report upward accurately and unreservedly;

(o) in all activities, be in the first line;

(p) separate out private and public interests in the advice of others;

(q) be "warm" to subordinates;

(r) think always of the organization;

(s) teach by concrete example and practice;

(t) respect juniors and help them to develop;

(u) be bright, humorous, sincere, and serious.

These characteristics are reflected in many other Gakkai media which are in most cases not aimed at an outside audience but apparently genuinely intended as instructions for leaders on all levels;[34] it seems plain that leaders are neither pictured as dictators, nor given unlimited prerogatives, nor relieved of responsibility toward those below themselves.

The above are the ideal attributes of Gakkai leaders in general; it becomes plain when talking to him that President Ikeda considers these norms of leadership applicable to himself also; that is, he does not recognize any special rights accruing to the presidency which are not possessed by the membership in general. He reiterates that while he is in a position of organizational leadership he is really no better than any other believer. He is frank; to the question, What is it like being Sokagakkai president? he once responded,

> I am the ruler of Japan; its president, monarch of its spiritual world, leader of all its thought and culture, and holder of supreme authority.[35]

This isolated remark has been widely cited as an example of Ikeda's megalomania; it conflicts sharply with the good personal impression which he makes, which has nothing of pomposity or *hubris* in it. It seems quite possible that his answer was a realistic appraisal of his position as defined doctrinally and perceived by a great many of the faithful; wide reading of his speeches and essays and personal conversations lead one to believe the following statement to be more accurately representative of Ikeda's temperament. When told that some believers see him as a divine figure, Ikeda answered:

> I am very touched at their respect, but they go too far. It would be dreadful if such a misconception should spread among the members.

> . . . can a person such as I . . . be thought of as a living god or a Buddha-incarnation? It is sheer nonsense! . . .
>
> If there should be a man who folds his hands to me in worship, my face will surely become deformed. I ask you not to do this. It is the Gohonzon only that you should worship.
>
> . . . if a man should over-respect the president . . . the Sokagakkai would be degraded to the level of the heretical sects. . . .[36]

In sum, it does not appear that authoritarian submission is either expected or inculcated by the Sokagakkai leadership.

Authoritarian aggression has on occasion been apparent in proselyting activites on the informal level; it is quite possible that the belligerence of President Toda reflects a highly authoritarian degree of aggressiveness, although such aggression has not had official sanction for several years. The aggression discernable is not (as it is hypothesized by Adorno that authoritarian aggression will be[37]) directed against those who violate "conventional values;" there is no evidence that Sokagakkai members are pathologically attached to "conventional" mores of any kind. Nevertheless, the aggressive impulses apparently released in shakubuku are of an intensity that suggests a pathological drive to dominate and defeat. It is most probable that there are aggressively authoritarian persons in the Sokagakkai, though no estimate of their number is possible.[38]

The concern here, however, is formal organizational aggressiveness. That the Gakkai is aggressive is unquestionable; that it is at present more so than any vigorously proselyting religious group is debatable. The Society speaks of relations between religious groups as "a matter of victory or defeat," and has created such operational organs as the "Tenrikyo-Rissho Kosei Kai Liquidation Committee (Tenrikyo-Rissho Kosei Kai Bokumetsu Iinkai)" to handle programs directed expressly against two rival sects. But in recent years the Gakkai has taken an explicitly "hate the sin, not the sinner"[39] position and seems to be increasingly abstract and rhetorical in its aggression. This aggression is not directed at social or political deviants, as Adorno suggests it will be; on the abstract level it is directed toward heretical groups and evil politicians in general while in concrete action it is directed toward undifferentiated non-believers. Except insofar as vigorous propagation by any religious group is deviant behavior in Japan, the Sokagakkai does not formally appear notably more aggressive than any evangelical religion and certainly not sufficiently so to merit the description "authoritarian."

None of the aspects of the authoritarian personality examined here appear to characterize the Sokagakkai, with the exception of superstitiousness. One final, additional note may be made of a measure of "totalitarianism" composed by Herbert McClosky on the basis of proclivity to accept "unfairness or brutality," "cruelty and even ruthlessness," and the suffering of "a lot of innocent people" in the pursuit of "great purposes" or "great changes for the benefit of mankind."[40] The Sokagakkai certainly acknowledges that Kosen-rufu and Obutsu-myogo are such purposes; however, the Gakkai condemns other political movements for their cruelty, sacrifice, and aggression and rejects those methods in its own activities.[41]

The idea of sacrifice is singled out in Gakkai literature. All enterprises which entail sacrifice of or cause misfortune to one group for the benefit of another are *ipso facto* bad, whether they are products of German Nazism, Russian communism, or Japanese Imperialism.[42] In the achievement of *Kosen-rufu*, according to President Ikeda,

> There must not be a single person sacrificed. Not one person must become a victim. . . . Even if there is /but/ one victim, even if there is /but/ one unhappy person, even if *Kosen-rufu* is attained by sacrificing these people, that is not the true will of Nichiren. Nichiren would not be happy.[43]

In a more general comment on the means by which social goals are realized, Ikeda has written:

> to say that the sacrifice of human lives cannot be helped is the same as personally renouncing one's competence as a human being.[44]

Although the equation of willingness to sacrifice others with totalitarianism is, at least in nations trying desperately to modernize, perhaps unrealistic, the explicit rejection of such means by the Sokagakkai suggests a significant distance from totalitarian ideologies. Supplemented by the data presented in relation to the various facets of Adorno's "authoritarian personality" as applied on an organizational level of analysis and in light of the inclusion of this personality model in Kornhauser's model of totalitarianism, one may surmise that ideologically the Sokagakkai does not resemble a totalitarian or authoritarian movement.

* * * * * *

Self-alienation does appear to be one characteristic of the formal ideology of the Sokagakkai. Simplism typifies both the most-emphasized points of doctrine and the method in which they are inculcated. Unicausality in explanation and interpretation, and in prescription a consistent simplism which often ignores both the natural and social sciences and common sense as well, are typical. Reiteration of the impotence and insignificance of man outside the Gakkai can hardly be expected to increase the believer's sense of intrinsic individual worth, despite the Society's assertions that man is an actor with integrity and potentiality to the revolutionize himself and his environment.

The Gakkai itself explicitly maintains that it reduces the alienation of its believers and returns them to themselves and to society as full individuals and useful members of the human collectivity. But on the basis of the view of man contained in Sokagakkai doctrines, and the simplism of style of these doctrines, one must suggest that as regards self-alienation the Sokagakkai as a formal organizational entity resembles a mass movement. It does not, however, resemble a totalitarian movement. It contradicts the criteria of such movements suggested by both Adorno and McClosky.

B. Human Alienation

No specific data concerning generalized trust of people in general or of particular groups of people as felt by the Sokagakkai is available. Content analysis of Gakkai media would probably give an accurate indication of official organizational perceptions of social groups; in this study, however, the factors of human alienation, that is, (a) distrust of people in general and (b) intense partisanship in those social relationships which do exist, and (c) a diffuse envy of all those social elements perceived to be better off in any way than the perceiver, will be inferred through a non-quantitative study of Gakkai's official relationships with other human groups, both as idealized in Society media and carried on in practice.

The external perceptions and relationships of the Sokagakkai may be divided into those dealing with religious and political organizations. In any case, pluralist theories of democracy suggest that (a) a balance of operational conflict and fundamental normative consensus, (b) social co-operativeness, and (c) limited associational partisanship constitute the most stable social basis for democratic systems.[45] Limited partisanship and co-operation are made possible by the presence of consensus on, inter al., the broad "rules" of conduct in political and social action; however, the inevitability and value of conflict for democratic society are also realized.

It has been asserted that the Gakkai's concern for social harmony is not compatible with pluralist democracy. One extreme expression of this viewpoint is the following: groups such as the Gakkai

> deny the permanence of human conflict, elevate the value of order over freedom, and work for a completely peaceful, happy, and orderly society by the elimination of people, ideas, or institutions which they think are the cause of human misery.[46]

The Sokagakkai expressly denies the accuracy of this interpretation. In his Politics and Religion President Ikeda asserts that cleavages, dissonance, inconsistency, and conflict are natural concomitants of social behavior and that the idea of Buddhist Democracy recognizes and encompasses them all, and this position is backed up by high Gakkai officials in conversation.[47] The factor in focus here, however, is the opposite pole of social interaction, that is, conflict, and in this respect the Society gives an initial impression of extreme distrust and intense partisanship.

The Sokagakkai's relationships with other religious groups have usually been characterized by total conflict. "As for evil clerics," says Ikeda, "Buddha's command is 'Torment them thoroughly.'"[48] "Buddhism is a battle. In faith there is no compromise. Only after attacking slander, attacking and attacking thoroughly, and banishing it, will a peaceful world be realized where believers, and non-believers too,* can live in peace of mind."[49] Other sects are attacked indiscriminately; all are in collusion with corrupt politicians, are covetous, opportunist, and mercenary, and all have evil designs upon the Gakkai (aside from their general malign influence) as the embodiment of true religion. In many instances, especially in recent and more confident years, the view of other faiths has been closer to ridicule than to hostility: heretical cults are withering away, weak, and fighting among themselves.[50] Nevertheless, the basic attitude has been one of distrust, avoidance, and total non-cooperation.

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*One might parenthetically note here the apparent institutional and not personal focus of attack.

One relationship may be singled out--that with the Rissho Kosei Kai, another new religion also derived from the teachings of Nichiren. The phenomenon of greatest hate for the enemy who is most like oneself is not new in either religion or politics,[51] and indeed it seems to be the case as regards the Gakkai's view of the Kosei Kai. The Kosei Kai has long been the primary organizational focus of the Gakkai's anti-heresy campaign; the most recent steps were the founding of the Kosei Kai Defectors' League (Kosei Kai Dattai-sha Domei) in late 1967 and the simultaneous appearance in the Seikyo Shimbun of a series of testimonials by defectors entitled "Awakening From the Kosei Kai Nightmare."[52] One should note, however, in reference to the behavioral aspect of the Gakkai, that even when Ikeda created the Tenrikyo-Rissho Kosei Kai Liquidation Committee, in the more extreme days of 1960, he specified that the means of wiping out the sect was individual shakubuku, "a one-on-one struggle on the lowest level," and not organizational conflict.[53]

This distinction is one which the Gakkai is careful to make, and one which has received increasing emphasis in recent years. According to an official Gakkai publication, those who call the Gakkai uncooperative, partisan, or exclusivistic are confusing "strict pureness in the religion with co-operativeness within the society." Though they assert the sublimity and purity of their faith, believers are good members of society and can interact harmoniously with other fellow-citizens regardless of their religious beliefs.[54]

And even this assertion if now made in less extreme fashion than was once the case. In the early 1960's some observers began to discern an operational "thaw" in the Gakkai, brought on perhaps by the confidence which comes with large numbers, financial solvency, a firm position in the Japanese religious world, and political power. The *Seikyo Shimbun* has become markedly less vitriolic since 1962 and 1963; the term *shoju* (moderate propagation) was introduced in 1964; the Gakkai now describes itself as un-(e.g.) Christian, not anti-Christian; and Gakkai members can now say, "If someone feels he is happy with the Nembutsu or Shingon /sects/, that's O.K."[55] There is a tolerance and a willingness to work with other groups on non-religious matters in 1967 which was not present in 1962.

There are suggestions that this change has affected even official relations with other sects. In February 1966 the Gakkai was invited to join the Religion Center, a nonpartisan organization of both old and new religions whose mottoes are "religious co-operation" and "a nation of believers (*shukyo kyoryoku*; *kokumin kai shinko*)." The Society reacted favorably, but repercussions within the Center were intense and disruptive and the matter ended with the Gakkai still excluded.[56]

The present "thaw" is perhaps one facet of the process of maturation and moderation through which it has been suggested that all religious movements must pass, and thus one might expect it to continue and expand to other aspects of the Gakkai.[57] It has already affected the Gakkai's view of adherents of other sects. But the basic ideological orientation toward other religious organizations is still intolerant, distrustful, uncooperative, and highly partisan. There is nothing whatsoever in the *Shakubuku Kyoten* or Ikeda's *Lectures on the Rissho Ankoku Ron* which suggests that the existence of other religious organizations is ultimately tolerable, justifiable, or acceptable.[58] Fuller examination of the Gakkai's behavioral patterns will hopefully indicate the relative importance of the operational "thaw" in regard to other actors in the Gakkai's religious environment; at this point one must recognize the fundamental ideological alienation which exists.

The possible alienation of the Sokagakkai from other types of actors in its environment may be examined in its political and non-political aspects. Politically, the Gakkai has been from the beginning ideally non-partisan, pragmatic, co-operative (within limits), and non-exclusive, and has always maintained formal freedom of members' political expression. Most recently, President Ikeda stated in the Komei Shimbun of January 8, 1967, that members were to vote for whom they wished if (a) they couldn't agree with Komeito policies of if (b) the position of another party were tied to their personal livelihood. The only firm instructions he gave were not to buy or sell votes or break any other election laws; to any such violations excommunication might apply.

Regarding other parties the Komeito is certainly cooperative, if not entirely trusting. Several representatives of both the Komeito and Sokagakkai have insisted that the party is willing to cooperate with any parliamentary force whatsoever in order to maximize the people's welfare--even the representatives of other religious groups.[59] The numerous ad hoc alliances which appeared during the 1967 session of the House of Representatives--on occasion including even the communists--attest to the realism of the Komeito's assertion. Such trust and cooperation apparently ends at the Diet door, however. In its direct contracts with the people the Komeito prefers to maintain its organizational integrity; Chairman Takeiri has stressed the need for collaboration in order to amass a sufficient intraparliamentary force, but "as for outside the Diet, it's completely unthinkable."[60] The January 1968 Sasebo lecture meetings of protest, held separately while other parts of the city resounded to the noise of violent Zengakuren demonstrations, are a case in point.

As in parliamentary action, the Komeito is quite willing to cooperate with other parties in joint, compromise policy statements. In February 1967, for instance, the Komeito engineered a 6-point policy agreement with the Socialists and the Democratic Socialists covering prices, housing, traffic accidents, tax reduction, public hazards, and medium- and small-scale business policies.[61] But there are, of course, limits to the Komeito's willingness to trust, compromise, and cooperate. In its present corrupt state, the LDP is an unsuitable partner in a coalition government, according to President Ikeda. If in the future the party's quality should change, however, such a coalition could not be ruled out.[62] The only present coalition possible is one of Socialists, DSP, and Komeito, "excluding the Communist Party."[63] In addition, there are bounds to the non-partisan practices of the Komeito; although non-Gakkai members are welcome as Komeito members, it is highly doubful that the party would nominate a non-believer for office--Komeito candidates must first of all appeal to the Gakkai membership.[64]

In regard to relations with labor unions, the Sokagakkai appears to be drifting toward alienation; however, in this instance the cause is to be found largely in the unions themselves. The Gakkai's history has been marked by a series of confrontations with labor unions; six times court cases have resulted from alleged union infringement of the rights of political expression of Gakkai-member unionists.[65] In most of these collisions the Gakkai has appeared to take a defensive position; as the Society stated during a confrontation with the coal miners' union in Hokkaido in 1960,

> Since the Sokagakkai is an organization of faith and differs from a union, it has no intention of disrupting unions and will attempt no disruption or anything else. Since the unions talk about freedom of religious belief, it's all right if union members believe in Nichiren Shoshu. The Gakkai guides belief; it does not guide union activities. Therefore, not only does the Gakkai not say how union activities should be conducted, but it would be impossible to do so. There are probably instances when Gakkai-member unionists participate in religious activities and not union activities, but this is a matter of individual freedom. If this is called disruption of the union then it is the responsibility of the union; shouldn't the union guide in such a manner as to bring all union members to participate in union activities? It is totally erroneous to ignore the lack of leadership capability in the union and to criticize the Sokagakkai.[66]

As surmised earlier, the shortcomings of the Japanese labor unions are to a significant degree contributory to the Gakkai's present size; it also seems likely that they are largely responsible for the decision of the Gakkai in 1967 to establish its own labor union. The very decision signifies the crossing of some threshold of alienation from the present union system, in combination with (a) an appraisal of present power in the laboring class, (b) a desire to increase the scope of the Gakkai's control over the lives of its members, and (c) the goal of a organized electoral base in labor for the Komeito similar to those possessed by the Socialists and Democratic Socialists. The Komeito claims that its union will be non-partisan, open, and cooperative with other unions; however, it would not be wise to ignore the element of alienation involved in the decision.

In terms of general social cooperativeness the Sokagakkai seems to have become more open, less tense, and more confident since the early 1960's. The author noticed this between visits in 1962 and 1967; another American observer cited the same change between 1962 and 1964.[67] The tendency is visible both in Gakkai ideology and in practice; one student of the Society now sees the Gakkai's social ideal as a society with an underlying spiritual consensus, upon which exists a populace which participates as before in multiple interest groups,[68] while the suspicion and distrust directed toward students of the organization has given way to cooperation, solicitous concern, and apparent trust in the integrity of the observer.

In all, the Sokagakkai does not seem to be sufficiently uncooperative, exclusivistic, and mistrustful of other actors in its environment to merit the description "alienated" in the sense that a mass movement is doctrinally alienated. Alienation does indeed exist--most notably, in regard to other religious actors. But such specific ideological antipathy is to be expected in any militant religious group; that it does not carry over into either political or social policy or practice or even into some operational phases of the Gakkai's interaction with religious groups suggests that the general alienation from social groups is not excessive. In addition, the only discernable present trend seems to be toward greater openness and intercourse with the social environment, both its individual and collective components.

Nor does one see in the ideology of the Sokagakkai the diffuse envy of all those groups who appear relatively better off which is often a characteristic of both lower-class religious and social movements in general and mass movements in particular. In a direct line of theological descent from the millennial sects of medieval Europe, the small sects of America frequently feature vindictive teachings, foreseeing the judgment day when "they shall change places with the prosperous and comfortable, who shall be cast down while the pious poor shall be exalted."[69]

The economic program of the NSDAP, specious as it may have been, may be taken as an indication of the appeals which the party felt would be fruitful. It included such measures as confiscation of war profits, nationalization of trusts, communalization of department stores, and other steps aimed at equalizing the positions of the middle and upper classes both by raising the middle class and bringing down the plutocrats.[70] The Poujadists were even more explicit. Vehemently opposed to big business, they fulminated against les gros, the "fat ones" who "used the little people as shock troops in a battle where their own interests alone triumph."[71] Established political forces were another target; the Poujadists described their movement as "the invasion of professional politics by all the new sans-culottes of the honest trades of France."[72]

The economic and political foci of envy are combined in the vocabulary of the American far right; certain of Senator Barry Goldwater's more extreme supporters in 1964 saw his nomination as a long-overdue and richly-deserved victory over the "Eastern fat-cat kingmakers" of the Republican party. But neither is visible in the classical or operational vocabularies of the Sokagakkai. Gakkai leaders frequently remind their followers that together they possess the sole and most sublime truth and that they need not feel inferior to anyone. But such encouragement is never at the expense of any other social group. President Toda was rather more extreme--on one occasion he stated that the poor, the weak, and the suffering made the best believers, while managerial and professional people and those with secure lives were "no good."[73] President Ikeda has also mentioned retribution of a sort; upon the achievement of Kosen-rufu and all its wonders, he told the faithful, "at that time, how greatly will those who ridicule or slander you now repent, and be envious. This is the absolutely accurate postulate of Buddhism."[74] These are among the most extreme statements construable as "vindictive" or "envious." There is simply no figure in the Gakkai dogma to compare with the plutocrats, les gros, the imperialistic monopoly capitalists, the rich and crafty Jews, or the blasphemous materialists who have served as the social foci for frustration, anxiety, envy, and hate in mass movements of the past. Given the additional data presented in regard to social distrust, uncooperativeness, and exclusivistic partisanship, one may tentatively conclude that the formal doctrine and operational ideology of Sokagakkai do not demonstrate the human alienation typical of a mass movement.

C. Systemic Alienation

The ideologies of historical mass movements have been characterized by antipathy both to the concrete social and political systems within which they exist and to the more abstract structures and ideals connected with democratic forms of government. These movements, especially the politically chiliastic ones, have tended to be more or less honest about their aims: "the propaganda of totalitarian movements which precede and accompany totalitarian regimes is invariably as frank as it is mendacious."[75] Whether it is Lenin speaking bluntly of destroying the Russian state; the anti-Semites of 19th century Europe or their offspring, the Nazis, attacking the existing governments of Austria or Weimar Germany; or the Poujadists denouncing the Fourth Republic; the alienation from the immediate system is clear.[76] And the state against which Lenin aimed his attack in State and Revolution was the liberal, bourgeois-democratic state with all its meretricious constitutional and parliamentary accoutrements; the ideals rejected by both the Austrian anti-Semites and the National Socialists were those of parliamentarism and party politics, the rule of law, legal equality, and freedom of expression and behavior; representative democracy was rejected by the Poujadists also.[77] The ideals of majority rule, minority rights, and democracy itself (in the non-communist sense) have no place in the ideology of mass movements.

The ideology of the Sokagakkai will be studied here as it applies to the concrete phenomena of the Japanese environment and to the three elements of the "democratic formula" previously discussed. It is assumed for the purposes of this essay that neither the official Gakkai media nor the leaders personally interviewed are engaged in deceiving their audiences as to the true orientations of the Society.

1. Structures

As opposed to many of the mass movements of history, the Sokagakkai does not formally contemplate any notable structural changes in the political or social system. Excepting a series of rather grandiose plans for urban redevelopment and redistribution of wealth, the Gakkai policy position is one of conserving existing institutions. As an opposition political party the Gakkai is naturally antipathetic toward the present incumbents and misses no opportunity to criticize their policies; the antipathy and criticism, however, does not surpass that of the other opposition parties except in that it is directed equally at the other opposition parties as well as at the LDP. In general, the negativity of the

Komeito regarding the instrumental aspect of the political and economic systems is to be expected and is as described in the chapter above on Komeito policies.

That the Gakkai's instrumental oppositionism does not carry over into alienation from the total political system suggests that this oppositionism is just that--the natural attitude of an opposition party. The Society takes a strong stand in favor of the existing system, both its constitutional basis and its parliamentary, liberal, pacifistic, democratic manifestations. The constitution is to be protected at all costs:

> When our country resuscitated herself as a democratic, peace-loving nation from the first defeat in her history and the rubble of war, we enacted the present Constitution, which we can be proud of before the world, with a clear-cut mention of the sovereign power in the hands of the people, a declaration of intention to work in the cause of maintaining peace and of renunciation of war, and a guarantee of basic rights for the people.
>
> This spirit of the Constitution is the kind of matter which should be proclaimed and propagated not only in Japan but in other nations of the world with a view to establishing a world of peace and prosperity.
>
> * * * * *
>
> Komeito hereby wishes to declare its firm resolve to crush such attempts to trample democracy and peace underfoot and suppress basic human rights through the malicious revision of the Constitution. . . .[78]

The Gakkai also approves of the several parts of the constitution. The idea of remonstrating with the authorities has a prominent role in Gakkai scripture and ideology; brushes with the law are sometimes interpreted as remonstrations and thus sanctioned.[79] But such stands never approach wholesale condemnation of "the state" in the relatively abstract Leninist sense or of the immediate institutional framework within which the Gakkai and Komeito operate.

2. The "Democratic Formula"

As regards the first element of the "democratic formula," attachment to the abstract notion of democracy as a political system or an ism, the Sokagakkai is almost vehemently positive. The Gakkai is, according to Ikeda, the "true friend of the masses" by definition[80] and, as one can see from the political platform of the Komeito, democracy in the abstract occupies a very prominent place, along with the respect for human dignity which is its keystone. A verbal commitment to democracy is certainly not incompatible with undemocratic ideology, nor with the aims of mass movements. But in the case of the Sokagakkai one sees neither the specialized definitions which allowed such disparate figures as Mussolini and Mao Tse-tung to label their regimes democratic, nor the conditional acceptance which in fact renders the commitment invalid.[81] It is conceivable that the Gakkai's verbal commitment to democracy is only a pose but such cynicism is not assumed here.

Naiveté, on the other hand, may be present. The Gakkai's idea of democratic society is unrealistically sophisticated: according to Ikeda, the social requisites for a democratic system are (a) high education; (b) full and sound knowledge; (c) social morality; (d) awareness, civic duty, patriotism, and tolerance; and (e) the general willingness to stand up against unjust ideologies and politics.[82] There is an unwarranted expectation regarding the inclination of the people--any people--to participate in or even take an interest in politics, and an historically unwarranted faith in the amenability of people in general to democratic behavioral norms. The Gakkai exudes a refreshing, though occasionally immature, idealism in its advocacy of democracy.

The ambivalence of the Gakkai's orientation toward the concrete factors of the democratic formula contrasts sharply with its wholehearted acceptance of democracy in the abstract. In the religious sphere, naturally, the Society does not accept the validity of majority rule, nor, as a religious organization, does the Gakkai feel the charismatic and non-majoritarian administrative style of President Ikeda improper. It is pointed out that Nikko Shonin, the founder of Nichiren Shoshu, was but one of Nichiren's 6 disciples but was nevertheless the true successor; the believers of Nichiren Shoshu are a minority today but this in no way means that their faith is not the most exalted of all religions.[83] But although the validity of religion must be determined on an absolute plane, on the relativistic plane of ordinary human existence where political behavior takes place majority rule is sufficient to determine right and wrong.[84]

As regards particular applications of majoritarianism the Gakkai is favorable in principle. The proper form of a democratic polity, according to President Ikeda, is a bicameral parliament which accurately represents the whole people.[85] In order that it represent the people fairly and thus validate majority rule, the legislature must be constituted through fair election by an enlightened, politically aware populace.[86] The fact that the Sokagakkai does not consider either today's elections fair or today's electorate aware raises doubts about the Society's real present commitment to majoritarianism.

The second condition which validates majoritarianism in the eyes of the Gakkai is full prior discussion and debate, with adequate respect for minority views.[87] Again, the Gakkai's opinion that such views are not at present sufficiently respected leaves open the possibility that the Society may reject the validity of Diet decisions. The Komeito has reiterated its support for majoritarianism in principle, but warns that if the Liberal Democrats attempt to force legislation through the Diet the party's attitude "will change."[88] The party declares itself committed only to democratic procedures; if the ruling party tries to steamroller bills through the Diet according to the letter of Roberts' Rules, then "even if the form is parliamentarist, the true nature is nothing but dictatorial, fascist, anti-parliamentarist action" which absolves the Komeito of its duty to acquiesce.[89]

A final reference to majoritarianism which has received considerable currency among observers of the Sokagakkai is the following statement by President Ikeda:

> Rather than having a great number of irresponsible men gather and noisily criticize, there are times when a single leader who thinks about the people from his heart, taking responsibility and acting decisively, saves the nation from danger and brings happiness to the people. Moreover, if the leader is trusted and supported by all the people, one may call this an excellent democracy.[90]

One might also call it plebiscitary democracy or Bonapartism, but according to General Executive Akiya Einosuke no Caesarist idea or fuehrer principle was intended by the remark. Akiya drew an analogy with the decisive action taken by President Kennedy on his own responsibility in the Cuban missile crisis, without waiting for the approval of Congress.[91] In non-crisis situations, however, Akiya emphatically insists that the Gakkai "absolutely protects parliamentary politics."

The conditions applied by the Sokagakkai to its acceptance of majority rule in political matters are not necessarily inconsistent with the criteria of "polyarchal democracy" set forth by Robert Dahl.[92] Whereas a preference for majority rule is an indication of support for democratic practices, a total acceptance of the principle and ignorance of the possibility of majority tyranny is neither responsible nor realistic. The stipulation that elections be fair is another justifiable point; the recognition that at certain moments collective survival may require unilateral executive initiative is only realistic.

The majoritarian inclinations of the Sokagakkai are thus limited, but it is for each observer to say whether or not they are undemocratically limited. The present study assumes honesty (albeit perhaps naive honesty) on the part of Gakkai leaders who explain the conditional acceptance of majority rule, but in recognizing the literal proximity to the model of mass movement of certain of these conditions, one also must reserve doubts as to the genuine commitment of the Gakkai to majoritarian norms.

The problem of minority rights is one with which all religions which claim supreme validity for themselves must struggle. The Roman Catholic Church has, in its expression in contemporary Christian Democracy, come to a democratic resolution of certain doctrinal legacies which in their literal form seem profoundly antidemocratic. In the encyclical Libertas Praestantissimum Pope Leo XIII, the father of Christian Democracy, spoke out against freedom of religious belief and against freedom of expression, of conscience, and of education: "'any liberty, except that which consists in submission to God and in subjection to His will, is unintellibible.'"[93] Even the more recent work of Jacques Maritain proposes an intuitively unworkable combination of religious absolutism and political freedom,[94] but in reality a modus vivendi has been reached in several countries which suggests that the Sokagakkai's similar doctrinal blend of religious absolutism and secular relativism is not incompatible with democratic politics.

In the opinion of Reverend Joseph Spae, this suggestion is fatuous.[95] In contrast to the Catholic Church, which realizes the exigencies of political democracy and accordingly dilutes its religious absolutism to harmonize with religious freedom, the Sokagakkai, he asserts, does not recognize and would not accept the necessary discrepancy between ideal and actual religious purity. The Gakkai as faith would reject the religious freedom of minorities and the Gakkai as organization would reject the rights of the individual vis-a-vis the collectivity.

Certainly Makiguchi gave precedence to the whole society in his view of individual and collectivity. In his A System of Value-Creative Pedagogy (Soka Kyoikugaku Taikei) he stated,

> The creator of value is not the individual. It is society. The individual is a mere technician in the great organization called society. Only by becoming fully aware that he is a component of society, a social man, can he be creative.[96]

Plainly, the ultimate goals of the Sokagakkai are collective; the immediate goal, however, is individual human revolution, and the elaborate denunciations which the Gakkai makes of any and all enterprises which entail involuntary sacrifice suggest that the Society at present places great emphasis upon the particular in its beliefs. At least, it never calls for the total submersion in the collectivity which Sebastian DeGrazia sees as the leitmotif of mass movements, which Eric Fromm sees as the goal of anomic man, and which, as authoritarian submission, Adorno considers an integral part of the authoritarian personality.[97]

Nevertheless, in practice one receives the impression that the individual is subordinated to the group. This is perhaps an unescapable phenomenon in Japanese society, and in this respect the Gakkai is probably no more undemocratic than any other Japanese organization; but the fact remains.

As regards particular rights such as freedom of expression and religious belief, one must entertain doubts as to the benefit to a democratic society of the orientations propagated by the Sokagakkai. Articles and books considered unfair or mistaken are criticized in the official Gakkai media with a vehemence bordering on paranoia and it is difficult to imagine the Gakkai respecting the freedom of critical expression were the Komeito to take power.

In past years many blatantly biased, inaccurate, and totally irresponsible articles concerning the Gakkai have appeared, making the Society quite sensitive about criticism in general. The Gakkai has been likened to "Hitler and his hordes" and described as "a militant, antidemocratic . . . sect" whose "organization and methods are similar to those of Communism and Fascism. Like Chinese Communism's 'thought reform,' Soka Gakkai has 'shakubuku.'" "Like the early Nazi movement, it looks like a crackpot outfit--but it's growing rapidly. It's ceremonies . . . at the foot of sacred Mt. Fuji last year /1964/ had all the trappings of Hitler's Nurnberg conclaves.[98] In recent years, however, coverage has become more balanced and objective, with the notable exception of the leftwing press. The Gakkai, however, has become increasingly strident in its denunciations of "erroneous" works. Criticism is variously labelled "irresponsible," "know-nothing," "antisocial," "unqulified," "criticism for the sake of criticism."[99] It appears as if criticism is considered ipso facto irresponsible, and the Gakkai couples its attacks with reminders that rights and freedoms imply and require responsibility.

In many cases the freedom of speech is clearly threatened:

> Today's weekly-magazine journalism . . . has reached the ultimate in vulgarity. Certainly, this must be called irresponsible, antisocial behavior; there is no true "freedom of speech" therein.[100]

> Really, is it good that such things [as irresponsible journalism] be permitted in society? . . .
> . . . the time will certainly come when the masses themselves will hand down judgment.[101]

> True "freedom of speech" should be permitted to that speech which teaches justice to the masses and is based upon correct principles which guide toward a value [-creative] way of living; shouldn't evil speech and dishonest speech be eliminated from this world?[102]

Representatives of the Gakkai reject all allegations that the Society would in any way infringe upon the valid exercise of any constitutional right.[103] The condemnatory reviews carried in Gakkai media, one is told, are due to the fact that only mistaken works are reviewed. And any response by the Gakkai is and would be limited to a "multilateral campaign of debate."[104] Nevertheless, even if one assumes that the Gakkai is sincere in its affirmation of all legal rights, it seems that the Gakkai media might be creating a hostile "they," a vague external enemy composed of all those who criticize. It is difficult to imagine a fully-socialized and deeply committed member of the Gakkai with a genuine belief in the legitimacy of criticism.

Similar doubts exist regarding the authenticity of the Sokagakkai's acceptance of religious freedom. The writings of Nichiren are replete with admonitions to wipe out heresy;[105] the dire promises of divine punishment which accrue to resistance to proselyting are so immediate and violent as to threaten freedom;[105] and the statements of President Ikeda are occasionally open to unfavorable interpretation:

> Freedom of religious belief. [This] is absolutely correct. Exactly so. However, freedom of religious belief must also be freedom of doctrinal debate and propagation. . . .
>
> However, is it the responsibility of the nation, or of the governors, that the people are taken in by vulgar teachings? Is it the responsibility of the people themselves? Is it the responsibility of the founders of heretical religions? Is it due to insufficient strength of those who spread the True Law?[107]

According to Gakkai leaders' interpretations the responsibility is that of the people and of the propagators of the True Law. No political relevance is accorded the drive to eliminate heresy: "we protect freedom of belief to the utmost;" "freedom of religion is the fundamental principle of democracy;" "if the Komeito becomes the ruling party, religion will be kept strictly free."[108] Belief and non-belief, dissemination, proselyting, rejection, and criticism are all accepted and protected.[109]

To the suggestion that elimination of heresy implies elimination of heretics General Executive Akiya Einosuke replies that the Sokagakkai clearly recognizes the necessary division of ideal religious purity and practical tolerance which Reverend Spae asserts they reject.[110] Human beings are at all times to be treated with respect and compassion; such treatment takes precedence over doctrinal injunctions to militance. It is for this reason that there is no contradiction between a Komeito member's political obligation to aid all citizens and his religious duty to eradicate heresy: what is, strictly speaking, blasphemous favoritism to heretics is in fact the Komeito member's first duty; what benefits the whole populace without exception is his highest goal.[111]

The entire subject of the role of minority rights in the Sokagakkai ideology is highly debatable. As one can see from the data presented here, ambiguities, contradictions, and opportunities for sharply contrasting interpretation abound in the Gakka's treatment of minority rights and in its treatment of majoritarianism. In fact, the only aspect of the democratic formula on which the Gakkai takes an unambiguous position is the abstract factor of "democracy" itself. As mentioned in the introduction to this study, the author prefers in the absence of empirical evidence of behavior to give the Gakkai the benefit of all doubtful points contained in its doctrine. Nevertheless, doubts are raised by certain of the Gakkai's orientations toward minority rights, despite the strong support for democracy as an abstract ideology and the Japanese polity as a concrete political system.

Because of the author's personal interpretation of the Gakkai's protestations of support for personal liberties, in combination with unambiguous, positive orientation toward both democracy and the structures of the Japanese polity, the conclusion reached here is that the Sokagakkai does not possess the systemically alienated properties of a mass movement and therefore may not be termed a threat to democracy on these grounds.

* * * * * *

As regards the overall alienation of the Sokagakkai, as evidenced in its ideology, the organization does not seem to be a mass movement, although one can recognize close proximity to the model on several points and a moderate resemblance overall. Preaching as it does the impotence of man outside the faith and typified as it is by a simplism which overrides considerations of reason and science, Gakkai ideology seems to contribute to any feelings of self-alienation which the members might harbor. In regard to other social actors in the Gakkai's environment, however, the organization does not appear to be alienated. Religious exclusivism is reasonable; social and political behavior is ideally characterized by pragmatism, cooperation, and openness. Human alienation does not thus seem to be part of the Gakkai's ideological complex.

Systemic alienation does not appear to dominate either. In spots it is marked, but only in light of actual behavioral tendencies can one conclude that one interpretation of ambiguous points of doctrine is more accurate than another. As the various elements of the democratic formula become less abstract the Gakkai appears more ambiguous and less positively attached; however, on the least abstract systemic level, that is, on the level of the concrete political environment of the Gakkai, alienation is least present and ambiguity is almost wholly lacking.

NOTES: CHAPTER 17

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CHAPTER 18

THE SOKAGAKKAI AS ACTOR

A. Focus of Attention: Remote?

As suggested in Part IV of this study, there has been work done in the social sciences which indicates that the behavioral aspect of the models of both mass man and mass movement is the most significant both from theoretical and practical points of view. It has been shown that countries with democratic polities can survive and even, as the United States, appear stable while including in their populations large numbers of persons who are neither attached to their social environment nor particularly close, affectively, to either the political system or the abstract principles of democratic politics. In this study it is assumed that roughly the same may be said of organizations. A group may be unattached to and alienated from its environment without being a mass movement in the fullest antidemocratic sense if, in its behavior, it adheres to the informal norms and legal rules which regulate social (and especially political) behavior in its social context. One may gauge potential for mass behavior from unattachment and alienation; theoretically, this increases the possibility of prediction from the model to the concrete political system; practically, this enables other social and political actors to focus their attention upon the causes of unattachment and alienation in a manner (suggested in the "social controls" aspect of the model of development of social movements presented in Part I of this essay) calculated to compensate for the social conduciveness and ameliorate the social strains which contribute to unattachment and alienation.

One aspect of behavior itself is partly potential; that is, the objectives of behavior may be seen ideally in doctrine and actually in pratice. Ideally the Sokagakkai meets the criteria of a mass movement almost exactly. The entire notion of Kosen-rufu and Obutsu-myogo, though perhaps conceivable, seems hardly realistic. And even were this goal to be achieved, the naive idea that all human conflict would be submerged in harmony and the facile prediction that the absolute happiness of every individual would blend with the prosperity of every human society sounds utterly utopian. Finally, the ultimate idea that all heretical religions will naturally die out, thus removing the cause of all human misery and ushering in an era of euphoria, has even a threatening note, just as the word "die" implies.

In their description of the means to be used in achieving these remote goals the Sokagakkai has aroused suspicion. Such statements as

> In the near future the world will worship the Gohonzon, and the Japanese people must soon begin bringing this about.[1]

and

> Japan is the savior of the world and Sokagakkai is the savior of our country.[2]

are not calculated to reassure those who recall the most recent attempt by the Japanese people to "save" the world or a part of it.

To be sure, other religions with equally ominous means and equally utopian goals have adapted to secular society and even to democratic society; Judaism and Islam are noteworthy cases in point. Thus the doctrinal utopianism of the Sokagakkai does not necessarily imply mass behavior. However, the Gakkai has not undergone the evolutionary process which the major world religions have and one assumes that utopian goals are relatively salient in the Gakkai.

In action, though, the Gakkai has created an elaborate set of intermediate and immediate goals toward which it directs its activities pragmatically. These immediate goals are both organizational and individual--short-term shakubuku drives and political campaigns aid the Gakkai; prayer and participation bring divine benefit to the believer. As regards coverage in the Gakkai media, immediate goals receive much more attention than remote, but rhetorical references to the utopia to come are included almost everywhere.

It is quite possible that the constant reference to unrealistic goals is becoming lip service which serves to legitimize other enterprises (especially political) which may in fact be developing into ends in themselves. Moreover, it was suggested previously that the utopian goals neither receive much attention from nor create much allegiance in the average member. Nevertheless, the utter fantasy of a large number of the goals upon which the Gakkai's attention is at least nominally focused requires that one recognize the proximity of the Society to the model of mass movement in this respect.

B. Action: Direct?

Direct action in contravention of both social norms and legal rules is the behavioral characteristic of the mass movement. This is equally true of the medieval millennial sects of Europe which aimed at the "destruction of the ungodly" and permitted all things to their adherents, regardless of conventional standards of decent or orderly behavior,[3] and of modern mass religious movements such as the combative and highly political Hau-Hau of New Zealand and the Mamaia of Polynesia.[4] It typifies the political mass movement as well: the political hoodlumism of early National Socialism is well-known and its later techniques require no retelling:[5] violence *per se* was an intrinsic element of fascism;[6] and even a less extreme movement such as the Poujadist was not free of violence.[7]

Impressionistically, much evidence exists which suggests violent ideological predilections in the Sokagakkai. Nichiren, in the *Rissho Ankoku Ron*, asserted that the killing of heretics did not constitute murder, and that government should "extirpate heresy with the sword,"[8] while "the persecution of the enemies of the Lotus Sutra is the highest divine blessing."[9] The Gakkai itself has been described (by a not unbiased source) as "a fortress of corruption and immorality, exploitation and violence,"[10] while shakubuku has included intimidation, coercion, or threats.

Empirically there is an indisputable record of illegal actions by Sokagakkai members. Japanese government records implicate believers in such incidents as the beating of a supposedly "lazy" member; the beating of one member who spoke of leaving the Society and the threatening of several others; the attempted murder of a landlord who forbade his tenants to read their prayers loudly; the invasion of numerous temples of other sects and the arson of a temple of Konkokyo, another new religion; several cases of shakubuku which ended in violence; numerous instances of destruction of paraphernalia of other religions in the homes of new converts (a previously-sanctioned practice known as hobo-barai); and the firing of several employees by the president of their firm because they would not convert to Nichiren Shoshu.[11] In a number of spots Gakkai-member schoolteachers took advantage of their relationship with pupils to gain access to parents for the purpose of shakubuku; in at least one case the teacher told the parents that if they converted their child's illness would be cured; if not, he would become "abnormal."[12]

One notable feature of nearly all of these cases is that they occurred before 1957, that is, over ten years ago. Another is that they nearly all appear to be the spontaneous and officially unsanctioned work of individuals or small groups of believers. Thus, while constituting strong evidence in support of the proposition made above that there is an element of mass men in the Gakkai membership, these incidents do not necessarily signify that the official organization is itself a mass movement. In other infrequent cases, however, the official sanction which would enable governmental dissolution of the Gakkai in accord with the provisions of the Religious Juridical Persons Law[13] seems to be present: in 1952 a group of believers led by President Toda set upon an aged monk at the Taisekiji, tore off his vestments, and dragged him to Makuguchi's grave where they forced him to write an apology for having advocated collaboration with the authorities during the war.[14] Apparently no legal action was taken, but the incident shows that the Gakkai has officially at least skirted the bounds of legality.

Politically, too, there is an empirical record of direct action. In the 1950's election-law violations were numerous, particularly those of ostensible shakubuku which was in fact illegal door-to-door canvassing.[15] The connection between the official organization and the perpetrators of these crimes is again tenuous. One anti-Gakkai book claims that there were official directives ordering participation in canvassing activities;[16] in any case the Gakkai did on occasion defend its members post facto, attacking the police for their illegal persecution of the Society.[17] It is also significant that documented incidents of political crime date, almost without exception, from before the incumbency of President Ikeda.

The Gakkai officially, if obliquely, acknowledges the events which have contributed to its unfavorable public image. As one official pamphlet puts it,

> there might be times when some too ardent members in earnest go overboard with their method of persuasion that might suggest their methods being compulsory.[18]

President Ikeda is more explicit:

> There may be some fanatic believers in our Society who misunderstand or misinterpret the teachings of Nichiren and the interpretations of the Sokagakkai. Their individual words and deeds are liable to be interpreted as obedience to orders of the Society itself.
>
> In the Sokagakkai none of the presidents--neither Mr. Makiguchi, Mr. Toda, nor myself, or the chief leaders--have ever given orders to burn family altars, ancestral tablets, or to destroy tomb stones.[19]

As the quotation makes clear, the Gakkai today neither denies past excesses nor condones them. The official interpretation of Nichiren emphasizes his statements that violent repression of heresy was a pre-Sakyamuni technique and that in his own time the proper way to "out off" heretical sects was to cut off all monetary donations to them.[20] The Society also asserts that Nichired never condoned illegal violence by his followers, nor practiced it himself.[21]

> The truth of the matter is that Soka Gakkai leaders have never been happy about the public image that its fanatical members--especially its young members--have created, and they have consciously sought to change this image and gain as much respectability as possible for their organization.[22]

This "conscious seeking" is the "thaw" mentioned in several contexts above. The thaw is visible as tacit change; it is also explicitly stated by the highest leaders of the organization.[23]

> All Gakkai members, at the same time that they are believers obeying the Buddhism of Nichiren, are splendid members of society. . . . Gakkai members should live as excellent members of society, excelling all others.[24]

In the words of President Ikeda,

> I want your activity to be completely kind-hearted, thoroughly sincere, absolutely courteous and rich in common sense, completely free of incidents.[25]

Finally, the position of the Sokagakkai on direct, illegal political action is also explicit; here, too, the position does not appear to be that typical of a mass movement. Even a leftist critic of the Society admits that "all mass behavior which opposes authority has been skilfully excluded."[26] This particular critic excepts election law violations from his evaluation, but even in this field it is obvious that either the supporters of the Komeito are an exceedingly law-abiding group or the Gakkai has been quite successful in keeping its faithful in order.[27] The new technique, to obtain through parliamentary channels a change in the election law, was successfully concluded in 1968 by a liberalization of the law to permit canvassing.

Where violations of law or of Gakkai directives have occurred, the official response is often excommunication. In past instances where believers were arrested for election law violation the Gakkai protested their innocence but did not condone such violations per se. In fact, what the Gakkai is attempting to do regarding political action is just what it asserts: to increase the tendencies of its members to pursue their political goals through institutionalized channels.

> The awareness President Ikeda hoped for among the members was one which would eliminate the pessimistic, scornful view of politics as something with which clean people did not concern themselves, /as something/ devilish wherein one had always to join hands with demons.[28]

The Gakkai's opposition to and avoidance of direct and illegal collective action is as marked as its proscription of individual illegality. The Society reserves the possibility of street demonstrations if certain crucial interests are involved; however, the Gakkai was careful in January 1968 to contrast its own form of "demonstration" in the Sasebo lecture meetings against the simultaneous bloody actions of Zengakuren and Communist Party supporters. One student of the Gakkai suggests that the threats of demonstration are largely a strategic bluff: the more intense the opposing minority appears to be, the less likely the Liberal Democrats are to try to force through legislation.[29] Indeed, one suspects that the violence of the Gakkai is becoming increasingly rhetorical and that the longer the Society participates in the sanctioned forms of political expression the less likely it is that recidivism to earlier, more direct forms of action will occur.

* * * * * *

Despite its nominal focus of attention upon remote goals, which suggests a potentiality for the direct and extremist political action which typifies mass movements, the actual behavioral patterns of the Sokagakkai at present are in complete contradiction to the behavioral aspects of the model of such movements. One must not forget that doctrinal sanction for violence exists in Nichiren Shoshu and that certain of the Gakkai's members have in the past shown a penchant for direct action which is at odds with the most elementary norms of democratic politics. On occasion a connection with the official organization may also be seen in acts of questionable legality; however, in very few instances (of which none are recent) is this possible. Moreover, for several years the Gakkai has cultivated an image of respectability, honesty, and adherence to democratic standards of behavior which are either the sincere effort to direct its own and its members' actions into legitimate channels or an elaborate deception of both members and non-members.

The assumption made here is one of honesty and sincerity. For this reason it is concluded that the Sokagakkai, as a formal organizational entity, is not a mass movement as defined by Kornhauser. There is potential; this is very clear. Structurally, the ideal pattern of intermediate relationships in the Gakkai--weak and inclusive--has parallels with totalitarian movements; ideologically, the Society's ideal position regarding the individual human being seems quite possibly to increase self-alienation and its views of majority rule and minority rights leave one with serious doubts as to its real attachment to democratic principles. Behaviorally, there is a doctrinal millennium which is available for pursuit at any time and scriptural justification for a repression of heretics which goes far beyond mere debate.

However, The Gakkai does not seem ideally to be intent upon detaching its members from their non-Gakkai social context; also, as regards structural position, the Society is internally open to mediated vertical communication and influence which is more suggestive of pluralist than mass movements. Although the Gakkai might conceivably be alienating man from himself, it seems to offer an example of openness to actors in its social and political environment which contradicts the mass movement's exclusiveness, partisanship, un-cooperativeness, and programmatic envy. Moreover, the Gakkai takes a stand strongly protective of the constitution and of democracy in the abstract which seems threatening neither to the concrete system nor to abstract democracy.

Behaviorally there is a record of informal violence and crime. The record is, however, informal and--if one does not interpret the years of Ikeda's tenure as a temporary moderate aberration or an eight-year exercise in duplicity--has been explicitly repudiated for an ideal stand in support of legal means and constitutional procedures which is reflected in the concrete and actual patterns of official Gakkai action. The potential of the Sokagakkai for undemocratic, mass behavior is not to be underestimated; in its formal and actual state as an active organization, however, the Sokagakkai is not congruent with the model of mass movement.

NOTES: CHAPTER 18

1. Sokagakkai, The Soka Gakkai, Tokyo, 1960, p. 72.

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3. Norman Cohn, The Pursuit of the Millennium, Fairlawn, 1957, pp. 188, 262ff.

4. Vittorio Lanternari, The Religions of the Oppressed, New York, 1963, ch. 6.

5. Alan Bullock, Hitler, A Study in Tyranny, New York, 1964, p. 71.

6. Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, New York, 1966, p. 70.

7. Stanley Hoffman, Le Mouvement Poujade, Paris, 1956, pp. 134-35.

8. Quoted in Charles Eliot, Japanese Buddhism, New York, 1959, p. 277. Full text in Hori Nichiryo ed., Nichiren Daishonin Gosho Zenshu, Tokyo, 1961, p. 17; French Translation by Gaston Renondeau, "Le 'Traite sur l'Etat' de Nichiren," in T'oung Pao, vol. 40, 1951, p. 123.

9. Takase Hiroi, Dai San Bummei no Shukyo, Tokyo, 1962, p. 170.

10. Yui Hiromichi, Dato Sokagakkai, Fujisawa, 1967, p. 1.

11. Mombusho, Sokagakkai: Soshiki Ichiran-hyo, Boryoku Jiken Shu, Koshoku Senkyo Ho Ihan Jiken Ichiran-hyo, Tokyo, 1957, pp. 47-56.

12. One incident recorded in Yomiuri Shimbun, July 6, 1956; Mombusho, Sokagakkai ni tsuite, Tokyo, undated. Others from classified sources.

13. William Woodard, "Study on Religious Juridical Persons Law," in Contemporary Japan, vol. 25 nos. 3, 4, 1958, vol. 26, nos. 1, 2, 1959.

14. Nitta Rinzo, *Sokagakkai, Komeito no Shinso*, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 26ff.

15. Takase Hiroi, *Komeito*, Tokyo, 1964, p. 110; Mombusho, *Sokagakkai no Zenkoku Ku Rikkohosha ni kansuru Senkyo Ihan Jirei*, Tokyo, 1956; "Japan's New Church Militant," in *Japan Quarterly*, vol. 4 no. 4, October 12, 1957, p. 418; Saki Akio and Oguchi Iichi, *Sokagakkai*, Tokyo, 1960, p. 217.

16. Yui, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

17. Saki and Oguchi, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

18. Sokagakkai Overseas Bureau, *Head Temple Taisekiji*, no. 5 in "This is the Sokagakkai" series, Tokyo, undated, p. 13.

19. *World Tribune*, September 2, 1965.

20. See Hori, *op. cit.*, p. 17; and Renondeau, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

21. Nitta, *op. cit.*, p. 24.

22. Noah Brannen, "False Religions, Forced Conversions, Iconoclasm," in *Contemporary Religions in Japan*, vol. 5 no. 3, September 1964, pp. 237ff.

23. Takase, *Dai San* . . . , p. 132.

24. Ikeda Daisaku, *Shido Memo*, Tokyo, 1966, p. 193.

25. *Seikyo Shimbun*, May 22, 1967.

26. Saki Akio, "Komeito no Seisaku to Honshitsu," in *Ekonomisuto*, vol. 43 no. 32, July 27, 1965, p. 38.

27. *Japan Times*, January 31, 1967; *Asahi Shimbun*, February 10, 1967.

28. Takase, *Komeito*, p. 139.

29. Interview with Ikado Fujio, Religious Affairs Department, Ministry of Education.

PART VI: INTERACTION: ORGANIZATION AND MEMBER

CHAPTER 19

INTRODUCTION: THEORY

As may be discerned from the previous two parts of this study, there are several points within the Sokagakkai as a social and organizational totality at which one might surmise contradiction between the patterns of the membership as a particular human collectivity and the ideals of the Gakkai as a formal organization, regardless of the similarity implied by Kornhauser. The interaction of these patterns and ideals takes the form of a process by which the Gakkai tries to socialize its members into ideal patterns of thought and behavior, while individual members seek to fulfill through membership in the Gakkai whatever need or needs brought them to join. These two aims need not be compatible; moreover, in addition to the conscious socializing aims of the organization, there may be latent socializing effects of membership which are not necessarily either reinforcing of or compatible with the official, ideal socialization process. In this chapter we shall consider some theoretical propositions concerning the relative significance of membership in organizations and the quality of this membership in order to develop some expectations about the nature of interaction within the Sokagakkai, and then a few alternative hypothetical types of interaction between individuals and collectivities (informal and formal) will be presented for orientation before the specific patterns of interaction discernable within the Sokagakkai are examined.

A. Socialization: Fact and Quality

A study by Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba of political attitudes in five nations indicated that the subjectively perceived political compentence of citizens who were members of some voluntary association was higher than that of those who were not; in addition, those who considered themselves members of a politically relevant association felt even more competent than other association members.[1] In three of these five nations pride in and emotional attachment to the polity correlated positively with subjective competence; the pluralist implication is that membership in voluntary organizations is associated with increased allegiance to the political system and thus contributes to the legitimacy and stability of the system,[2] and a further pluralist inference which may be drawn is that the greater the extent of associational membership and subjective political competence in a society, the more stable and legitimate the political system.[3]

One is tempted also to infer from these data that the mere fact of associational membership is contributory to stable democratic or other political systems. In the aggregate this may be true: a society characterized by a great number of diverse, cross-cutting voluntary groups may be a relatively favorable setting for a democratic polity. But such an associational network, though perhaps necessary for stable democracy, is not sufficient. One might add the condition that, ceteris paribus, high associational behavior is beneficial for democratic systems because if there is a general cultural bias against democratic norms and practices then perhaps no number of voluntary associations will enable the stable existence of democracy.

In other words, ceteris are not always paribus. Cultural influences may be crucial: in two of the nations studied by Almond and Verba allegiance to the political system was not affected at all by feelings of subjective political competence, although competence did increase with membership in the activism in organizations.[4] In addition, qualitative variations in association must be considered. One may not generalize from the pluralist premise that many associations are beneficial to democracy to the conclusion that any one, or any additional one, is also beneficial. To assert that the appearance of a group such as the Ku Klux Klan is beneficial for American democracy because it increases the number of voluntary associations in existence is farcical.

Trying to judge the significance of a single group such as the Sokagakkai from the pluralist premise that the mere fact of associational membership, in the aggregate, is significant for the maintenance of stable democracy, is pointless. One cannot infer quality of membership from the fact of membership but must consider qualitative membership and socialization separately.

Associational membership as an interactive process of socialization has three aspects: content, structure (of which focus is one important facet), and environment. Content includes the specific ideology inculcated through the process; structure includes the methods and techniques by which the ideology is implanted. Structure may vary with content--different parts of the ideology may be communicated in different ways, and vice versa; the patterns of thought and behavior acquired will differ in accord with the differing manners in which they are presented. Both structure and content have their manifest and latent (noticed and unnoticed) and intended and unintended aspects: an organization may neither be aware that it is implanting in its members certain ideas, nor intent upon the inculcation of these ideas. At the other extreme, there are those ideas which the organization consciously wants to instill and which it openly attempts to transmit.

The focus of the socialization process merits special attention. The process by which persons become involved in mass movements may be envisioned as follows:

$$\left.\begin{array}{l}\text{Unattachment}\\ \\ \\ \text{Alienation}\end{array}\right\} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{c}\text{Availability for}\\ \text{mobilization}\end{array} \longrightarrow \begin{array}{c}\text{Mobilization by}\\ \text{mass movement}\end{array}$$

Socialization into a given group may entail influences upon one's degree of social attachments or upon his psychological alienation (i.e., upon his availability for mobilization), or upon behavioral mobilization itself. In more concrete terms, does socialization result in more satisfying, fulfilling, and restraining social relationships between the individual and society, or does it cut him off, isolate his relationships, and limit his communications from his environment? Does it decrease alienation, relieving frustration through new forms of self-fulfillment;[5] dispelling anxiety and insecurity;[6] giving new faith in oneself, one's fellows, and one's social and political environment? Or does it simply deflect the aggressive tendencies which spring from frustration, or temporarily repress them, or even intensify them;[7] does it create external enemies, new threats, and new anxieties and insecurity; does it inculcate disdain or hate for oneself, or for others, or for society and polity?

Finally, does socialization of those who are already unattached and alienated constitute mobilization along the behavioral patterns of mass movements, or does it consist of inhibition of such behavior for any reason?

The significance of the environment of the socialization process is reflected by the data of Almond and Verba. The two nations where, according to their researches, subjective political competence had no effect upon general affect for the political system, were Germany and Italy, both countries with recent experiences with profoundly antidemocratic and now discredited political systems.[8] Almond and Verba inferred that culture, history, and personal experience were such in these two nations that the legitimacy of any political system would probably still be weak. The parallel between Japan and these two nations in culture and recent political history is interesting; no data which enable comparison with Germany and Italy are available, but one should keep possible similarities in mind when studying Japanese associations.

The theory and data available suggest two points: first, mass movements tend to focus primarily upon the alienation and mobilization aspects of the process pictured on page 619 and operate to intensify alienation and its consequences, not to alleviate them; second, (deducing from the first point), the alienation aspects of Kornhauser's mass models are more important than the unattachment aspects, thus (adding the previous assertions made concerning primacy of the behavioral aspects of the models) one may establish a hypothetical sequence of decreasing importance (both theoretical and practical) in the models: behavior, alienation, unattachment.

On the first point, both Eric Hoffer and Sebastian DeGrazia note the reinforcement and intensification by mass movements of feelings of alienation, anxiety, hostility, and insecurity among their members during the process of socialization and mobilization.[9] Concretely both Poujadists and Sokagakkai have been explicitly accused of aggravating, not alleviating, the frustrations, dissatisfactions, and discontent of those whom they attract.[10] That alienation is more significant than unattachment is suggested by data which indicate that clearly alienated persons may be members of mass movements and yet be not at all detached from their social environments. The fact that a member of a movement is *ipso facto* possessed of a certain number of secondary social relationships contributes to this observation; more important, however, is the fact that social ties not related to membership in a mass movement may also co-exist with such membership. Examples are the members of the Christian Anti-Communist Crusade studied by Wolfinger *et al*., and the "Stalinoid" type of communist fellow-traveler described by Selznick, who expressly maintains his preexistent social ties and associational memberships and tries to incorporate them into the pattern of goals and duties incumbent upon him as a communist sympathizer.[11]

That behavior is more significant as concerns evaluation of a movement as a possible mass movement is suggested by the work of McClosky and that of Prothro and Grigg, who reveal that many persons are considerably alienated from practices usually deemed necessary for the stable operation of democratic polities but that since these persons are among the least likely to take political action their alienation does not create crisis.[12] The final progressive assumption regarding Kornhauser is this: unattachment to society is one index of "massness" but, since socially attached members of mass movements do exist, it is not as good an index as is alienation. And since alienated individuals who do not behave in ways characteristic of mass man also exist, one may assume that actual behavior is the most explicit index of "massness." The theoretical relevance of this progression lies in its aspiration toward an assignment of relative weights to the various aspects of Kornhauser's models; its practical relevance lies in its recommendation that those who would work to forestall, deflect, transform, or remedy mass conditions would most fruitfully observe behavior in their efforts to discern such conditions and most fruitfully direct their remedial efforts toward the reduction of alienation (assuming that it is better to attack causes than manifestations of "massness").

B. Patterns of Interaction

1. Congruence

The two most general patterns of relation between an organization as a formal-ideal-official entity and its members either as actual discrete individuals or as an actual social collectivity are those of congruence and incongruence.[13] A condition of congruence which does not entail any attitudinal or behavioral change in the members may occur in two ways (or via a combination of the two): through selective entry into the organization of only those who agree with the formal ideology and prescriptions and proscriptions of the organization, or by eventual natural selection of the membership, by which only those who agree with organizational ideals remain in the group. In such a condition organizational ideal attributes and rank-and-file actual attributes are nearly identical in that the membership is trying to internalize the ideals and realize them in thought and behavior.

Lipset, Adorno, and Katz and Lazarsfeld provide data descriptive of such conditions of congruence: they point out that entry into voluntary associations is neither by chance or blind imitation, but is "in large part an expression of important emotional dispositions."[14] Due to such dispositions,

> people tend not to "expose" themselves to communications which conflict with their own predispositions, but instead to seek support for their opinions and attitudes in favorable communications

such as those provided in associations with organizational ideals congruent with the predispositions of the individual.[15] Where persons enter with aims or predispositions which, it develops, are incongruent with organizational ideals such persons tend to drop out, thus increasing the proportions of the total membership which agrees with the ideals and conducing to congruence between ideal and actual.[16]

However, even allowing for the operation of such pre- and post-entry selection as mentioned above, "there is often a great gap between the top leaders' notions of the [ideal] purpose of the organization and those of the [actual] members at the bottom."[17] That such is the case with the Sokagakkai has been maintained; one Japanese observer has surmised that fully half of the Gakkai membership is radically critical of present social conditions but that their views are not reflected in organizational ideals:

> One may think that in a way there is present, as is quite visible in religious parties in foreign countries, a structure wherein the rank-and-file is critical and the upper echelons are conservative.[18]

Where such is the case, various types of contradictions are possible: between ideal and actual ideological, social, and behavioral patterns; between latent (unrecognized) and manifest (recognized) patterns; between intended and unintended patterns.[19] Patterns which combine two or more of the above characteristics (e.g., ideal, intended, and manifest *versus* actual, unintended, and latent) create numerous additional possibilities.

The possible outcomes of the interaction of organization and membership are multiple. The organization may influence the members, or *vice versa*, or there may be a compartmentalization whereby antagonistic patterns of thought and behavior coexist unreconstructed. Naturally, influence need not be one-way through time or in all aspects of the organization-membership interaction. Nor is it strictly accurate to speak of "outcomes;" what exists is a constant process, as the term interaction implies, with changing configurations of influence and counter-influence which change the overall proximity of the organization to, e.g., a model such as Kornhauser's model of mass movement.

2. Incongruence: Organizational Influence on Members

There is a body of data which leads one to suspect that the influence of the Sokagakkai as an organization will prove to be the key determinant of the Gakkai's proximity to the model of mass movement. The ability of groups to influence individual patterns of thought and action is well known; Katz and Lazarsfeld, and Riesman, illustrate directions and degrees of such influence upon the general opinions and actions of members; Levinson and Schermerhorn show the specific influence of collective pressures upon group members through time in the absolute convergence of F-scale scores and decreased standard deviation of scores through time.[20] Lipset is more politically explicit:[21]

> Commitments to democratic procedures and ideals by the principle organizations to which low-status individuals belong may also influence these individuals' actual political behavior more than their underlying political values, no matter how authoritarian. . . .
> Commitments to other values or institutions by individuals (cross-pressures) may also override the most established predispositions.

For this reason,

> The specific propensity of given social strata to support either extremist or democratic political parties, then, cannot be predicted from a knowledge of their psychological predispositions or from attitudes inferred from survey data.

Such a statement is in agreement with Kornhauser, who considers mass movements to be macro-mass man, and with the Sokagakkai, which officially arrogates to itself sole and absolute knowledge of the ultimate truth and the ability to instill this truth in its believers. For this reason the Gakkai is not selective with its converts: any person can be remade into a believer and then into a true believer. A similar pattern is shown by communist organizations:

> Rather than limiting admission into its ranks to indoctrinated people, the party in reality throws out a wide and coarse net, admits all comers, and relies upon internal pressures and training devices to make Communists out of this heterogenous human material.[22]

The Sokagakkai, somewhat unrealistically, sees all believers as activists. Most new converts are at best tepid in their faith; the problems at hand are (a) keeping them in the Gakkai, (b) inducing action, and (c) inducing zealous belief, in that order. In the solution of these problems, the two main features are the incentives (positive and negative) designed to hold, mobilize, and socialize members, and the means with which these incentives are applied.

Incentives are both positive and negative; there are physical, material, normative/symbolic, and ecological incentives. The physical type is of little use (at least as a negative incentive) in a voluntary association within a free society. Material incentives, especially as expressed by the conception of divine benefit or its opposite, divine punishment, play a major role, however, as do symbolic incentives such as promotion and demotion. Ecological incentives have a crucial role; considering the importance for the individual member of his tako-tsubo face-to-face group, the manipulation by group leaders of this invironment so as to bestow or withhold favorable responses and acceptance is a powerful influence toward adopting at least the outward forms of faith.

Multiple means are used by the Gakkai in applying these incentives. They consist of a great variety of printed media, supplemented by both large- and small-scale gatherings and interpersonal groups of sufficient number and variety to enable almost total existence within the Gakkai social nexus.

This combination of incentives and means seems well fashioned to maximize organizational influence vis-à-vis the members in a non-coercive context. Organizational influence, at least over members' verbal and physical behavior, is more likely to be greater where (a) the identification of members with both peers and leaders is high and (b) acceptance as one of the group is very important to the individual member; where (c) the organization comes close to monopolizing the communications (both through impersonal media and especially through direct social interaction) received by its members; and where (d) the centralization of the organization is high.[23] The Gakkai actively promotes (a) and (d); (c) is attempted either consciously or unconsciously; (b) is an assumed actual (though perhaps not a manifest or intended) ideal condition. Thus one might expect the influence of the Gakkai vis-à-vis its members to be relatively high, especially as regards those members who have been members for a longer period of time or are more activist and, according to survey data, evince greater degrees of identification and communication closure.

Despite the indications of survey data that the communications monopoly of the Gakkai vis-à-vis its members is much less than perfect, the other ecological and symbolic incentives used by the Gakkai imply a relatively high degree of organizational influence. The ecological means of environment-as-communication in face-to-face situations is of especial importance, as is the symbolic incentive of acceptance (again applied largely by ecological manipulation) to those for whom identification with the group is a major psychic need.

A further variation in organizational influence concerns the area of the members' thought or action which the organization attempts to influence. It is assumed here that such non-deviant verbal and physical behavior as is necessary to ensure acceptance and, in a more marked form, promotion within the organization will be most easily influenced. Attitudes of all kinds, especially those unrelated to the primary needs of belonging, identification, and belief will be less easily influenced, as will markedly deviant behavior. Thus one might expect the influence of the Sokagakkai upon its members to be greatest, in terms of the model at hand, in the area or unattachment: the extent of participation in Gakkai activities and of consumption of Gakkai communications necessary to ensure acceptance may be such as to lead gradually to attenuation of non-Gakkai contacts. Alienation and behavior--especially deviant or illegal behavior--would be less amenable to influence; no *a priori* estimation of relative susceptibility will be made here except an assumption that those attitudes concerning which the Gakkai can most nearly monopolize the individual's information, and those areas of activity which are least deviant, will be most amenable to organizational influence.

3. Incongruence: Members' Influence on Organization

One must not assume that the influence upon members of formal organizational ideals is a one-way process; as social and cultural patterns and popular attitudes may be more important for the functioning of a political system than are its formal structures, so perhaps the attitudes and informal behavior patterns of members are of crucial significance for the organizations to which they belong. Just as

> patriotism and the strength of one's attachment to a political community need not depend on one's approval of its intellectual, cultural, or political values,

so also it often is that

> men may become attached to a party, a community, /a religious group?,/ or a nation by forces that have nothing to do with ideology or consensus.[24]

Empirical data reinforces the impression that official organizational goals and ideologies are often only tenuously connected with the individual's reasons for continued membership. Gerhard Lenski, in a study of religion in Detroit, found that the religious subcommunity, i.e., the socially-related collectivity of believers, was a much stronger influence upon believers' attitudes than was the official aspect of religious belief, i.e., the believers' associational membership in a church.[25] And in a local study of Sokagakkai members in Fukuoka City, fully half of the nonleaders polled evinced no interest whatsoever in whether the Sokagakkai grew in members or not, while only 24% claimed to have a "serious interest" in this extremely important organizational goal.[26] These members, while not activists, were verbally committed Gakkai members; it appears that the pursuit of official goals may not be the primary reason for their continued membership--what, then, is?

Some of the possible alternative motivations to entry and membership aside from sincere faith have been mentioned; it is possible that such motivations either influence the total phenomenon which is the movement or at least coexist within it with official patterns of thought and action. The presence of varying motivations in entry into organizations has been studied in regard to communist parties by Gabriel Almond, in regard to other religious groups by Earl Babbie and Charles Glock; in regard to social movements by Eric Hoffer; and in regard to organizations in general by Max Weber.[27] Neill McFarland has discerned several levels of belief in Nichiren Shoshu, from simple magical attractions to interest in the esoterica of Buddhism.[28] In addition to these one may cite other motives for entry which are unrelated to Shoshu beliefs: primary interest in intraorganizational status or in political activity which could lead to emphasis of the Gakkai (as opposed to Nichiren Shoshu) or the Komeito respectively.

The most important alternative motivation to entry into and continued membership in the Sokagakkai, aside from either sincere interest in the beliefs of Nichiren Shoshu or interest in the doctrinally specified benefits of belief, is satisfaction of pre-existent personal psychological or social needs. Where the satisfaction of such needs can be realized only through thorough overt conformity to organizational ideals of thought and behavior, organizational influence over the individual may be decisive. However, where satisfaction is possible without close and demonstrative adherence to ideal norms of thought and action, organizational influence is liable to be slight, at least as regards covert orientations.

Certain data suggest that (a) at least one major motivation to continued membership in the Sokagakkai--gratification of primary human needs--is unrelated to the official goals and norms of the organization and that (b) only those aspects of thought and action in which conformity is required for satisfaction of these needs are greatly influenced by organizational ideals.[29]

What sort of benefits do thus-motivated members perceive? In a series of case studies of Gakkai members, the majority gave such reports as "I've changed," and "I've become self-confident."[30] A further example is given by an ex-convict with a record of extortion, theft, and narcotics violations:[31]

> My nickname used to be "The Bear." I was constantly driven by an impulse to slice up anyone I saw. I was ostracized by the gang. All the tough guys, hoods, and gangsters would run from me.

After his most recent release from prison and before he joined the Gakkai, this man reported that neighbors shunned him and he was fired from successive jobs;

> it's for this very reason that I'm so very, very grateful to the members of the Gakkai. They're the only ones who treat me like a human and don't at all care about my past record. I'm now a chikubu-cho; where in this world would I, an ex-convict who used to be like a wild animal, be given such a post of responsibility?

Whether or not people such as those quoted above and those uninterested in official ideals are the same is not known; however, it is not unreasonable to suspect that the alternative focus of interest which keeps organizational apathetics in the Gakkai is the search for personal and social gratification.

The most immediately visible influence of the Gakkai upon its new members concerns superficial intragroup behavioral professions of faith of the type which increase smoothness of intercourse with and make a favorable impression upon one's kumi. Prayer, attendance, reading of required material, and overt interest in and enthusiasm over activities represent explicit organizational influence. Inducement to very time-consuming or deviant behavior, one may assume, requires greater influence; the great frequency of members who either take little interest in or completely eschew shakubuku suggests that organizational influence is less than overpowering in this case.

Little attitudinal change of any kind is required for satisfaction of primary needs. One may not assume that congruence of attitudes and ideology, where it exists, represents a result of selective entry, because even where group membership is the individual's need there is internal pressure to conform to group ideals beyond simple mouthing of formulae. Still, examination of attitudes of Gakkai members on different levels of consciousness suggests that selective entry, rather than organizational influence, is the primary process by which congruence between Gakkai ideal and member's reality is achieved.

The assumptions inherent in this suggestion are that, *ceteris paribus*, (a) overt, non-deviant behavior is more susceptible of organizational inducement than is either deviant behavior or attitudinal change, and that (b) attitudes concerning which the Gakkai takes an explicit, official stand will be more amenable to organizational influence than attitudes concerning which the relevant Gakkai position is ambiguous. The fact that considerable data indicate that a great many Gakkai members are not inclined either to attend activities, or to read Gakkai media or scriptural materials or to perform specified rituals hints that in many cases organizational influence is not sufficient to change even these relatively superficial patterns of behavior; as regards such deviant behavior as *shakubuku* similar patterns may be inferred: no more than half of the membership appears to take part.[32] Marked discrepancies between ideal and actual are visible also as regards attitudes upon which the Gakkai's position is clear, especially political issues. The most striking example concerns the constitution: the Gakkai firmly supports the present constitution, but the membership in general has a markedly negative orientation toward it.[33] The preliminary and as yet empirically tenuous assumption made here on the basis of partial data is, crudely, that Sokagakkai believers are born, not made; that the Gakkai attracts or at least keeps those who are basically in agreement with Gakkai precepts rather than successfully resocializing converts into entirely new patterns of thought and action. The basis of this assumption is the previous assumption that if superficial behavior patterns cannot be changed, then neither can more deeply-held social attitudes; since in many cases such behavior has not changed one assumes that congruence of basic social orientations and Gakkai ideals is due to prior similarities, not successful indoctrination. It is perhaps conceivable that resocialization of converts into organizationally ideal patterns without influence upon behavioral tendencies is possible, and that the preliminary observation presented above represents this phenomenon. This possibility is contradicted by evidence (again, partial) that certain social attitudes typical of Japanese people which are specifically rejected by the Sokagakkai are held by large numbers of the membership; among these are religious tolerance and the feeling that religious groups should not participate directly in the political process.[34] The adherence of many members to these culturally sanctioned beliefs suggests an unreconstructed, preexistent orientation which has resisted, and coexists with the effects of, socialization.

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From the preliminary presentation of theory and data made here one can see contradictory implications of the relative influence of organizational ideal and members' actuality upon the nature of the Sokagakkai as a possible mass movement. The kinds of needs to belong to and be accepted by a group which conduce to high organizational influence can be found among the members of the Gakkai, but it is possible that the group which is the primary focus of loyalty and the source of the most sought-after values is the kumi and not the whole Gakkai,[35] and that the attitudes and behavior patterns which are amenable to organizational influence are those most relevant to acceptance by the small group.

One assumes that the relative influence of organization and members will vary from sphere to sphere of behavior and opinion. In comparing the Sokagakkai in its interactive form (as opposed to the previous isolated applications to its organizational-formal and social-informal forms) to Kornhauser's model of mass movement, we shall focus upon the following points of the model: does the interaction result in greater or less attachment of organization and member to the larger society; does it lead to more or less alienation of members from themselves, and of members and organization from other people and from social, and political contexts; and does it conduce to unstable, direct pursuit of remote or utopian goals?

We shall focus also on the different elements in the Gakkai: in relation to which aspects of the model is the influence of members' preexistent attitudes primary; in relation to which is organizational socialization into ideal patterns successful; and as regards organization, where are official Gakkai ideals dominant and where are informal group norms instilled by the kumi as an autonomous social entity more influential?

Finally, we shall focus upon the different stages of the following analysis as they relate to the various elements of the definition of democracy used here. Briefly, the elements are (a) the regular, constitutional change of governing officials at least in part (b) through choice by a maximum proportion of the populace; (c) general consensus on the "democratic formula;" and (d) one set of officials in office and a recognized, legitimate opposition. As previously suggested, social unattachment is the least significant aspect of the mass model as regards potential for either "massness" or undemocratic political implications, and behavior is the most significant. Review of the definition of democracy used here corroborates this suggestion; the relevance of social unattachment to the definition is indirect at best. Thus as the following analysis progresses from consideration of unattachment, to alienation, to behavior, one might see it as becoming increasingly significant for evaluation of the political implications of the Sokagakkai.

NOTES: CHAPTER 19

1. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture, Boston, 1965, pp. 252-254.

2. Ibid., pp. 204-05, 211.

3. Ibid., p. 262.

4. Loc. cit.

5. John Dollard et al., Frustration and Aggression, New Haven, 1939, pp. 8, 9.

6. Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory, Glencoe, 1958, p. 300.

7. Dollard et al., op. cit., pp. 8-9.

8. Almond and Verba, op. cit., ch. 8, esp. pp. 197ff.

9. Eric Hoffer, The True Believer, New York, 1966, pt. III; Sebastian DeGrazia, The Political Community, Chicago, 1948, pp. xv-xvi.

10. Stanley Hoffman, Le Mouvement Poujade, Paris, 1956, p. 401; Tanaka Tadao, "Seiji to Shukyo ni tsuite no Ikkosatsu," in Nihon oyobi Nihonjin, no. 1432, January 1966, p. 92.

11. Raymond Wolfinger et al., chapter in David Apter, Ideology and Discontent, Glencoe, 1964; Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon, New York, 1952, pp. 297ff.; for a similar suggestion see Robert Lane, Political Life, Glencoe, 1959, p. 27.

12. James Prothro and C. W. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," in Journal of Politics, vol. 22, spring 1960, p. 276; Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," in American Political Science Review, June 1964, p. 361.

13. For a discussion of "ideal" and "actual" conditions and attributes see Marion Levy, Modernization and the Structure of Societies, Princeton, 1966, pp. 26-30.

14. T. W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality, New York, 1950, pp. 206-07.

15. Elihu Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, Personal Influence, Glencoe, 1955, p. 96.

16. S. M. Lipset, *Political Man*, Garden City, 1963, pp. 91-92.

17. James Dator, "The Soka Gakkai: A Socio-Political Interpretation," in *Contemporary Religions in Japan*, vol. 6 no. 3, September 1965, pp. 208-09.

18. *Asahi Shimbun*, February 3, 1967.

19. Levy, *op. cit.*, p. 70.

20. Katz and Lazarsfeld, *op. cit.*, p. 48; David Riesman, *et. al.*, *The Lonely Crowd*, New Haven, 1961, pp. xxii-iii; Richard Christie and Marie Jahoda, *Studies in the Scope and Method of "The Authoritarian Personality,"* Glencoe, 1954, p. 181.

21. Lipset, *op. cit.*, pp. 91-92.

22. Gabriel Almond, *The Appeals of Communism*, Princeton, 1965, p. 167.

23. Katz and Lazarsfeld, *op. cit.*, pp. 50-51, 69, 31-32.

24. McClosky, *op. cit.*, p. 378; see also Almond, *op. cit.*, p. 103; and Hans Toch, *The Social Psychology of Social Movements*, New York, 1965, p. 161.

25. Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor*, Garden City, 1963, pp. 181-82.

26. Suzuki Hiroshi, "Toshi Kaso no Shukyo Shudan," in *Shakaigaku Kenkyu*, no. 24, 1964, pp. 83-84.

27. Almond, *op. cit.*, pp. 230ff.; Earl Babbie, "The Third Civilization: An Examination of Soka Gakkai," in *Review of Religious Research*, winter 1966, p. 101; Rudolf Heberle, *Social Movements*, New York, 1951, pp. 95-99; Hoffer, *op. cit.*, pt. II.

28. Neill McFarland, *Rush Hour of the Gods*, New York, 1967, pp. 204-05.

29. Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," in Daniel Lerner, *Propaganda in War and Crisis*, New York, 1951, p. 368; Naikaku Kanbo Naikaku Chosa-shitsu, *Shinko Shukyo ni kansuru Shakai-shinrigakuteki Kenkyu*, Tokyo, 1965 (?), p. 8.

30. Naikaku, *op. cit.*, pp. 83ff.

31. Takase Hiroi, *Ningen Fukko: Sokagakkai ni Ikiru*, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 116ff.

32. Unpub. data from third National Character study by the Tokei Suri Kenkyu-jo, Tokyo, 1963; Suzuki, op. cit., pp. 73ff.

33. Unpub. data from Japanese government survey of popular attitudes toward the Constitution, 1965.

34. Unpub. data from survey by Miss Takahashi Naoko.

35. For an example of such microcosmically-focused loyalty in the German Wehrmacht, see Shils and Janowitz, op. cit., p. 368.

CHAPTER 20

UNATTACHMENT

A. Exclusivity

The degree to which members of the Sokagakkai are unattached to their social environment and the extent to which organizational socialization is responsible for such unattachment may be examined through the concepts of the exclusivity and inclusivity of relationships. _Exclusivity_ signifies social unattachment with the exception of one's relationship with the movement,* i.e., the Gakkai constitutes one's exclusive connection with secondary social groups outside of oneself (including subjective class identity) and one's exclusive source of communication. _Inclusivity_ denotes the degree to which one's relationship with, e.g., the Sokagakkai expands to comprehend an ever greater proportion of one's total life. The two terms are related: the more inclusive a relationship is, the more exclusive it is likely to be; however, they are not mutually independent, that is, one may have a highly exclusive but specifically and solely political relationship with a political party, while he may also have very inclusive relationships with two or more groups, each of which has partial influence over the same broad areas of behavior.

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*This one relationship must be postulated because, in contrast to the ideal mass man, the member of a mass movement has _ipso facto_ at least one social attachment.

In addition to unattachment of members to society, the ideal and actual internal structure and process of the organization, as an interaction of official norms and informal practices, may be analyzed in order to see if man in the organization under study is in an analogous position to man in mass society or mass movement: are his secondary relationships weak and non-inclusive? Weakness of secondary intraorganizational ties is analogous to extraorganizational social unattachment; non-inclusive secondary intraorganizational ties are analogous to such ties outside the organization. Finally, as a consequence of the presence or absence of secondary groups and of their strength or weakness, one may observe the accessibility of the organizational elite to influence by non-elites: is such accessibility high and unmediated either ideally or actually or both?

The Sokagakkai's ideal concerning social interaction, except as regards the religious aspect of its members' behavior, is non-exclusive, and no one is ever instructed to cut off social contact with non-believers among one's circle of friends. At the same time, however, there is an actual influence toward exclusivity which is indicated by the data on individual members' social ties: closure of both social and communications ties with the non-Gakkai environment varies directly with length of membership in the Society and with activism in terms of either participation in activities or office-holding. One can envision with no difficulty a central core in the Society which is almost entirely cut off from the rest of Japanese society except for its ties with the Gakkai.

Such a cutoff among the general membership is asserted by other observers. Believers have been accused of retreating from, not meeting, life's misfortunes by ignoring reality and escaping into a world of internal (daimoku, gongyo) and external (shakubuku, organizational participation) activity which further reduces contacts and commonality with society.[1] Certain opinion surveys suggest that Gakkai members screen out information which is irrelevant to their organizational interests: "They are sharply attuned to their own party, to the exclusion of knowledge [of] or interest in other political parties."[2] The norms of full participation in Gakkai activities and full knowledge of Gakkai teachings put pressure on believers to eliminate conflicting demands upon their time; the most dispensable of those demands are those related to reception of communications from and social interaction with the non-Gakkai environment.

The exclusivist tendency may even work explicitly against Gakkai ideals (although, in cases such as recommendation of reading matter, one might infer that exclusivism is a Gakkai ideal); such a phenomenon has been noted in other movements:

> There is . . . evidence to suggest that the communist party's demand for dedication often produces consequences which are quite in conflict with the other doctrinal and practical demand that the party maintain close contact with the masses. A process of isolation from the outside world appears to take place as individuals move into the inner core of the movement. . . .[3]

It is possible that the Gakkai, by consistently and simplistically explaining all in religious terms, is isolating its believers from the secular world. It may even be cutting them off from its secular arm, the Komeito, by asserting that electoral victory is the result of faith and even by contradicting the party in its explanations of certain phenomena: whereas the proximity of a heretical shrine was blamed by the Gakkai for a train wreck, the Komeito saw reform of the Japan National Railways administration as the cure for such incidents.[4]

In spite of the actual influences exerted upon members by the fact of membership in the Sokagakkai and the actual condition of closure and social detachment visible among certain of the activists, there is reason to believe that the largest part of the membership more closely approximates the Gakkai's interactive ideal than it does the unattached mass man. Even if shakubuku does not necessarily constitute a fulfilling, harmonious social relationship, it serves to tie the individual to his social environment; the total process of socialization into the Gakkai is an opportunity to learn about society and polity in a way which can make entry into the complex, ultra-modern world of urban Japan easier for the less-educated and lower-class persons who comprise the majority of the faithful.[5]

Survey data also indicate that for the majority of the membership socialization into the Sokagakkai does not result in social and communicative closure. Sketchy data suggest that the average member may in fact be a more active member of society than the average Japanese non-believer in terms of non-Gakkai office-holding experience; additional data show believers to be sufficiently well connected to their environment both through social ties and communications, while the existence of extra-Gakkai reference groups of various kinds indicates that the Gakkai does not have exclusive access to its members. The faithful do not, in large part, succumb to the socially isolating influences of socialization and are thus not an unattached, free-floating human mass available for mobilization by any movement of whatever type and with whatever goals. They do, however, include an element of just such an unattached, free-floating mass; the more committed and more active are apparently influenced by the actual socialization process of the organization and constitute a source of potential mass behavior of which both the Gakkai's critics and the Gakkai leadership itself (since this unattachment is incongruent with the Society's ideal pattern of social behavior) should be aware.

B. Inclusivity

The Sokagakkai has no manifest ideal regarding the degree of inclusivity of its relationship with its members, but insofar as the manifest efforts of the Society to create a network of groups under which every aspect of one's behavior, both religious and secular, can be subsumed may be taken as an indication of the Gakkai's intent, one may assume that the ideal, while latent, is one of total inclusivity. In actuality the Gakka's efforts are very much manifest; the Komeito and such interest groups as the Democratic Music Association are nationally known and the Gakkai's latest project, the creation of a labor union with official spiritual sanction, has received extensive press coverage.

Estimation of the degree of inclusivity of the relationship between the members and the Gakkai is a highly conjectural enterprise. The "activists" who appear to be closely connected to the organization through participation, concentration upon official communications, ties of friendship, and identification may not all be of the same element of the membership: those who read only the Seikyo Shimbun and Dai Byaku Renge may spend their social life with acquaintances who have no tie to the Gakkai whatsoever; those who go to the meetings of the Student Division, their kumi and block, the Fuji Symphonic Orchestra, and the Kayo-kai might never look at the Seikyo Shimbun or any scriptural or organizational media. Such compartmentalization is, however, dubious. The only such compartmentalization apparent is characteristic of those whose needs are satisfied within the context of the zadankai and individual worship; such persons might well maintain the non-Gakkai nature of most if not all of the secular sphere of their lives and even show a reluctance to immerse themselves in any more of the Gakkai's doctrine and activities than is necessary and sufficient for the satisfaction of their needs.

For these reasons it appears that the influences toward exclusivity implicit in the Gakkai's socialization process are paralleled by influences toward inclusivity. As the activist increases his Gakkai-related social and communications ties, these ties replace non-Gakkai ties concerning the same phases of his life. Insofar as organizational commitments is deep (for whatever reason), one may expect that believers will be motivated to subsume increasing areas of their lives under the ever-expanding Gakkai umbrella.

For the general membership also it is probable that there is a positive relationship between exclusivity and inclusivity; the areas of life in which non-Gakkai-related ties exist are *ipso facto* not included--at least not completely--in one's relationship with the Gakkai. But whereas non-exclusivity represents congruence with the Gakkai's ideal, actual non-inclusivity contradicts the official ideal. The social patterns of the membership are at least consistent: the activists tend to be exclusively and inclusively tied to the Society, while the rank-and-file tend to be non-exclusively and non-inclusively tied. The Gakkai's own ideals are internally inconsistent; it is unreasonable to suppose that the membership should be fully participant members of society and simultaneously involved in Gakkai-related groups in all aspects of their lives. The fact that the latter ideal is latent may enable the Gakkai to persist in this inconsistency; the fact that the actual influences of socialization are consistent--inducing both exclusivity and inclusivity--may enable continued coexistence of contradictory ideals.

Thus, although the actual patterns of social interaction and identification with the Gakkai of the average membership in one case contradict and in one case parallel the official ideal, in both cases they contradict the actual patterns instilled by the Gakkai socialization process. The overall picture, as regards unattachment in its exclusive and inclusive aspects, then, is one of a majority of several million Gakkai members whose preexistent (or perhaps even developed postconversion) social relationships and reference groups and sources of information continue to exist at least partly in addition to the new relationships with the Gakkai and whose relationship with the Gakkai is sufficiently specialized and compartmentalized that they do not resemble unattached mass man. Supplementing this picture is another, of several hundred thousand activists resembling mass man in varying degrees as, over time, they relinquish their social ties to non-Gakkai members, turn to Gakkai media for their information, and see the Gakkai as their primary social reference group.

C. Internal Structure and Process

Neither the ideal nor the actual pattern of internal structures within the Sokagakkai indicates that the Gakkai is a mass movement. Ideal and actual, however, vary in different directions from the model and, as in the case of the Gakkai's ideal socializing effects upon the social attachments of members, the ideal internal structure of the Sokagakkai has partially dysfunctional implications for a democratic political environment.

Ideally, secondary structures in the Sokagakkai are *weak vis-à-vis* the central authorities. No autonomous locus of intraorganizational power is permitted; no one is allowed to parlay his own personality, role, or extra-Gakkai status into a position of influence over some group below the central leadership; and whatever remonstrance or other kind of upward feedback contrary to enacted policy does occur is unorganized.

Intermediate groups are also ideally *inclusive vis-à-vis* the membership. In a mass movement, however, these groups are non-inclusive; an organization with weak and inclusive intermediate groups approximates a totalitarian, not a mass, movement. In actuality, intermediate groups in the Sokagakkai, especially the lower-level groups of the vertical line, may well have a degree of intrinsic strength and autonomy quite at odds with the Gakkai ideal. The importance of simply belonging and the ability to satisfy one's needs to belong, to be accepted, to express oneself, and to solve other problems within the context of the secondary group and by means of participation in Gakkai activities only insofar as they involve the secondary group suggest that these secondary groups will be of great intrinsic importance to the believer.

The possibility that kumi and han have autonomy is indicated by the fact that the periodic meetings of these units are not scheduled from above as are the meetings of all larger groups; membership records are kept on these low levels and the fact that even the central leadership of the Gakkai does not know precisely the total active membership of the Society indicates that communication with the lowermost secondary structures is less than perfect. That individuals find happiness primarily through the zadankai and through such organizational activities as are conducted through the kumi is suggested by the story of Tanaka Gen'ichi:[6]

> "Even if others do not talk to you they will understand you through your work." Tanaka Gen'ichi (47 years old, Inokashira Chapter, Mitaka City, Tokyo) who makes plastic signboards, used to console himself by thinking of this. His innate reticence hurt him, making taking orders his greatest distress. In contracting, too, he was at the mercy of the other contracting parties, and he often incurred losses for this reason. This speechlessness was due to Tanaka's stutter.
>
> After 1961 the competition in his business became acute and orders almost stopped coming in. Tanaka, feeling trapped, began reciting the daimoku. "No matter how I avoided it, it was no good. Well, now I'm going to believe devoutly and cure this stutter."--after so resolving, there was force in his daimoku. . . .
>
> He led the way in zadankai participation. He exuded courage when he spoke. There was Tanaka, stuttering along until sweat stood out on his jaw. When he did shakubuku, Tanaka recited the daimoku one or two hours before setting out. He stuttered, but Tanaka's enthusiasm got through and not a few people were moved to convert.
>
> In his work, too, he made the most of the experiences he gained through these Gakkai activities, and aggressively developed a brand-new clientele. Not only could he get contracts just the way he wanted them, but his losses due to errors in estimations also ceased.

> In September 1963 Tanaka made a great promise. Thinking "This stuttering is terrible," he began assiduously to recite the daimoku. His relations with others became smoother; once it occurred to him, "I didn't stutter." At that point, he says, "I was truly happy." Using this opportunity he had cured his stutter.

The point of this story is not that Mr. Tanaka himself became involved in his own prayer and zadankai activity and individual shakubuku at the expense of the larger organization and perhaps became estranged from larger organizational activities and structures and goals in the process, but that opportunities for the solution of major personal problems are available outside of the larger Gakkai organization and, given the natural tendency for one's immediate environment (especially if this is his primary problem-solving context) to be more salient to him than more remote and, as regards personal problem-solving, less relevant environing groups, it is easy to imagine that numerous members of the Sokagakkai are more closely identified with their kumi and han than with the larger organization.

Whether the "strength" and "autonomy" inferred here is of a degree sufficient to obstruct efforts by the Gakkai elite to mobilize the membership is impossible to say. If the secondary groups were utilized in such a mobilization, as they are in shakubuku, the possibility is great that many ideologically lukewarm members could be brought out into the streets. But since only about half of the Gakkai membership regularly attends meetings, even such a mobilization would not be total. If, on the other hand, an attempt were made to call out the membership without utilizing the vertical line structure, it is likely that efforts would be much less successful. The really intimate and powerful relationships in the Gakkai are in the vertical line and any program which eliminated the vertical line would in all probability lead to the stagnation or disintegration of the Gakkai.

But just because there is strength in the secondary group structure of the Gakkai does not mean that this structure has any significant strength *vis-à-vis* the central organization. In order that such strength might exist it would be necessary for the secondary groups to be organized, and this is not the case. In that intermediate groups do not appear to have any real collective strength *vis-à-vis* the organization as a whole, they are weak. But in that they do possess a degree of autonomous and intrinsic value for their members and are somewhat separated from the overall Gakkai organization, they do have strength in the sense that they constitute a set of structures which, if not ably manipulated, could obstruct major programs of the organization and create a membership indifferent to the larger ideals, goals, and activities of the Gakkai. One might say that the intermediate group structure is weak, but not so weak as the Gakkai's ideal stipulates and perhaps possessed of sufficient strength to place it moderately close to the pluralist model of strong intermediate structures.

Regarding the inclusivity of the intermediate structures of the Sokagakkai, one may refer back to the section of this chapter on inclusivity of members' relations with the Society. Despite the ideal inclusivity attempted through the creation of a wide variety of secondary groups, only a minority of the membership of the Gakkai actually appear to have forsaken their extra-Gakkai ties to the extent that one may infer inclusivity in their relationship with the organization. For the majority, the non-inclusive nature of their membership suggests that the mass or pluralist type of non-inclusive intermediate group structure, rather than the totalitarian inclusive type, is approximated. In combination, the intermediate structure appears to be one of either strong and non-inclusive (i.e., pluralist) or weak and non-inclusive (i.e., mass) secondary relationships. The speculation made above to the effect that the secondary group structure possesses a degree of strength of its own leads in this case to the inference that the actual structure of the Gakkai is neither clearly pluralist nor clearly mass, and certainly not totalitarian. It is thus incongruent with both the Gakkai's structural ideal, signifying the primacy in this area of influences from the membership, and with the model of mass movement, signifying a potential for mass behavior by and mobilization of the membership below that of a mass movement.

Neither the pattern of social and communications ties typical of Gakkai members nor their position in the Sokagakkai suggest strongly either that they are actually mass men or that the Gakkai is actually a mass movement, although again one must recognize the potential indicated by the Gakkai's ideal, in this case a potential which points toward totalitarianism in structure and mass-like unattachment in social position.

There is no such ambivalence in the internal process of the Gakkai. The Gakkai's ideal is high elite accessibility, albeit regularized and mediated accessibility, such as typifies pluralists, not mass, social systems. Impediments to this access are noticed and countered; as President Ikeda noted recently, with organizational growth and the proliferation of elite duties Gakkai leaders have become increasingly busy and

> personal contact among members has been weakened. This is indicative of the fact that relations among members have become less intimate. Personal contact is very important in maintaining one's faith; otherwise faith will be lost.[7]

In actuality, non-elite access to the elite is extremely high. Leaders are in constant view at meetings on the lower levels of the organization and President Ikeda meets frequently with groups of members around the country. The Citizens' Discussion Centers provide another structure of access; the number of cases handled by the Centers (most of which, one may assume, are brought by Gakkai members and Komeito supporters)--several hundred thousand per year--suggests the extent to which the Gakkai membership takes seriously the ideal opportunities for indirect access to the elite which are open to them.

The reverse of this process, that is, the degree to which non-elites are available for mobilization by elites, will be discussed as part of Gakkai behavior. Here, at least, one may infer that as regards non-elite access to elites the Sokagakkai exhibits a general congruence between ideal and actual patterns, and neither pattern is characteristic of a mass movement.

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One may say that the Sokagakkai, as a total social and organizational phenomenon, does not constitute a mass movement with a membership isolated from the extraorganizational social environment, an internal structure characterized by weak and non-inclusive intermediate groups, and an elite accessible to direct, unmediated influence by non-elites. The majority of the faithful are attached to Japanese society; they endow the intermediate groups of the Gakkai with a degree of strength, while resisting influences toward inclusivity in Gakkai relationships; and they have and take advantage of considerable opportunities for mediated access to elites.

The Gakkai is not, however, an unmitigated blessing for Japanese democracy or the diametric opposite of a mass movement. While noting the attachment of most of the members one must note also the influences which conduce to detachment, latent in the Gakkai's socialization process and the activist element among the membership which is (motivated either by prior inclination or by desire to participate more fully and ideally in the Gakkai) receptive to such influences. One must note also the ideal internal structural patterns of the Gakkai, which have more in common with totalitarian movements than with either mass or plural social systems. A minority of the members actually resemble mass man in his unattached aspect, and the internal structure of the organization is ideally totalitarian.

Insofar as the model of mass movement, in its socially unattached and internally structured aspects, is relevant to democratic politics, one may say that the majority of the members of the Gakkai are not so unattached to their environment that they are incapable of acting as responsible citizens. On the contrary, many may have become more aware and active as a result of their socialization into the Gakkai. However, the beneficial effect of the Gakkai is at least partly due to the ability of its faithful to compartmentalize their lives and to resist the ideally inclusive and exclusive pattern of membership.

There are apparently those who do not compartmentalize. The activist hard core may well have severed its secular social ties to such an extent that the rich, variegated group life envisioned by the theorists of pluralist democracy is wholly negated and there is created within the Society a group susceptible to mobilization by whatever elite it chooses to follow. Even if that elite aims at overthrow of the existing system or its alteration so as to negate the basic principles of the "democratic formula," mobilization will be possible if the unattached allegiants are also alienated from the system or from the elements of the formula and thus without normative restraints upon their behavior.

NOTES: CHAPTER 20

1. Mochizuki Issei, "Kyodan to Shukyoteki Ningen Keisei," in Shukyo Koron, January 1963, p. 38.

2. "Voting Characteristics Revealed in Pre-Election Opinion Poll--House of Councillors Elections, July 1965," Tokyo, United States Information Service, 1965, p. 10.

3. Gabriel Almond, The Appeals of Communism, Princeton, 1965, pp. 169-70.

4. Sugita Masao, "Komeito no Jirenma," in Nippon, vol. 8 no. 2, February 1965, p. 61.

5. Suzuki Hiroshi, "Toshi Kaso no Shukyo Shudan," in Shakaigaku Kenkyu, no. 24, 1964, pp. 54-55; Takase Hiroi, "Daigaku ni Ibuku Sokagakkai," in Shukan Gendai, May 23, 1963, p. 27.

6. Seikyo Shimbun, June 16, 1967.

7. World Tribune, January 11, 1966.

CHAPTER 21

ALIENATION

A. Self-Alienation

Insofar as a mass movement is composed of persons alienated from themselves, the Sokagakkai as a social collectivity approximates a mass movement; this approximation is compounded by the probability that the influences exerted upon believers during the socialization process serve to increase this self-estrangement. Whatever inclinations of Gakkai members toward simplism may have predated conversion are exacerbated by the Society's socialization process. The Gakkai's official ideal is not simplism but doctrinal complexity. However, this ideal receives no more than lip service; in actual operation the Gakkai reduces its teachings to a bare minimum of unicausal explanation and narrowly personal goal-seeking and proceeds to state that knowledge is not really necessary at all, that faith is all that really counts.

The membership of the Gakkai is, if anything, more simplistic in its outlook than is the organization. Members seldom know much more than the basic principles that heresy is the cause of evil and that faith is the road to happiness, and they both credulously accept and dutifully recount stories of divine benefit with little or no evidence of critical evaluation. It is quite possible that in this instance the membership is influencing the organization: official interpretations of the relative worth of medical science and faith which are fairly sophisticated (especially regarding neurotic and psychosomatic disorders) are carried in the Seikyo Shimbun along with testimonials attributing omnipotence to religious belief in all matters from sore feet to cancer. In certain ways the organization must come down to the level of its members--the addition of pronunciation aids in Gakkai written media is one such instance--and it is quite possible that oversimplification is such a case. The faithful are an undereducated and unsophisticated group; however, the Gakkai seems to be doing little to raise the tolerance of its followers for complex explanations or for a richly variegated frame of reference by means of which to comprehend the world. Converts appear to bring a simplistic orientation to the Gakkai, which responds by addressing itself in actuality to this simplism and not to either the real and complicated secular world or to the elaborate doctrinal corpus which is its official ideal. Thus the membership inescapably influences the organization, but the organization does nothing to counter this influence and indeed seems to supplement it.

As simplism may tend to alienate persons from themselves, so does the portrayal of man as an essentially powerless being. The Gakkai's ideal as regards the inherent capability of man is ambivalent; it sees man as the only possible agent of world revolution, but it is equally explicit on the absolute necessity of not only faith in Nichiren Shoshu but active participation in the Sokagakkai: "By oneself, faith cannot last, nor is it possible to live a life overflowing with divine benefits."[1]

The members of the Sokagakkai are similarly ambivalent, but there is equally good reason to believe that the sense of self-alienation is relatively high, and the deprecation of the self discernable in Gakkai ideology conceivably contributes to such a condition. Futility, powerlessness, and low expectation of advancement may be inferred from the responses of Gakkai members to questions on numerous surveys, although a possible increase in emotional stability and diffuse initiative, and a noteworthy sense of political potency offer a contrast.

This contrast may be due to the fact that the Gakkai, through the Komeito, has demonstrated its potency in the political sphere, while the area of occupation and status remains outside of the Gakkai's explicit sphere of operations. If this is so, it indicates that the Gakkai is able to influence its members in the direction of greater self-acceptance, since it is dubious that the average convert comes to the Gakkai with a relatively high sense of personal political potency. That feelings of economic and social futility are relatively high suggests that the role of faith in imparting potency is more clearly perceived by Gakkai members than is any assertion of inherent individual power, and that the power of faith must be attributed explicitly to various areas of life if a sense of competence is to be instilled. It is also possible that the faithful see their political environment as more manipulable than their social and economic environment: a vote for a Komeito candidate is usually reflected in electoral victory, that is, success and potency; the concrete context of job, family, neighborhood, and income is less productive of immediate, direct, and tangible results.

Thus Gakkai doctrines may have an easier task in influencing members toward the official ideal of political man than toward the ideal of devout--and therefore potent--social man. Gakkai membership as an actual learning process has often been credited with features which one would expect to have a diminishing influence upon self-alienation, but as far as the data heretofore presented allow of conclusion one must recognize that any such learning has not to date been sufficient to dispell a feeling of personal impotence.

The zadankai certainly serves as a structure of self-expression within which the individual can act as a positive being and be recognized as such by others. The whole process of advancement operates on the basis of personal effort and achievement; those who excell at shakubuku, those whose talents are more applicable to administrative tasks, and those with a penchant for doctrinal study--all have the opportunity to rise in position, peer-group esteem, and intraorganizational status.[2] But if such experiences and opportunities create greater acceptance of the self as a legitimate actor this is not discernable in the data available. Although the Gakkai proclaims in abstract terms its doctrinal efficacy against alienation in all its forms, no significant alleviation of self-alienation is visible in the Gakkai's socialization process. Either the obduracy of the social and economic spheres of the average member's life and their resistance to faith-induced change exert greater influence upon the member's outlook on the world, or the actual alienative elements in Gakkai teachings are more salient to the member than are its integrative elements. Signs of positive influence upon members' initiative and their sense of political competence suggest that there is room for influence of the believers toward self-restoration through faith; however, to date the teachings of the Gakkai as they relate to social and economic life do not seem to deal with this matter; the resultant condition is one of collective self-alienation more or less typical of mass man.

Totalitarian or authoritarian man, however, is not approximated, either by members' attitudes or by official doctrine. One cannot infer even relative authoritarianism from the F-scale scores of a small sample of Gakkai members; nor do the teachings of the Society evince the principal features of the authoritarian syndrome. Nor does the actual experience of life in the Gakkai context seem calculated to instill authoritarian norms; hostility, aggression, extreme submissiveness and conventionalism, and constant power-seeking are neither doctrinal ideals of Nichiren Shoshu nor working norms of the Gakkai organization.

Two exceptional features of the Society do exist which are relevant to possible authoritarianism. First is the relatively authoritarian tendency inferred from the higher F-scale scores of activists. Despite the above-average education of activists (F-scale scores consistently vary inversely with education), it appears that either by natural selection or actual socialization a group of high-scoring persons is concentrated among the Gakkai elite. Second, and perhaps explanatory of the first point, is the ambiguity of the Sokagakkai's ideal stand on several elements of the authoritarian syndrome, an ambiguity which creates a place in the organization for persons with authoritarian tendencies. The Society is conventional, though moderately so, in its social mores; anyone who desires to submit himself totally to a power figure has both the gohonzon and President Ikeda upon which to focus; and aggressive impulses and a desire to display one's toughness may be realized in the practice of shakubuku, as may be a generally hostile and destructive outlook upon the world. The Gakkai's injunctions to believe, and only then to try to know, are amenable to an antipathy to intraception and intellectualism and any personal faults may be projected outward onto the heretical and degenerate world. Finally, stereotypy is one aspect of the syndrome regarding which the Gakkai is explicitly congruent with the model.

Neither the official ideal nor the actual attitudinal configuration of the general membership of the Sokagakkai indicates the accuracy of the description "authoritarian." Considering the educational level of the membership, the F-scale scores obtained were, if anything, lower than anticipated. There is an empirical basis, however, for the view that the less extreme form of self-alienation characteristic of mass man is approximated by the membership of the Sokagakkai, and the ideal prescriptions that the universe is consistently simple and that faith and organizational activity are essential if the self is to be a valid actor seem to contribute to whatever self-alienation the new convert may bring to the Gakkai, regardless of the Gakkai's own claims to alleviate alienation.

B. Human Alienation

Relative to other members of Japanese society, the members of the Sokagakkai evince a slight alienation from their fellow men: they appear to be somewhat less trustful of people in general and somewhat more partisan in their associational commitments. In both of these respects their attitudes contradict both the official Sokagakkai ideal of intrapersonal relationships and the actual trend of its activities. The relative resemblance to alienated mass man is slight, however, and not supported by a body of data sufficient for decisive evaluation; on the other hand, the ideal and actuality of official norms are of sufficient clarity for more confident generalization, and the generalization which they justify is one of sharp contrast with the model of mass movement.

The sparse data available suggest that Gakkai members may be relatively less trusting of other people; one suspects, however, that such distrust is brought to the Society by its converts, because the whole thrust of the Gakkai's socialization effort is toward creation of "good members of society." Specific admonitions are made to leaders and rank-and-file alike to trust and rely upon one another and to extend mutual help and encouragement.[3] The unrestrained self-revelation indulged in at zadankai suggests that trust is considerable. It is possible that none of the trust visible in the zadankai extends to non-Gakkai society; however, it is obvious that a profound degree of human trust does exist in this social microcosm and this impression, combined with the overt efforts of the Gakkai to increase trust, is more persuasive than the sketchy survey data available.

Relatively intense partisanship incontrovertibly characterizes the membership of the Sokagakkai. Paralleling the exclusivistic aspect of social unattachment, though, this partisanship is not in general extreme, nor is it congruent with the official ideal, where this ideal is highly partisan.

It is only as regards other religious actors that the Gakkai ideal prescribes intense partisanship, and even in this area smooth social intercourse is now accorded primacy over elitist doctrinal purity in the daily lives of believers. The members do not evince the ideal degree of partisanship in abstract opinion, much less in concrete behavior. They maintain extra-Gakkai social contacts and friendships, vote for parties other than the Komeito, and show a laxity in prosecution of their propagation duties which contrasts with the extreme partisanship of mass man.

Doubts about the absolute degree of partisanship increase upon observation of the Gakkai's doctrinal ideal and operational actuality in non-religious spheres. The political ideal is principled intraparliamentary cooperation with all like-minded groups for the larger public benefit; in practice this position has been consistently adhered to. Socially, too, the Gakkai has been cooperative; when the Democratic Music Association invites foreign ballet troupes or orchestras to tour Japan, it does so in concert with other musical groups and major newspapers.[4] In addition, the Society urges its members to be similarly cooperative with others for the good of society;[5] that the combination of explicit injunction and implicit example does exert some variable influence upon the members is suggested by comparison of responses of Gakkai members (rank-and-file and activists) and non-members to survey questions concerning the proper manner of living. In two polls,--one local, one national--Gakkai members were more likely to choose the response that one should "live for society," and activists were more likely to choose this answer than non-activists.[6] It is possible that these responses reflect simple indoctrination and not an inclination toward social cooperation; it is more probable, however, that they indicate a sincere empathy with other human beings which contradicts the hypothetical human alienation of mass man.

The total orientation of the Sokagakkai toward other human actors in various spheres of social life seems to contradict the model of a mass movement. There is no discernible envy, either ideological or attitudinal or operational.[7] Distrust and partisanship do exist among the members, but they are neither decisively shown nor, insofar as they are shown, do they appear to be very intense. Opposed to this is ideal and actual cooperativeness in social and political action, and a religious partisanship which appears increasingly rhetorical. As regards the effect of Gakkai socialization, actives are--as one might suspect--more likely to vote for the Komeito, to decrease their ties to non-Gakkai society, and to engage in shakubuku and other partisan practices than are the rank-and-file. There are no data, however, which indicate that they feel any more alienated from their fellow men than do other Gakkai members. The survey cited above suggests that they may (as Gakkai leaders insist that they will) feel more social obligation and conscientiousness than do non-believers and less active Gakkai members: insofar as official organizational activity has any influence, it must be toward less alienation from one's fellows.

C. Systemic Alienation

1. Instrumental Alienation

As in the case of other types of alienation, the Sokagakkai's manifest ideal of orientation to one's concrete social, economic, and political environment is the promotion of closer affective ties. The Gakkai claims to create good neighbors, hard workers, and responsible citizens, and it claims to achieve this by attacking the sources, not merely the manifestations, of estrangement and dissatisfaction. According to the Society, through faith one can regain his sense of competence as an actor and thus enjoy the confidence necessary for successful action in his social, economic, and political context.[8]

As regards instrumental alienation, that is, antipathy toward one's environment as its outputs affect one personally, the enjoyment of tangible divine benefits might be expected to bring some degree of satisfaction if indeed most Gakkai members are conscious of such benefit and if they recognize that personal effort is in some degree responsible for such benefits. Several surveys indicate that divine benefit (goriyaku or kudoku) is in fact perceived by most members; the perception varies positively with length of membership and activism. Whether these variations are due to natural selection of those who do perceive benefit or self-delusion by those deeply committed to the Gakkai for other reasons, or both, the significant fact is that great numbers of the faithful do feel that they have enjoyed divine reward. In five samples of the general Gakkai membership the proportion reporting positive kudoku varied between 50 and 75 percent[9] (with one sample of new converts reporting the lowest incidence of benefit), while in three samples of activists the proportion of recipients of divine mercy varied roughly from 80 to 90 percent.[10]

In addition, one might suspect that the chances provided for members to raise their status by dint of individual effort and to achieve academic title without formal education would go far toward removing the frustrations felt by less-educated and relatively deprived social elements in their contacts with the secular world. Gakkai members are indeed proud of their ranks; whether this pride signifies a decrease in diffuse estrangement from the secular world is uncertain.

Comparison of the perceptions of Gakkai members of their own enjoyment of *goriyaku* with their sense of alienation from their social and economic context suggests that the Gakkai's claim that it attacks alienation at its roots is less than accurate. Gakkai members evince relatively great dissatisfaction with the social and economic systems within which they exist; considering motives for conversion, one might surmise that most of this dissatisfaction predates entry. But there is no data which supports the Gakkai's assertion that it decreases alienation at its source; one small survey showed that while perceived *kudoku* varied positively with length of membership, satisfaction with one's job varied inversely, and dissatisfaction with society was uninfluenced.[11] Another local survey of Society members shows the same inconclusive picture: activists perceived much more *kudoku* but were little if at all more satisfied with their jobs than non-activists.[12]

The explanation offered by many,[13] which is intuitively acceptable, is that the Gakkai's actual denunciation and criticism of the secular, heretical world and insistence that whatever kudoku comes one's way is essentially caused by faith and faith alone combine to produce in the believer an alienation from the secular social and economic system and the mental bifurcation of occupational effort and divine reward:

> In other words, they believe they can survive in this world only because their idol Buddha is their savior. . . . Because of his blessing, they believe, they can earn money and support their families. The members don't think that the wages they receive from their employers are the rewards of their labor.[14]

The testimony of defectors corroborates this inference. Several lower-level leaders who left the Gakkai reported that the inevitable counsel offered to believers, regardless of their problem, was "Just pray harder."[15] In other words, no attempt whatsoever was made to attack the possible secular causes of misfortune; the only solution provided was autosuggestion of benefit and happiness and sublimation of frustration through prayer and Gakkai activity. Since this benefit is received through participation in officially sanctioned activities alone and derives only from the Buddha's compassion, it is not surprising that socialization into the Gakkai belief system does not appear to diminish the alienation which Gakkai members bring into the Society.

It is not firmly demonstrated by any of the data presented that the actual Gakkai socialization process in fact increases any feelings of alienation from the Japanese social and economic system which new converts may possess. The Gakkai's manifest ideals sharply oppose such alienation and it is probable that the Society is not conscious of the alienating effects of its teachings and activities. On the other hand, Gakkai members evince considerable alienation from their environing social and economic systems and the negative attitude toward and supplementary aloofness from these systems by the Gakkai scarcely seem calculated to diminish this alienation.

Politically also, the constant attacks upon the Japanese political system, its incumbents, and the policies they espouse, can hardly contribute to greater satisfaction with the system's instrumental aspects. Again, the Gakkai insists that its ideal beliefs will lead people to true integration with the polity as responsible political actors; again, also, its unceasing actual attacks upon the performance of the system, its injustice, and the venality of those in office are, in a political framework still in a state of flux where legitimacy and consensus are still of dubious stability, regrettable. In light of the already high degree of discontent with the outputs of the polity discernable among the membership of the Gakkai, such a vociferously negative stand can only be evaluated as contributory to collective alienation of the faithful.

It is quite possible that the Gakkai's attacks on the performance of the political system represent in part a concession to the membership. It is probable that converts enter the Gakkai with negative orientations toward the polity (where they have any orientations at all); the increased vote won by minor parties in the 1967 Lower House election and 1968 Upper House election was interpreted in just this way: voters, alienated from both of the major parties, were protesting with their votes. Thus Gakkai negativism may be a calculated appeal to certain elements in the electorate. But it is also the inescapable conclusion of Gakkai beliefs regarding the secular state, and to interpret it as wholly a capitulation to rank-and-file discontent is erroneous.

The Gakkai denies the foregoing assertions and, in actuality, certain of the Society's political activities might well serve to decrease instrumental alienation from the political system. Those persons who utilize the Citizens' Discussion Centers quite possibly gain from the experience a new sense of ability to influence a responsive polity. In addition, the operational example of the cooperative Komeito may exert an influence upon politically attentive Gakkai members.

Nevertheless, the overall effect of the Gakkai's tirades about political evils, in combination with the objective degree of alienation demonstrated by Gakkai members, probably outweighs the effect of such experiences and examples. There are no firm data indicating that socialization into the Sokagakkai increases instrumental alienation--either social, or economic, or political--but neither may one assert that the socialization process appears to exert a diminishing effect upon the considerable instrumental alienation which members of the Sokagakkai seem to feel. In that they do feel this way they approximate mass men; that the Gakkai does not appear to exert any actual countering influence suggests either that its ideals do not impress the faithful or that some latent element which at least preserves the alienation felt by converts is present in the process. Neither alternative constitutes reason for judging that the macro (organizational) attributes of the Sokagakkai decrease the similarity of the Society's micro (social) attributes to the model of mass man and movement.

2. General Systemic Alienation

In their orientations toward the structures of the political system in general, the actual attitudes of the members of the Sokagakkai conflict sharply with the formal, ideal position taken by the organization. Despite its incessant instrumental criticism of the polity, the Gakkai's stand on the system *per se*, as embodied in the constitution, is one of absolute and unflinching protection. Gakkai members, on the contrary, while as well or better informed about the contents of the constitution than the average Japanese, are notably more negative about the charter and more receptive to the notion of revision than is the general populace. This relative negativity held up under demographic controls in a nationwide survey carried out by the Japanese government in

1965, that is, in any sex, age, or educational group, Komeito supporters were more negative toward the constitution than were other persons.[16] It is well to note that the sample used in this survey was composed of professed Komeito supporters; if one assumes that such persons are among the more committed Gakkai members and are thus more likely to have internalized official Gakkai norms, then the striking contradiction between rank-and-file attitudes and organizational ideals appears even more significant.

This diametric opposition of macro and micro may be explained in two ways. First, individuals may enter the Gakkai with a considerable degree of preexistent systemic alienation and either resist the ideal orientations disseminated by the Society or perceive in the actual socialization process some negative, perhaps latent, orientation toward the system which confirms their previous attitudes. Second, the persons who enter the Gakkai may not be relatively more alienated than their fellow Japanese but may be subjected to an actual latent socialization process of such powerful influence that by the time they have been politicized into support of the Komeito they are markedly more antipathetic toward the present political system than are non-Gakkai members.

The explanation preferred here is the first. The socioeconomic strata from which most Sokagakkai members come are, it may be assumed, most subject to frustration, discontent, and dissatisfaction which need not be limited to the instrumental aspects of their environment. The Gakkai experience does indeed seem broadening; Gakkai members, especially in those socioeconomic groups where one least expects it, evince relatively keen awareness of their position in the larger political and social context.[17] But if the Gakkai socialization process exerts no influence toward diminishing whatever instrumental alienation may exist, then this broadening effect may simply lead to general systemic alienation where it had not existed before.

In addition, as opposed to the ideal socialization performed by the Gakkai, which claims to be creating allegiant, responsible political actors, the actual socialization process appears to include a large measure of highly negative orientations toward the system. When it is proclaimed that the entire polity is rife with heresy, graft, self-seeking, and evil, it would appear difficult to avoid implanting at least some negative views in those to whom such proclamations are unceasingly directed. The sum effect appears to be a condition of bifurcation; although the Gakkai, in its ideal positions, is not alienated from its specific political structural context in the way that a mass movement is, the systemic alienation of the rank-and-file is sufficient to suggest that there is actual potential in the membership of the Gakkai for mass political behavior in contravention of or even in direct opposition to the norms of the system. This does not appear to be the result of complete immunity of individually-held attitudes to influence by the Gakkai socialization process, but rather of a congruence of actual, latent, perhaps unintended, elements within the socialization process with rank-and-file orientations which predate conversion. The relevance for a democratic system is clear: the Gakkai appears to contain the potential for mass behavior, a potential which might eventually be realized if an elite intent upon full political mobilization of the organization were to shift the ideal stand on the political system in a negative direction.

The possible latent alienative factor in the Gakkai's actual stand on the overall Japanese political structure may be offset by the Society's position on the various elements of the "democratic formula." In its support of democracy in the abstract the Gakkai is as unrelenting as it is in its defense of the constitution. In addition, the Gakkai socialization process is ideally envisioned as a process of learning in the ways and virtues of democracy; as the Seikyo Shimbun editorialized on August 4, 1967, "The Sokagakkai is itself the ideal democratic society." The actual orientations of the membership appear to be in general agreement with Gakkai ideals; while the general members' view of democracy is slightly less positive than is that held by the general populace and much less fulsomely positive than that of the organization, it does appear to lean toward a welfarist, somewhat socialistic, revisionist capitalist system which is in no way incompatible with democracy but is simply contrasted in the Japanese mind with the present political system which has economic connotations of free-wheeling capitalism and a "double economic structure" wherein the less modernized, smaller-scale sector of the economy is economically deprived. This inclination is most certainly not strongly toward any form of fully socialist or communist regime of a type which could be set in sharp contrast to the present liberal democratic system.

In the matter of majority rule, both the Gakkai and its members take an ambivalent, inconclusive position. The Society's ideal position is in support of majoritarianism in political and other secular affairs (but only where full consideration is given to minority viewpoints), but the actual operation of the organization displays conflicting elements of democratic and undemocratic decisional procedures. The formal structure of the Gakkai, as shown in the "Rules of the Sokagakkai," is clearly and completely authoritarian: the president is in full and formally unlimited command. Ikeda does assume supreme directorial authority; after the Komeito's poor showing in the 1967 Tokyo ward assembly elections he stated:

> Well, after all, personnel selection [of candidates] in an important election can't be left [to others]. Next time I'm taking command.[18]

On intraorganizational decisional procedures in general his view is that

> Examination, debate, and administration ought to be carried on democratically, through the knowledge of many. But as for leadership and objectives, I give them.[19]

As Ikeda notes, below the level of supreme command democratic procedures are to be followed. But these practices do not include real majority rule in any case. Elections of a sort are held at certain leaders' meetings; the decision to create a political party in 1964 and the "re-election" of President Ikeda in 1967 were ostensibly handled in this manner. At the May 3, 1964, Headquarters General Meeting (Honbu Sokai), Ikeda asked,

> Do you agree with me in entrusting the Koseiren with the decision as to whether they will form a political party or run in the Lower House election? (Unanimous applause.) Well, then, I believe all of you have given approval to this program.[20]

At the April 30, 1967, Headquarters Leaders' Meeting (Honbu Kanbu-kai), Ikeda's question was

> I am to ask, at the Headquarters Leaders' Meeting . . . for approval or disapproval of the installation of the president. All those who wish that I serve as President for the next seven years please raise their hands. (All raise hands. Applause.)[21]

This "re-election" (which was not called for by the Gakkai's "Rules"), was managed in a plebiscitary manner by the elite and thereafter, as are all Gakkai decisions, communicated downward through the organization. If democratic, this process is at best democratic-centralist.

But although elements of majoritarianism may be latent and the overall process, if superimposed upon the present Japanese political system, would hardly constitute democratic practice, the elements are in fact present and the internal processes of the Gakkai as a large organization--especially as a religious group--are as democratic as most and more so than many. It is well to regard the "Rules" as Gakkai leaders do: as "legalistic jargon" composed to satisfy the requirements of law; and to observe the actual workings of the Society to determine the substantive degree of intraorganizational democracy.[22]

Such observations reveal the high degree of mediated non-elite access to a responsive elite which characterizes the internal process of the Sokagakkai and the genuine respect for and actual guarantee of two-way communication and consensual patterns of decision-making which are probably as extensive as any giant organization can manage and still maintain its administrative efficiency. Gakkai life does not constitute a specific learning process in majoritarianism, but insofar as there is two-way vertical communication, an elite which is perceived as attentive to rank-and-file desires, and a decision process which is perceived as operating broadly in response to the will of the largest part of the membership, there is a possible latent element of socialization into majoritarian orientations--an element not present in many organizations of any type in Japan.

But the congruence of actual Gakkai processes with democratic norms is still very ambiguous. Though Ikeda explicitly denies it,[23] there is a not inconsiderable charismatic factor in his authority which may completely overshadow whatever learning of majoritarian procedures may occur within the Society. This charisma directly contradicts the organizational ideal of E-ho, fue-nin (Rely upon the law, not upon the man)[24] but despite this doctrinal proscription the charismatic element in Ikeda's authority seems to be increasing in recent years. Rank-and-file attitudes seem to resist formal socialization; the rather sophisticated distinction drawn between the absolutist religious plane and the relativist secular plane may also be beyond the powers of comprehension of the general membership, who might therefore have difficulty understanding the justification of majority rule in politics. One cannot say that the Gakkai, either as a social collectivity or as an official organizational entity, is opposed to political majoritarianism or that the interaction of collectivity and organization results in diminished adherence to the principle; one can say, nevertheless, that collective attitudes seem to prevail over occasionally clear official majoritarian ideals and that these attitudes (and, often official ideals as well) are at best ambivalent.

Similar ambivalence is visible between the Gakkai's ideal and actual stands on minority rights. All of the rights and freedoms specified in the constitution are fully supported; the Society goes to great lengths denying intent to infringe upon freedom of religion in particular. In its actual tirades against criticism, however, there is a hint of less than full acceptance of freedom of expression; one might expect the volume of this criticism to have a latent alienating effect upon the faithful. In terms of total coverage, however, it is probable that positive, emphatic, explicit affirmation of equality and freedom of all exceeds the conditional acceptance which is suggested on occasion.

Within the Gakkai all are ideally equal and in actuality membership appears to be a continuing lesson in the disregard of educational, social, and economic status distinctions. Before the law of Buddha all are equal,[25] and intraorganizational practice seems to approximate the ideal. But whether such a view is extrapolated to the general society by the members is another matter. The general orientation toward minority rights held by the rank-and-file is positive, but the same ambiguities concerning freedom of expression and religious faith as are visible in official media are discernable among the membership, although such a conditional outlook is marked only among more active members. On the other hand, there is a striking liberal tendency as regards personal rights among certain less educated, lower status, and older groups where the contrast between Gakkai members and non-members is greatest.[26] It may be that the Gakkai appeals to the most progressive elements in the least progressive sectors of society, but it seems more likely that the Gakkai's constant ideal emphasis upon rights and freedoms exerts an influence upon the membership which is most marked in those who are initially the least likely to adhere to the principle of minority rights.

Certain characteristics of the responses of Gakkai members to survey questions about minority rights suggest a collectivist orientation with commitment to the norm of minority rights only insofar as selfish consciousness of the Gakkai's minority status is felt. For reasons given above (see Chapter 14), such a collectivist orientation is not assumed here; nevertheless, the ambivalent stands taken on the crucial points of freedom of religious faith and of expression signify that the Gakkai is not clearly in full support, ideal and actual, of the norm of minority rights. One must recognize the overall ambivalence which characterizes the total orientation of the Sokagakkai, as an interacting entity with both informal, collective orientations and formal, organizational orientations, toward the "democratic formula." Actual adherence to the abstract ism of democracy and possible socializing influences toward acceptance of both democratic procedures and norms and minority rights are offset by possible implicit alienating influences pushing toward non-recognition of the validity of criticism and opposition and toward acceptance of charismatic authority instead of selection of governors by the governed.

D. Conclusion

Due to its ambiguity, the Sokagakkai's affirmation of the elements of the "democratic formula" does not offset the actual state of alienation from the political system discernible in the Society. One of the factors contributing importantly to this ambiguity is the frequent discrepancy between official, ideal, and often abstract support for the system, its structures, and the democratic formula and latent, actual organizational influences toward alienation from the system, its incumbents, and its performance which have as much, if not more, influence upon whatever preexistent feelings of alienation believers may possess than do the ideal and sometimes perhaps rhetorical socializing influences. Just as a hypothetical interaction of this type contributes to a condition of relative similarity of the Gakkai as a total entity to a mass movement in its systemically alienated aspect, so the same reinforcing interaction pattern between informal rank-and-file attitudes and actual, often latent organizational socialization influences contributes to a condition of relative similarity of the Gakkai as a total entity to a mass movement in its overall alienated aspect.

Explicit Gakkai ideals do not conduce to greater alienation from self, from other humans, or from one's concrete environment. However, latent influences which may well exacerbate individual feelings of inherent impotence and futility and alienation from the political system in particular seem to be exerted upon the membership by the comprehensive socialization process. Where conflict between Gakkai ideals and members' actual attitudes occurs, the nature of the Gakkai's latent socializing influences is important; where ideal and actual socialization combine to contradict the alienation felt by members--as in the case of human alienation--possible rank-and-file alienation does not seem to offset organizational characteristics. But where latent influences seem to coincide with preexistent collective attitudes, explicit ideals are not sufficiently influential markedly to alleviate feelings of alienation and the potential for mass political behavior which the model of mass movement suggests is a consequence of such alienation.

The resemblances between the alienated Gakkai and the alienated mass movement are not exact. Numerous specific contradictions of this general condition have been cited and in very few instances is similarity quite close--in almost every instance where comparison is possible, for instance, supporters of the Japan Communist Party appear significantly more alienated than do either Sokagakkai members or Komeito supporters. Resemblance is thus not exact; it is, however, both relative and absolute and one may therefore expect the potential for mass behavior to be greater in the Sokagakkai than in the general population of Japan.

NOTES: CHAPTER 21

1. Seikyo Shimbun, August 1, 1967.

2. Ikado Fujio, "Kyodan Soshiki Ron Josetsu," in Toyo Bunka Kenkyu-jo Kiyo, vol. 34, March 1964, pp. 193-96; Miyata Mitsuo, "Shukyo Seito to Minshushugi," in Sekai, no. 233, May 1965, p. 159; Ide Yoshinori, "Seiji to Shukyo no Issen ni Mondai," in Asahi Janaru, vol. 9 no. 10, March 5, 1967, p. 17.

3. Seikyo Shimbun, July 2, 1967.

4. This cooperativeness does not contradict the previous assertion that the Gakkai is organizationally detached from its environment. It signifies only that detachment is (a) not total and (b) unaccompanied by alienation.

5. Takami Jun, "Sokagakkai ni Tou," in Chuo Koron, August 1962, p. 296.

6. Suzuki Hiroshi, "Toshi Kaso no Shukyo Shudan," in Shakaigaku Kenkyu, no. 24, 1964, p. 86; unpub. data from third National Character study by Tokey Suri Kenkyu-jo, Tokyo.

7. In fact, Ikeda has spoken out explicitly against envy of other persons. See World Tribune, June 28, 1966.

8. Seikyo Shimbun, April 29, 1967.

9. Suzuki, op. cit., p. 68; unpub. data from study by Miss Takahashi Naoko; Shiobara Tsutomu, "Sokagakkai Ideorogii," in *Tembo*, no. 78, June 1965, p. 49; Tsurumi Shunsuke *et. al.*, *Shakubuku*, Tokyo, 1962, p. 201; Naikaku Kanbo Naikaku Chosa-shitsu, *Shinko Shukyo ni kansuru Shakai-shinrigakuteki Kenkyu*, Tokyo, 1965 (?), pp. 56-57.

10. Shiobara, *op. cit*., p. 49; Koya Azumi, "Functions of Soka Gakkai Membership," unpub. paper, Columbia University, 1967, p. 14; Naikaku, *op. cit*., pp. 56-57.

11. Takahashi data.

12. Suzuki, *op. cit*., p. 86.

13. Yanaihara Isaku, "Minshu Fuman no Sentoteki Nensho," in *Asahi Janaru*, August 5, 1962, p. 17; *Shin Shukyo Shimbun*, August 1967, all issues; Suzuki, *op. cit*., p. 55; Shiobara, *op. cit*., p. 49.

14. *Japan Times International Edition*, November 20, 1965.

15. *Shin Shukyo Shimbun*, August 1967, all issues.

16. Unpub. data from Japanese government survey of popular attitudes toward the Constitution, 1965.

17. *Loc. cit*.

18. Nakaba Tadakuni, "Sokagakkai Gekido no Shichinen," in *Zaikai*, July 1, 1967, p. 117.

19. Takase Hiroi, *Ningen Kakumei wo Mezasu Ikeda Daisaku*, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 61-62.

20. *Seikyo News*, May 12, 1964.

21. *Seikyo Shimbun*, May 1, 1967.

22. Interview with Akiya Einosuke, General Executive, Sokagakkai.

23. Ikeda Daisaku, "Komeito e no Gimon ni Kotaeru," in *Jiyu*, no. 90, May 1967, p. 72.

24. *Loc. cit*.

25. *Seikyo Shimbun*, July 12, 1967; *World Tribune*, June 4, 1966.

26. Constitution survey data.

CHAPTER 22

BEHAVIOR

The behavior characteristic of mass movements is the direct pursuit of remote goals; that characteristic of mass men is an unstable vacillation between apathy and a similarly direct pursuit of remote goals. Even considering past events and surviving scriptural justifications, the Sokagakkai is not at present, either as a social collectivity or an organizational entity, behaviorally identifiable as a mass.

From the foregoing analysis one can do no more than infer potentiality for behavioral mobilization or for certain forms of concrete political behavior. No more than inference is possible; identification of verbalized responses to survey questions with behavior is completely unwarranted. This does not mean that inference is a vain enterprise; on the contrary, it is only through inference of the resemblance of model to reality that one is able to analyze aspects of social reality not characterized by obvious behavioral phenomena.

Obvious behavioral phenomena are, naturally, most helpful in furthering analysis; equally so, in significant instances, is their absence. In the case of the Sokagakkai, where a relative degree of social unattachment and a significant degree of alienation exist, the absence for several years of either ideal or actual mass political behavior raises questions about other possible factors which limit the availability of the membership or account for the non-mobilization of a possibly available membership.

As regards apathy, neither Gakkai ideals nor rank-and-file behavioral patterns are "mass-like." Members evince a relatively high frequency of experience in non-Gakkai public office and a relatively strong inclination to talk about politics and to vote. They also articulate a participant image of the citizen. The Gakkai, while stressing constant mobilization, specifically rejects outbursts of frantic activity. President Ikeda often reminds believers that faith and the activity necessary thereto should be like flowing water, not leaping flame: that faith which burns hottest burns out most quickly. Nor does the actual behavioral example offered by the Gakkai in its official activities conduce to unstable behavior. Each year is neatly divided into periods of expansion through shakubuku, consolidation through guidance, and study; activity is constant and at times so much so as to be stressful, but it provides a lesson in stable, patterned behavior.

There is definitely a remoteness of focus in the ultimate ideal goals of the Sokagakkai, Constant passing reference is made to these goals in Gakkai media, but one wonders just how integral they are to the propagation or socialization processes. At zadankai they are very seldom heard except when the Seikyo Shimbun is read, and even then at these times the selections chosen tend to focus on immediate problems and events. In any event, it is apparent that for the average member of the Gakkai the remote, utopian objectives of Obutsu-myogo and Kosen-rufu are of little concern. The great majority of testimonials carried in the Seikyo Shimbun are couched in purely personal terms; activists have in a few surveys indicated a somewhat broader view of society than the rank-and-file, but in one survey of relative activists, almost 70 percent reported receiving divine benefits with reference to themselves alone.[1]

Insofar as the outlook of believers does broaden with time it is probable that, except for a small elite, this is no more than the transcendance of the normally parochial outlook of the average citizen in any society. It is unlikely that the behavior of many Gakkai members is directed toward unrealistically remote objectives and the simple existence of remote goals does not constitute an actual behavioral characteristic. The actual operations of the Society may contribute to the immediacy of focus of members. Since the early 1960's at the very latest the Gakkai's actual behavior has been characterized by pragmatic pursuit of realistic goals in an increasingly moderate manner. These intermediate goals, established between the present and the millennium, serve to keep hope alive where imminent achievement of ultimate goals seems impossible; they vary in type and scale. It is these immediate organizational goals which impinge most strongly upon the member in his efforts to satisfy his own needs through membership in the Gakkai; it may well seem to the individual member that the goals which the organization really considers important are little more remote than his own private goals.

Perhaps it is this immediacy of focus which explains the absence of mass behavior by the members of the Sokagakkai in the presence of relative unattachment and alienation, that is, of relative availability. It may well be that while socialization into the Sokagakkai does not diminish one's alienation from society and polity, it does diminish the aggressive behavioral consequences of secular frustration by providing compensatory primary gratifications through the medium of the *zadankai*. Thus, due to the immediacy of focus of members, it may be that alienation from the secular world may coexist with a disinclination toward mass or other forms of deviant behavior, and may in fact render it more difficult for the organization to influence the members toward any form of collective behavior.

Nevertheless, it does not appear that mobilization is impossible or that remote objectives are absolutely necessary for the mobilization of large numbers of people for deviant behavior. If the promised rewards for such behavior are immediate (especially if, as in the case of *shakubuku* at *zadankai*, reward is integrated with small-group activity) and tangible and the behavior required is not too deviant, as in the case of present *shakubuku*, narrowly personal motivation may suffice to create a proselyting force of several million persons.

But even this figure represents no more than half of the professed membership of the Sokagakkai,[2] testimony to the fact that even believers consider shakubuku to be deviant behavior.[3] And shakubuku is not at present a wildly deviant practice; if members are so lax in their propagation duties as to make such statements as

I only talk about religion with other members of the Gakkai;[4] and

> Yes, I do shakubuku. But I don't press it so unreasonably as people say. . . . I don't do it [at work]. Matters of religion shouldn't be taken into the company;[5]

and

> I'm not particularly pressured [to proselyte]. It's completely up to the individual, since increasing the number of members isn't the objective of this Society;[6]

then one would not assume that they are fully available for mobilization into the forms of behavior which characterize mass politics.

One might question the extent to which the majority of believers are available for any collective action, so much do their actual patterns of thought and activity conflict with Gakkai ideals. The ideal, briefly, is permanent mobilization--behavioral and psychological, religious and political.

> Inertia is already conservatism, and conservatism corrupts man. Therein, the feeling of mission has already ceased to be, and the resolute spirit of reconstruction and pioneering has faded.[7]

Complete availability of the faithful in mind and body is the ideal of the Gakkai, but it seems to be infrequently approximated in actuality. One han chief estimated that perhaps 20 percent of the members of his unit were "of firm faith" and "enthusiastically active," and one observer estimated that only 20 to 30 percent of the supposedly hard-core activist Student Division was really active;[8] in one local survey of believers only 26 percent reported zealous activism while 45 percent reported not much interest at all in organizational activities.[9] In sum, the evaluation of one Gakkai leader seems to be borne out: "The only ones who really believe are a number of leaders."[10] Compared to the followers of other Japanese religions Gakkai members are quite active, although equalled or surpassed in certain aspects of activity by other new religions or Christianity;[11] nevertheless, absolutely the discrepancy between ideal and actual is great.

In more specific aspects of activism the discrepancy is also visible. There is a sufficient number of meetings of various types to keep a real activist busy almost every night[12] but, as in the case of shakubuku, it appears that only about half of the members even claim to participate regularly. According to one survey the distribution of attenders and non-attenders was as follows:[13]

Han zadankai / Kumi zadankai	Always or almost always attend	Usually attend	Not too often or hardly ever attend	Total
Always or almost always attend	30.59%	2.99%	1.87%	35.45%
Usually attend	1.12	11.94	2.61	15.67
Not too often or hardly ever attend	.37	1.12	47.38	48.87
Total	32.08	16.05	51.86	99.99%

The Gakkai itself is even less optimistic about attendance rates, suggesting that respondents in surveys are painting themselves in somewhat more active colors than is in fact the case.[14]

Study and the making of pilgrimages are two other activities in which all are expected to participate. The numbers of persons taking Study Department examinations has increased yearly, but apparently not so rapidly as the Gakkai would like. In late 1967 the Seikyo Shimbun expressed "great doubts" that the year had seen any increase in study efforts; of attendance at study meetings the paper said, "by no means can we call it good."[15] With pilgrimages also, great numbers of believers throng the Taisekiji daily, but there are suggestions that these throngs are largely composed of frequent pilgrims, while many of the faithful hardly ever go: in one local sample of members, 21 percent had visited the Taisekiji only once and 48 percent had never been there; in another such survey, 26 percent were one-time pilgrims while 27 percent had made no pilgrimages at all.[16]

The Gakkai is not spectacularly successful at mobilizing its followers to political action either, even to such non-deviant behavior as voting for Gakkai candidates.[17] However, those members who have been politically mobilized appear to be quite disciplined; in two national surveys carried out in early 1965 professed Komeito supporters indicated earlier decisions regarding which candidate to vote for in the national constituency of the Upper House election held in July of that year than followers of any other party and were more disciplined than any other party's supporters, 90 percent in one poll and 100 percent in the other voicing the intention to vote for Komeito candidates.[18] Similar discipline was shown in three surveys in which expected voting behavior in the Tokyo gubernatorial election of 1967 was asked: the percentage of professed Komeito supporters who articulated the intention to vote for Abe Ken'ichi was between 80 and 92 percent, higher than any other group in two of the polls and barely second to the Communists in the third.[19]

It may be questioned, however, just how much of the discipline demonstrated by Komeito supporters is real availability for mobilization by the party or the Gakkai. In one national survey of 1965 party affiliation of candidates appeared much more important to Komeito supporters than to supporters of the other major parties;[20] in two other national polls, however, Komeito showed little difference from supporters of other parties in the relative weights they assigned to party or individual in their selection of candidates.[21]

A large proportion of the Gakkai membership is not available for physical mobilization to either religious or political behavior. It seems also that many of the "faithful" are not available for mental mobilization along the ideal lines of Gakkai doctrine or Komeito policy. The Society's ideal is ideological uniformity and internal consistency, that is, a high degree of "constraint" within the belief systems of members.[22] Such constraint does not exist, either manifestly or latently, in the minds of most members: analysis of the attitudes of a sample of Gakkai members by Tanaka Kunio in 1963 revealed belief systems so scattered, inconsistent, and at odds with Gakkai docrine that no body of beliefs describable as "ideology" of any type (much less the officially-sanctioned Gakkai type) could be discerned.[23] On the level of manifest acceptance of this ideal ideology, only 37 percent of one sample of rank-and-file members stated that they would follow a Gakkai instruction when it conflicted with personal viewpoint; 73 percent of the leaders polled, however, evinced this mental availability.[24]

On specific points of religious and political policy the same discrepancy between organization ideal and rank-and-file actuality is visible. Many religious ideas are successfully instilled in the membership; the general idea of unicausality and the relationships between worship and reward, laxity and misfortune appear to be most thoroughly internalized, and certain viewpoints derivative of Nichiren Shoshu are also developed: to a question concerning the advisability of the traditional pilgrimage of new Prime Ministers to the Shinto shrine at Ise, Gakkai members sampled by a national survey were three times as likely as non-members to respond "It's better that he not go," or "He shouldn't go."[25] Still, only 43 percent of the Gakkai members took this doctrinally orthodox stand, as did 64 percent of the most active group of believers.

Clearly, the religious availability of Gakkai members' minds is less than total. Even so, it seems to be more so than their political availability. As mentioned, not all Gakkai members support the Komeito; in a September 1962 local survey 56 percent of a sample of believers said they had never even *heard* of the Koseiren, while another 28 percent had heard of the party but knew nothing at all of its policies.[26] Of those who are aware that the Gakkai is involved in politics, not all are agreed that such involvement is a good thing. One observer reported discrepant views among members on the wisdom of religious participation in the political system in the early 1960's;[27] as late as 1964, 22 of the 36 respondents to a poll of believers in Tokyo expressed the view that religious groups should not go into politics.[28] Certainly, an *n* of 36 is hardly a reliable sample; nevertheless, opponents of organizational political participation outnumbered proponents in every subgroup according to degree of activism and length of membership.

On specific political policies, as on religious doctrines, there are suggestions that Gakkai members are mentally available for influence only in those ways that one would assume them to be even before conversion, simply from analysis of their socioeconomic and demographic composition.

Gakkai members are the relatively deprived; consequently, an alienation from the system by which they are deprived (or at least not sufficiently assisted) is not surprising but for the suspicion that latent socializing influences in fact have a reinforcing effect. Other conflicts regard those issues not directly related to personal needs or to the satisfaction of these needs through Gakkai activities: Komeito supporters responded more negatively than backers of any other party or the populace in general to questions in a 1966 national survey regarding recognition of Red China and its admission to the United Nations,[29] despite strong, official party support for both recognition and admission. The same survey contained a question about the best means of national protection; Komeito supporters chose among the various responses with very little difference from the general public, and were no more likely to choose those alternatives which the party officially espoused ("Expectation of help from the United Nations;" "Unarmed neutrality") than were non-supporters of the Komeito. On six additional questions dealing with the Vietnam war Komeito supporters appeared slightly more "dovish" than the general public and slightly less sympathetic to the United States' role in Vietnam, both tendencies which reflect party policy; however, in no instance was there striking uniformity of supporters' views or overwhelming backing for the official stand.

Domestically, the views of Komeito supporters and official party policy are more congruent. When asked, in a 1967 poll in Tokyo, "What do you want the new governor to focus on first of all?" Komeito backers were 80 percent more likely than either supporters of any other party or the total sample to choose "Housing problem" and over twice as likely as either other type of group to choose "Welfare."[30] But here, where mental availability appears to exist, it quite likely preceded conversion. On the other hand, where one might assume prior incongruence between individual attitudes and official ideals--for instance, as regards religious intolerance, social attachments, or political participation by religious groups--incongruence is still discernable among estabished members, indicating that availability has not been created or, in other words, that believers for the most part come to the Gakkai rather than being created by it.

Whether they come or are created, believers do exist in large numbers and those whose belief and behavioral commitment is of such an intensity as to constitute real availability. That no incidents of violence or illegality have occurred in several years should not be taken to mean that the potential for mass behavior has drained out of the Gakkai. Members have broken the law and the professions of absolute devotion and undying obedience which one hears from a few zealots appear sincere and amenable to any type of behavior whatsoever that the Gakkai elite may choose to prescribe. It is not unreasonable to assume that those members who evince the greatest degree of social deracination and social and political alienation are largely concentrated in this most deeply-committed half million.

But this element, one might also assume, is most deeply motivated to adhere to the formal, ideal teachings of the Gakkai and especially to the pronouncements of President Ikeda. And the behavioral ideal and operational actuality displayed by the Gakkai during the 1960's has been one of continuous moderation, increased cooperativeness and openness, decreasing partisanship, and explicit proscription of all forms of deviant or illegal behavior, violence, and circumvention of the social norms or legal rules of Japanese society and polity. Moreover, the actual learning experience which participation in Gakkai activities yields is one of behavior within a structure where mediated but extensive access to attentive and responsive elites through established channels and procedures is the rule.

Thus the situation regarding behavior seems to be one of mutual and crucial interaction of collective tendencies and organizational ideals. The great majority of the membership does not appear to be available. They are neither sufficiently unattached, sufficiently alienated, nor sufficiently remote in focus of attention to make mobilization toward utopian goals by extreme means possible. The satisfaction of primary human needs and the perceived solution of economic and other problems in the context of the *zadankai* may decrease the aggressive behavioral consequences which usually stem from frustration,[31] though alienation from the secular context remains or is even exacerbated by the latent Gakkai socialization process; a more likely consequence of this gratification through the *zadankai* is simply the obstruction of organizational efforts at mobilization by commitments to the *kumi* and other intermediate groups which may in fact be greater than one's commitment to the Sokagakkai. In its largest part, then, the

Gakkai does not approximate the behavioral model of a mass movement.

For another portion of the membership, however, past record and present zeal indicate that availability does exist; it may be nothing more than the present official choice of operational ideals and actual tactics which keeps the activist hard core out of the streets. The scriptural justification of violence and the existence of ultimate and utopian goals, if invoked with more than the present rhetorical effort, could activate several hundred thousand of the more ideologically committed believers to practically any form of behavior. As opposed to the bulk of the membership which, although perhaps relatively unattached and alienated, is apparently not sufficiently so to be available for mobilization (that is, to be congruent with the model of mass man), the activist minority seems to be available but the present organizational leadership does not choose to mobilize it, that is, the organization does not fulfill the behavioral criteria of a mass movement.

NOTES: CHAPTER 22

1. Koya Azumi, "Social Basis of a New Religious Party: The Komeito of Japan," paper delivered at annual convention of American Sociological Association, August 1967.

2. Suzuki, Tatsuzo, "A Study of the Japanese National Character, Part III," in _Annals of the Institute of Statistical Mathematics_, supplement 4, 1966, p. 22; unpub. data from survey by Miss Takahashi Naoko; Tsurumi Shunsuke _et al._, _Shakubuku_, Tokyo, 1962, p. 200; Ishida Ikuo, "Shakubuku no Uchimaku," in _Gendai no Me_, vol. 5 no. 9, September 1964, pp. 85-86; Murakami Shigeyoshi, _Sokagakkai to Komeito_, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 28-29.

3. In one local poll, 93% of the non-believers and 56% of the believers polled acknowledged this. See Tokyo Daigaku Shakaigakka and Tokyo Joshi Daigaku Shakaigakka, *Sokagakkai*, Tokyo, 1963.

4. Naikaku Kanbo Naikaku Chosa-shitsu, *Shinko Shukyo ni kansuru Shakai-shinrigakuteki Kenkyu*, Tokyo, 1965 (?), p. 90.

5. *Ibid*., pp. 99-100.

6. *Ibid*., p. 111.

7. Ikeda Daisaku, *Ningen Kakumei*, vol. 2, Tokyo, 1966, p. 302.

8. Ishida, *op. cit*., p. 86; Ozawa Nobuo, "Sokagakkai: Kono Rinjin-tachi," in *Tembo*, no. 78, June 1965, p. 169.

9. Naikaku, *op. cit*., p. 8. Data collected by Sidney Verba *et al*., in the Cross-National Study of Political and Social Change shows the same pattern: only 30% of the Sokagakkai members had ever held office, assisted at meetings, or otherwise been positively active.

10. Ishida Ikuo, *Sokagakkai*, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 25-26. The Sokagakkai is not alone in this problem; see Irving Howe and Lewis Coser, *The American Communist Party*, Boston, 1957, pp. 529, 534.

11. Hayashi Chikio, *Zusetsu: Nihonjin no Kokuminsei*, Tokyo, 1964, p. 146; James Dator, unpub. data presented at annual convention of Association for Asian Studies, March 1968.

12. Ozawa, *op. cit*., p. 169.

13. Suzuki Hiroshi, "Toshi Kaso no Shukyo Shudan," in *Shakaigaku Kenkyu*, no. 24, 1964, p. 73.

14. *Seikyo Shimbun*, July 17, 31, 1967; Koya Azumi, "Functions of Soka Gakkai Membership," unpub. paper, Columbia University, 1967, p. 5 note 1.

15. *Seikyo Shimbun*, October 6, 1967.

16. Suzuki, *op. cit*., p. 74; Murakami, *op. cit*., pp. 47-48.

17. See above, chapter 14, and unpub. data from third National Character (Kokuminsei) study by the Tokei Suri Kenkyu-jo, Tokyo. The proportion of believers who support the Komeito, as indicated by the Verba *et al*. Cross-National Study of Political and Social Change of 1966, is 67.6%. It is assumed that more complete politicization of the

Gakkai membership rather than sampling differences accounts for the increase.

18. Unpub. data from Mainichi Shimbun survey of June 1965; "Voting Characteristics Revealed in Pre-Election Opinion Poll--House of Councillors Elections, July 1965," Tokyo, United States Information Service, 1965, pp. 1-2, 4.

19. Unpub. data from Yomiuri Shimbun survey of March 1967; Nishihira Shigeki, "Minobe Nihyaku-nijuman no Shiji-so," in Jiyu no. 91, June 1967, pp. 87-88.

20. U.S.I.S., op. cit., pp. 6-7.

21. Data from Yomiuri survey of March 1967 and Mainichi survey of June 1965.

22. The concept is Philip Converse's and denotes "the success we would have in predicting, given initial knowledge that an individual holds a specified attitude, that he holds certain further ideas and attitudes." In David Apter, Ideology and Discontent, Glencoe, 1964, p. 207.

23. Tanaka Kunio, Nihonjin no Shakaiteki Taido, Tokyo, 1964, pt. III, esp. chs. 5, 6.

24. Suzuki, op. cit., pp. 83-84.

25. Kokuminsei data.

26. Suzuki, op. cit., p. 76.

27. Tsurumi et al., op. cit., pp. 79-81, 89, 96.

28. Takahashi data.

29. Data from Yomiuri survey of March 1966.

30. Data from Yomiuri survey of March 1967.

31. John Dollard et al., Frustration and Aggression, New Haven, 1939, pp. 1, 166.

CHAPTER 23

CONCLUSION

The Sokagakkai, as a total interactive entity composed of members of varying degrees of commitment and activism and of official organizational doctrines, is not a mass movement as defined by William Kornhauser; nor are its members, considered in isolation, mass men. There are major and minor contradictions and trends which necessitate close attention to the apparent fact that a potential for mass behavior and a possible nucleus of prototypical mass men does exist in the Gakkai. But the overall impression gained from wide observation of a considerable variety of data applied to a number of indices for each aspect of each model, is that the Sokagakkai is not at present a mass movement and thus cannot be expected to have the implications for a democratic political system of such a movement.

The social attachment of the Gakkai is primarily the consequence of the relatively successful resistance of the membership to latent actual socializing influences exerted by the organization in the direction of reduced social and communications ties with the secular world. This influence may not be intended; nevertheless, it has apparently resulted in the creation within the membership of a nearly closed activist element. The significant patterns of interaction here are actual: the actual retention of extra-Gakkai relationships by members and the actual inducement of withdrawal in the activists.

Structurally the Sokagakkai is dissimilar to a mass movement despite a rather totalitarian ideal--though latent--concerning intraorganizational secondary groups. Here again, the relations developed by members within the framework of (and in contravention of the ideals of) the Gakkai are crucial. Lasting extra-Gakkai social ties negate the ideal of group inclusivity; provision through the zadankai of the primary gratifications which loom so large in the goal configurations of members invests intermediate groups with a strength which contradicts the ideal. Non-inclusivity is an actual condition; if weakness is also, then the Gakkai structurally resembles a mass movement; if the condition is one of strength, then the Society is actually pluralist in structure. A supplementary ideal and actual structural aspect, high but mediated non-elite access to elites, contributes further to the suspicion that the Gakkai may actually have significant pluralist structural characteristics which, as the framework within which believers operate, could have a democratically instructive effect upon the membership. This further structural feature may at least offset the totalitarian ideal of intraorganizational relationships.

There appears to be a considerable degree of overall congruence between mass movement in its alienated aspect and the Sokagakkai. What seems at first to be a clear contradiction between and compartmentalization of pre-existent rank-and-file attitudes and organizational socialization appears to be, after deeper analysis, a subtle aggravation--outside of the knowledge and contrary to the ideals of the Gakkai leadership--of pre-existent feelings of alienation by actual denigration of the intrinsic worth of the individual and condemnation of the political system, and by increasing believers' awareness of their socioeconomic and political environment without commensurately increasing their satisfaction with its performance or present condition. This aggravation impinges upon the roots, not the manifestations, of alienation and conduces to increased estrangement. The Gakkai does perhaps have the capability to influence away from alienation; it offers an operational example in increased cooperativeness and moderate partisanship and devotes great efforts to reiterating its ideal support for the Japanese political structure in particular and the principles of the "democratic formula" in general. However, while the Gakkai's ideals are proclaimed vociferously they are also often proclaimed ambiguously: the exact impact of the Society's actually ambivalent views on majoritarianism and minority rights is impossible to estimate, but a selectively perceptive membership could derive rationalizations for either democracy or totalitarianism therefrom.

The actual attitudes of the membership toward the principles of the "democratic formula" are also ambiguous. One cannot conclude that the rank-and-file are antipathetic to the norms of democratic politics on the basis of the inconsistent data presented here; nor can one deny categorically that the Gakkai socialization process has a liberalizing influence upon certain older and less-educated groups in the membership. Moreover, on several of the indicators of alienation of different types members' attitudes, while apparently more estranged than those of the general Japanese public, were not drastically so, and in most instances where comparison is possible Gakkai members appear considerably less alienated than supporters of the Japan Communist Party. The JCP is not one of the world's more strikingly militant communist parties and one suspects that any collectivity which is notably less alienated than the supporters of the JCP cannot be, absolutely, too alienated from self or society.

Nevertheless, the data do indicate a degree of alienation of sufficient scope and intensity to justify the conclusion that the Gakkai approximates a mass movement. But because the alienation is not extreme one is less surprised than might be the case to find that mass behavior is absent from the present, actual behavioral pattern of the Sokagakkai. The low degree of alienation and relatively high frequency of attachments contribute to the unavailability of the majority of the Sokagakkai membership, which is neither disciplined nor mobilized either religiously or politically, and render the quality of the membership the crucial factor in the overall non-mass nature of the Gakkai.

The role of the organization must not be overlooked, however. Especially in light of the latent alienating influences of Gakkai socialization and the inclusion of utopian goals and extreme means in Nichiren Shoshu scripture, the express stand taken by the leadership of the Gakkai against deviant behavior of all types may well be the primary factor in the elimination over the last several years of unsanctioned violence and law-breaking by the more activist and deeply-committed elements of the Society. Such a stand deals only with the behavioral manifestations of mass qualities, while alienative influences strike at their causes; the achievement of gratification in the small group which leaves alienation from the secular world unassuaged has the same superficial effect. Nevertheless, deviant behavior is not to be seen and the data available are not sufficiently manipulable to enable one to predict accurately the consequences of a change to extremist techniques by the Gakkai leadership. A certain degree of mass behavior is highly probable; however, probability connotes potentiality and speculation and at present the Gakkai does not exhibit the actual behavioral characteristics of a mass movement.

The unavailability of the membership is one of the reasons for this behavioral pattern. Combined with the accessibility of the Gakkai elite, it demonstrates a pluralist internal process.[1] In its total being, comprehending ideal and actual patterns of organizational and rank-and-file behavior and orientation and the interaction between them, the Sokagakkai is not a mass movement, for this and other reasons presented above. In this total picture the quality of the greater part of the Gakkai membership seems to determine the nature of the Gakkai; however, as regards a sizeable minority of activists the role of organizational leadership and ideal may be crucial. Both forces, however, contribute to a total picture of incongruence with concomitant potentialities for congruence.

There may be reason for weighting present actuality over future potential in evaluating the Gakkai, although the possibility of extremism should never be forgotten. According to several students of collective behavior moderation is the inevitable fate of social movements:

> spontaneity and enthusiasm inevitably lose their position of dominance in social movements which survive for any period of time, and the processes of institutionalization and routinization gain the ascendancy.[2]

In addition,

> The need for indoctrination of the young in the peculiar doctrines arises, and those who are trained in the sect seldom espouse its principles with the same devotion of those who were initiated therein by personal experience. The virtues of frugality and industry bear fruit in prosperity, and when prosperity comes the reasons for the sectarian revolt disappear and the manner of life against which the fathers rebelled is embraced by their children. Thus the spiritual need and economic forces which in one generation drew the sect out of the church turn about to transform the sect into a church.[3]

Perhaps the "thaw" in Gakkai behavior is a first step in this process of "institutionalization and routinization." The lasting factor of charisma suggests that if this is so, the process is yet not far advanced, and another generation must be awaited before the Sokagakkai becomes a typical actor in the Japanese religious system. But indications are that a process has begun which will in time render the Gakkai less like a mass movement.

The detailed application of the models of mass movement and mass man to the Sokagakkai provides some illumination regarding both the utility of the models themselves and some of the assumptions which preceded the application. The assumption that Kornhauser's essentially isomorphic models of man and movement were an oversimplification was borne out. Not only is there ample room for interaction, both harmonious and conflictual, between the macro and micro levels of a social movement, but there are further distinctions which must be drawn between members of varying degrees of activism and between ideal and actual, latent and manifest patterns of thought and behavior. Eric Hoffer's model of the "true believer," like Kornhauser's model of mass man, may apply to a minority of the Gakkai membership; however, both of these writers tend to use their models rather unrealistically to denote entire memberships of movements.

Hoffer is, however, instructive in his description of the manner in which mass movements tend to intensify the characteristics of mass man, a phenomenon noted previously by Sebastian DeGrazia.[4] The similarity of the Sokagakkai to a mass movement will be noted when one recalls that certain forms of unattachment and alienation are in fact latent effects of the Gakkai socialization process. However, the "terror" spoken of by DeGrazia and the hatred and fanatical behavior described by Hoffer have no counterpart in the Gakkai. If Hoffer's model is taken very selectively, very cautiously, and applied to a small proportion of the Gakkai membership and a partial aspect of the organization's effect on its members then it is helpful; however, it is a highly meretricious model and its uncritical use can convey a misleading impression of the nature of the Sokagakkai.[5]

It was assumed that the most significant aspects of the mass models, in decreasing order, were behavior, alienation, and unattachment. Behavior still seems to be most important, especially in light of the existing alienation among the membership. This alienation exists despite considerable attachment, a condition consistent with the observations of Wolfinger *et al*., and Selznick;[6] in the case of the most active element the alienation, in (assumed) combination with unattachment or even in its absence, appeared to be sufficient to make mass behavior a possibility, thus further suggesting the cruciality of behavioral tendencies and restraints.

It was also assumed that non-deviant behavior and attitudes concerning which relevant Gakkai views were most clear would be most susceptible to organizational influence. What was found was that the only real organizational influence which was exerted upon most members concerned those attitudes, needs, and motivations which the members may have brought into the Gakkai with them. A penchant for simplistic thinking, a receptivity to the idea of divine benefit, and a political interest in welfare, housing, and other matters of immediate concern might be assumed in the majority of converts to Nichiren Shoshu; that more extreme changes could not be wrought in the faithful is partly due to the fact that social and communications ties to secular society are maintained by most members and that, while identification with the Gakkai is no doubt of great psychic importance to most members, the "Gakkai" upon which they focus their loyalty may in many cases be not the entire Gakkai organization but its the intimate *tako-tsubo* aspect.

Where deep commitment to ideology, leadership, and organization exists one may surmise greater changes in members' attitudes: increasing detachment from the secular world, decreased faith in oneself except as a member of the Gakkai, and alienation from society and polity. But for those less committed members even non-deviant behavior such as attendance at meetings is successfully instilled in no more than half of the membership. And on matters not directly related to needs and desires of the types which brought the largest part of the membership to the Gakkai, even crystal-clear statement of the Gakkai position does not suffice to alter members' views or even to stimulate their interest; Komeito supporters' views on several planks of the party's foreign policy platform indicate this comflict.

A final assumption was that determination of the degree of congruence between the Sokagakkai and the model of mass movement would enable some generalizations about the relevance of the Gakkai for democratic political systems in general and the Japanese system in particular. The Gakkai being incongruent with the model, one assumes that it would not be incompatible with any democratic system, including the Japanese. However, there are several partial points of conflict, such as members' alienation from specific Japanese political structures and ambivalence regarding certain abstract democratic norms, and latent organizational influences toward alienation and detachment; thus one might expect a degree of friction in the relationship between such an organization and its general democratic or specific Japanese environment. In the following part of this study an analysis of the relationship of the Sokagakkai and its environment will be attempted in order to distinguish the points at which such friction is actual or potential.

NOTES: CHAPTER 23

1. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, Glencoe, 1959, p. 40.
2. Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor, Garden City, 1963, p. 333.
3. Elmer Clark, The Small Sects in America, New York, 1949, p. 17.
4. Eric Hoffer, The True Believer, New York, 1966, pt. III; Sebastian DeGrazia, The Political Community, Chicago, 1948, pp. vx-xvi.
5. For two examples of incautious use of Hoffer's model see David Hesselgrave, A Propagation Profile of the Soka Gakkai, unpub. Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota, 1965; and Neill McFarland, Rush Hour of the Gods, New York, 1967, ch. on Sokagakkai.
6. Philip Selznick, The Organizational Weapon, New York, 1952, pp. 297ff.; Raymond Wolfinger et at., chapter in David Apter, Ideology and Discontent, Glencoe, 1964.

PART VII. THE SOKAGAKKAI AND ITS JAPANESE ENVIRONMENT

CHAPTER 24

THE SOKAGAKKAI IN JAPANESE SOCIETY AND CULTURE

The relations--social, religious, and political--of the Sokagakkai with its Japanese environment have been characterized more often than not by friction. The initial cause of this friction was shakubuku and intolerance; as observers looked more deeply into the organization and its teachings a disturbingly nationalist and quasi-militaristic element was detected, as were the blatantly materialistic principle of divine benefit and the rather far-fetched interpretations of reality which flowed therefrom.

The opprobrium with which the Gakkai has been regarded has been directed in part toward all of the new religions. Their simplism and unsophisticated teachings and approaches have repelled the extraordinarily articulate and literarily prolific Japanese intelligentsia, which has ridiculed or warned against their faith cures, hopes for world regeneration, and bizarre tenets. Rival clerics deride them as "perversions of true religion perpetrated by greedy impostors," but they also realize the role of stagnation of and discontent with the traditional faiths as a factor in the rise of the new sects and therefore mitigate their harshness a bit.[1]

The Gakkai is looked upon with even more disfavor than are the other new religions. One index of this disfavor is a survey run in 1964 in which 42 per cent of the respondents chose the adjective "fanatical" to describe the Koseiren and 46 per cent termed the Gakkai "extremely repulsive," "frightening," or "heretical."[2] More intensive attitudinal data are provided by a recent clinical study done by psychologist Yamaguchi Akira, in which non-Gakkai members evinced a generally negative view of the Gakkai (those who had been subjected to shakubuku were even more strongly negative) and perceived it as unobjective, unscientific, autocratic, arbitrary, destructive, negative, and selfish.[3]

Any evaluation of the Gakkai's image and its efforts to change that image must include scrutiny of the Gakkai's critics. A great number of critics have had religious and political axes to grind, and many critiques have little validity except in relation to Marxist social and political theory.[4] The knowledge of Nichiren Shoshu upon which many are based is slim;[5] facile equation of Nichirenite Buddhism and chauvinism is common; and in many cases teachings are hardly considered: the songs, flags, and military terminology are cited as solid evidence of fascist, militaristic tendencies.[6]

Much criticism of the Sokagakkai provides more insight into the attitudes of the critics themselves than it does into the nature of the Gakkai. First, ridicule and condemnation of the new religions in general typifies the elitist, intellectually arrogant orientation of the Japanese intelligentsia toward the more unsophisticated and less educated and "progressive" masses.[7] Second, attacks upon the irrationalism, doctrinal distortions, philosophical shallowness, and materialism of the Gakkai demonstrate a failure to comprehend that such criticism affects the Society little (which, indeed, owes much of its growth to these features) and explains neither its roots, its present role, nor its social and political significance.

A. The Present Relationship with the Environment

These criticisms do, however, constitute one aspect of the Sokagakkai's relationship with its environment. This relationship may be analyzed in its present and future states; its beneficent and maleficent (eufunctional and dysfunctional) implications for the environment; and its manifest and latent aspects. In this chapter present and future will be the basic points of reference; within them the other aspects of the relationship will be observed. Finally, we will digress on a particularly relevant aspect of relations with the environment--the existence or potential existence of nationalistic or chauvinistic tendencies in the Gakkai.

1. Systemic Eufunctions

In 1938 Emil Lederer warned that

> Japan is faced with what seem to be insurmountable difficulties. . . . She appears to be struggling through a period that shatters the foundations of the Japanese spirit without giving in exchange anything more than technological guidance.[8]

This statement is an even more accurate description of the immediate postwar situation, and one must recognize its residual validity even today. It is perhaps in this area that the Sokagakkai--and the new religions in general--is most beneficial for its social and cultural environment. It offers to large numbers of economically, physically, and psychologically deprived persons an alternative to unarmed confrontation with complex rapidly-changing modern urban life; a secure social nexus from within which the individual can move out into the larger social and political environment; and, through the figure of Nichiren, a tie with Japan's past and her culture.

For the larger part of the Sokagakkai membership belief means attachment to society through both social ties and communication, even though both are in many cases mediated through Gakkai channels and structures. It means experience in a possibly pluralist social structure. As numerous testimonials assert, it means new volition in work, new devotion to family, a new pattern and order in life, and a new sense of responsibility toward society.

The actual example of Gakkai organizational operations may also influence its members toward social integration. As this influence upon human alienation is a possible benefit, so is an influence away from deviant behavior (especially in light of the other signs of alienation present among the membership).

The structures responsible for the Gakkai's beneficial implications for its social context are the basic vertical line groups, the kumi and han, and their small meetings, the zadankai. The gratifications obtained through the zadankai may serve to deflect the potential aggression which derives from the frustrations of the deprived in Japanese society. The Gakkai promises happiness within the established social and political framework; this may be interpreted critically as simple conservative support of the status quo, but for better or for worse it does conduce to social stability by decreasing the extent of apathy in society while simultaneously lessening the societal potential for deviant behavior.

This postulation of self-realization within existing social and political structures is similar to the "fusion" of religion and society which Robert Bellah cites as one of three types of relationship between religion and the world.[9] Another type is "creative tension" wherein the world, being potentially meaningful and valuable, is considered a valid sphere for religious action. The Sokagakkai and the other new religions are today stressing as never before the relavance of religion to daily personal and social life. In the case of the Gakkai this stress often produces friction with other actors; however, one may not say therefore that the relationship characterized by "tension" is bad for either the Gakkai or for Japanese society.

The Sokagakkai in fact plays the role of gadfly in the Japanese social and religious systems and has hastened new currents in reaction. The success of the Gakkai Student Division has prompted reflection and new effort among other student organizations both religious and political. A similar defensive reaction has led to new cooperation between both old and new religions; although the primary and initial focus of such groups as the All-Japan Buddhist Association (*Zen Nihon Bukkyo-kai*)[10] and the Union of New Japanese Religious Groups (*Shin Nihon Shukyo Dantai Rengo-kai*)[11] was the negative goal of countering the growth and influence of the Gakkai, this very goal necessitated thorough examination of the role of religion in Japanese society and of the lethargic condition of most of Japan's organized religions. Japan's religious world is now in ferment, and

> Perhaps one result of this ferment will be to establish a new outlook on religion which will make it a truly positive and creative social force in Japan,[12]

one which can contribute to a solution of the dilemma suggested above by Emil Lederer.

2. Systemic Dysfunctions

The third type of socio-religious relationship specified by Bellah is "disjunction," a condition of opposition and antipathy which commonly results in attempts by religious groups either to withdraw (externally or internally) from the social environment or to transform it entirely in accordance with the ideals of the sect.[13] This disjunction (in social-science jargon, a condition wherein a given religious group is dysfunctional for the stable existence of its environing social system) may be manifest, as when the secular world is explicitly excoriated, or it may be latent, as when belief and participation in a sect conduce to attitudes potentially contributory to disruptive behavior.

Latent subversion of the social context may be discerned in the Sokagakkai's socialization process insofar as it leads to detachment from the social environment among the more active believers. Additional socially maleficent latent effects of Gakkai membership may be seen in the manner in which the Gakkai treats the individual human self, and the effects of membership upon human alienation and social-systemic alienation are even more manifestly disjunctive. The attacks upon the environment in which the Gakkai indulges can scarcely be calculated better to integrate the faithful with Japanese society.

Moreover, certain aspects of Gakkai activities, (especially their frequency) appear to increase rather than decrease the sum total of alienation, hostility, and conflict in Japanese society: there are cases where children, practically deserted by activist parents, have fallen into delinquency;[14] activist wives with inactive or non-Gakkai member husbands create situations of intense domestic strain;[15] and a number of defectors cited almost total lack of spare time and consequent familial disharmony and disintegration as reasons for disillusionment with the Society.[16] The Gakkai recognizes these problems, recommending moderate practice where familial or community opposition is severe and treating social and familial harmony as an aspect of faith.[17] Nevertheless, social stress and alienation are occasional concomitants of active belief.

The Sokagakkai does not at present evince any marked tendency toward deviant or "disjunctive" social behavior either ideally or actually. One should recall the past record of violence and illegality, and the infrequent suggestions that deviant behavior is still sanctioned: in his biography of Toda Josei President Ikeda justifies the visits of Gakkai-member teachers to the homes of their pupils for the purpose of converting their parents; in one probably fictitious incident one teachers' union official who objected to this practice later died, insane; another became ill and had to cease working.[18]

B. Future Relationships with the Environment

Insofar as future relationships between the Sokagakkai and its social and cultural context may be predicted at all they might best be seen simply as extrapolations of present relationships. One significant change which could take place autonomously within the Gakkai concerns alienation as a possible result of latent socializing influences exerted by the organization. The present situation, if continued, could give rise to a degree of alienation creating availability for mobilization for mass behavior among larger segments of the membership; if the ideal of self, social, and systemic integration gives way and becomes more manifestly and intentionally alienative then mass behavior becomes a very likely prospect, either organized or without official sanction. If, on the other hand, the Society should restrict its proclamation of the impotence of the faithless self and the degeneracy of the social system and thus bring its actual socialization process more into line with its present ideal process, then the potentially beneficial effect upon Japanese society would increase.

The same is true of the discrepancy between structural ideal and actuality. Cognizance by the Gakkai of the socially isolating effects of inclusive relationships with the organization and of the political implications of experience in an organization with weak, inclusive secondary relationships and reinterpretations of the organizational ideal leading to closer congruence of ideal and actual could create a more socially beneficial relationship with the secular context. Such reinterpretations, however, might well have consequences for the internal process of the Sokagakkai; these will be considered in Chapter 26 below.

One inevitable future internal development which might influence the relationship of the Sokagakkai with its environment concerns the gradual appearance of a social community of Sokagakkai believers. The present penchant for marriage within the Gakkai has already been suggested,[19] as has the inclination (which seems to vary with activism and length of membership) to see the Gakkai as a social reference group.[20] The increasing role of the family as an agent of general Gakkai socialization and the possible role of the Soka Schools and Soka University are difficult to estimate but it is most probable that they will lead to greater social, kinship, and geographic ties among members.

The relevance of this development is suggested in Gerhard Lenski's The Religious Factor, a study of religion in Detroit.[21] Lenski found that religious affiliation had two aspects: the associational, typified by membership in a goal-oriented, formally organized church; and the communal, which signified the faith as a subculture, a socially and kin-based community of religiously like-minded persons.[22] Lenski found that previous explanations of the connection between religious zeal and intolerance and political extremism did not adequately describe the implications of religious affiliation; some evidence suggested that high associational involvement contributed to increased tolerance, while "the religious subcommunities foster and encourage a provincial and authoritarian view of the world."[23] One cannot presume that the increased integration of the family into the Sokagakkai will increase friction with the Gakkai's social environment; however, it could quite possibly lead to increased social unattachment.

The usual focus of attention when speaking of the future social development of the Sokagakkai is just that: development. Is the Gakkai simply an evanescent manifestation of a temporary postwar period of strain or is it a firmly-rooted actor in the Japanese religious system which can be expected to survive? Many of the Japanese new religions have been transitory phenomena, and as the particular strains which gave rise to new sects by the hundreds in the immediate postwar period subside one may expect that many of the more specialized faiths will fade. Those sects which draw upon the most traditional social elements, the completely politically unaware, the diseased, and the abjectly poor will decline. Some of the new faiths will grow, like the century-old innovation, Tenrikyo, and become established actors in the Japanese religious world. But which type is the Sokagakkai?

At present the Gakkai is strong on the periphery of Japanese society, but has yet to indicate that it has any real attraction for the core sectors of that society: organized labor, the peasantry, the relatively stable and secure urban middle class, and the intelligentsia. Lacking a new appeal by the Gakkai or a new susceptibility to the old appeal by these major social elements, the Gakkai must remain a fringe religion, based in the deprived and the gradually shrinking unsophisticated sector of Japanese society.

There are those who see the Gakkai as essentially a transitory phenomenon, "characteristic of Japan at this stage of its economic and social development:"

> Doctrinally, it is for the credulous, but the credulous are declining in numbers, not increasing, as educational levels rise . . . . it posits a crisis philosophy, and fewer Japanese feel a sense of crisis.

That is,

> the sudden expansion of Soka Gakkai should probably be regarded as a temporary phenomenon of a society in rapid change, interesting because it is linked with a native Japanese sect that goes back to medieval times.[24]

The Sokagakkai is no doubt in part the result of forces released during a process of change; however, the conclusion that it is "temporary" disregards the differences in doctrine, organization, leadership, and causative factors between the Gakkai and other of the new sects which have contributed to the further growth of the Gakkai during precisely the period of declining credulity and crisis of which the above author speaks.

It is possible that the growth of the Sokagakkai itself is near its peak; the proponents of the "limit theory" may in late 1968 be nearly correct. But Komeito power is not yet near its zenith; as noted above, there is a time lag between conversion and politicization, and the lag may increase as the Gakkai waits for its strength in a given district to reach the desired level at which candidates will be run for the first time. One may assume that the Gakkai has in many localities increasing but as yet unused reserves of votes which can be called upon to influence local elections when a threshold is crossed.

To write off either the party or its Gakkai parent as "temporary" is to rule out three factors. One is the paraphrased fact that "the deprived you will have always with you;" no matter how affluent Japan becomes, relative differences in status, income, power, health, and security will exist.[25] Deprivation of various kinds can be felt on every level of society and on certain levels and in certain areas (as will be noted below) discrepancies in economic and social well-being are increasing and not decreasing at all. Among the deprived, splinter sects or other types of remedial movements (the deprived among the Japanese intelligentsia have their Marxism) will have an appeal; the flexibility and breadth of appeal demonstrated by the Gakkai in its steady growth in a nation which has climbed from ashes to affluence suggests that adaptation to new conditions and dominant types of deprivation is not beyond the talents of the leaders of the Sokagakkai.

Second, various types of environmental changes could enlarge the size of the social strata to which the Sokagakkai presently appeals. A major depression would be such a change; war or terrifying international crisis might be another. Third, through new doctrinal appeal or environmental change the variety of social strata to which the Gakkai appeals may increase: with increasing maturity, moderation, and sophistication the Sokagakkai may come to be more acceptable to the better educated urban sectors;

with continued effective and responsible action and realistic policy-making the Komeito may come to appeal to these same politically critical, aware, and largely uncommitted social elements.

Four relatively deprived social groups, of which the last also represents a new class into which the Gakkai might expand, may be noted here. First are the urbanites, especially the new urbanites who come rootless to the city from the rural areas. This social group will increase during the coming decade at least; the present labor shortage in some sectors of urban industry will lead to increased wages which will constitute an ever stronger incentive to move to the cities.[26] The Gakkai has already shown its appeal to the new urbanites who often constitute a "psychologically drifting mass;"[27] as urban population concentration becomes greater the policies which the Komeito espouses--more social security and welfare, better public transit, water supply and sewage, and housing--will become highly salient problems for ever greater numbers of Japanese.[28]

Whether the newly deprived urbanites turn to religious or political solutions is unknown; the trend toward political solutions will probably grow, but one would be well to remember that the Gakkai, which offers both religious and political remedies, is not as likely to suffer from the process of cultural secularization as are many other new sects. And even with economic growth and overall cultural secularization associational participation in the

Gakkai might not suffer: Lenski noted that in Detroit and in America as a whole there is a trend toward increased associational religious involvement as those social elements least likely to be involved (laborers and first-generation immigrants) decrease as a proportion of the total population and those most likely to participate (the middle class and third-generation Americans) become an ever larger percentage of the populace.[29] To generalize from America to Japan is impossible, but the suggestion is interesting.

Second are the socially mobile, those persons undergoing status changes. Vertical status change in either direction entails psychic stress the consequences of which are as yet unclear; it is not unreasonable to describe downward social mobility as a deprivation in terms of self-esteem and objective circumstances. Upward mobility, too, seems to bring on at least temporary periods of status insecurity and ambiguity of identity of the type which the Sokagakkai dispels. Where a society is characterized by a high degree of social mobility one might expect to find a lasting niche for at least a few splinter religious groups.

Despite the high rate of social flux in postwar Japan, according to a study published in 1959 Japan does not have the highest overall rate of vertical social mobility among industrialized nations; it does, however, have a large absolute degree of vertical mobility and a moderately large degree of downward mobility, and examination of mobility patterns in more developed nations suggests that both the overall mobility in general and the downward mobility in particular will persist and perhaps even increase.[30] According to this study by Seymour Lipset and Reinhard Bendix the vertically mobile proportion of the non-farm population in 6 advanced nations in the mid-1950's was as follows:[31]

United States:	30%,	Sweden:	29%,	France:	27%,
West Germany:	31%,	Japan:	27%,	Switzerland:	23%.

The proportion of upward-mobile persons (non-manual laborer sons of manual laborer fathers) in the non-farming populations of 9 industrial nations varied between 26 and 44 percent, while the downward-mobile proportion (manual laborer sons of non-manual laborer fathers) varied from 13 to 38 percent; the proportions for Japan were 33 percent and 21 percent respectively,[32] indicating that perhaps one of every five Japanese employed outside of the agricultural sector is of lower occupational (and probably economic) status than was his father.

Third are the small businessmen and entrepreneurs. The plight of the merchants and artisans gave rise to the Poujadist movement in France and, considering the role in the Sokagakkai of small shopkeepers and service personnel, appears to contribute to splinter religious groups as well. The questions at hand are whether or not the relatively deprived small-business sector of the Japanese economy, squeezed between modern and efficient giant industry and secure, highly organized labor unions, can be expected both to remain and to remain deprived. For the foreseeable future the answers seem to be "yes." The proportion of the total

Japanese economy occupied by small enterprises remains large and no extrapolation of present trends indicates its disappearance. In one respect the role of small business has increased with time: the percentage of the Japanese work force employed in factories with 5 to 99 workers changed from 41.8 percent in 1921 to 41.4 percent in 1935, to 49.1 percent in 1951 and 47 percent in 1959.[33] In 1959 enterprises with less than 100 employees accounted for 98 percent of all Japanese manufacturing establishments, 56 percent of all manufacturing employees, and 34 percent of all manufacturing output.[34]

This phenomenon is not limited to Japan. A study by Eugene Staley and Richard Morse indicates that the role of small business in the economies of several nations has shown "surprising stability" since World War I;

> evidence appears to refute the belief that, in a given country, the relative role of small manufacturing establishments must continue to fall indefinitely.[35]

> Rather, empirical evidence strongly suggests that in a given country, once a critical minimum level of modern industry is established, the role of small factories does not decline with time but holds an equal position in the future development and expansion of the manufacturing economy.[36]

But although the small business sector seems sure to remain, what will be its condition? Staley and Morse suggest from the experiences of other developing economies that until the small-scale sector can modernize sufficiently to balance the large-scale (and earlier modernized) sector there will be overall economic inefficiency and strain upon the less modern sector.[37] Japan is certainly not yet at this final, balanced stage. Incredibly complex networks of middlemen and multi-level subcontracting systems contribute to high retail prices and exploitation of small enterprises by large, and bankruptcies of all magnitudes are a commonplace.[38]

The Sokagakkai and Komeito, as one can see from perusal of the party platform, focus closely upon the problems of the small-business sector and appear to have made inroads upon this segment of the population. It is reasonable to assume that even if this sector of the population does not increase, it is not likely to decrease radically either; moreover, the economic insecurity of a fair part of this sector is likely to continue for at least the next several years. Thus although the Gakkai may not stand to make any spectacular gains in this social stratum, it does appear to enjoy there a relatively stable source of converts.

Fourth among the relatively deprived groups, and the only one among which the Sokagakkai has to date made no striking advances, is the peasantry. Looked after by the ruling party in Tokyo and "relatively prosperous and unalienated,"[39] and still relatively strongly tied to the traditional religions and thus antipathetic toward the new religions, the farmers have thus far indicated no great receptivity to the Gakkai or the Komeito, although the party vote grows slowly (in absolute size) in nearly all prefectures.

Income, industrialization, and "modernization" as measured on various indicators vary markedly between regions in Japan, and the disparities in some cases seem to be increasing. On an aggregate interval scale of 8 indices of "modernization" compiled by the Japan Broadcasting Association (NHK) eight urbanized prefectures scored between +6 and +23; 26 prefectures scored between -5 and +5, while 12 scored between -6 and -12.[40] The Japan Red Cross, using a scale aggregated from 25 indices of standard of living, found that while the highest regional score increased from 156.7 to 174.8 between 1960 and 1966, the lowest score decreased from 66.9 to 57.8,[41] that is, the less developed regions appear to be growing even less developed (i.e., more deprived) relative to the rest of the nation.

The rural areas are not a hotbed of dissatisfaction. However, a minority does feel the deprivation and, as the mass media persuade the farmers even more of the affluent life enjoyed by the urbanites it is conceivable that this minority will grow. The NHK study mentioned above polled residents of Shimane prefecture, one of Japan's most rural and poor areas, about their perceptions of their prefecture; about one-fifth chose "backward" to describe the prefecture's cultural and economic condition.[42] This is not a large proportion; however, as relative backwardness increases and migration to the cities continues a situation similar to that of France in the 1950's, which gave rise to the Poujadist movement, could develop:

> Nous sommes en présence d'un sursaut quasidésespéré contre un changement qui s'est, plus ou moins insensiblement, manifesté depuis la Libération: le dépeuplement et le sous-développement d'une partie de la France rurale marque le déclin d'un mode de vie ... traditionnel auquel des masses importantes, imparfaitement organisées parce que l'organisation même est contraire a leur idéal et a la nature du régime, restent attachées.[43]

Agrarian unrest was an important factor in the rise of right-wing political forces in Japan in the 1920's and 1930's, and contributed to Poujadism also. The key factor at present obstructing a linkage between rural discontent and the Sokagakkai is religion; were the Komeito successfully to divorce itself from the Gakkai in the eyes of the electorate, it could probably extend its power into the countryside much farther than is at present possible.

Such an extension is at present no more than conjecture; the religious and community ties of the rural areas have not only rendered superfluous but have actively opposed such groups as the Sokagakkai much in the same way as have the educational level, sophistication, and economic stability of the urban middle class and intelligentsia and the economic security and organization of the unionized working class. But there are signs that these social groups are not immune to the political appeal of the Komeito. The 1967 general election saw an electoral trend away from the traditionally strong conservative parties in the country and away from the leftist parties in the urban areas.[44] The Socialists profited from this rural trend, while the Democratic Socialists and Komeito appeared to be the primary beneficiaries of the urban changes. The hypothetical right-to-left-to-center electoral trend is caused by increased voter sophistication and issue-awareness; the urban areas lead in any such trend, being the first areas of support for the left and the first areas to turn in considerable force to the supposed parties of the center, the DSP and Komeito.

The Komeito has also profited from voter discontent with parties previously supported in the country; its seizure of a Lower House seat in rural Tokushima prefecture attests to this, as does the increased rural Komeito vote in Upper House elections.[45] Its areas of greatest new strength, however, as indicated by election statistics and survey data, seem to be the suburban commuter-inhabited peripheries of the major cities. Thousands upon thousands of Japanese white-collar workers commute daily to their jobs in a sector of the economy which has made Japan fourth among industrial nations of the world; each evening they return to tiny, cramped apartments which are all that can be managed in a nation which is only twenty-second in standard of living.[46] The dissonance which such a transition creates can give rise to feelings of deprivation and it is on such feelings that reformist political and religious groups batten.

Sokagakkai advances in the new urban middle class will in all likelihood not be great;[47] they may provide modest increases in membership or perhaps just enable the Society to maintain its present size. The only circumstance under which a spectacular increase in Gakkai numbers can be envisioned is one in which the social strata normally attracted by the Gakkai--the new urbanites, the relatively poor or at least economically insecure, and the socially mobile or otherwise rootless--should sharply increase as a proportion of the Japanese population or in which the present appeal of the Gakkai should for some reason suddenly become congruent with a newly-salient problem common to great numbers of the entire populace.

Depression, war, defeat, or other calamity would create circumstances of the first type; the second is related to the first in that a new relevance of present Gakkai policy would probably appeal first to those otherwise least resistant to the other facets of Gakkai doctrine and organization, but different in that it would broaden the Gakkai's appeal to otherwise aloof social groupings. Such circumstances might arise if, in a context of rising Japanese nationalism and international tension, the Gakkai decided to capitalize upon the nationalist potential of Nichiren Buddhism.

C. The Sokagakkai and Japanese Nationalism

The relationship of the Sokagakkai and Japanese nationalism, as one aspect of the Gakkai's relationship with its environment, is properly discussed as part of the consideration of the Gakkai as a social and cultural subsystem rather than as part of the Gakkai's political interaction with its context because to date portwar Japanese nationalism and the Gakkai's usage of and relationship with that nationalism have been more cultural than political.

It is highly dubious that any social movement could grow to a size comparable to that of the Sokagakkai if it constituted a total break with the historical values and symbols of the society in which it arose. Even such unprecedented phenomena as modern totalitarian movements and regimes have their links with a cultural past.[48] Those "new" Japanese religions which have grown largest--Tenrikyo, Rissho Kosei Kai, and Seicho no Ie--all evince continuities with traditional culture; thus it is natural to look for such continuities also in the largest of the new sects, the Sokagakkai.

That nationalism is a significant factor in Japanese culture is still not clearly apparent today, although in the largely ideologically-motivated demonstrations of leftwing groups there is an unmistakable nationalistic element. Nor is its nature clear; insofar as nationalism is a form of national identity the Japanese are and have long been an intensely nationalistic people, but the manifestations of nationalism are many and the more noticeable ones (notably the political) are not the most salient today. In Maruyama Masao's words,

> it would not be quite right to say that the old nationalism had either died out or qualitatively changed. It would be more precise to say that it had vanished from the political surface only to be inlaid at the social base in an atomized form.[49]

The political relevance of this "social nationalism" is clear; as Maruyama notes,

> In a country like Japan, democratic institutions . . . are walking along an almost impassable road through a swamp of pre-modern relationships. If they forget this even for a moment, I think they're lost.[50]

However, the nationalism existing today does not appear to Maruyama to be an autonomous force:

> even if there is a systematic effort to recentralize the dispersed and amorphous national sentiments of today, it does not seem likely that sufficient strength can be mobilized for the resultant nationalism to be an independent political force. In all likelihood the new creation from old fabric will be joined to a higher political force, perhaps to an international power. It will then be permitted to exist only in so far as it serves to further the latter's set political goals.[51]

Could the Sokagakkai be such a "higher political force?" Sociologist Nagai Michio has described the Gakkai as one aspect of a cultural-nationalist reaction to the West and the flourishing of the Nichirenite new religions--Sokagakkai, Rissho Kosei Kai, Reiyukai, and others--in general has been described as "a reflection of the rising surge of national self-respect, the national image, or purpose for which the Japanese appear to be searching."[52] The Gakkai certainly claims traditional sanction from the 700-year history of Nichiren Shoshu. The sect declares Nichiren to be the original, eternal, omnipotent Buddha of the Lotus Sutra; since the disestablishment of State Shinto the Gakkai has thus been the only major Japanese religion with an indigenous deity. Given the universalist goals of the Gakkai, this means also that the proper object of worship for all mankind is a Japanese.[53]

Thus the Sokagakkai appears to be congruent with the cultural and historical aspect of its environment; this congruence may make the Gakkai a more credible religious alternative and a more appealing channel for the articulation of politically nationalistic attitudes for those possessing such attitudes. Certain of the nationally self-assertive statements of the Komeito suggest that in a situation of nationalist ferment the Gakkai might become the "higher political force" of which Maruyama speaks.

This possibility, given the assumed undemocratic potential of the Gakkai and the past record of Japanese nationalism, has brought down upon the Society the epithet "fascist."* Repeated mention in both Komeito and Gakkai media of the "mission of the Japanese people;"[54] the usage of banners, armbands, martial songs, and military terminology; and the often-cited "troop review" held by President Toda before 13,000 members of the Youth Division in 1954[55] all contribute to the image.

But the superficially militaristic characteristics of the Gakkai organization are certainly no more pronounced than are those of the Salvation Army. The Gakkai now plays up the persecution of the early 1940's as a glorious example of resistance to the militarist regime,[56] and in its teachings and political policies the Sokagakkai is totally antiwar. In his Lectures on the Rissho Ankoku Ron President Ikeda asserted,

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*"Fascism," as used by the Gakkai's critics (i.e., in a vague, undefined manner), denotes an evil non-communist political system or movement with totalitarian, militaristic, and chauvinistic features.

> In modern times war is itself the greatest of disasters; I would like also to point out that contained therein is every kind of calamity.[57]

Ikeda's fictionalized biography of President Toda, Human Revolution, begins in mid-1945 as follows:

> Nothing is so cruel as war.
> Nothing is so tragic as war.
> And yet the war went on.
> None are so miserable as a people drawn
>   into [war] by stupid leaders.[58]

This is a primary theme in all Gakkai writings and Komeito statements; the Society denounces even milder, though still exclusivistic, manifestations of nationalism.

The nationalist organizational position taken by the Gakkai and Komeito is political only in that it rejects what they consider to be Japan's servile adherence to American political interests. The nationalism which the Gakkai urges upon its faithful constitutes an appeal to the Japanese to take some justifiable pride in their accomplishments, in their national development, and in their upbringing. The Japanese are urged to avoid fawning attitudes toward foreigners and to feel confidence, integrity, and resolve as Japanese.[59] These organizational positions indicate nothing beyond a nationalism of the cultural-integrity type and certainly nothing "fascist."

Actual orientations of the Gakkai membership corroborate the opinion that the Gakkai is at present neither ultranationalist nor militarist. Nationalism undoubtedly exists; a nationwide survey of 1963 included the question, "Which are superior, Japanese or foreigners?"[60] The responses were distributed as follows:

	Japanese superior to foreigners	Japanese inferior to foreigners	Both are the same	Can't generalize	Other, DK, NA
Total sample	33%	14%	16%	27%	10%
Sokagakkai members	42	15	15	22	6

Sokagakkai members were more "nationalistic" than non-members in every age, sex, and educational grouping.

A more specifically political orientation can be seen in the responses of Komeito supporters to a late 1966 survey dealing with the Okinawa problem.[61] It is difficult to determine the degree to which responses were influence by party ideology or genuine national sentiment; the incongruence of Gakkai members' attitudes with ideal party policy found elsewhere and the lack of constraint within the attitude structures of members in general suggest that the relative influence of national sentiment is high. Seventy-seven percent of the supporters of the Communist Party (responding largely, one suspects, to anti-American shibboleths) favored immediate restitution of Okinawa to Japan; this response was chosen by 58 percent of the Komeito supporters, 54 percent of the Socialists, 46 percent of the Democratic Socialists, 41 percent of the Liberal Democrats' supporters, and 41 percent of those expressing no party preference.

This national sentiment is, however, manifestly not militaristic. The survey cited immediately above included a question on perceived necessity of a Japanese Self-Defense Force. Komeito supporters in the majority responded that such a force was necessary.[62]

Supporters of:	Commun. Party	Social. Party	Komeito	Demo. Social. Party	Lib.-Demo.-Party	No Party Pref.
Think SDF Necessary	21.4%	58.4%	66.8%	77.1%	84.6%	66.7%
Think SDF Unnecessary	68.7%	26.5%	20.8%	14.1%	4.6%	11.2%

However, when asked why they thought the Self-Defense Force necessary, 35.4 percent of the Komeito supporters replied that it was needed for disaster relief and similar catastrophes; 20.4 said that it was necessary for internal national security, and only 5.8 percent thought the force necessary to meet foreign invasion.

The same rather militarily indifferent orientation is suggested by a 1966 survey by the Yomiuri Shimbun, in which the question, "What would you do if Japan were invaded?" was asked.[63]

	I would:					
Supporters of:	Fight	Remain quiet without fighting	Flee (to mountains or overseas)	Such an event will not occur	NA,DK	Totals
Lib.-Demo.	40.2%	16.5%	5.4%	24.0%	14.0%	100.1%
Social.	34.0	18.1	4.8	25.3	17.8	100.0
Demo. Social.	44.7	17.5	3.9	24.3	9.7	100.1
Commun.	37.9	6.9	3.5	24.1	27.6	100.0
Komeito	22.9	15.7	12.9	28.6	20.0	100.1
National Sample	34.5	16.5	5.3	24.5	19.1	99.9

Compared to other groups of politicized Japanese the supporters of the Komeito took the most optimistic view of the international environment, were least likely to fight, and most likely to flee an invader. This may be another indication of alienation from the political system; it may be a sign of alienation from the nation; it is certainly not the sort of response one would expect from a militaristic group.

Despite the evidence adduced by the Gakkai in refutation of the "militarist" accusation, critics will not be stilled. The view of the Gakkai as "a rebirth of Nazism" or "a Japanese edition of Goldwaterism" is described by one as "natural and sound;"[64] others see implications of "revived chauvinism," "the repudiation of democracy," "neo-colonialism," and "anticommunist xenophobia" in the Society.[65] The ideals of world propagation still nominally motivate the Sokagakkai; organizational and rank-and-file actuality, however, as suggested by the data presented here, indicate that such fears are at present ungrounded.

The words "at present" are important. If the Japanese political system were to break down completely or to undergo serious prolonged crisis the chances that popular political sentiment would swing to the right are good.[66] There is instructive historical precedent; moreover, the persistent force of nationalism, the greater congruence of right than left with the Japanese tradition, the present dominance of conservative political forces, and the fact that a rightward swing requires no structural change all contribute to the probability that if political extremism grows in time of crisis (as Kornhauser and others suggest it will)[67] it will be extremism of the right more than of the left.[68]

In such a situation the integrity of the Sokagakkai leadership would be sorely taxed. Completely apart from Gakkai scriptures and structure (the features upon which most critics focus), there are suggestions that the leadership's responsiveness to and claimed personification of public opinion could result in an unprincipled effort to lead opinion farther in the direction of current trends. The Gakkai's connection with Nichiren would make its nationalistic appeal quite credible; it would be doubly dangerous due to the above-mentioned available activist element in the Gakkai.

Thus the Gakkai does not at present appear to be militarily, expansionistically, or xenophobically nationalistic. Organizational and rank-and-file actuality are congruent and organizational ideals are not now utilized for much more than rhetorical legitimatization. But the line between present and potential is rather narrow; an available element does exist, and the raw scriptural material from which a nationalist appeal could be fashioned is right at hand.

The behavior of the Sokagakkai during the period surrounding the expiration in 1970 of the first ten-year period of the United States-Japan Mutual Security Treaty should be instructive as regards the behavior of the Gakkai during times of aroused nationalist sentiment. The leftists plan to stage widespread demonstrations aimed at unilateral Japanese cancellation of the treaty and, considering the present trend of rising nationalist spirit, by 1970 the ability of the Gakkai responsibly to resist extremist pressures and temptations will be adequately tested.

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The Sokagakkai has mixed implications for its sociocultural environment. It is viewed in a largely unfavorable light by its social environment, although the Gakkai works assiduously to improve this image and may be succeeding, at least as concerns the popular conception of the Komeito. The Gakkai performs a beneficial function for Japanese society by relieving certain social strains. It apparently goes far toward instilling an element of order and stability, both behavioral and psychological, in the lives of its members, providing them with basic human gratifications, offering a sense of continuity with the Japanese past, and giving them the opportunity to participate in a largely pluralist organizational structure characterized by trust, mutual responsiveness, open communication, and the possibility of self-realization.

In a society in flux such as Japan's these functions performed by the Gakkai for its members are of benefit to the society as a whole and, considering the probable continuation of many of the strains and even the possible growth of the marginal, strained groups upon which the Gakkai draws and the apparent absence of structural alternatives to the Gakkai, these functions may require further performance by religious groups of the Gakkai's type in the future.

These beneficial functions are not all performed through smooth interaction with the environment. The relationship between the Gakkai and Japanese society has been characterized more often than not by conflict and friction. This does not mean, however, that the relationship is not beneficial for society as a whole; the "gadfly" function in particular performed by the Gakkai and the other new sects *vis-a-vis* other Japanese religious groups may be the catalyst which draws traditional Japanese religion into a meaningful relationship with the Japanese people.

But neither is the relationship wholly beneficial for society. The actual socializing influences exerted by the Gakkai appear to create a socially isolated group of activists, alienated from society and self and available for mobilization to collective action of practically any type. The simple existence of such a group threatens the stability of Japanese society, although behaviorally it remains only potential. The condition of availability does point up, however, the critical position in which the leadership of the Sokagakkai stands: responsible action; the continued proscription of deviance; and perhaps the redefinition of ideal structures, goals, and conceptions of self and secular society would render the Gakkai a valuable actor on the Japanese social scene. However, should the leadership see a need for extreme measures it has the capability to create disturbances which could endanger the stability of the entire society.

The same cruciality of leadership is seen in regard to the phenomenon of Japanese nationalism. It is quite possible that the Sokagakkai, through its ties with Nichiren and its advocacy of totally anti-militarist feelings of national confidence, pride, and integrity, not only aids the development of a healthy sense of national identity but influences the inevitable increase of nationalist sentiment toward non-extremist channels. Nonetheless, there are in Nichiren Shoshu scripture all of the necessary ingredients for expansionist, xenophobic chauvinism; the smoothness of the relationship between the Gakkai and the nationalist aspect of its environment suggests that in a nationalistic atmosphere, should the Gakkai leadership decide on mobilization it could generate collective, even mass, action on a scale much larger than that possible by means of mobilization of the activist minority alone. One might consider congruence of ultranationalist Gakkai appeals and nationalist popular feeling a beneficial relationship between the Gakkai and its social environment; in that during the Second World War chauvinistic sentiment contributed greatly to social stability this is true. However, a beneficial or eufunctional relationship, as used here, is one which contributes to the continued existence of a social system, not just to its short-term stability; in this sense, Japanese ultranationalism was socially extremely pathological and, should the Gakkai fail to live up to its non-chauvinistic ideals, the result could again be profoundly tragic for Japanese society.

NOTES: CHAPTER 24

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3. Yamaguchi Akira, Issenman-nin no Kokoro wo Tsukanda Himitsu: Sokagakkai no Shinri Senryaku, Tokyo, 1967, pp. 130-31.

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20. *Loc. cit*.; see also ch. 13 above.

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25. David Aberle, "A Note on Relative Deprivation Theory as Applied to Millenarian and Other Cult Movements," in *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, supplement 2, 1962, pp. 210-13.

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37. *Ibid*., p. 22.

38. Tsuji Takehisa, "Komeito ni Kihon Seisaku," in *Ekonomisuto*, vol. 43 no. 38, September 7, 1965, p. 53.

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40. NHK Sogo Hoso Bunka Kenkyu-jo, *Rokaritei Kenkyu: Sono Riron to Chosa*, Tokyo, 1967, pp. 5-7.

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42. NHK, *op. cit*., p. 30.

43. Stanley Hoffman, *Le Mouvement Poujade*, Paris, 1956, p. 400.

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45. Although the seizure in all four prefectures in rural Shikoku of 20% of the vote in the 1968 Upper House election is explained partly by the fact that the candidate who based his campaign there, Ninomiya Bunzo, was a Shikoku man.

46. Interview with Nagai Michio, Tokyo Institute of Technology; see also *New York Times*, January 19, 1968: Japan's GNP in 1966 was $91.1 billion; living standard was computed from such indices as housing (floor space per capita), utilities, recreation facilities per capita, transportation facilities, and dietary characteristics.

47. As opposed to Komeito advances: in five urban prefectures with a claimed Sokagakkai membership of 1.3 million the Komeito vote in the 1968 Upper House election was 2.6 million. Which urban elements provided the difference is unknown but the indication is that the Komeito is successfully broadening and secularizing its appeal. See *Asahi Shimbun*, July 17, 1968.

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51. *Ibid*., p. 153.

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66. Ivan Morris, Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan, New York, 1960, p. 414.

67. William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society, Glencoe, 1959, pp. 124ff.

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38

CHAPTER 25

THE SOKAGAKKAI IN JAPANESE POLITICS

In its relationship with its political environment the present thrust of the Sokagakkai's efforts is toward greater harmony and increased acceptance by other actors. The tactics which succeeded in the absolute poverty, acute psychic dislocation, and moral vacuum of the immediate postwar years were no longer valid in the relatively stable and affluent 1960's; moreover, by this time the Gakkai had attained a size and strength (both economic and political) which enabled a less defensive, more confident outlook.[1] Politicization hastened this process; it was also realized that ideal and actuality need not coincide and that in the compromising political arena there were disadvantages in strict exclusivism and in the description at election time of other religions as "heresy."[2]

Accordingly both tactics and policies changed. Policy alterations included the elaboration of the entire platform and the adoption of more concrete proposals regarding local politics. In parliament, pragmatic cooperation has been the rule.

There are indications that this "thaw" has been successful in producing greater harmony in the relationship between the Gakkai and its political environment.[3] The Japanese electorate, generally of the opinion that politicians are dishonest, appears to accept the self-description of Komeito politicians as honest men, whatever it may think of party policy. Many of the Komeito's policies, too, are the sorts of issues which command almost universal concern and the Komeito's stand on each reflects majority opinion. The gradually increasing nationwide Komeito vote (especially where the vote exceeds claimed Gakkai membership in that area)[4] indicates also that the Gakkai is becoming politically more congruent with its environment, although the connection between Gakkai and Komeito is probably still an obstacle in the road to greater popular acceptance of the Komeito.

Apart from ideological dissonance, the activities of the Komeito also produce friction in the Japanese political system. The expansion of the Sokagakkai into the suburban sector of society has changed the nature of its opposition; what was once largely a religious confrontation with other sects which drew upon the urban lower and lower-middle class has become in part a competition with other political parties for the electoral support of the new urban and suburban middle class.[5] Komeito inroads have aroused the Communist Party in particular; the JCP magazine Vanguard (Zen'ei) carries scathing attacks on the Gakkai and Komeito which seem in no way warranted by the treatment received by the communists in Gakkai media.[6]

Gakkai organizational activities have also created friction. As noted, in several instances the political activities of Gakkai-member unionists have led to court cases where the right of free political expression has been upheld. The political conflict with labor unions, of which these cases are one manifestation, will almost certainly be exacerbated by the Gakkai's creation of its own union and subsequent competition for members.

In parliament, too, disharmony has occurred. Komeito representatives, claiming inexperience, have demonstrated a disregard for certain precedents and points of etiquette which smooth relations between legislators,[7] and increasing oppositionism will certainly produce more acrimonious debates in parliament and, as the Komeito increases its power throughout the nation, more possibilities for disruption of the parliamentary process.

In one respect, however, the policy-oriented oppositionism of the Komeito will decrease friction with the environment by enabling more confident expectations by other political actors regarding the Komeito. At present, Japanese observers seem obsessed with a desire to pin the Komeito somewhere on a right-left political spectrum and they are distrustful of any political group which frustrates this desire.

The standards against which the Gakkai and Komeito are measured are, basically, orthodox Marxism on the left and "fascism" on the right; though internally consistent, the Komeito's policies are highly contradictory when compared against either of these two models. The Gakkai dismisses such "contradictions"; in Ikeda's words:

> We need not be bound with such labels as "rightist," "leftist," or "reactionary." As we are constructing and advancing along a road unprecedented in past history, it is quite natural that no one can understand it.[8]

The Gakkai asserts both the obsolescence of traditional political clichés and the greater utility of a political spectrum running between moderation and extremism;[9] Japanese political observers, however, are wedded to a right-left political continuum and their intolerance of ambiguity leads to friction in their relationships with the Sokagakkai.

This friction is often felt much more by intellectuals and so-called "political commentators" than by the political actors who must deal directly with the Komeito in and out of parliament. As in its relationship with the general electorate, the Gakkai's relationship with the intelligentsia is characterized by conflict; on the extraparliamentary organizational level, too, disharmony is the rule. On the intraparliamentary organizational level of the political system, however, the relationship between the Gakkai and its fellow political actors seems to be characterized on the whole by harmony.

A. The Present Relationship with the Environment

1. Systemic Eufunctions

The Sokagakkai's political relationship with its environment is similarly often conflictual, but still in certain respects contributory to the stability of the Japanese polity as a democratic system. According to Harry Eckstein,

> A government will tend to be stable if its authority pattern /that is, its attitudes toward, and practices and applications of authority/ is congruent with the other authority patterns of the society of which it is a part.[10]

In other words, democratic authority patterns in non-governmental organizations are supportive of democratic political systems. Despite drawbacks, the actual organizational experience gained by members of the Sokagakkai is in many ways more democratic than the experience offered by most Japanese organizations. High but mediated access to attentive and responsive elites, opportunity for two-way communication and for articulation and self-expression, and application of authority at least in part as the response to majority opinion are not striking features of most Japanese organizations, but the Sokagakkai does provide a socialization into these democratic political patterns. Moreover, it provides this socialization for those social elements otherwise least likely to experience such a process: the less-educated, unorganized, relatively poor urbanites.

In other words, Gakkai membership is a means by which otherwise voiceless elements of the Japanese electorate achieve political significance. As mentioned above, political activism is not necessarily always beneficial for a democracy, nor is all apathy bad for such a system;

> It certainly is not clear that increased participation without an appropriate background of interest and involvement benefits either the participant himself or the society of which he is a member.[11]

But, on the other hand,

> in the infinitely complex series of events which cause a society to move toward even mildly authoritarian patterns, the failure of these groups to exercise political power may be more dangerous than any political success they might have.[12]

The Gakkai, by "attaching" to the political system heretofore inarticulate social groups which evince a marked degree of alienation, is in precisely the delicate position suggested by the above quotation. Apart from the moral judgment that participation is the right of all in a democracy and thus a good in itself, the dangers inherent in excluding a large number of persons from the political process suggest that the Gakkai's attaching (i.e., politicizing) function is beneficial for the Japanese political system.

In addition, the ideal position taken so vociferously (if abstractly) by the Gakkai regarding the constitution and the democratic values therein is definitely beneficial. General "system affect," a diffuse allegiance to the polity *per se* apart from its performance, is a form of "capital" upon which a government can rely when actual performance is low; where such affect is weak a government is much more dependent upon efficient performance in its efforts to keep its popular support and if performance declines such a government becomes much more unstable than a regime which enjoys a high degree of inherent legitimacy in the eyes of its public.[13] Such system affect is only incompletely developed in Japan; in surveys taken since the end of the war the proportion of respondents which positively supports either the constitution or the unconditional guarantee of civil liberties seldom approaches a majority.[14] And when

> the Socialist party readily repudiates parliamentary process and retaliatory violence bursts out among ultranationalists, the general public stands apathetically by. One suspects that the average citizen has only a fleeting concept of his responsibility to the democratic state.[15]

In such a situation the constitutional, participatory, and democratic ideals of the Gakkai have a potentially beneficial role to perform. The actual provision of an introductory and responsive political structure, the Citizens' Discussion Centers, may also contribute to a lessening of the alienation from the present parties and regime which is felt by many Japanese.[16] And alienation, especially among Gakkai members, may be influenced by an additional actual example: the activity of the Komeito as it interacts cooperatively and openly with the other actors in the parliamentary arena.

This non-deviant example may be reinforced by the Sokagakkai; the need-fulfillment function of the zadankai reduces the overall frustration of the individual, making aggressive behavior less likely even though alienation may persist, while activation and behavioral stabilization render the peculiarly mass form of political behavior less likely.

The organizational aggressiveness which typifies the Gakkai, though it creates a conflictual relationship with the Gakkai's environment, is also beneficial in certain ways for the Japanese polity. In particular, the muckraker and gadfly roles of the Gakkai are significant.

It is perhaps unavoidable that scandals should accompany uninterrupted national rule for almost 20 years by any single group. The reign of the Liberal Democrats in Japan has been marred by numerous scandals, culminating in the popularly-termed "black mist" period of 1966 when a string of irregularities over the preceding two years resulted in general excoriation of the LDP by the mass media. It is impossible to determine the effect which the constant investigations, accusations, and revelations of illegality and irregularity made by the Komeito have had upon the conduct of Japanese politicians; there is a widespread opinion that this muckraking has in fact made the LDP more careful and the role of the Komeito in supposedly keeping the politicians honest is appreciated.

The gadfly role of the Gakkai has its strictly political and religious-political aspects. The success and scope of the Citizens' Discussion Centers have spurred similar efforts by the other parties. Except for the Komeito there is no real popularly-based political party in Japan; if the other parties can succeed in drawing larger numbers of the public into active participation in the political system one might hope that the present lack of confidence or trust in the system might be assuaged.

The Sokagakkai stimulus may also draw into the social and political systems otherwise moribund religious groups. Political interest by religious organizations is nothing new in Japan; State Shinto is the most recent example of a direct sect-state tie, while several of the new religions have run candidates of their own in more modest attempts to achieve representation for their narrow interests in parliament.[17] A broad program of political education or even of social concern, however, was largely lacking until other religious groups began to see the Sokagakkai as a distinctly political threat.

The Buddhist Political League (Bukkyo Seiji Domei) was established in 1964, followed in 1965 by the Current Affairs Policy Conference of Religionists (Jikyoku Taisaku Shukyosha Kaigi), an amalgam of new and traditional sects committed to countering Gakkai political influence.[18] In 1966 the Union of New Japanese Religious Groups, a fifteen-year-old union of some 90 new religions claiming 7 million adherents, created its own political union, and in 1967 the Nishi Honganji, one of the largest traditional Buddhist organizations, established a Current Affairs Association (Jiji Kyokai).[19]

None of these organizations, or numerous similar but smaller ones, has attempted to organize its own political party. For the most part they restrict themselves to the recommendation of candidates and to efforts to mobilize their adherents electorally in support of these candidates.[20] Since they only recommend candidates already nominated by parties they have no claim on the representatives elected; therefore, although they can cite considerable success in terms of the proportion of recommendees elected they do not in fact command any bloc of votes in any assembly as does the Komeito. For instance, Prime Minister Sato is a follower of the Nishi Honganji,[21] but he is no more that sect's representative in the Japanese government than President John F. Kennedy was the representative of the Roman Catholic Church in Washington.

The new relevance of these religious groups is not an unalloyed benefit for the Japanese political system. There are signs that the established parties are choosing candidates with religious bloc votes in mind, courting politicized religious groups, and even assisting in the creation of such groups.[22] The possibility that religious organizations might become mere appendages of the parties is not particularly enjoyable to contemplate. Nevertheless, any process which renders Japanese religion more relevant to the postwar era must be considered, in a time when Japan is still "in search of her soul," to be of benefit to the nation;[23] and if, in the words of one leader of the Honganji's _Jiji Kyokai_, it is possible to "break the shell of the established religions and take a step out into society."[24] an important causative agent in this process will have been the Sokagakkai.

2. Systemic Dysfunctions

But if the new politicization of Japanese religion results in a reinforcement of political cleavages by religious ones, much influence must again be attributed to the Sokagakkai. While the actual structure through which the membership participates has notable pluralist and democratic aspects, the ideal structure is of a possibly totalitarian nature, featuring a wholly inclusive relationship with the individual member. It appears that a sizable number of socially unattached and therefore potentially available activists has been created in the organization and this availability is itself an ideal of the Gakkai.

The actual alienating effect of socialization into the Sokagakkai has also been discussed. The muckraking and criticism which can contribute to the honesty of the system through their influence upon the general public may in fact play an even more important role by aggravating what feelings of political alienation may already be felt by the Gakkai's members. The extreme simplism of many Gakkai interpretations and explanations, in addition to exacerbating self-alienation, may contribute further to alienation by denigrating the causative processes which do in fact determine the phenomena of the social and political systems.

In specifically political orientations the destabilizing influence of the Gakkai upon the Japanese polity may again be seen. Although the organization speaks out in support of the Constitution the membership is markedly unsympathetic toward the constitution and notably ambiguous in its orientations toward democratic principles. The organization reflects this latter ambiguity and one must acknowledge the validity of the fears of those who profess to see in the Gakkai a cabal of totalitarians intent upon eradicating all dissent, heresy, and heretics from Japan by whatever means. In the absence of clarity the possibility also exists that undemocratic elements can find a convenient niche in the Gakkai.

B. The Future Relationship with the Environment

Whatever threats the Sokagakkai poses to its political environment are potential. Scripture embodies a set of utopian, millenarian goals and the justification for their pursuit by extreme means; the Gakkai membership contains a number of available people. A transfer of emphasis by the

Gakkai leadership to the more remote and extreme ideals sanctioned by scripture could bring about a real pursuit of the millennium by several hundred thousand Japanese.

Such a change would bring about greater congruence of ideal and actual by changing the actual; a similarly extreme outcome might result if ideal socializing influences were changed. In particular, if the Gakkai's ideal orientation toward system alienation, social unattachment, and certain of the elements of the "democratic formula" became more manifestly and intentionally similar to the largely latent and partially unintended actual orientations discernable, a degree of availability for mobilization to mass behavior much in excess of the present condition could be created.

The primary factors in the Gakkai's undemocratic potential are activist availability and leadership choice. The number of persons which the Gakkai could mobilize for direct action would probably vary with the issue at hand; in any case the group which could be mobilized for almost any organizationally-sanctioned end amounts to perhaps half a million people.

The possibility of mass behavior, however, depends also upon mobilization by the Gakkai elite, something not yet attempted. The moderate political course pursued by the Gakkai for several years has not been so explicitly congruent with certain Gakkai ideological and operational characteristics that one may hold firm expectations regarding future behavior. Reservations may be held concerning the firmness of principle of the Gakkai leadership under certain conditions; nevertheless, insofar as recent behavior and the impressions gained from extended contacts with Gakkai leaders are reliable indicators, one is entitled to assume that the leadership's choice will be responsible.

There are, in addition to this assumption, other potentially beneficial influences which the Gakkai may exert upon its political environment. A doctrinal shift in ideals and actualities could be detrimental to Japan's effort to build a democratic polity, but a reverse shift--recognition and amelioration of the alienating and isolating effects of latent socializing influences--could contribute to the stability of the polity.

A further deliberate elite choice which could benefit the political environment is explicit support for the principles of democracy, in particular minority rights. It is perhaps too much to expect a religious organization actually to operate on the principle of majoritarianism, especially where the leader has the type of charisma of which Ikeda is possessed; in a political system such as Japan's, where the ruling party is occasionally inclined to use its parliamentary majority to bludgeon its opposition, uncritical support for majoritarianism may signify more naiveté than intelligent democratic spirit. Thus the Gakkai's conditional acceptance of majoritarianism, while contravening an abstract principle of democracy, is not, in the concrete Japanese context, necessarily an evil influence. The majoritarian element in the Gakkai could be made more explicit to the members but even Ikeda's incessant attacks upon charismatic allegiance are of some benefit.

The present road along which the Gakkai is seemingly traveling also appears to contain an element of deliberate harmonization with the Japanese context. Such a process might ultimately lead to non-Gakkai Komeito members and candidates, the attraction of great numbers of non-Gakkai voters, and the participation of the Komeito in a coalition cabinet. One might consider the candidacy of Abe Ken'ichi in the 1967 Tokyo gubernatorial election and the campaign plans for the next general election[25] as important steps in this process: the Gakkai has explicitly begun entering contests which it knows it cannot win; the Society apparently feels either that political failure has no adverse effect upon members' faith or that the exigencies of secular politics outweigh any such effect. If the former is true, it signifies that the Gakkai has matured to the point where it need not rely upon purported divine omnipotence for electoral success; if the latter, then the elite at least has decided that politics are more important than doctrinal purity.

This contrast of politics and purity symbolizes a larger problem which the Gakkai faces now and in the future, that of reconciliation of adaptation to the external envionment with internal integration. The "thaw" which portends responsible social, religious, and political action may necessitate such a compromise of doctrinal principle that the internal cohesion of the Society may disintegrate. Thus internal considerations of unity may place a limit upon the degree to which the "thaw" can be pursued and will thus have an influence upon the significance of the Sokagakkai for its environment apart from the external "eufunctions" and "dysfunctions" discussed in this chapter.

NOTES: CHAPTER 25

1. Kasahara Kazuo, Seiji to Shukyo, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 219-20; Chugai Nippo, March 26, 1963.

2. Chugai Nippo, March 26, 1963; interview with Joseph Spae, Oriens Institute, Tokyo.

3. In two Tokyo polls by the Asahi Shimbun in April 1967 and March 1968 the percentage of respondents professing dislike for the Komeito fell from 33.9% to 18.6% (see Okabe especially Okabe Keizo, "Seron-mushi no Jimin-to ga Naze Tsuyoi?" in Asahi Janaru, June 23, 1968, p. 49). The similar percentage in a national survey of late 1966 was already down to 14.1% (unpub. data from Sidney Verba et al., Cross-National Study of Political and Social Change).

4. Asahi Shimbun, July 17, 1968.

5. Takase Hiroi, "Ikeda Daisaku Shu-in Rikkoho no Haikei," in Gendai no Me, vol. 8 no. 11, November 1967, pp. 195-96.

6. Miyamori Shigeru, "Sangi-in Senkyo to Kaku To Hihan," in Zen'ei, no. 238, July 1965, p. 170; Saki Akio, "Komeito no Seisaku wo Hihan suru," in Zen'ei, no. 238, July 1965, p. 199.

7. "Komeito 'Shiroto' Giindan Genkoroku," in Shukan Yomiuri, April 14, 1967, pp. 16-17.

8. World Tribune, August 28, 1965.

9. Interview with Akiyama Tomiya, Chief, Sokagakkai Public Relations Bureau.

10. Harry Eckstein, *Division and Cohesion in Democracy*, Princeton, 1966.

11. Robert Lane, *Political Life*, Glencoe, 1959, p. 343.

12. *Loc. cit*.

13. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, Boston, 1965, pp. 364-65.

14. Nobutaka Ike, "An Experiment in Political Forecasting: Japan, 1965-75," unpub. paper, Stanford University, 1966, p. 24; unpub. data from 1965 Japanese government survey of popular attitudes toward the Constitution.

15. William Lockwood, chapter in Robert Ward and Dankwart Rustow, *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, Princeton, 1964, p. 144.

16. Ike, *op. cit*., pp. 24-26.

17. Murakami Shigeyoshi in Takahashi Kazumi, "Shinko no Seiji Rikigaku," in *Gendai no Me*, vol. 8 no. 4, April 1967, p. 80; Ivan Morris, *Nationalism and the Right Wing in Japan*, New York, 1960, pp. 141-42.

18. Alfred Bloom, "Observations in the Study of Contemporary Nichiren Buddhism," in *Comtemporary Religions in Japan*, vol. 6 no. 1, March 1965, p. 64; "Komeito ni Idomu to Iu Nishi Honganji no Ito," in *Shukan Gendai*, vol. 9 no. 21, June 1, 1967, p. 21.

19. *Japan Times International Edition*, November 13, 1965; Shumu Jiho, no. 14, January 1967, p. 12; "Komeito ni Idomu . . .," pp. 16-17.

20. *Asahi Shimbun*, July 5, 1967.

21. "Komeito ni Idomu . . .," p. 17.

22. *Asahi Shimbun*, February 24, 25, 1967; "Komeito ni Idomu . . .," p. 21.

23. Joseph Spae, "Japan in Search of Her Soul," Tokyo, 1967, passim.

24. "Komeito ni Idomu . . .," p. 17.

25. *Japan Times International Edition*, September 7, 1968.

CHAPTER 26

INTERNAL PROCESSES: PROBLEMS AND POSSIBILITIES

A. Adaptation

The adaptation of the Sokagakkai to its environment (especially by gaining new converts therefrom), is one of the most important factors determining the nature of the Society's relationships with that environment. All of the Gakkai's efforts to create a particular relationship between itself and its context are adaptive, as are some of the most significant problems which the Gakkai will face.

The success of the Gakkai in adapting to its environment may be gauged in several ways: the proportion of the Japanese population which can be won over to conversion, the votes garnered by the Komeito, and the actual approximation of the Society's relationships with other social, religious, and political actors to its relevant ideals. One may discern a current goal of greater and smoother integration with Japanese society. The degree of success attained to date in the pursuit of this goal has been discussed; in this chapter we shall discuss the significant internal implications of the goal.

Some balance must be struck between the necessity for adaptation and integrity.[1] Internal integrity, or integration, requires a certain degree of doctrinal purity and exclusivism; however, the particular doctrines espoused by the Gakkai -- or perhaps religious principle in general -- will if overemphasized lead in Japan more to conflict than to harmony. Especially at this point in time, when the Gakkai may already have almost fully exploited those social elements most amenable to an exclusivist and doctrinaire approach, it appears that the failure to stress smooth adaptation can lead only hinder propagation.

If adaptation is overstressed, however, the resultant loss of integrity and identity could have damaging consequences for the internal cohesion of the Gakkai. The more the distance between the Gakkai and its environment is diminished and the less unique Gakkai goals and beliefs become, the less reason there is for joining, and the less the membership will feel committed to some special organization. Greater proximity to the social context might initially increase propagation achievements; however, conversion would signify even less commitment than it does at present and the resulting strain upon the socializing agencies of the Gakkai might prove unbearable. In addition, the image of the Gakkai held by the general public might in improving lose that special identity which leads people to join.

The Gakkai is a social movement, a response to certain strains and conditions present in the Japanese social and religious systems. In order fully and adequately to respond to these strains and conditions the Gakkai must embody certain teachings, such as divine benefit, which conflict with certain other of the conditions prevalent in modern society. To the degree that it disavows supernatural agencies of assistance, simplism, and exclusivism the Gakkai will become more like its total environment but less like a social movement, a revitalizing response to a situation of social strain. Such a change might lead to greater appeal, but the Gakkai has always been concerned with quality as well as quantity in its membership and it is probable that at some point the leadership would act to arrest a process which seems calculated to improve quantity to the severe detriment of quality. The point at which accommodation must be curtailed cannot be known precisely, but the speculation made above that declining growth rates signify the saturation of certain social elements most susceptible to mobilization by social movements suggests that a decision will have to be made in the relatively near future regarding the widening of appeals.

One means by which the Sokagakkai's appeal is broadened is politics. Although the replacement of the religious focus by a political one would change the appeal and the nature of the Sokagakkai greatly,[2] the coexistence of political and religious foci is (it was suggested in Chapter 2) one of the basic reasons for the relative success of the Gakkai among the Japanese new religions. Secularization and moderation in style and attitude, nationalism and welfarism in ideology are features well calculated to create a broad appeal and such breadth is an explicit Komeito goal: the creation of great numbers of non-Gakkai member Komeito supporters such as those suggested by the results of the 1968 Upper House election is one of the prerequisites for achievement of the party's goal of becoming the number two party within ten years.[3]

However, it has been suggested that one of the greatest obstacles blocking the efforts of the Komeito to capitalize on the inherent appeal of its platform is its connection in the popular mind with the Sokagakkai. In order to overcome this obstacle either the Gakkai must become fully acceptable to the broad Japanese public (a condition which has implications detrimental to the internal integration of the Gakkai) or the Komeito must sever even more completely its relations with the Gakkai.

Such a separation could take two forms: ideological and operational. The ideological is of less importance, since Komeito media are already almost exclusively secular and even references to the Gakkai are uncommon. The doctrinal tie is obvious to any Gakkai member but, if separated from other aspects of the relationship, would probably not be noticed by the majority of the Japanese electorate. Operational separation, on the other hand, could have serious repercussions upon the Gakkai's internal condition.

The unique blend of politics and religion which the Gakkai offers may be, in a nation at Japan's stage of development, of crucial importance in attracting converts. But if the Komeito were to disavow certain Gakkai tenets or cooperate with other political forces so closely as to obscure the essential unity of party and Gakkai the utility of the Komeito as an arm of the Gakkai could be seriously impaired. The Gakkai explicitly sanctions political expediency; however, just how legitimate collusion with other parties appears to the average member is difficult to determine. The social openness evinced by the rank-and-file suggests that extensive compromise is feasible but certain moves may be beyond this feasibility. One such might be the joint backing of candidates with other parties. It was rumored that Gakkai backing of conservative candidate Azuma Ryutaro in the 1963 Tokyo gubernatorial election aroused considerable opposition among the younger and more leftist leadership;[4] this story is apocryphal but some of the reasons given by the Komeito for the independent candidacy of Abe Ken'ichi in the 1967 election suggest that considerations of internal unity may have been a factor in the rejection of all other parties' candidates.

Selection of a non-Gakkai member as a Komeito candidate would be a similarly adaptive move, but here again chances seem slim at present. The flexibility shown by the Gakkai in dropping the religious High Sanctuary from its platform and the ease with which it repudiated previous stands against politicization and then against any move into the Lower House connote a high degree of pragmatic adaptivity, but whether the votes gained by a non-Gakkai candidate would offset the detrimental effect of substantively merging with the environment is dubious.

Other aspects of the Sokagakkai have latent effects upon the adaptation of the organization to the environment. One such is the autonomy of the *zadankai*. The inherent ability of the *zadankai* to fulfill important human needs quite likely plays a significant adaptive role regardless of doctrinal changes. The maintenance of social ties by members no doubt facilitate the type of relationships which can be taken advantage of in *shakubuku*, especially in the newer, moderate form of *shakubuku*. The tolerance and openness evinced by members exceeds that shown by the organization; this may not (as in the case of hesitance to proselyte) contribute to recruitment of new members but the example of a socially non-deviant membership will, with time, probably make an impression upon the general public which will make easier realization of other of the Gakkai's goals. But the primary adaptive problem concerns the degree of adaptation which is compatible with organizational and doctrinal integrity and identity.

B. Socialization

The present adaptive trends discernable in the Sokagakkai indicate that future influences upon the Gakkai socialization process will be in the direction of more autonomous and perhaps easier dissemination of ideal patterns of thought and behavior. Excessive mobilization for elections, propagation, or other projects cuts down on the time available for study and other aspects of the socialization process; the balance between periods of shakubuku and study struck in the last few years seems calculated to guard against insufficient allowance of time for socialization and consolidation.

More autonomous and decentralized socialization than is at present possible will be provided by the family as the Gakkai grows older. If ideals are instilled in childhood the chances that at least nominal faith will be maintained throughout adult life are increased, although the cultural tolerance typical of the Japanese may be manifested much more strongly when the family is free to influence young believers than is presently the case. Thus one might expect a more stable but less enthusiastic and exclusivistic socialization process to emerge which might lead the Gakkai in the direction of a denominational form of religious organization.[5] On the other hand, Gakkai ideals may enter the formal educational process of believers who attend the Soka Schools, despite Gakkai denials. Such socializing influences may well lead to the creation of a highly-indoctrinated elite.

The effect of both of these developments will be the increased significance of what Gerhard Lenski calls the "communal" aspect of religion, the quality of the congregation as a social collectivity. The parochializing and rigidifying effects exerted by such religious gemeinschaften should be recalled,[6] although the state of comparative studies of religion is such that no generalization from the American to the Japanese context is possible here.

The only generalization possible is temporal: the Sokagakkai as an organization (aside from its educational subsidiary, the Soka Schools) will probably be able to cut its formal socialization effort once familial socialization becomes more developed; however, if this less militant and less exclusivistic socialization process leads to a more lackadaisical and tolerant outlook than the Gakkai leadership feels that it can tolerate, then a doctrinaire reaction which could drive out a large proportion of the membership might ensue. In the short run, though, prospects for familial socialization appear to be roughly congruent with the apparent official attitude toward socialization.

The formal structures of the Gakkai, too, contribute to a congruence of membership patterns and official ideals. Vertical and horizontal line organizations, peer and interest groups all impinge upon the believer from different directions and each approaches him with different facets of Gakkai doctrine. There are two exceptions to this general condition; first, the overall socialization process seems to contain considerably more influences toward alienation than either are known to the Gakkai or are congruent with its ideals. Second, the zadankai does not seem to be the comprehensive socialization structure ideally envisioned by the Sokagakkai. The zadankai undoubtedly does conduce to conformity by its members to the more overt forms of belief: recitation of prayers, professions of faith, presentation of testimonials, enthusiastic agreement with others, and shakubuku. However, just how much of the zadankai's influence works toward greater personal commitment to the larger Gakkai organization and its more remote religious goals is open to question. The fact remains that the defection rate in the Gakkai is 50 percent or more and that the socialization structures are apparently not adequate to their task. Perhaps the assumption of a considerable proportion of the pattern-maintenance function by the family will improve the quality of socialization in terms of stability of membership; it will most probably change it qualitatively in the direction of greater relaxation, but this is the direction in which the leadership may in fact be tending also.

C. Achievement of Objectives

The principal difficulties which the Sokagakkai encounters in the attainment of its goals lie in the area of mobilization of the membership. These difficulties are actual: the faithful can be aroused neither to universal propagation, nor to universal support for the Komeito, nor even to universal attendance at Gakkai functions and acceptance of Gakkai communications media. They are also potential: the probability is high that if the Sokagakkai tried today to mobilize the membership along a course of mass political behavior only a small minority would respond.

As the present moderating trend continues one might assume that goals in general, by requiring less deviant action, will become easier to achieve; as indoctrination becomes more a part of the childhood socialization experience one migh expect that generalized commitment will become more stable, although mobilization for activist or mass behavior may become more difficult.

In addition to these characteristics of the rank-and-file, difficulties may arise between membership and leadership. The autonomy of the kumi and han is one such point. One might expect that if individual kumi and han were ordered from above to mobilize their members for mass action each would be able, playing upon the individual loyalty to the small group of each individual member, to mobilize a considerable proportion of its membership. If a majority of the members of each kumi were activists, then this might be possible. It appears, rather, that too few persons in any one small group are sufficiently active to be able to impose activist norms upon the rest of the group; leaders may criticize poor turnout but the vast majority of the followers appear to accept informal norms dictating no more than regular attendance at zadankai, and some 50 percent apparently do not even consider regularity necessary.

At the top of the Sokagakkai, too, there are potential trouble-spots in the goal-attainment process. One of these has to do with the quality of leadership: President Ikeda exercises essentially one-man rule which may be unfeasible in an organization of the Gakkai's size; delegation of authority, however, puts great responsibility in the hands of men quite possibly less able than he. Ikeda's stature probably stifles criticism, thus making change difficult. Subordinate autonomy has invited such blunders as the Tokyo ward elections of 1967; Ikeda as much as admitted that his lieutenants left much to be desired when he stated after these elections that henceforth he would himself choose candidates. The abilities of Ikeda may well place limits on the development of the Sokagakkai; the Society has been surpassingly fortunate in its leadership succession and, although there is no reason to expect a succession crisis to follow Ikeda's incumbency, there is neither any reason to expect that the next president will be his equal.

The area of political activity is a fertile one for the appearance of problems. As the Gakkai's political activities become more extensive the chances increase that persons of incompetence or dishonesty will be elected to office as Komeito representatives.[7] The fund of leadership-caliber personnel in the Gakkai is limited. Whether or not the number of qualified candidates available will impose restrictions upon the parliamentary growth of the Komeito is not known; a greater problem concerns the adequacy of the leadership of the Sokagakkai itself: what would be the consequences of an increasingly large elite composed in part by relatively inept persons?

As in the case of adaptation, problems of attainement of objectives relate to the area of internal integration: with organizational growth how is the degree of integration necessary for efficient operation to be maintained? And how is the necessity of organizational integration to be reconciled with the present trend toward greater politicization, with all of the compromise and adaptation it requires? Objectives necessitate adaptation, but too much adaptation may appear as schism-producing heresy.

D. Internal Integration

The Sokagakkai is without a doubt the largest and best integrated organization to appear in all of Japanese history. Even the presurrender Imperial armed forces could not maintain the unity which characterizes the Gakkai. A seeming cultural predilection for factionalism, fed by the preference for small group contexts over bureaucratized, impersonally organized relationships, contributes to internal division in large social collectivities of all types in Japan; in this setting the continued high integration of the Soka-gakkai is almost incredible.

Because of this incredibility, internal divisions are expected by observers; the present writer acknowledges that, although the Gakkai's integrative subsystem seems to be functioning with relative efficiency at present, in a cultural context such as Japan's any temporary breakdown could lead to irreparable schism. The personality of President Ikeda, the belief system, and the organizational structure (especially the vertical line, an adroit incorporation of small-group relationships into the formal structure) all contribute to the unity of the Society; the forms of integration (i.e., the reasons for commitment) need not all be contributory to the attainment of official goals, but they do at least add up to an astounding degree of organizational cohesion. Breakdown in any of these areas could lead to the appearance of pro- and anti-Ikeda factions, numerous varieties of doctrinal factions, or functional or regional division.

1. Individual Malintegration

Aside from factionalism, individual malintegration is also a problem; in terms of magnitude it is at present the larger. Great numbers of the faithful defect, at least in terms of attendance and professed commitment. Many, no doubt, join in the hope of remedying a specific problem; either long and fruitless effort or successful remedy may eliminate motivation with apostasy the result. The failure of divine benefit to accrue to worship is probably one of the major causes of rank-and-file defection; the unrelenting pressure to achieve goals and mobilize one's followers is the typical cause of defection among leaders.

The tension under which the leaders operate is intense. They receive no pay and must hold jobs in addition to their Gakkai duties, necessitating sacrifice of nearly all of their spare time for organizational activities. The accounts of apostate leaders indicate that this strain and tension are primary reasons for defection.[8] Even the Gakkai recognizes the problems of malintegration and defection; official media now use the term taiten (defection, apostasy) with moderate frequency[9] and President Ikeda has found it necessary to speak on the subject:

> There are former leaders of the Sokagakkai who have forsaken their faith and have brought forth harsh and unjust criticisms against this religious organization. This is a horrible thing. . . .[10]
>
> You /High School Division members/ will surely grow up to be leaders of Japan and of the world but, at that time, you must not forget the Gohonzon and the Sokagakkai. The sin of those who once believe Nichiren's Buddhism and then begin to criticize it is the deepest of all.[11]

As the Gakkai grows and activities proliferate, while the social strata most susceptible to shakubuku become saturated, the tension upon leaders and rank-and-file alike will grow. One may assume that only constant mobilization has kept Gakkai numbers growing; relaxation might create a situation where backsliders outnumber converts, but continued constant mobilization could produce increased malintegration. The key to this problem may be the family; if mobilization continues until the rate of recruitment and socialization by the family matches that of defection then the pressure to proselyte and teach could be relaxed. The most significant indicator of the degree to which the family is assuming the recruitment and socialization function is the Boys' and Girls' Division (*Shonen-bu*): the rate of growth of the *Shonen-bu*, if compared with the claimed rates of growth by *shakubuku* and the defection rate as estimated from comparison of the various indices of Gakkai size discussed above, could give some indication of the proximity of the point at which *shakubuku* could be relaxed with no consequent decrease in membership. Again, the type of believer produced by the intrafamilial recruitment and socialization process might not be sufficiently militant to persuade the leadership that *shakubuku* might be safely relaxed; nevertheless, present organizational trends suggest that the future will see more familial socialization, more subsequent moderation, and less defection of members due to pressure or to instrumental dissatisfaction with the faith (this last presupposes that instrumental motives will come to play a smaller role in conversion and thus be less a factor in the Gakkai overall).

Another form of integrative problem is that of opportunist, dishonest, or otherwise insincere members, referred to rather poetically by the Gakkai as "worms in the bowels of a lion (shishi shinchu no mushi)."[12] Such persons are those who try to use the Gakkai organization to their own ends (such as considering the membership as a potential business clientele or bloc of votes), who try to achieve high rank simply to satisfy a greed for status, or who worship solely with narrow personal benefit in mind.[13]

A specific type of "worm" singled out for attack is the member who plays upon Gakkai ties in order to borrow money. This problem is often mentioned, suggesting that it is a persistent one;[14] there is at present an absolute ban on all loans of money between Gakkai members. The sanctions imposed on such violations include excommunication; preventive measures consist largely of symbolic sanctions, the explicit promise of dire divine punishment.[15] The relative infrequency with which penalties are mentioned in Gakkai media suggests that this form of integrative problem is numerically a minor one. The relevance of such incidents for the Gakkai's public image (especially where the member's misbehavior is criminal) is much greater, but the Gakkai seems to be quite successful in preventing such cases.

2. Internal Division

There are three areas in which internal schism could strike the Sokagakkai: within the Gakkai itself; between the Gakkai and the Komeito; and within the Komeito. The first type is often spoken of as one manifestation of shishi shinchu no mushi: persons who endeavor to create cliques of their own, especially among their own converts in the vertical line.[16] Specific reference to factionalism of this type indicates that on occasion it has been a problem; nevertheless, the major threats of division are to be found elsewhere: in relationships to leaders; in educational differences; and in the reconciliation of adaptation and integration.

Various observers have asserted the existence of groups ("factions" is definitely too strong a word) oriented relatively strongly to Presidents Makiguchi, Toda, and Ikeda respectively, ties augmented by strong age correlations. A tacit distribution of posts among the various membership groups--by function, age, interest, or education--is quite possible; it is even possible that such a distribution is an important element in the prevention of factionalism. But if such is the case, then this type of division seems to present relatively little threat for the future: with organizational growth there will certainly be no dearth of posts with which to keep all at least relatively satisfied; and, with each year, the "followers" of President Ikeda will become relatively more numerous as the older leaders die out.

Nevertheless, the Gakkai does take specific steps to prevent factionalism on the basis of personal allegiance. The manner of selection of Ikeda Daisaku as president was fashioned to avoid cleavage: he was not imposed upon the organization but chosen through "contextual consensus," a tacit recognition built up over several years based upon universal knowledge of President Toda's special evaluation of Ikeda.[17]

Ikeda's treatment of himself is also calculated to prevent schism. He considers himself and all members of the Gakkai without exception to be mere mortals; there is absolutely no doctrinal sanction for personal revelation or personalized divinity. Japanese religions have shown themselves to be particularly prone to this form of split and the investment of Ikeda with quasi-divine properties by some of the members suggests that the Japanese tenedency to blur the line between human religious leaders and their divine sources of legitimacy cannot be entirely eliminated. But the spread of such docetism to other individuals in the organization has been successfully circumvented and will probably continue to be so.

Schism along educational lines is a greater likelihood than that along personal ones. The Gakkai tries most assiduously, for reasons of both elite recruitment and harmonization of relations with the social environment, to attract students and intellectuals; it is reasonable to expect that if and insofar as they are successful, these more able elements will gravitate through the Gakkai's merit system to the top posts. If this happens the chances are good that the intellectual element, as has long been the case with the Japanese intelligentsia, will become aloof from the masses who constitute the bulk of the membership; the consequences for internal communication, responsiveness, mobility, and consequently cohesion are easy to imagine.

It is possible that divisions of this type are already appearing. The younger leadership elements of the Gakkai and Komeito are better educated than their elders,[18] and Ikeda is increasingly explicit in his suggestions that future leaders of the Gakkai come from the Student Division. It is perhaps significant that one ex-leader, in criticizing internal Gakkai procedures, complained that persons with a poor educational record had little chance of being appointed to high office.[19] The exigencies of efficient operation necessitate the greatest possible capability in Gakkai leaders; however, if efficiency is overemphasized at the expense of fraternity and symbolic rewards for all, regardless of formal education, the resulting cleavages could destroy the Sokagakkai's unity.

The proper balance of principle and pragmatism, of purity and flexibility is a difficult one to strike; since the Gakkai appears to have opted for greater adaptation in the short run it is only a matter of time before the problem must be met. If it is not overtly "met," and if present

Gakkai trends and prevalent Japanese social and economic conditions prevail, one may expect the Sokagakkai doctrinally and behaviorally to drift gradually toward the Japanese religious establishment in moderation and non-militance. But it is possible that at some point an element within the membership, if not the president himself, will try to reverse the present course and revitalize the Society through some intra-organizational "Great Cultural Revolution;" perhaps with equally chaotic results.

If no such revitalization occurs, the very process of moderation could go far toward eliminating the Gakkai as a religious force. Assuming that at least certain of the strains which contribute to Gakkai growth, and the social elements relatively subject to them, will continue to exist in the foreseeable future, one may surmise that even if the Gakkai adapts completely to prevalent social and religious norms it will not be able to make major inroads into that part of the populace currently more accustomed to other faiths, while by so adapting it may lose its relevance to the strains which concern only a minority of the people and thus lose its raison d'être. Barring unforeseen economic and political upheaval this latter course of moderation without revitalization seems probable; all of the potentialities for mass behavior, for elite irresponsibility, and for radical changes in size and orientation brought on by economic or political crisis must be fully noted, but insofar as prediction is possible extrapolation of present trends suggests a gradual transformation of the Sokagakkai from a sect into a church.[20]

Another way in which the compromise-cohesion problem could become manifest is in the relationship between the Sokagakkai and the Komeito. The Gakkai insists that the Komeito cannot exist apart from the Society; however, as the politicization of the Gakkai continues it becomes increasingly likely that schisms will appear between adaptation-oriented, politicized compromisers and integration-oriented, religious purists.[21] The explicit contradictions between the exigencies of politics and religion, no matter how skilfully resolved by the two-plane view of existence adopted by the Gakkai, must eventually be faced unless all concerned are able to understand and accept this rather sophisticated resolution.

The possibility of division is increased by the appearance of functionally specialized personnel in the Gakkai and the the Komeito. One may distinguish among the top 20 Gakkai leaders such primarily political figures as Takeiri Yoshikatsu, Tashiro Fujio, Suzuki Kazuhiro, and Ninomiya Bunzo and such primarily religous figures as Kodaira Yoshihei, Morita Kazuya, Nakanishi Haruo, Seiryu Tsutomu, and Harada Tatsuru.[22] Most of the leadership is occupied with both types of roles, but as time passes one may expect further specialization which could reinforce any ideological differences which may appear.

The integration-adaptation problem might appear as a split within the Komeito rather than between the Gakkai and Komeito. Secular and religious wings could develop and divide the party. More likely sources of internal party schism, however, are right-left opposition and non-ideological tactical differences. A right-left bifurcation personified by Takeiri on the right and Yano on the left has been surmised by some observers,[23] but any such split would arise more probably in combination with non-ideological disagreements over tactics than independently. As previously noted, one of the reasons for unity thus far has been the Komeito's success; should failures occur in instances where tactical differences had preceded operational unity one may expect the differences to be more strongly expressed thereafter. The support for Azuma in the 1964 Tokyo gubernatorial election is rumored to have stirred internal opposition which reappeared in 1967 as the force behind an independent Komeito candidate. It is possible also that feelings were irritated by the tactical blunders accompanying the Tokyo ward elections of 1967 and that a degree of rancor persists today.

* * * * * *

This chapter has been largely speculative. Insofar as any internal strains are discernable in the monolithic Sokagakkai they must be largely inferred or recognized as no more than potential. They are intimately related: adaptation, socialization, goal-attainment, and integration must all be managed and overemphasis of any one of these tasks may lead to breakdown of the others. But the primary area of potential stress may be distinguished at least analytically in the relationship of adaptation and integration. This is the process of "routinization" focused upon in the examination of the development of the Sokagakkai (see Chapter 4): the necessity of harmonization with the environment, but not at the cost of organizational and doctrinal identity and integrity; the appearance of ideologically and functionally specific groups; the changes of strategy and tactics necessitated by efforts to broaden appeals and to bring in ever larger numbers of converts and votes; and the integrative problems created by the desire to maintain constant mobilization.

The adaptation-integration problem is most clearly epitomized in the difference between Gakkai and Komeito, a difference reinforced by personal functional specialization. For this reason a division along religious and political lines is most easily imaginable.

Integrative failure might take a form less spectacular than open rift. Excessive adaptation might simply reduce the identity and integrity of the Gakkai to a point at which the Society begins to melt away. More likely is the possibility that familial socialization will prevent such a disintegration, though it will not suffice to maintain large-scale numerical growth. Present internal trends point to increasing institutionalization and moderation such as overtook the

78

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Methodist Church; but whether or not such a process will take place in sufficient conjunction with the development and secularization of the Komeito so as to prevent schism one cannot now know.

NOTES: CHAPTER 26

1. James Dator, "The Soka Gakkai: A Socio-Political Interpretation," in Contemporary Religions in Japan, vol. 6 no. 3, September 1965, pp. 223ff.; Ikado Fujio, "Kyodan Soshiki Ron Josetsu," in Toyo Bunka Kenkyu-jo Kiyo, vol. 34, March 1964, p. 112.

2. Lawrence Olson, "The Value Creation Society," American Universities Field Staff, 1964, p. 22.

3. Komei Shimbun, July 19, 1967; Asahi Shimbun, July 17, 1968.

4. Interview with Ikado Fujio, Religious Affairs Department, Ministry of Education.

5. Richard Niehbur, The Social Sources of Denominationalism, Cleveland, 1957; Benton Johnson, "A Critical Appraisal of the Church-Sect Typology," in American Sociological Review, vol. 22 no. 1, February 1967, p. 88; Harold Pfautz, "The Sociology of Secularization: Religious Groups," in The American Journal of Sociology, vol. 61 no. 2, September 1955, p. 121; Bryan R. Wilson, "An Analysis of Sect Development," in American Sociological Review, vol. 24 no. 1, February 1959, p. 3.

6. Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor, Garden City, 1963, p. 328.

7. Dator, op. cit., pp. 233ff.

8. Yui Hiromichi, Dato Sokagakkai, Fujisawa, 1967, passim; Shin Shukyo Shimbun, autumn 1967, all issues, "Kokuhaku" column.

9. Seikyo Shimbun, August 4, 1967.

10. World Tribune, May 8, 1965.

11. World Tribune, May 21, 1966.

12. Ikada Daisaku, Shido Memo, Tokyo, 1966, p. 132.

13. Kasahara Kazuo, Seiji to Shukyo, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 178-79; 181ff.

14. *Ibid.*, pp. 181ff.; Seikyo Shimbun, July 31, 1967; Saki Akio and Oguchi Iichi, Sokagakkai, Tokyo, 1960, p. 122.

15. World Tribune, December 25, 1965; February 12, 1966.

16. Kasahara, *op. cit.*, pp. 178-79, 181ff.

17. Nakaba Tadakuni, "Sokagakkai Gekido no Shichinen," in Zaikai, May 15, 1967, p. 119.

18. Saki Akio, "Sokagakkai Seinen Shoko no Shogen," in Gendai no Me, vol. 8 no. 2, February 1967, pp. 124-25.

19. Shin Shukyo Shimbun, September 20, 1967.

20. Niehbur, *op. cit.*; Pfautz, *op. cit.*; Johnson, *op. cit.*; Wilson, *op. cit.*

21. Togawa Isamu, Zenshin-suru Komeito, Tokyo, 1966, p. 244; Sokagakkai Kyogaku-bu, Shakubuku Kyoten, Tokyo, 1967 ed., pp. 352, 357; Shiobara Tsutomu, "Sokagakkai Ideorogii," in Tembo, no. 78, June 1965, p. 57.

22. Nakaba, *op. cit.*, October 1, 15, November 1, 1967.

23. Hori Yoshio, "Komeito no kore kara," in Ekonomisuto, vol. 45 no. 9, March 7, 1967, p. 51; "To-Fuku-chiji Hiketsugeki no Butai-ura," in Asahi Janaru, vol. 9 no. 22, May 28, 1967, p. 9.

24. Chugai Nippo, May 9, 1963; Ikado interview; conversation with John K. C. Oh, Marquette University.

APPENDIX 1

RATE OF INCREASE OF SOKAGAKKAI MEMBERSHIP

Year	Absolute Size (in families)	Absolute Increase (in families)	Rate of Increase
	(million)	(million)	(%)
1953	.07		
		.09	130
1954	.16		
		.14	87
1955	.30		
		.08	38
1956	.38		
		.17	45
1957	.55		
		.25	45
1958	.80		
		.25	31
1959	1.05		
		.37	35
1960	1.42		
		.48	34
1961	1.90		
		.47	25
1962	2.37		
		.68 (.58 million)	29 (24%)
1963	3.05		
		.85 (.75 ")	28 (25%)
1964	3.90		
		1.07 (.97 ")	27 (25%)
1965	5.07		
		.37 (.67 ")	7 (13%)
1966	5.44		
		.69	13
1967	6.13		
		.35	6
1968	6.48		

NOTE: Figures in parentheses represent an attempt to prorate the downward revision of membership figures (by 500,000 families) announced in 1966 over four years by subtracting 100,000 families from each of the preceding three years and adding 300,000 to the period 1965-66.

SOURCES: Up to 1955: Saki Akio and Oguchi Iichi, *Sokagakkai*, Tokyo, 1960, p. 211.
"Soka Gakkai and the Nichiren Sho Sect," *Contemporary Religions in Japan*, March 1960, p. 62.

APPENDIX 1 (Continued)

SOURCES: *Up to 1955*:
Takagi Hiroo, *Nihon no Shinko Shukyo*, Tokyo, 1961, p. 71.
Takase Hiroi, *Dai San Bummei no Shukyo*, Tokyo, 1962, p. 171.
Thomsen, Harry, *The New Religions of Japan*, Tokyo, 1963, p. 85.

1955-1963:
Kasahara Kazuo, *Seiji to Shukyo*, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 187, 193, 206.
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1963- :
Japan Times, January 15, 1967.
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Seikyo News, May 19, October 6, November 3, December 2, 1964.
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APPENDIX 1a

GROWTH OF THE SOKAGAKKAI STUDENT DIVISION

Year	Membership
1957	500
1958	1,200
1959	2,000
1960	2,850
1961	6,000
1962	12,000
1963	20,319
1964	51,000
1965	100,000
1966	150,000
1967 (May)	180,000

SOURCE: Seikyo Shimbun, June 30, 1967.

APPENDIX 2

STRUCTURE OF THE SOKAGAKKAI IN 1951


President
Newspaper
Secretariat
Dai Byaku Renge Department
Publishing Department
General Director
Financial Department
Lecture Department
Guidance and Inspection Department
Board of Directors
General Executive
Planning Department
Youth Division
Women's Division
Guidance Department
Local Propa- gation
Chapter Chiefs' Meeting
District Committees
Young Men's Division
Young Women's Division
Chapter Representative
Chapter
District
Periodic Zadankai

SOURCE: KASAHARA KAZUO, Seiji to Shukyo, Tokyo, 1965, p. 43.

APP

STRUCTURE OF THE


President
General Director
General Administrators
Board of Directors
General Executive Bureau
General Editorial Bureau
General Publishing Bureau
General Overseas Bureau
General Liaison Bureau
Public Relations Bureau
Personnel Committee
Study Committee
Pilgrimage Committee
Construction Committee
Press Committee
Overseas Committee
Seikyo Press
Ushio Publishing Company
Theory Dept.(1)
Culture Bureau
(4)
Women's Division
Men's Division
Joint Headquarters
Youth Division
Staff
Study Dept.
Guidance Dept.
Superintendent's Dept.
Financial Dept.
Pilgrimage Dept.
Art Dept.
Science Dept.
Public Opinio
Dept. (3)
Education Dept.
Economics Dept.
Headquarters
Joint Block
Young Men's Division
Young Women's Division
Student Division
High School Division
Junior High Division
Boys' & Girls'
Division

PPENDIX 3

E SOKAGAKKAI AS OF 1967


4)
Institute of Buddhist Philosophy
Institute of Occidental and Oriental Thought
Institute of Politics and Economics
Institute of Oriental Science
Asian People's Association
Institute of Asian Culture
Democratic Music Association
Democratic Drama Association
Fuji Symphonic Orchestra
ion
General Chapter
Chapter
District
Group
Unit
General Block
Major Block
Block
Minor Block
Headquarters
Subdivision
Corps
Company
Group
Unit
Suiko Club (2)
Headquarters
Subdivision
Corps
Ward
Group
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Kayo Club (2)
Subdivision
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Squad
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SOURCE: Adapted from World Tribune, October 3, 1967.

NOTES :
1. Seikyo Shimbun, April 30, 1967.
2. World Tribune, August 14, 1965.
3. Takase Hiroi, Komeito, Tokyo, 1964, p. 315.
4. Sokagakkai Overseas Bureau, "This is the Sokagakkai" series no. 3, Tokyo, undated, pp. 7-8.

APPENDIX

STRUCTURE OF THE


Policy Affairs Bureau
Party Paper Bureau
General Convention of Both Houses of Parliament
Informat Bureau
Advisors
Organiza Burea
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Committee Chairman
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Secretariat
Executiv Bureau
Parliame Assemb Burea
Control Committee
Election Policy Committee
Diet Pol Committ
Local As Commit
Komei Press
Auditors
Komei Magazine

SOURCES: Adapted from Komeito-Clean Government Party, Tokyo, undated; Takase Hiroi, Komeito, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 316-17.

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HE KOMEITO


Foreign Affairs Committee
Administrative Affairs Committee
Economic Affairs Committee
Social and Labor Affairs Committee
Land Development Committee
Nineteen Divisions
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Local Headquarters
Prefectural Assembly League
Chapters
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Prefectural Assemblies
Ward & City Assemblies
Town & Village Assemblies
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Assembly
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International Affairs Bureau
Youth Bureau
Women's Bureau
Student Bureau
Labor Bureau
Public Welfare Bureau
Education Bureau
Medium & Small Enterprise Bureau
Bureau for Agriculture, Forestry & Fisheries

APPENDIX 5

SOKAGAKKAI MEMBERSHIP AND ELECTORAL STRENGTH



SOURCES: See Appendix 1; Sangi-in Jimukyoku; Sangi-in Giin Senkyo Ichiran, Nos. 4-7, Tokyo, 1957, 1960, 1963, 1966; Mainichi Shimbun, July 9, 1968.

APPENDIX 6

KOMEITO SUPPORT AS INDICATED BY PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS



SOURCES:
1. September 1963: Mainichi Shimbun.
2. November 1964: Ibid.
3. February 1965: Naikaku Sori Daijin Kanbo Koho-shitsu, Kenpo ni kansuru Seron Chosa (Nos. 1-10), Tokyo, 1966, p. 140.
4. June 1965: Mainichi Shimbun.
5. March 1966: Yomiuri Shimbun.
6. May 1966: Mainichi Shimbun.
7. March 1967: Yomiuri Shimbun.
8. April 1967: Asahi Shimbun.
9. September 1967: Sidney Verba et al., Cross-National Study of Political and Social Change.

APPENDIX 7

KOMEITO SUPPORT AS INDICATED BY CHUO CHOSA SHA PUBLIC OPINION SURVEYS



SOURCE: Chuo Chosa Sha (Central Research Service), Tokyo.

APPENDIX 8a

UPPER HOUSE ELECTIONS, NATIONAL CONSTITUENCY: SOKAGAKKAI ABSOLUTE VOTE BY PREFECTURE

Prefecture	1956	1959	1962	1965	1968*
Hokkaido	50,471	71,822	141,859	197,250	261,161
	(+21,551:43%)	(+70,037:97%)	(+55,391:39%)	(+63,911:32%)**	
Aomori	11,835	28,373	39,835	51,271	66,942
	(16,538:140)	(11,462:40)	(11,436:29)	(15,671:31)	
Iwate	6,729	19,790	39,022	35,460	49,382
	(13,061:190)	(20,232:102)	(-3,562:-9)	(13,922:39)	
Miyagi	31,944	42,448	60,647	60,465	93,626
	(10,504:33)	(18,199:43)	(-182:--)	(33,161:55)	
Akita	20,910	35,084	50,416	53,443	58,130
	(14,174:68)	(15,332:44)	(3,027:6)	(4,687:9)	
Yamagata	13,531	35,472	50,513	54,451	63,305
	(21,941:162)	(15,041:42)	(3,938:8)	(8,854:16)	
Fukushima	31,558	56,979	68,251	93,117	117,783
	(25,421:81)	(11,273:20)	(24,866:36)	(24,666:27)	
Ibaraki	26,542	57,372	103,109	123,848	136,247
	(30,830:116)	(45,737:80)	(20,739:20)	(12,399:10)	
Tochigi	23,400	40,935	67,072	85,764	100,420
	(17,585:75)	(16,087:39)	(18,692:28	(14,656:17)	
Gumma	35,992	55,888	79,646	87,477	116,718
	(19,696:55)	(23,758:43)	(7,831:10)	(29,241:33)	
Saitama	56,347	72,755	128,241	161,497	229,229
	(16,408:29)	(55,484:76)	(33,256:26)	(67,732:42)	
Chiba	31,740	53,508	125,558	156,092	221,823
	(21,768:67)	(72,450:136)	(30,534:24)	(65,731:42)	
Tokyo	142,553	256,734	493,251	647,378	741,343
	(114,181:79)	(236,517:92)	(134,127:27)	(93,965:15)	
Kanagawa	69,996	133,339	225,228	260,798	375,992
	(63,343:90)	(91,889:68)	(35,570:16)	(115,194:44)	
Niigata	20,819	49,532	80,862	80,999	128,269
	(28,713:138)	(31,330:63)	(137:--)	(47,270:58)	

APPENDIX 8a

UPPER HOUSE ELECTIONS, NATIONAL CONSTITUENCY: SOKAGAKKAI ABSOLUTE VOTE BY PREFECTURE

Prefecture	1956	1959	1962	1965	1968*
Hokkaido	50,471 (+21,551:43%)	71,822 (+70,037:97%)	141,859 (+55,391:39%)	197,250 (+63,911:32%)**	261,161
Aomori	11,835 (16,538:140)	28,373 (11,462:40)	39,835 (11,436:29)	51,271 (15,671:31)	66,942
Iwate	6,729 (13,061:190)	19,790 (20,232:102)	39,022 (-3,562:-9)	35,460 (13,922:39)	49,382
Miyagi	31,944 (10,504:33)	42,448 (18,199:43)	60,647 (-182:--)	60,465 (33,161:55)	93,626
Akita	20,910 (14,174:68)	35,084 (15,332:44)	50,416 (3,027:6)	53,443 (4,687:9)	58,130
Yamagata	13,531 (21,941:162)	35,472 (15,041:42)	50,513 (3,938:8)	54,451 (8,854:16)	63,305
Fukushima	31,558 (25,421:81)	56,979 (11,273:20)	68,251 (24,866:36)	93,117 (24,666:27)	117,783
Ibaraki	26,542 (30,830:116)	57,372 (45,737:80)	103,109 (20,739:20)	123,848 (12,399:10)	136,247
Tochigi	23,400 (17,585:75)	40,935 (16,087:39)	67,072 (18,692:28	85,764 (14,656:17)	100,420
Gumma	35,992 (19,696:55)	55,888 (23,758:43)	79,646 (7,831:10)	87,477 (29,241:33)	116,718
Saitama	56,347 (16,408:29)	72,755 (55,484:76)	128,241 (33,256:26)	161,497 (67,732:42)	229,229
Chiba	31,740 (21,768:67)	53,508 (72,450:136)	125,558 (30,534:24)	156,092 (65,731:42)	221,823
Tokyo	142,553 (114,181:79)	256,734 (236,517:92)	493,251 (134,127:27)	647,378 (93,965:15)	741,343
Kanagawa	69,996 (63,343:90)	133,339 (91,889:68)	225,228 (35,570:16)	260,798 (115,194:44)	375,992
Niigata	20,819 (28,713:138)	49,532 (31,330:63)	80,862 (137:--)	80,999 (47,270:58)	128,269

Prefecture	1956	1959	1962	1965	1968*
Toyama	5,112 (9,613:188)	14,725 (10,624:72)	25,349 (906:4)	26,255 (14,834:56)	41,089
Ishikawa	3,057 (8,192:268)	11,249 (10,114:90)	21,363 (6,561:31)	27,924 (19,779:69)	47,703
Fukui	3,445 (7,364:213)	10,809 (14,379:133)	25,188 (-532:-2)	24,656 (11,997:49)	36,653
Yamanashi	9,945 (8,937:91)	18,882 (12,159:64)	31,151 (6,836:22)	37,987 (14,232:37)	52,219
Nagano	26,265 (23,176:88)	49,441 (35,820:72)	85,261 (8,068:9)	93,329 (35,905:39)	129,233
Gifu	6,452 (22,484:349)	28,936 (39,425:136)	68,361 (38,540:56)	106,901 (28,069:26)	134,970
Shizuoka	51,600 (29,532:57)	81,132 (61,280:76)	142,412 (39,601:28)	182,013 (44,278:24)	226,291
Aichi	24,050 (79,080:328)	103,130 (75,891:74)	179,021 (50,209:28)	229,230 (28,316:12)	257,546
Mie	4,418 (28,052:658)	32,470 (47,385:142)	70,855 (22,453:32)	93,308 (21,847:23)	115,155
Shiga	2,392 (11,299:473)	13,691 (6,408:47)	20,099 (11,170:56)	31,269 (8,707:28)	39,976
Kyoto	19,262 (37,204:193)	56,466 (40,285:85)	87,751 (28,382:32)	116,133 (25,725:22)	141,858
Osaka	69,954 (135,452:194)	205,406 (60,913:30)	266,319 (183,005:69)	449,324 (114,078:25)	563,402
Hyogo	28,968 (89,045:310)	118,013 (93,292:78)	212,405 (759:--)	213,164 (134,719:63)	347,883
Nara	5,399 (22,035:407)	27,434 (6,841:25)	34,285 (27,003:79)	61,288 (5,665:9)	66,953
Wakayama	10,665 (28,322:264)	38,987 (16,142:41)	55,129 (17,267:31)	72,396 (22,786:32)	95,182
Tottori	6,386 (13,586:213)	19,972 (8,098:40)	28,070 (11,031:39)	39,101 (7,086:18)	46,187
Shimane	1,630 (10,651:657)	12,281 (17,677:144)	29,958 (9,351:31)	39,309 (11,016:28)	50,325

Prefecture	1956	1959	1962	1965	1968*
Okayama	25,333	71,434	101,658	127,010	150,281
	(46,101:182)	(30,224:42)	(25,352:25)	(23,271:18)	
Hiroshima	9,581	55,847	109,538	134,016	180,564
	(46,266:484)	(53,691:96)	(24,478:22)	(46,548:35)	
Yamaguchi	2,403	46,708	80,574	88,546	107,271
	(44,305:185)	(33,866:73)	(7,972:10)	(18,725:21)	
Tokushima	1,756	19,249	47,927	49,862	70,863
	(17,493:994)	(28,678:144)	(1,935:4)	(21,001:42)	
Kagawa	5,702	22,121	60,738	56,603	78,394
	(16,419:288)	(38,617:174)	(-4,135:-7)	(21,791:39)	
Ehime	4,898	37,124	74,932	98,494	132,460
	(32,226:658)	(37,808:102)	(23,562:32)	(33,966:35)	
Kochi	11,002	32,398	51,372	50,215	75,630
	(21,396:194)	(18,974:59)	(-1,157:-2)	(25,415:51)	
Fukuoka	46,590	123,140	185,457	176,233	257,032
	(76,550:164)	(62,317:51)	(-9,224:-5)	(80,799:46)	
Saga	3,620	24,727	28,246	28,780	47,601
	(21,107:583)	(3,519:14)	(534:2)	(18,821:65)	
Nagasaki	6,112	47,231	60,887	58,534	80,494
	(41,119:672)	(13,656:29)	(-2,353:-4)	(21,960:38)	
Kumamoto	10,113	54,418	63,028	69,882	94,259
	(44,305:438)	(8,610:16)	(6,854:11)	(24,377:35)	
Oita	2,441	20,256	37,679	45,733	69,028
	(17,815:730)	(17,423:86)	(8,054:22)	(23,295:51)	
Miyazaki	4,572	31,107	40,739	49,130	65,178
	(26,535:580)	(9,635:31)	(8,400:21)	(16,048:33)	
Kagoshima	3,914	47,986	56,545	71,755	94,450
	(44,072:113)	(8,559:18)	(15,210:27)	(22,695:32)	
TOTALS	991,540	2,486,801	4,124,269	5,097,682	6,656,500
	(+1,495,261:143%)	(+1,637,468:35%)	(+973,413:19%)	(+1,558,818:13%)	

SOURCES: Sangi-in Jimukyoku, *Sangi-in Giin Senkyo Ichiran*, Nos. 4-7, Tokyo, 1957, 1960, 1963, 1966.
Mainichi Shimbun, July 9, 1968.

NOTES: * Figures for 1968 are unofficial.
** Figures in parentheses are as follows: (net change in absolute vote from one election to the next: percentage change in absolute vote).

APPENDIX 8b

DISTRIBUTION OF SOKAGAKKAI VOTE IN UPPER HOUSE NATIONAL CONSTITUENCY ELECTIONS, BY PREFECTURE (PERCENTAGE)

Prefecture	1956	1959	1962	1965	1968*
Hokkaido	5.1	2.9 (-2.2)	3.4 (.5)	3.9 (.5)	3.9
Aomori	1.2	1.1 (- .1)	1.0 (- .1)	1.0	1.0
Iwate	.7	.8 (.1)	1.0 (.2)	.7 (- .3)	.7
Miyagi	3.2	1.7 (-1.5)	1.5 (- .2)	1.2 (- .3)	1.4 (.2)
Akita	2.1	1.4 (- .7)	1.2 (- .2)	1.0 (- .2)	.9 (- .1)
Yamagata	1.4	1.4	1.2 (- .2)	1.1 (- .1)	1.0 (- .1)
Fukushima	3.2	2.3 (- .9)	1.7 (- .6)	1.8 (.1)	1.8
Ibaraki	2.7	2.3 (- .4)	2.5 (.2)	2.4 (- .1)	2.0 (- .4)
Tochigi	2.4	1.7 (- .4)	1.5 (- .2)	1.7 (.2)	1.5 (- .2)
Gumma	3.6	2.3 (-1.3)	1.9 (- .4)	1.7 (- .2)	1.8 (.1)
Saitama	5.6	2.9 (-2.7)	3.1 (.2)	3.2 (.1)	3.4 (.2)
Chiba	3.2	2.1 (-1.1)	3.0 (.9)	3.1 (.1)	3.3 (.2)
Tokyo	14.4	10.3 (-4.1)	11.9 (1.6)	12.7 (.8)	11.1 (-1.6)
Kanagawa	7.1	5.4 (-1.7)	5.5 (.1)	5.1 (- .4)	5.6 (.5)
Niigata	2.1	2.0 (- .1)	2.0	1.6 (- .4)	1.9 (.3)
Toyama	.5	.7 (.2)	.6 (- .1)	.5 (- .1)	.6 (.1)
Ishikawa	.3	.5 (.2)	.5	.5	.7 (.2)
Fukui	.3	.4 (.1)	.6 (.2)	.5 (- .1)	.6 (.1)
Yamanashi	1.0	.8 (- .2)	.8	.7 (- .1)	.8 (.1)
Nagano	2.7	2.0 (- .7)	2.1 (.1)	1.8 (- .3)	1.9 (.1)
Gifu	.7	1.2 (.5)	1.6 (.4)	2.1 (.5)	2.0 (- .1)
Shizuoka	5.2	3.3 (-1.9)	3.4 (.1)	3.6 (.2)	3.4 (- .2)
Aichi	2.4	4.1 (1.7)	4.3 (.2)	4.5 (.2)	3.9 (- .6)
Mie	.4	1.3 (.9)	1.7 (.4)	1.8 (.1)	1.7 (- .1)
Shiga	.2	.6 (.4)	.5 (- .1)	.6 (.1)	.6
Kyoto	1.9	1.9	2.1 (.2)	2.3 (.2)	2.1 (- .2)
Osaka	7.1	8.3 (1.2)	6.4 (-1.9)	8.8 (2.4)	8.5 (- .3)
Hyogo	2.9	4.8 (1.9)	5.2 (.4)	4.2 (-1.0)	5.2 (.1)
Nara	.5	1.1 (.6)	.8 (- .3)	1.2 (.4)	1.0 (- .2)
Wakayama	1.1	1.6 (.5)	1.3 (- .3)	1.4 (.1)	1.4

Prefecture	1956	1959	1962	1965	1968*
Tottori	.6	.8 (.2)	.7 (- .1)	.8 (.1)	.7 (- .1)
Shimane	.2	.5 (.3)	.7 (.2)	.8 (.1)	.8
Okayama	2.6	2.9 (.3)	2.5 (- .4)	2.5	2.3 (- .2)
Hiroshima	1.0	2.3 (1.3)	2.7 (.4)	2.6 (- .1)	2.7 (.1)
Yamaguchi	.2	1.9 (1.7)	1.9	1.7 (- .2)	1.6 (- .1)
Tokushima	.2	.8 (.6)	1.2 (.4)	1.0 (- .2)	1.1 (.1)
Kagawa	.6	.9 (.3)	1.5 (.6)	1.1 (- .4)	1.2 (.1)
Ehime	.5	1.5 (1.0)	1.8 (.3)	1.9 (.1)	2.0 (.1)
Kochi	1.1	1.3 (.2)	1.2 (- .1)	1.0 (- .2)	1.1 (.1)
Fukuoka	4.7	4.9 (.2)	4.5 (- .4)	3.5 (-1.0)	3.9 (.4)
Saga	.4	1.0 (.6)	.7 (- .3)	.6 (- .1)	.7 (.1)
Nagasaki	.6	1.9 (1.3)	1.5 (- .4)	1.1 (- .4)	1.2 (.1)
Kumamoto	1.0	2.2 (1.2)	1.5 (- .7)	1.4 (- .1)	1.4
Oita	.2	.8 (.6)	.9 (.1)	.9	1.0 (.1)
Miyazaki	.5	1.2 (.7)	1.0 (- .2)	1.0	1.0
Kagoshima	.4	1.9 (1.5)	1.4 (- .5)	1.4	1.4
TOTAL SOKAGAKKAI VOTE:	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

SOURCES: Sangi-in Jimukyoku, Sangi-in Giin Senkyo Ichiran, Nos. 4-7, Tokyo, 1957, 1960, 1963, 1966.
Mainichi Shimbun, July 9, 1968.

NOTES: * Figures for 1968 are unofficial.
Figures in parentheses represent net change in percentage from preceding election.

APPENDIX 8c

SOKAGAKKAI VOTE IN UPPER HOUSE NATIONAL CONSTITUENCY ELECTIONS AS PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE,* BY PREFECTURE

Prefecture	1956	1959	1962	1965	1968**
Hokkaido	3.5 (+1.6=)	5.1 (+2.5=)	7.6 (+3.2=)	10.8 (+2.0=)	12.8
Aomori	3.3 (+3.9=)	7.2 (+1.3=)	8.5 (+1.6=)	10.1 (+2.8=)	12.9
Iwate	1.5 (+2.7=)	4.2 (+2.5=)	6.7 (-1.0=)	5.7 (+2.8=)	8.5
Miyagi	5.9 (+1.6=)	7.5 (+1.2=)	8.7	8.7 (+4.4=)	13.1
Akita	4.4 (+3.0=)	7.4 (+1.1=)	8.5 (+ .4=)	8.9 (+1.9=)	10.8
Yamagata	2.4 (+4.0=)	6.4 (+1.4=)	7.8 (+ .8=)	8.6 (+2.0=)	10.6
Fukushima	4.1 (+3.5=)	7.6 (- .1=)	7.5 (+2.9=)	10.4 (+2.5=)	12.9
Ibaraki	4.5 (+4.0=)	8.5 (+4.8=)	13.3 (+2.5=)	15.8 (+1.9=)	17.7
Tochigi	4.7 (+3.7=)	8.0 (+3.1=)	11.1 (+2.3=)	13.4 (+1.7=)	15.1
Gumma	6.0 (+2.5=)	8.5 (+3.0=)	11.5 (+ .8=)	12.3 (+3.0=)	15.3
Saitama	7.8 (+1.9=)	9.7 (+3.4=)	13.1 (+1.7=)	14.8 (+3.8=)	18.6
Chiba	5.2 (+2.1=)	7.3 (+6.7=)	14.0 (+2.3=)	16.3 (+3.3=)	19.6
Tokyo	6.8 (+3.2=)	10.0 (+3.4=)	13.4 (+2.5=)	15.9 (+ .4=)	15.5
Kanagawa	8.6 (+5.0=)	13.6 (+2.2=)	15.8 (+ .5=)	16.3 (+2.5=)	18.8
Niigata	2.6 (+3.0=)	5.6 (+2.4=)	8.0 (- .5=)	7.5 (+4.0=)	11.5
Toyama	1.3 (+2.5=)	3.8 (+1.8=)	5.6	5.6 (+2.5=)	8.1
Ishikawa	.8 (+1.7=)	2.5 (+2.6=)	5.1 (+1.3=)	6.4 (+3.1=)	9.5
Fukui	1.1 (+2.3=)	3.4 (+3.1=)	6.5 (- .1=)	6.4 (+3.5=)	9.9
Yamanashi	3.4 (+2.4=)	5.8 (+3.0=)	8.8 (+1.6=)	10.4 (+4.5=)	14.9
Nagano	.3 (+5.7=)	6.0 (+2.7=)	8.7 (+1.2=)	9.9 (+3.9=)	13.8
Gifu	1.2 (+3.9=)	5.1 (+4.4=)	9.5 (+4.4=)	13.9 (+1.3=)	15.2
Shizuoka	5.5 (+2.2=)	7.7 (+3.7=)	11.0 (+3.4=)	14.4 (+1.5=)	15.9
Aichi	2.1 (+6.0=)	8.1 (+2.5=)	10.6 (+1.9=)	12.5 (+ .9=)	13.4
Mie	.8 (+5.3=)	6.1 (+4.7=)	10.8 (+3.2=)	14.0 (+2.7=)	16.7
Shiga	.8 (+3.7=)	4.5 (+1.0=)	5.5 (+3.0=)	8.5 (+1.6=)	10.1
Kyoto	3.6 (+4.0=)	7.6 (+4.0=)	11.6 (+2.4=)	14.0 (+1.5=)	15.5
Osaka	5.5 (+8.8=)	14.3 (-1.7=)	12.6 (+6.1=)	18.7 (+1.2=)	19.9
Hyogo	2.6 (+7.5=)	10.1 (+4.0=)	14.1 (+1.4=)	12.7 (+5.9=)	18.6
Nara	2.1 (+7.6=)	9.7 (+ .1=)	9.8 (+7.7=)	17.5 (- .2=)	17.3
Wakayama	3.0 (+7.6=)	10.6 (+1.8=)	12.4 (+3.9=)	16.3 (+4.1=)	20.4

Prefecture	1956	1959	1962	1965	1968**
Tottori	2.6 (+4.9=)	7.5 (+2.1=)	9.6 (+3.6=)	13.2 (+2.7=)	15.9
Shimane	.4 (+2.8=)	3.2 (+3.4=)	6.6 (+2.4=)	9.0 (+2.9=)	11.9
Okayama	4.1 (+6.5=)	10.6 (+3.1=)	13.7 (+3.7=)	17.4 (+1.6=)	19.0
Hiroshima	1.3 (+5.4=)	6.7 (+4.8=)	11.5 (+2.1=)	13.6 (+4.0=)	17.6
Yamaguchi	.4 (+7.2=)	7.6 (+4.2=)	11.8 (+1.5=)	13.3 (+2.3=)	15.6
Tokushima	.8 (+5.7=)	6.5 (+7.3=)	13.8 (+ .3=)	14.1 (+6.4=)	20.5
Kagawa	1.6 (+4.1=)	5.7 (+8.2=)	13.9 (- .4=)	13.5 (+6.6=)	20.1
Ehime	1.0 (+5.3=)	6.3 (+5.4=)	11.7 (+3.1=)	14.8 (+5.7=)	20.5
Kochi	3.7 (+4.6=)	8.3 (+4.0=)	12.3 (+ .1=)	12.4 (+7.8=)	20.2
Fukuoka	4.1 (+5.1=)	9.2 (+2.8=)	12.0 (= .6=)	11.4 (+3.6=)	15.0
Saga	1.0 (+6.1=)	6.5 (+ .9=)	7.4 (+ .2=)	7.6 (+4.4=)	12.0
Nagasaki	1.2 (+&.1=)	8.3 (+1.5=)	9.8	9.8 (+3.1=)	12.9
Kumamoto	1.6 (+6.1=)	7.7 (+1.0=)	8.7 (+1.0=)	9.7 (+3.2=)	12.9
Oita	.5 (+3.4=)	3.9 (+3.2=)	7.1 (+1.6=)	8.7 (+4.2=)	12.9
Miyazaki	1.1 (+6.1=)	7.2 (+1.9=)	9.1 (+1.5=)	10.6 (+3.3=)	13.9
Kagoshima	.6 (+5.6=)	6.2 (+ .9=)	7.1 (+1.9=)	9.0 (+2.9=)	11.9
SOKAGAKKAI PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL VOTE:	3.5%(+5.0=)	8.5%(+3.0=)	11.5%(+2.2=)	13.7%(+1.8=)	15.5%

SOURCES: Sangi-in Jimukyoku, Sangi-in Giin Senkyo Ichiran, Nos. 4-7, Tokyo, 1957, 1960, 1963, 1966.
Mainichi Shimbun, July 9, 1968.

NOTES: * Figures in parentheses represent net change in percentage from preceding election.
** Figures for 1968 are unofficial.

APPENDIX 8d

CONCENTRATION OF SOKAGAKKAI VOTE IN 12 URBAN PREFECTURES IN UPPER HOUSE NATIONAL CONSTITUENCY ELECTIONS

	Percentage of Total Sokagakkai Vote from Each Prefecture				
Prefecture	1956	1959	1962	1965	1968*
Saitama	5.6%	2.9%	3.1%	3.2%	3.4%
Chiba	3.2	2.1	3.0	3.1	3.3
Tokyo	14.4	10.3	11.9	12.7	11.1
Kanagawa	7.1	5.4	5.5	5.1	5.6
Shizuoka	5.2	3.3	3.4	3.6	3.4
Aichi	2.4	4.1	4.3	4.5	3.9
Kyoto	1.9	1.9	2.1	2.3	2.1
Osaka	7.1	8.3	6.4	8.8	8.5
Hyogo	2.9	4.8	5.2	4.2	5.2
Okayama	4.1	2.9	2.5	2.5	2.3
Hiroshima	1.3	2.3	2.7	2.6	2.7
Fukuoka	4.1	4.9	4.5	3.5	3.9
TOTAL	59.3%	53.2%	54.6%	56.1%	55.4%
Percent of total national electorate in these prefectures:	45.2%	46.4%	48.6%	50.7%	No data
Percent of total national vote from these prefectures:	40.7%	42.8%	45.8%	47.6%	50.3%

SOURCES: Sangi-in Jimukyoku, Sangi-in Giin Senkyo Ichiran, Nos. 4-7, Tokyo, 1957, 1960, 1963, 1966.
Mainichi Shimbun, July 9, 1968.

NOTE: * Figures for 1968 are unofficial.

APPENDIX 9

The Upper House of the Japanese Diet is elected through two electoral systems. Of the 250 members, 150 are elected from local election districts throughout the nation, while the remaining 100 are elected from the nation at large. The term of office is 6 years; every 3 years approximately 75 seats in the local constituencies and 50 seats in the national constituency are contested in Upper House elections.

The voting procedure is as follows: every voter casts 2 votes--one for a candidate in his local constituency and one for one of the names on a single list of all of the candidates in the national constituency. The total vote of each of the national-constituency candidates is tallied and the 50 candidates having the highest totals are the winners.

For those parties or organizations who put up more than one candidate in the national constituency, organization of the vote is crucial. If the first choice of all of the supporters of a given party is the same person, then that person will get all of the vote which the party can command nationwide and all of the party's other candidates will lose.

Therefore, a party, to maximize its political power in terms of legislative seats, should calculate the total vote which it thinks it can command nationwide and the geographical distribution of this vote, calculate what it thinks will be the minimum vote necessary to finish in the top 50, and instruct the supporters of the party to vote for the various candidates in such numbers as to maximize the number of probable winners, given the party's probable total vote. Failure to communicate effectively with the supporters may result in a case such as the above, where all vote for one; even if some discipline is possible, voters who vote for the "wrong" candidate may not help him at all, if he has already mobilized enough votes to guarantee himself a seat, while it may hurt the candidate for whom the party wishes the voter in question to vote.

The Sokagakkai's strategy in this situation is to divide the nation into zones, one for each national-constituency Komeito candidate, on the basis of (a) the estimated minimum winning vote and (b) the estimated number of Komeito voters living in each zone. Then Gakkai members in each zone are instructed to vote for a given candidate. The success with which the Gakkai has pursued this strategy is illustrated by the results of the Upper House election of 1965. The Komeito put up 9 candidates in the national constituency; all were successful and the candidates drew the **major portion of their respective votes as follows:**

Of 490,000 votes cast for Harada Tatsuru, 457,000 (93%) came from zone 1.
Of 633,000 votes cast for Yamada Tetsuichi, 550,000 (87%) came from zone 2.
Of 461,000 votes cast for Nakao Tatsuyoshi, 432,000 (94%) came from zone 3.
Of 593,000 votes cast for Yaoi Hidehiko, 550,000 (93%) came from zone 4.
Of 594,000 votes cast for Kodaira Yoshihei, 562,000 (95%) came from zone 5.


Hokkaido
Aomori
Iwate
Akita
9
Miyagi
Yamagata
Fukushima
Niigata
6
Tochigi
Ibaraki
Ishikawa
Gumma
8
Saitama
Toyama
Nagano
Tokyo
Yamanashi
Chiba
Fukui
Gifu
7
5
Aichi
Shizuoka
Kanagawa
Kyoto
3
Shiga
Tottori
Osaka
Hyogo
Mie
Shimane
2
Okayama
4
Nara
Wakayama
Hiroshima
Tokushima
3
Kagawa
Ehime
Kochi
Yamaguchi
Fukuoka
Oita
Saga
1
Nagasaki
Kumamoto
Miyazaki
Kagoshima

Of 486,000 votes cast for Kuroyanagi Akira, 461,000 (95%) came from zone 6.
Of 705,000 votes cast for Kashiwabara Yasu, 607,000 (86%) came from zone 7.
Of 636,000 votes cast for Tada Shogo, 578,000 (91%) came from zone 8.
Of 500,000 votes cast for Miyazaki Masayoshi, 479,000 (96%) came from zone 9.

APPENDIX 10

SOKAGAKKAI PERFORMANCE IN UPPER HOUSE ELECTIONS

Election of:	1956	1959	1962	1965	1968
Seats contested:	c. 125	c. 125	c. 125	c. 125	c. 125
Sokagakkai* candidates:	6	6	9	14	14
Candidates elected:	3	6	9	11	13
Percent of Candidates elected:	50%	100%	100%	79%	93%
Seats held by Sokagakkai:	3	9	15	20	24
Percent of total seats** held by Sokagakkai:	1.2%	3.5%	6%	8%	9.6%
Change in number of Sokagakkai seats:	+3	+6	+6	+5	+4

NOTES: * "Sokagakkai" comprehends Koseiren and Komeito.
** Total of 250 seats in Upper House, half contested every 3 years.

SOURCES: Sangi-in Jimukyoku, Sangi-in Giin Senkyo Ichiran, Nos. 4-7, Tokyo, 1957, 1960, 1963, 1966.
Mainichi Shimbun, July 9, 1968.

APPENDIX 11

SOKAGAKKAI PERFORMANCE IN LOWER HOUSE ELECTION OF 1967

Seats contested:	486
Komeito candidates:	32
Candidates elected:	25
Percent of candidates elected:	78%
Seats held by Komeito:	25
Percent of total seats held by Komeito:	5.1%
Total vote:*	45,996,561
Komeito vote:*	2,472,371
Komeito share of total vote:*	5.4%

NOTES: * Unofficial figures.

SOURCE: _Asahi Shimbun_, January 31, 1967.

APPENDIX 12

TOTAL SOKAGAKKAI STRENGTH IN LOCAL LEGISLATURES

Elections of:*	1955	1959	1963	1967
Seats contested:**	56,524	45,735	45,867	42,963
Sokagakkai candidates:	54	304	842	1249
Candidates elected:	53	272	824	1108
Percent of Candidates elected:	98%	89%	98%	89%
Seats held by Sokagakkai:	53	272	824 (1087)***	--**** (1937)***
Percent of contested seats won by Sokagakkai:	.1%	.6%	1.8%	--****
Change in number of Sokagakkai seats:	+53	+219	+552	--****

NOTES:

* Elections for nearly all local administrative units held in same month.

** Decreases in seats contested due to amalgamation of local administrative units.

*** Figures in parentheses are interim totals (of April 1963 and November 1967) produced by by-elections.

**** No data yet available.

SOURCES:

Column 1: Takase Hiroi, Komeito, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 320-21; Jichicho, Senkyokyoku, Chiho Senkyo Kekka Shirabe, Tokyo, 1955.

Column 2: Jichisho, Senkyokyoku, Chiho Senkyo Kekka Shirabe, 1959.

Column 3: Takase, loc. cit.

Column 4: Jiji Tsushinsha, Jiji Nenkan, 1968 ed., Tokyo, 1968, pp. 267-9.

Interim Totals: Nakaba Tadakuni, Nihon no Choryu: Sokagakkai Hatten no Ayumi, Tokyo, 1968, pp. 308-09.

APPENDIX 13

SOKAGAKKAI PERFORMANCE IN PREFECTURAL* ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

Election of:	1959	1963	1967
Seats contested:	2537	2568	2605
Sokagakkai candidates:	4	40	94
Candidates elected:	3	39	84
Percent of candidates elected:	75%	97%	89%
Seats held by Sokagakkai:	3	39	84
Percent of total seats held by Sokagakkai:	.1%	1.5%	3.2%
Change in number of Sokagakkai seats:	+3	+36	+45
Total vote:	35,939,447	36,050,710	35,000,000**
Sokagakkai vote:	60,467***	615,118	1,210,905
Sokagakkai share of total vote:	.2%	1.7%	3.5%
Change in Sokagakkai vote (absolute):	---	+554,651	+595,787
Change in Sokagakkai vote (percent):	---	+918%	+97%

NOTES:
* Do-fu-ken only, Tokyo excluded.
** Unofficial figure.
*** Source: Memo from Akiyama Tomiya to the author, May 20, 1968.

SOURCES:
Column 1: Asahi Shimbun, April 17, 1959.
Takase Hiroi, Komeito, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 320-21.
Jichisho, Senkyokyoku, Chiho Senkyo Kekka Shirabe, Tokyo, 1959.
Column 2: Takase, loc. cit.
Jichisho, Senkyokyoku, Chiho Senkyo Kekka Shirabe, Tokyo, 1963.
Column 3: Asahi Shimbun, February 10, April 15 & 17, 1967.

APPENDIX 14

SOKAGAKKAI PERFORMANCE IN TOKYO METROPOLITAN ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

Election of:	1955	1959	1963	1965
Seats contested:	120	120	120	120
Sokagakkai candidates:	1	11	17	23
Candidates elected:	1	3	17	23
Percent of candidates elected:	100%	27%	100%	100%
Seats held by Sokagakkai:	1	3	17	23
Percent of total seats held by Sokagakkai:	.8%	2.5%	14.2%	19.2%
Change in number of Sokagakkai seats:	+1	+2	+14	+6
Total vote:	2,669,321	3,415,950	3,944,040	3,900,000
Sokagakkai vote:	19,312*	144,251*	413,826	506,706
Sokagakkai share of total vote:	.7%	4.2%	10.5%	13.3%
Change in Sokagakkai vote (absolute):	---	+124,939	+269,575	+92,880
Change in Sokagakkai vote (percent):	---	648%	187%	22%

NOTES: * Source: Memo from Akiyama Tomiya to the author, May 20, 1968.

SOURCES: Column 1: Jichicho, Senkyokyoku, _Chiho Senkyo Kekka Shirabe_, Tokyo, 1955.
Takase Hiroi, _Komeito_, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 320-21.
Column 2: Takase, _loc. cit_.
Asahi Shimbun, April 25, 1959.
Jichisho, Senkyokyoku, _Chiho Senkyo Kekka Shirabe_, Tokyo, 1959.
Column 3: Jichisho, Senkyokyoku, _Chiho Senkyo Kekka Shirabe_, Tokyo, 1963.
Takase, _loc. cit_.
Column 4: Kasahara Kazuo, _Seiji to Shukyo_, Tokyo, 1965, pp. 279-80.

APPENDIX 15

SOKAGAKKAI PERFORMANCE IN CITY* ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

Election of:	1955	1959	1963	1967
Seats contested:	9034	10,507	12,090	12,020
Sokagakkai candidates:	21	215	640	953
Candidates elected:	20	192	623	900
Percent of candidates elected:	95%	89%	97%	94%
Seats held by Sokagakkai:	20	192	623(716)**	900(1186)
Percent of contested seats won by Sokagakkai:	.2%	1.8%	5.2%	7.1%
Change in number of Sokagakkai seats:	+20	+172	+431	+277
Total vote:	14,725,487	18,347,034	20,587,248	___***
Sokagakkai vote:	39,000****	378,127****	1,325,134	2,301,963****
Sokagakkai share of total vote:	.3%	2.1%	6.4%	___***
Change in Sokagakkai vote (absolute):	---	+339,127	+947,007	976,829****
Change in Sokagakkai vote (percent):	---	+870%	+250%	+73%

Notes:
* Including the "five largest cities."
** Figures in parentheses are interim totals (of April 1963 and November 1967) produced by by-elections.
*** No data yet available.
**** Source: Memo from Akiyama Tomiya to the author, May 20, 1968.

SOURCES: Column 1: Jichicho, Senkyokyoku, *Chiho Senkyo Kekka Shirabe*, Tokyo, 1955.
Takase Hiroi, *Komeito*, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 320-21.
Column 2: Takase, *loc. cit.*
Jichisho, Senkyokyoku, *Chiho Senkyo Kekka Shirabe*, Tokyo, 1959.
Asahi Shimbun, April 30, 1959.
Column 3: Takase, *loc. cit.*
Column 4: *Asahi Shimbun*, February 13, April 17 & 28, 1967.
Japan Times, May 2, 1967.
Interim totals: Nakaba Tadakuni, *Nihon no Choryu: Sokagakkai Hatten no Ayumi*, Tokyo, 1968, pp. 308-09.

APPENDIX 16

SOKAGAKKAI PERFORMANCE IN TOKYO WARD ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS

Election of:	1955	1959	1963	1967
Seats contested:	938	970	1,021	1,039
Sokagakkai candidates:	32	74	136	202
Candidates elected:	32	74	136	124
Percent of candidates elected:	100%	100%	100%	61%
Seats held by Sokagakkai:	32	74	136	124(131)*
Percent of contested seats won by Sokagakkai:	3.3%	8%	13%	12%
Change in number of Sokagakkai seats:	+32	+42	+62	-12
Total vote:	2,287,602	2,752,468	2,844,385	---**
Sokagakkai vote:	59,422***	170,118***	335,385	463,987
Sokagakkai share of total vote:	2.6%	6.2%	11.8%	___**
Change in Sokagakkai vote (absolute):	---	+110,696	+165,732	+129,137
Change in Sokagakkai vote (percent):	---	187%	98%	39%

NOTES:
* Figures in parentheses are interim total (in November 1967) produced by by-elections.
** No data yet available.
*** Source: Memo from Akiyama Tomiya to the author, May 20, 1968.

SOURCES:
Column 1: Takase Hiroi, Komeito, Tokyo, 1964, pp. 320-21.
Jichicho, Senkyokyoku, Chiho Senkyo Kekka Shirabe, Tokyo, 1955.
Column 2: Takase, loc. cit.
Jichisho, Senkyokyoku, Chiho Senkyo Kekka Shirabe, Tokyo, 1959.
Asahi Shimbun, April 30, 1959.
Column 3: Takase, loc. cit.
Column 4: Asahi Shimbun, April 14 & 18, 1967.
Komei Shimbun, May 3, 1967.
Interim total: Nakaba Tadakuni, Nihon no Choryu: Sokagakkai Hatten no Ayumi, Tokyo, 1968, pp. 308-09.

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